The P-38J and L in the European theater.

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I don't recall any change of main airfoil from the NACA23016 or tip airfoil section. The change that did occur was to design and install a wing filet which did reduce buffeting.

You have to admit that a 16% thick aerofoil is a thick aerofoil. Ledicner gives:

Lockheed 22 P-38 Lightning NACA 23016 (root) NACA 4412 (tip)
Sadly no washout information. Even the tips are thick. It's no surprise that compressibility became an issue.


Below is an Me 262 replica displaying its full span 'slats out' during a manoeuvre at an air show.


The Me 262 had no washout angle (geometric twist) yet it had good stall characteristics both in landing configuration and under "G" with plenty of pre stall buffet.
Ledicner gives:

Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe NACA 00011-0.825-35 (root) NACA 00009-1.1-40 (tip)

In English: the roots is 11% thick with point of maximum thickness at 35%, tip is 9% thick with 40% (this actually increases the sweep angle)

The stall characteristics of the Me 109 with partial span slats was investigate in publications TB 9443 and UM7801 and LuFo

1 Stall angle of Messerschmitt's NACA 2R1 is 18 degrees at CLmax 1.46 degrees (somewhat more than the primitive Clark Y used in Shortround6's example)
2 With slats airflow remained attached till 30 degrees CLmax of 1.8

Its true that partial span slats do not significantly effect the inner portion of the wing however:
1 In tapered planforms such as Me 109 and P-51 tips will stall first unless either twist is added or slats so the positive effect of slats is more than just to avoid the 1 or 2 degrees of 'necessary evil' wing twist might suggest.
2 I believe due to propeller stream the airflow angle of attack over the inner un-slatted portion of the wing was less than the angle of attack over the slated portion.

Also note Messerscmitt experiment with wing fences on the Me 109B and found that they worked at stopping span wise flow and improving stall which effected even the small taper of the me 109 though not as good as slats.

Taking into account the whole wing the Me 109 had a CLMax of 1.46. This is apparently a higher CLmax over the total wing than the Spitfire V = 1.12 and P-51 = 1.28 Taking into account this lift loading and the much lower wing loadings of the Spit and P-51 we find that Me 109 is only a little worse than the Spit (4%) and slightly better than the P-51B. Early days yet, I'm gathering primary data before I stick my neck out. Manoeuvrability may get more down to power loading, lift to drag ratios and aerodynamic refinements than wing loading.

I realise I have hijacked the thread a little: but I was only arguing that the P-38 or any hypothetical twin could in theory be just as manoeuvrable as a single given equal technology, engine power and approximately equal lift loading or at least wing area. The P-38 should have worked very well.
 
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What was the motivation for redeploying P-38's to North Africa instead of using P-40's in that theatre?
Range?

Well, range and the fact that they KNEW the P-40 couldn't compete with the 109s on even terms. Even using P-40Fs. They did use hundred of P-40s in that theater along with P-39s. The P-38s flew top cover for the tactical bombers (B-25/B-26s) and the lower altitude fighters.

The P-40s could hold their own but only at the lower altitudes, which is no way to win a campaign. It only works IF your enemy co-operates and flies were your aircraft are the strongest.
 
Hey gjs,

I like the Wildcat, too. We have a frequent visitor at the museum in the form of Tom Camp and his FM-2. I love the whine of the supercharger as he flies a fast pass. Evey pilot who has had the fortune to fly it likes it, too.
 
Graugeist,

The P-38J and L are a "What IF" in the ETO. No more than a very few ever GOT there! I am not aware that there are rules about "what ifs."

Greg - For Certain, the P-38J started combat operations for both the 20th and the 55th in December, 1943. For certain, the 364th began combat ops with J-10 in late February 1944 as it lost one on the 29th. For certain the -15's were operational in May/June 1944 for the 20/55/364 and 479 so the inference is also for the 367/370 and 474 as they received ships from each of the 8th AF units in addition to their own inventory.

The combined air victory credits for three experienced P-38 Groups performing escort (20/55 and 364) were 104 plus 479 with 4 for those three months of operations with P-38J-10 and J-15's.

In the unhappy comparison with the 9th AF 354th FG which flew escort in all of May, mostly ground support and medium bomber escort for June/July - It destroyed 129 - again more than all the four 8th AF P-38s combined.

So to your point about Very few P-38J's being in the ETO, based on the TO&E for each FG of 26/squadron and 4 HQ for 100%, that would mean 82 but simplify math with 80

October through November 80 55thFG
December through February 160 55th and 20thFG
March through April 320 55th and 20th and 364th FG and 367th FG
May through July 560 55th, 20th, 364th, 479th, 367th, 370th, 374thFG's
August through September 479th plus 367 plus 370 plus 474


Approximate monthly sortie capability with perfect weather
October -November 80x30x2 = 4800 P-51= 0 354FG 9th AF arrives for Ops December1
December-February 160x2x30= 9600 P-51=80x2x30 (plus 357 80x15)=4800+1200= 6000
March- 240x30 = 7200 P-51=400x30 (4th and 355th and 363rd added)= 12000

In the period October 1943 through March 31, 1944 the P-38s in the 8th AF had an operational sortie capacity of 21600 sorties. The P-51B in 8th and 9th AF had a sortie capacity of 18000 sorties. That is a ratio of 21600/18000 or 20% more capacity in same flying weather.

But in that timeframe the P-38 destroyed 115 German aircraft, the Mustang 398 German aircraft

For Q2-1944

April 320x30 (367FG+) = 7200 P-51=480x30 (352nd added) =14400
May 560x30 (370/474/479+) =16800 P-51=640x30 (339/361/359+,363 removed)=19200
June 560x30 =16800 P-51=640x30 = 19200

Now the P-38 sortie capacity through Q2 is 40,800 while P-51 is 52,800
The P-38 destroys 90 German aircraft while the P-51 (with 30% more sortie capacity) destroys 972 in the same period.

In that period the P-38H destroyed 27 aircraft and the P-38J destroyed 178
In that period the P-51B (mostly) destroyed 1370 aircraft in the air.

The Total available sortie days from October, 1943 through June, 1944 were 62,400 for the P-38 and 60,000 for the P-51




Can you now make a case that the P-38J would have done very well?
 
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No problem - the AFA recognizes them and they are the central repository of Ace validation, depending on USAF, USN and USMC but also include validated confirmation for credits received by RAF, AVG records, etc.

So, if you drop to 24 for your cut off - then P-38 (3), F4U and P-51 (two each), P-47 (two) F4F (one) F6F (two)
 
and that leaves 3 P-38, 2 P-47, 2 F6F, 2 P-51, 2 F4U, 1 F4F aces

Interesting.

My earlier exclamation for the F4F driver is for the deeds he accomplished in an R-1830 powered aircraft.
Wonder what he would have accomplished in a F6F or F4U.

It's also interesting that there weren't more F6F and P51 aces.
Both were responsible for the destruction of so many axis aircraft.
I'm wondering if there were more US pilots, flying more aircraft, diluting the number of kills per pilot.
 
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Quite possible.

It is one thing to be flying from Henderson Field and having the Japanese supply numbers of targets to your location on a somewhat regular basis ( ) against a small group of defenders, and having hundreds of American planes (just on carriers) looking for targets in 1944/45. Campaigns (and battles) were often shorter and further apart.
On average the American pilots of 1944/45 were better trained too, so wingmen on others in the squadron were more likely to pick up one or two victories.

No disrespect intended for the early pilots ( and ground crew), ill fed, sick and living (and servicing aircraft ) in truly appalling conditions it was anything but a shooting gallery. However what some people may view as being outnumbered and surrounded (not literally in the case of Guadalcanal) other people view as a target rich environment.
 
In Fire in the Sky by Bergerud, he claims that the IJN had zero notion of finger four type formations for improved defense, and this claim seems to be backed by many Japanese pilot and air leaders.

He cites other factors for the Allies gaining the upper hand in 1942 despite the continued maneuverability advantage and residual supply of top notch fighter pilots out of the pre-war training program.

First, the Japanese radar lagged behind ours and was not in sufficient number to scatter and place in various strategic spots to get consistent early warning - and by the time they did our Strafers created havoc. Second, the Japanese construction battalions had good key core personnel but their labor supply was dominantly untrained indigenous labor in contrast to our CeeBee's and the equipment assets far behind ours. That resulted in airfields without good prepared surfaces from revetments to taxiways to the main air strip - meaning that it took a long time between alert and getting aircraft off the ground. Last, the combination of spare parts chain of supply and lack of sufficient mechanics resulted in a lot of the inventory un flyable from one mission to another.

Another major factor affecting both sides was disease - but we won with better supply of meds and docs and rotation to medical facilities whereas the Japanese suffered much worse attrition from daily flight rosters.

Even though the Germans never suffered as described above in the Battle over Germany, they also suffered skilled fighter pilot attrition as the war progressed into from 1942 into 1944. But, unlike the Japanese they almost always were able to get a battle force with an initial altitude advantage to begin the fight.

One last important factor. The LW fighter pilots were told to avoid US escorts and attack where no escorts existed. It was EASY to spot a P-38 and in combination with the 'avoid the escorts', the Germans found it far easier than against the P-51 which very much looked like a 109 until it was too late.

IMO, this resulted in the ability of the P-38 to do well in the PTO, and conversely why they had much more difficulty in the ETO.
 

Probably didn't dilute the ratio of kills per pilot, but more US pilots survived because we eventually attained numerical superiority. Very few US aces were lost in air to air combat as a percentage of aces...

Joe Foss returned to PTO as CO of VMF 115 flying F4U-1A and FG-1A for about 7 months at Espiritu, Bougainville and Emirau and finally Leyte. Never engaged again. It is all about opportunity, skill, and luck.
 

Simplictically, maybe. One of the knocks against the P-38 was the initial sluggish response to lateral stick force because of the relative rolling inertia to be overcome before steady state rolling rate was achieved. Even with boosted ailerons, the description was akin to tapping feet awaiting a slow then fast response. That is not a happy circumstance if somebody is on your tail or you are chasing someone with excellent roll and response rate that Reverses on you.

I just blathered a lot of 'stuff' from memory so I will have to actually look now. Enjoy the chat.
 
Mach limit anyone? in the 30,000+ft range a late model P-38's max level speed was perilously close to its mach limit (290 IAS at 30,000ft). Hence instructions like "max angle for extended dives is 15 degrees".

At lower altitudes, as per the Med and the Pacific it did pretty well. But for high altitude combat in mid-late '44...no fun at all.
 

The P-38 groups that went operational in the spring of 1944 were not exclusively equipped with J-15 and newer Lightnings. The 394th squadron of the 367th Fighter Group in April 1944 started with one J-5, 9 J-10's and 10 J-15's. (Dynamite Gang, page 26). The 370th Fighter Group lost a J-10 (42-68021)on 5/19/44 (The 370th Fighter Group in World War II, page 411). I do not have any information on the 474th as to its original equipment but suspect it also had a mixture of 5, 10, and 15's. As an aside,the 479th had at least one J-5 (42-67261)that was lost on a training mission on May 25, the same day that the Group went operational (The 479th Fighter Group in World War II, page 468).

IMHO, a P-38J-25/L flown by a well trained and experienced pilot would hold its own or more against most Luftwaffe piston-engined fighters. If those models had been available in late 43, early 44, they may have earned the P-38 a great reputation in the ETO. I do believe however, that by 1945, the Lightning had reached the end of its development potential, unlike the P-51D which morphed into the H, or the P-47D which could be developed into the M/N.

Eagledad
 
I do believe however, that by 1945, the Lightning had reached the end of its development potential, unlike the P-51D which morphed into the H, or the P-47D which could be developed into the M/N.

Eagledad

Hmmm, Griffon powered P-38?
 
Hello gjs238!

With the Lightning's relatively low critical mach number wouldn't one need to do some redesign of the airframe to get the most out of the power increases of a more powerful engine? Perhaps, if one wanted to use the Lightning in an exclusive low level role, a Griffon would work. However, I don't believe a Griffon powered P-38 would be able to successfully tangle with a high flying Ta-152, P-51H, P-47N, or Spifire XIX.

Eagledad
 

GregP,
Didn't George Preddy get all his kills in a Mustang?
V/R,
Biff
 
GregP,
Didn't George Preddy get all his kills in a Mustang?
V/R,
Biff


George Preddy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Griffon wouldn't really do much of anything for the P-38L at high altitudes anyway. With RAM it was good for 1425hp at 29,000ft Military power for 15 minutes. Without Ram it was 26,600ft. WEP was 1600hp at 28,700ft with RAM and 25,800ft without. That is at 3000rpm.

P-38L can make just about the same amount of power as a 60 series Griffon running 18lbs boost but 10,000ft higher. At low level the Griffon has it allover the Allison (at least by the book numbers) but the turbo (if working properly) is mighty tough to beat at 25,000ft and above.
Of course the Turbo or the Griffon do nothing to solve the mach tuck problem.
 
Hi Bill,
That's a lot of data that I'd LOVE to have access to. I have a pdf of Report 85, but it is a scanned document and not computer readable. I decline to retype it into readable format. So while I like the report, it has very little actual use to me. Your data on the P-38 in the ETO wouldn't happen to include the type missions they were assigned, would it?

As I've often stated in here, the scrutiny applied to a select few, like Boyington, has not been applied to everyone. Until it is, I'll take the victories awarded in the war and not the revisionist numbers. Anyone else is free to do as they please, just like I am. I will not argue about it; I simply use different numbers. Use whatever you like.

The numbers I have for the P-38 do not include aircraft attached to individual units and I'd love to have those data. From Francis Dean's "America's Hundred Thousand," I do have the numbers for USAAF aircraft in the ETO. Those numbers show the P-38 flying 60.7% of the sorties the P-51 flew while suffering 69.7% of the P-41's combat losses and dropping 355% of the bombs the P-51 did. That's 355% of the bombs with 60% of the sorties the P-51 flew. That figure alone makes me wonder VERY hard about the missions assigned to the P-38 versus the P-51, and it points me to the supposition that the P-51 was selected for the missions that afforded higher opportunities for air combat, while bomb-laden P-38's were assigned what can only be support bombing duties with MUCH less chance of encountering a defender in the air that is searching for high-altitude strategic bombers.

Those 60.7% of the P-51 sorties in P-38's resulted in 35.8% of the air victories and 18.1% of the ground victories. I think my supposition here is confirmed that the P-38's were supporting Army units. They would never replace strategic bombers and that leaves only ground support as the major mission.

So my opinion is they got what they assigned the two planes to do and both did OK. We don't KNOW how they would have dome if the missions were switched … they weren't switched, at least in the ETO.

Bottom line is the P-51 did a very credible job at escort and destroying enemy planes. The P-38 seems to have dome pretty well at what it was assigned and I see no evidence that would suggest to me that if the missions were swapped, we would have failed and lost the war. To come to that conclusion, I'd want to see statistics for similar missions flown against similar defenders. Obviously I have no data supporting my argument, but I KNOW the P-51 was afforded missions with much higher probability of seeing enemy aircraft. Bombers draw enemy fighters and escorts will engage them. P-51's were primary escorts. Pretty easy there. Perhaps the planners did that on purpose because they though as you do. Could be.

I think an experienced P-38 group would have done just fine on escort missions that were within their range. Then again, I think a Hellcat group would have dome the same, but that's another "what if." In the event, they all did what they were assigned. The P-51 won it's laurels fairly and is what it is in history. The P-38 showed what it could do in the PTO and MTO and, if employed correctly, would have done just fine in my opinion in the ETO. It's not intended to try to convince you, Graugeist, or anyone else, it's MY opinion. The only data I have that shows late model P-38 employed in escort mission was in the PTO and MTO, so that's what I use for comparison.

But, by all means, if you have the data in the ETO about mission types, please post it. I have never seen it and would like to. I don't disbelieve you, but would like to have the sources!

I'll end with this. The USAAF flew the A-36, P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47, P-51, P-61, some Spitfires, and some Beaufighters in the ETO. That's 9 types used by the USAAF. The P-38 in the ETO came in third in the ETO against all other USAAF types and that says it wasn't too bad. You guys can hate it and disrespect it all you want. It wasn't that bad in the final tally.

And I'm not trying to convince you of anything (you opinions are no doubt based on your own reading) and I don't doubt your data. I might embrace it if had the sources. Cheers.
 
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The latest sentence is dead on.
For the Griffo, we need also to add a substantial amount of exhaust thrust at such high altitudes, maybe equivalent of 20% of engine power? That woul make it about 1700 hp for military power at 27-30 kft?
 
GregP,
Didn't George Preddy get all his kills in a Mustang?
V/R,
Biff
No. The 352nd and 355th FG both began ops in September 1943. Both in P-47s. Both Preddy and Meyer got their first victory credits in P-47s. Both scored 3-0-0 and 3-1-0 respectively in the P-47 from September 1943 through March, 1944.

The 352nd converted to P-51s in mid April, 1944 and all the rest of their respective scores were in P-51s.
 

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