The New Eastern Front

[tyrodtom]

I think they should have concentrated more on the Me262, Ta152, Panther, maybe the V1 , forget the Me163, He162, V2,and Tiger.
They needed to start making a difference in late 43 or early 44. If they could have delayed D-Day, or turned it back. How long would it be before the Allies could try it again.
They were running out of fuel and men to man whatever weapons they developed, their only chance was a cease fire with the allies, before the shortages paralized them. Which might be possibly IF they vacated all invaded territory.

 

[Siegfried]

The research projects (whether you include V-2, Ta 152, etc, in that category) did nothing to really detract from FW 190 or Me 109 mod changes and production. Yet, the 190s and 109s were getting whacked with aircraft equal or better in quality and overwhelmed in skilled resources.

What did you have in mind?

The Germans were faced with the same kind of problems the USAAF was in deciding to introduce the P-38K or the RAF with trying to introduce a Sptifire VIII (with its better tankage and retractable tail wheel and taller fin) over the IX or improved versions with better radiators. For instance the Me 109K1 was ready for production just after the second half of 1943. It incorporated smoothed over and reconfigured cowling guns, a restoration of the retractable tail yoke that reduced drag and by virtue of its greater extension finally solved the ground looping problem, a taller tail that introduced a balance tab to replace the horn balance and raised Mach limit from 'around' 0.75 to about 0.80. So a Mach limit increase of about 0.05 and a level speed increase of about 12mph would have been possible by late 1943 in reasonable numbers. In fact the smooth cowling and retractable tail yoke should never have been lost since they were features of the Me 109F. Achievable improvements in construction quality would have achieved 6 mph more. Some of the test reports are on the Kurfurst site.

What actually happened was that these features came into production into service in October 1944 instead of October 1943 in the Me 109K4. These features certainly would have been usefull to those Luftwaffe pilots facing the stunning new P-51B at the end of 1943. When the more powerfull water injected engines and engines with enlarged superchargers became available in March/April 44 they could have been incorporated into the Me 109K1 airframes and produced an aircraft in the 430mph class. As it was the new engines went into what were essentially Me 109G6 airframes. I can't see more than 2 weeks disruption to production lines chosen for the upgrade plus a complication in spare parts.

The Panther by the time of the Normandy invasion (Ausf A came after Ausf D) was fairly reliable. The notorious final drive problem was caused by the use of straight cut gears as opposed to herringbone gears which engage several teeth at once and are considerably stronger for the same size. This was to reduce production time on gear cutting machines whose supply and whose supply of cutting steels were restricted. Anyone one that has tried to order a gear cutting machines and hobbing machines will know it takes years to get one delivered. I think the final solution was to be a planetary gearbox.

The war was won by the allies through the machine tool industry around Cincinatti and Milwauke as much as anything. Consider the problem Napiers had in punching out sleave valves in Victorian era presses as opposed to machines tools which eventually had to be imported from the USA to do cut out the ports.

 

[Jenisch]

The war was won by the allies through the machine tool industry around Cincinatti and Milwauke as much as anything. Consider the problem Napiers had in punching out sleave valves in Victorian era presses as opposed to machines tools which eventually had to be imported from the USA to do cut out the ports.

Certainly this was one of the factors. But the Germans were blamed for not considerate this. You enter in a war to won, not the opposite.

 

[pbfoot]

The Germans were faced with the same kind of problems the USAAF was in deciding to introduce the P-38K or the RAF with trying to introduce a Sptifire VIII (with its better tankage and retractable tail wheel and taller fin) over the IX or improved versions with better radiators. For instance the Me 109K1 was ready for production just after the second half of 1943. It incorporated smoothed over and reconfigured cowling guns, a restoration of the retractable tail yoke that reduced drag and by virtue of its greater extension finally solved the ground looping problem, a taller tail that introduced a balance tab to replace the horn balance and raised Mach limit from 'around' 0.75 to about 0.80. So a Mach limit increase of about 0.05 and a level speed increase of about 12mph would have been possible by late 1943 in reasonable numbers. In fact the smooth cowling and retractable tail yoke should never have been lost since they were features of the Me 109F. Achievable improvements in construction quality would have achieved 6 mph more. Some of the test reports are on the Kurfurst site.

What actually happened was that these features came into production into service in October 1944 instead of October 1943 in the Me 109K4. These features certainly would have been usefull to those Luftwaffe pilots facing the stunning new P-51B at the end of 1943. When the more powerfull water injected engines and engines with enlarged superchargers became available in March/April 44 they could have been incorporated into the Me 109K1 airframes and produced an aircraft in the 430mph class. As it was the new engines went into what were essentially Me 109G6 airframes. I can't see more than 2 weeks disruption to production lines chosen for the upgrade plus a complication in spare parts.

The Panther by the time of the Normandy invasion (Ausf A came after Ausf D) was fairly reliable. The notorious final drive problem was caused by the use of straight cut gears as opposed to herringbone gears which engage several teeth at once and are considerably stronger for the same size. This was to reduce production time on gear cutting machines whose supply and whose supply of cutting steels were restricted. Anyone one that has tried to order a gear cutting machines and hobbing machines will know it takes years to get one delivered. I think the final solution was to be a planetary gearbox.

The war was won by the allies through the machine tool industry around Cincinatti and Milwauke as much as anything. Consider the problem Napiers had in punching out sleave valves in Victorian era presses as opposed to machines tools which eventually had to be imported from the USA to do cut out the ports.

The only thing that could have saved Germany after mid 44 was the A bomb , all these other`toys`were merely a hindrance , kinda like a fly buzzing around the house . The Germans were toast sfter mid 44 but they were to dumb to know it.

 

[tyrodtom]

I think a lot of the Germans in the industry knew the war was lost, though they had to keep their thoughts to themselves.

But that didn't keep them from profiteering on exotic programs they knew would never make a difference, or even see production. They needed money now, to get thru the lean times they knew would follow the war.

 

[Jenisch]

I think that most of the stuff Germany was implementing in '44 was correct. Panther, Tiger, new prop planes, jets, assault rifle, etc. The Allies were already starting to implement such things. If Germany didn't, it would be soon be even more outclassed and ouproduced.

In my view the war in two-fronts was too much to Germany, since it didn't allowed sufficient flexibility. A stalemate in Russia was as good as a Phyric Victory fighting the Western Allies, and the Western Allies proved willing to support Russia in all it needed.