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Care to name those "decisive" defeats? For the ground warfare, only the surrender of the Stalingrad pocket could be classified as decisive, but that's actually more a 1942 than 1943 thing. What about the air?I just don't see this Dave.
1943 had already proved Russia could take on defeat German arms on the ground in the air decisively, despite occasional - and rare - German tactical successes
Wrong, not only was not "vastly greater", but actually smaller. Only in 1945 the Soviet GDP would become greater, for obvious reasons.Russian industrial output is simply vastly greater than Germany's by 1944 I can see no way the western powers (in this twilight vision) could ever supply Germany fast enough to make much difference to the coming Russian steam-roller which is fast gathering pace.
(and at their peak they only fielded 520 or some of them in Sept 1944).
520 Panthers at peak says it all.
Germans outproducing Soviets? In 1944? Mate you better check your references. In fact I would like you to give list of sources to support your claim.
As for massive foreign aid... The percentual share of Land-Lease in overall amount of arms and equipment used by the Soviets in 1941-1945:
- firearms: 0,8 %
- artillery and mine-throwers: 1,8 %
- tanks and self propelled guns: around 12, 1%
- aircraft: around 15 %
- motor vehicles (all categories): 32%
Source: ''Great Patriotic War Book of Loses - Secrets Revealed'' by group of Russian authors
Regarding the Land-Lease I want to be perfectly clear (as I was before in similar discussions on the forum). This was valuable aid to the Soviet war effort, but by no means decisive.
Care to name those "decisive" defeats? For the ground warfare, only the surrender of the Stalingrad pocket could be classified as decisive, but that's actually more a 1942 than 1943 thing. What about the air?
Wrong, not only was not "vastly greater", but actually smaller.
That's ridiculous, as they have more than that (655) by 10 June 1944, and only on the Western Front.
Don't think it says all, but says a lot...
No, not by a long shot.Well Kursk has to stand out as the single greatest disaster that saw Germany permanently on the defensive losing the initiative in the east, no
That's great. Of course, I could compare the soviet production of submarines against Germany's, and conclude that the "industrial output" of the SU was "vastly inferior", but that would be equally ridiculous. Fact is, partly to LL, the soviets were able to focus more in "military" products, but it is impossible to separate civilian of military production during a war, as most of the latter is essential to achieve the former.The feel free to show me the factory pouring out tanks at the same rate as the T 34 alone (nevermind the rest).
If you want to talk about aircraft production then the Il 2 tops any best numbers the Germans make.
That number (actually 522) I guess comes from Jentz (great source), but I suspect that the figures for the June or July should be higher, as there was not much action then. But he didn't gave the figures for the months of June, July and August, so I can't be sure.Actually is it not.
I should have been clearer, 520 was the peak number servicable available at any one time on the eastern front
(this is all supposed to relate to the EF, right?)
Yes I know the number is from Wiki but it is referenced.
Clausewitz said war is a expression of politics by other means. You really can't separate war and politics, particuliarly in a democracy.Tyrod - I don't think the post made any reference to political issues. It simply posed that the powerful Soviet Union could either be defeated or prevail against combined Germany, Commonwealth and US armies. Politically speaking Hitler and Nazi Party would be gone as minimum conditions..
No, not by a long shot.
That's great. Of course, I could compare the soviet production of submarines against Germany's, and conclude that the "industrial output" of the SU was "vastly inferior", but that would be equally ridiculous.
what do you think it would happen with all those Panthers on other fronts, if the Germans are only fighting the USSR?
Kursk was no disaster for the Germans (unless one think that a successful conclusion of the offensive would have serious consequences for the war in the East-I don't). The losses were not that great for them, and the ratio against the Soviet's was in line with have been so far (much bigger for the the Red Army), so it didn't have any consequences on the overall balance of forces. The front also did not change. So it can't be considered as "decisive", unless only by what could have been the result of a German victory. But this is mere speculation.Well we'll agree to disagree on that.
In my view Kursk illustrated the EF writ large.
Russia could easily absorb afford the losses Germany couldn't.
The 'only win with the help of General winter' war specialists had become masters of the summer war.
Like I said Germany could still enjoy occasional relief through periodic small scale tactical 'wins' but never anything significant and strategic after that point.
The initiative was lost never to return.
In 1943 (and it is debateable whether in fact the looming catastrophic loss was blindingly obvious from winter 1941).
Fair? depends on what one wants to prove with that. Countries adapts their production on their needs. Germany needed a lot of submarines, Soviets don't. But if you want to play in this silly scenario, you can't argue that, with the changed conditions, the aims of the production of Germany would be the same.So, are you saying the specifics of tank production, artilliary combat aircraft do not make fair comparison?
Surely they especially are about as utterly relevant as it gets to the EF (whereas U-boat production is not).
In 1944/45?
They be swept away by the tide of Russian armour.
A total of 6,000 Panthers verses 50 000+ T 34's alone......nevermind the J/IS2s, the Su's etc etc?
I think the Red army would be in for a serious round of hurt courtesy of the Allied GA effort, which had great success in tearing the Germans apart....I would pose a notion that major ground offensives if not successful initially because of the Soviet ground capability, would be succesful by virtue of forcing Soviets to account for invasion from the east beyond that allocated for Japan - and in fact would be vulnerable to invasion from the east by the western Allies. I would further pose that once the combined western allies gained control of the air that Soviet mobility would be greatly hampered to point of being vulnerable to major attacks on the ground from the west...
The real ratio, IIRC, between Soviet/German AFV production, was less than two to one.
Clausewitz said war is a expression of politics by other means. You really can't separate war and politics, particuliarly in a democracy.
If you can get the people to swallow having Germany as a ally, why not Japan too. Japan wasn't exactly best buddies with Russia, i'm sure they'd be delighted to help.
After taking on Germany as a ally after their excesses in western Europe, why would there be any difference in just accepting Japan too?
Technically, any speculation/discussion/hypothetical scenarios that deviate from what actually happened can be considered totally unrealistic.The concept of this thread is totally unrealistic. The origional concept sprang from Himmlers mind, what else needs to be said.