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The P-40N you mentioned was the "ultralight" version with reduced armament, fuel and the new aluminum radiators. Only 400 built before reverting back to the full load in the N-5. Performance fell back to 350mph and 31000' ceiling. Not very competitive.The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).
The same engine was installed on the XP-51J and first flown April, 1945 - with a pot load of engine issues that were never solved by Allison for boost above 61-63" MP. The experience was so bad that NAA abandoned testing with less than 10 hours and sent it to Wright Patterson.
CW didn't have a contract to produce P-40Q. Had a contract been forthcoming from Material Command, CW would been delighted to invest in tooling.
AAF finally saw the light on the Merlin Mustang potential mid 1942, and orders for Hybrid NA-99 to NA-102/103 kicked in at end of Q3. The deliveries of the P-51B-1 started at approximately the timeframe that P-40Q was being tested and modified. At the end of 1942, substantiation from Mustang X and Spit IX high altitude promise, combined with unfiltered reports by pilots that flew the XP-51 and P-51-1 outside the Material Command domain made it pretty clear that the P-51B had far more potential than P-40Q.
Greg's comments about maneuverability advantage the P-40Q promised were sound, but range and speed at altitude were already fully confirmed with first flight tests of the P-51B-1-NA by Chilton in May 1943. At the take off Gross weight of 8600 pounds (closer to interceptor/fighter role with only 105 gallons of fuel) the speed attained was 450+ at 29K, with climb rate of 3800+ fpm at 12K at MP of 61. This was without racks, specially prepared wing with sanded finish and taped gun ports. The follow on test at WP on the 18th May states 'equipped as production fighter' but unclear re: Racks had 442 and 3600 fpm from SL to 13K (3520fpm) in Low Blower.
Notable is that the actual flight test performance achieved by Chilton and Army flight tests were Very close to the original Performance Estimates Report NA-5534 dated 10-19-1942, BEFORE the first flight of XP-51B #1.
When the P-40Q started testing, the P-51B-1 was already in serial production on a brand new line funded by A-36/P-51A contracts, the Dallas P-51 line was receiving plans and tooling to begin NA-103 P-51C.
Curtiss had a very spotty 'estimate to actual' record including P-36, P-40, XP-46 and XP-60 and speculatively had a much higher performance estimate for the P-40Q than revealed in flight tests?
As a War Plans and Requirements Division of Air Staff, why would you allocate Tooling and supply priorities to a fighter with less potential?
Summary, the P-40Q offered zero advantage over the P-51B-1 (save roll rate), and due to increasing delta in advantage of P-51B-1 at escort altitudes and above, combined with far greater range - why would Army buy the P-40Q?
Resp:The whole P-40Q question is based on serial production of the two stage Allison beginning in March 1943. Curtiss, Bell and NAA all knew that the two stage Allison was coming, being tested and would be in production in early '43. They all could (should) have started modifications necessary to adapt their planes (P-40, P-39 and P-51) to this engine to coincide with it's serial production. All three would have had excellent high altitude capability shortly thereafter in mid '43.
The P-40Q first flew in April '44, much too late to put into production. Air superiority had already been secured in Europe so there was no need. But the engine was available in production much sooner a little over a year earlier.
Really no reason to continue P-40 production unless it had a two stage engine. An Allison P-40 reached combat ceiling (1000fpm climb) at UNDER 20000' in clean condition (no drop tanks). With an external tank it was even lower. Every engagement with any Axis fighter normally resulted in the P-40 being attacked first from above. Not good. Either give it a two stage engine or quit wasting resources producing it.
Same with the P-38. It wasn't really a good plane until the ultimate J-25 and L got into production in June of '44. Air superiority had already been won. Much better to have high altitude single engined fighters at half the cost to build, maintain and operate.
The competition was a lot better in Europe. In the PTO the Lightning had the speed and climb advantage. In the ETO their speed and climb was just barely able to keep up but the low Mach number and less maneuverability hurt them. And of course the cost to maintain a twin.Resp:
The only theater where the P-38 performed poorly, if I can say that, was the ETO. If you were in the AAF in any other theater before Jan 1944, what was better than the P-38? The P-47N didn't make it until 1945. So there was the P-39, P-40 and P-38 (few P-47s in PTO/CBI). All of the fighters evolved, with most getting better. As for the Allison contract, think about how many fighters were already needing engines ( don't forget replacements in the field)? Not sure they could supply the Allisons need for another fighter. Just think out loud.
The competition was a lot better in Europe. In the PTO the Lightning had the speed and climb advantage. In the ETO their speed and climb was just barely able to keep up but the low Mach number and less maneuverability hurt them. And of course the cost to maintain a twin.
CW hardly chose 'not to ask' for a contract to manufacture the Q. They were already looking at the end of the P-40N line with no follow on. They had failed to bring the XP-46 and XP-60 to successful achievement of promised performance, leaving their strong supporters (Echols) holding the bag as airframe after airframe specified by Material Command failed. They were staring into the abyss.CW chose not to ask USAAF to manufacture the Q. They could have replaced the N version with the Q. The engine was available for the P63 and P51j. Q had better flight performance over all coupled with higher altitude performance CW imho became a Greedy manufacture. It would have saved lives. Example, The F87 was the last straw with the now DOD. After that CW was asset stripped by greedy investors. Second most profitable Defense contractor during WW2. Today CW is a speciality DOD contacting company.
The US failed to introduce the P63 to USAAF which would have been a far better Ground attack and fighter plane than any of the current fighters. For the same reason the P51 almost got ingnored. The NIH issue came up. Like the P40 and whole new design P51 because the calaboration of two engineering groups the P63 suffered the same fate.
I will say this, the P-40AQ in SR6's post #305 is one sleek looking ship. I like it better than the bubble top version, but only for aesthetic purposes, I am partial to all the razor backs.
Well, range and the fact that they KNEW the P-40 couldn't compete with the 109s on even terms. Even using P-40Fs. They did use hundred of P-40s in that theater along with P-39s. The P-38s flew top cover for the tactical bombers (B-25/B-26s) and the lower altitude fighters.
The P-40s could hold their own but only at the lower altitudes, which is no way to win a campaign. It only works IF your enemy co-operates and flies were your aircraft are the strongest.
I think Bungey (His book "Most Dangerous Enemy") pretty much has debunked that common mythology. Only one airfield (Manston) was ever put out of operation. Virtually no planes were caught on the ground. The radars were hard to take out, only a Stuka might do it and they were easy prey, and the RAF had redundancy and mobile radars and quick repairs. The Luftwaffe tried that for weeks and got nowhere, except large losses.
The Germans attacking London was a last resort because nothing else had worked, the RAF just kept inflicting unacceptable losses. The Germans had worse problems getting new pilots and they didn't have the production of the British to replace machine losses.
Only if they had hit Sector stations and took out the controllers could they have done it...and they didn't know they existed, their importance or where they were.
They needed a quick victory (to enable an invasion), so they depended on the RAF being stupid. That is put up all their fighters in the air so that the Luftwaffe experten could shoot them down at a 5:1 ratio (as if) or get their planes caught on the ground. Neither of these things happened, Park tactically managed his forces beautifully.
Oh yes the RAF was under pressure all right, but so was the Luftwaffe. Neither side really knew how the other one was suffering. The Luftwaffe fell prey to over confidence, the RAF, correctly, remained very conservative. Even at the worst point, when Dowding broke up squadrons (allocated as A, B C categories) Fighter Command actually had more pilots than at the beginning of the Battle (don't forget the huge losses they suffered in France which had to made good). They were under establishment (ie theoretical) strength, but they still had plenty...plus reserves, which the Luftwaffe didn't.
And the Luftwaffe newbies were just as bad as the RAF ones, ie cannon fodder.
So the BoB would still have turned out the way it did, even if the Luftwaffe had kept on at the airfields (etc) and never touched London.
The Luftwaffe were not stupid they also tried very hard to take out aircraft production...and like Bomber Command and the USAAF did later, failed, despite the fact that (at that time) the Supermarine and Hawker production were well within 109 escort range (closer than London).
So we are back to inaccurate bombing again, which had little effect, so the bombers were just the reason to get the RAF up so they could be shot down. Trouble was, FC (after France) had a hard core of experienced pilots ..and, which they could never understand (and didn't understand later in '43 and '44) the concept of a 'General' maintaining effective tactical control over his forces.
You have to remember the Heer (Army part of the Wehrmacht) training, leadership, doctrine, etc (such as Mission Command) was all worked out before the Nazis took over. It was a master of 3rd Generation warfare. Hence why it was so good.. and took the combined forces of the USSR, UK and US to beat them.
The Luftwaffe was created by the Nazis. Hence it's doctrine and ethos were very different. Full of the 'warrior hero' nonsense. Technology, logistics, tactics, were secondary to 'will power' and all that piffle. Hence things like Galland not wanting radios in fighters in the BoB, pilots never getting breaks (while their soldier brothers were far better looked after). Marseille feted, who slaughtered huge numbers of Hurricanes and P-40s...and shot down only 4 bombers in his entire career (leaving his soldier brothers to get hammered by the DAF while he got the headlines...dickhead).
Galland, even at the end, still couldn't except tight effective tactical ground control. To him the pilots in the air were the 'kings'...and then repeated the mistakes of Leigh Mallory in France in '41...the same which mistakes he benefited from in getting his 'score' (and medals).
So it was a weird and very disfunctional organisation, the most effective leader of it all was Kesselring, a very (prior and later) good ground general..who got thumped twice by Park.
Park was like Monty, a really good General who knew his stuff inside out. He knew what he wanted to achieve, he learned, he taught, he changed things. He out thought the enemy at all points...he denied them of what they wanted. He never risked too much at any point in time, hence his opposition to (along with many other reasons) the 'big wing stuff. He understood that air warfare was 3 dimensional and that timing, position and surprise were more important than just raw numbers. 4 planes at the right time and place with the advantage of position and surprise can create more damage than 200 at a tactical disadvantage.
And he cared about his pilots. When the Luftwaffe was hitting the RAF's airfields (many not Fighter Command) his jumped up and down, not because the airfield's were out of operation ..they weren't (Spits and Hurris all took of in grass) but because the pilots didn't have a bed and food and so on. Unlike Leigh Mallory, Park got in his Hurricane and went all round his airfields and talked to his people regularly.
A true leader.
The Luftwaffe, unlike the Heer who produced many of them, was incapable of producing and using people like Park...hence they lost.
Though the RAF (overall) wasn't much better in may ways since it fired Park and Dowding real fast after the BoB.....took until the DAF to get it back being useful again.... 70% losses in Bomber Command (50% killed)? Which was the same the Luftwaffe overall suffered, as did the U-Boats.... Ideology (idiotology?) achieves nothing just gets people killed for nothing.
unlike the RAF the USAAF squadrons were using 'finger four' formations with wingmen, they had better radios
Really? The RAF were still using Vic formations in 1942/43?
And the USAAF had better radios than the RAF?
The P-40Q first flew in June 1943. The limitations including very low oxygen supply (2 3/4 hrs at 20K), no external wing rack capable of carrying either drop tanks or bombs of same weight, no internal space to add extra fuel tank, limited capability to pressurize tanks without modification, 20-30mph slower than Production P-51B with much better performance using an engine that was in full production (1650-3) rather than development stage (V-1710-119) and -121).
The same engine was installed on the XP-51J and first flown April, 1945 - with a pot load of engine issues that were never solved by Allison for boost above 61-63" MP. The experience was so bad that NAA abandoned testing with less than 10 hours and sent it to Wright Patterson.
The P-40N you mentioned was the "ultralight" version with reduced armament, fuel and the new aluminum radiators. Only 400 built before reverting back to the full load in the N-5. Performance fell back to 350mph and 31000' ceiling. Not very competitive.