The piece of paper that fooled Hitler

[Messy1]

Nice post Mike, agree with you.

 

[mikewint]

Thanks messy, throughout history successful attacks have usually been made where the enemy least expected that attack, i.e. Hannibal over the alps comes to mind immediately.
Feints have also always been a part of any contest as the Germans feinted at the low countries. Deception is just a type of feint. Keep the marks looking at the almost naked lady while the elephant walks off the stage

 

[ctrian]

Ctrain, I semi-agree with you and your points are well taken. However the point still remains that INITIALLY the German forces outnumbered the Allied. Troops and material can only be off loaded so fast. Had the Germans reacted swiftly and decisively the landings could have been vastly limited and contained. There were plenty of reserves within striking distance had they been allowed to be used but the Germans held back allowing the Allied numerical and material build up to continue. This is where the disinformation campaign made itself felt. Much as the Germans had used the French reliance on static defenses and attacked through the "Impossible" Ardennes.
What the German really lacked was IN DEPTH reserves due to the German attack into Russia. Once the landings had been established and a deep water port established it was indeed all over for the Germans. Now they had a true two front war to deal with and the industrial might of the US made itself felt.
Like an infection, the time to deal with it is in the early stages and not when it is fully established

Thats only true if you compare the entire German force in France with the 156.000 allied soldiers landed on D day .But as i said before only a small part of those forces was mobile and an even smaller one was battle worthy.With a lack of trucks and fuel plus heavily damaged transport network(courtesy of USAAF and RAF bombers) there was no way for the Germans to speedily assemble a powerful force (assuming they had one to begin with).

 

[mikewint]

In 1943, Hitler appointed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to command Army Group B and with it, the responsibility for the defense of Normandy. Rommel inspected the beach defenses and found them altogether inadequate. He immediately set to building improvements, laying minefields on the beaches and beach approaches and in the English Channel. Fortifications were strengthened, fields of fire were improved, and obstacles of all sorts were placed in the water at approaches to possible landing sites. In addition, flood plains were flooded and fields were positioned with poles to prevent their possible use as landing areas.
Rommel realized that the defenses he was in charge of constructing were not going to stop an invasion. The best he could hope for was that the defenses could delay the invasion and cause significant confusion among the invaders. He understood that the invasion force mustn't be allowed to establish a foothold, because if it did, it could bring in near limitless resources. Rommel believed that it was absolutely critical that any invasion must be met quickly by his troops and especially Armored units. His belief was that they must defeat the Allies on the beaches, before a foothold could be established.
Rundstedt's philosophy on the countering an invasion was to hold back the six panzer divisions in reserve in Northern France and deploy them in a crushing blow after the it was determined where the real invasion was taking place.
By June 1944, the German forces in France numbered 46 infantry divisions and 9 panzer divisions (notably the Panzer Lehr, 1st, 2nd, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions). Several infantry divisions were inexperienced and contained lower quality young troops and older men - troops that were unable to immediately fight on the Russian front. In addition, of the 850,000 men under Rundstedt's command, 60,000 were hilfswillige (prisoners from the Russian front who volunteered for Russian service - mostly Tartars, Cossacks, Ukrainians, etc.) But, most infantry divisions were of good quality and several consisted of battle-hardened veterans from the Eastern front. A typical German division was slightly smaller than an American division, but because of material and fuel shortages, it lacked significant mobile transport - relying on heavy use of horse and train.
Hardly an insignificant force had they been brought to bear on the actual invasion instead of sitting around waiting for the "real" invasion to occur. That's disinformation at work

 

[ctrian]

Look i can't go on repeating myself .If you want you can compare 800.000 Germans to 156.000 allies or even the whole German ground forces ,roughly 4.600.000 troops to 156.000 allies.It is still a wrong comparison since only a small part of the troops in France had mobility.
Regarding Rommel vs Rundstedt look at what happened at Gela and Salerno, massive allied air support and naval fire stopped the Germans from defeating the Anglo-American forces. The same was bound to happen in Normandy ,only more so.I would advise you to read zetterling's ''Normandy 1944'' book it deals with all these questions in detail.

 

[mikewint]

Ctrain, I guess we'll have to disagree on that point. I simply agree with Rommel, who I would hope knew his forces better than you or I. In my opinion D-day would have gone a lot different had Rommel had a free hand and exploited the breakthrough at Lion.

 

[ctrian]

No problem.However if you are that interested in the Normandy campaign do yourself a favour and buy that book,maybe it will change your mind or make you rethink things.I've already changed a person's mind on this forum regarding the German war economy so trust me on this!

 

[mikewint]

Ctrain, we're still digging out from our blizzard but that book is on my list. Though our debate is not really about the German economy, we really agree on that aspect. Much of that was due to things the Germans did to themselves such as 250,000 RM for a single Tiger I with all its mobility and mechanical problems or attacking Russia and opening a two front war.

 

[ctrian]

Ctrain, we're still digging out from our blizzard but that book is on my list. Though our debate is not really about the German economy, we really agree on that aspect. Much of that was due to things the Germans did to themselves such as 250,000 RM for a single Tiger I with all its mobility and mechanical problems or attacking Russia and opening a two front war.

Actually i meant that i know my books.There was an other discussion where the topic of the german war economy came up and i mentioned that the old version ''the german economy was mismanaged/speer increased production'' was debunked by a new book ''Wages of Destruction'' by Adam Tooze.

 

[mikewint]

I'll add that to my list as well

 

[ctrian]

I decided to resurrect this post for the following reason ,the official British history '' British Intelligence in the Second World War'' vol 4 p177-78 debunks the widely held view that the Germans held back their forces due to the deception plan.Case closed !

 

[mikewint]

Ctrain, don't know how you can post this and still hold your position, please read your own post: "the enemy has tied his hand strategically by his fear of future landings". The physical difficulties of bringing up those divisions is another issue

 

[ctrian]

mike it is clearly stated in the bottom of the pages that not even the Allies expected that the 15th army would be moved to normandy.At most the 6 divisions mentioned were thought to be in danger of being moved.Out of these 1st SS was not combat ready and the order to move it was cancelled.The ONLY armored division in the channel area 2nd Pz Division was however ordered out on 9 June that is D+3.Other units mentioned were not mobile in any case.For example 5th parachute was in a bad state and was sent in small units.Also keep in mind that British appreciations are different from German ones.

 

[mikewint]

From further on the same document: "attributed the short-fall to fear of further landings" and a bit further on: "The decrypts referring to the enemies anxiety about further landings" and a bit further: "the importance of maintaining it by all possible means"
From the page bottom: "the difficulty the Germans would have had IF they had decided to move them"
no one has denied the difficulty of transport but the deception program prevented that decision from even being made until the beacheads had been established

 

[ctrian]

I should clarify the appreciations part. The Overlord plan anticipated German reinforcements at a specific rate per day.When the real rate was lower during the actual battle the British estimate was that units where held back in fear of other landings.In reality the major problem for the Germans was that their units were in poor shape with limited mobility due to lack of motor transport and the destruction of the railway lines.Units that had mobility where moved fast like the panzer divisions( 12 SS ,Lehr) .The most powerful unit in 15th army(2nd Pz Div) was also sent to Normandy after three days.So I think it's obvious that the Brits overestimated the mobility and strength of German units( for example they thought 21Pz Div had 300 tanks while the real number was 113). Hope this clears up things.

 

[ctrian]

From further on the same document: "attributed the short-fall to fear of further landings" and a bit further on: "The decrypts referring to the enemies anxiety about further landings" and a bit further: "the importance of maintaining it by all possible means"
From the page bottom: "the difficulty the Germans would have had IF they had decided to move them"
no one has denied the difficulty of transport but the deception program prevented that decision from even being made until the beacheads had been established

Yes that was the British appreciation at that time based on Japanese diplomatic decrypts and on their estimate of german strenghs and mobility(which was not correct).Also im'not sure who prevented 2 Pz Div from moving to Normandy.

 

[mikewint]

The most powerful unit in 15th army(2nd Pz Div) was also sent to Normandy after three days.

All agreed and accepted, but from your own statement why the three day delay before the unit was even attempted to be moved. Time bought by the deception. Time for the beachheads to be established. As Rommel knew, the Allies had to be defeated on the beach before the Allied material advantage club could be wielded.

 

[ctrian]

2 Pz was ordered to move on 9 June and elements of the division entered combat on 12 .Even if they had been ordered on D-day they couldn't be there until probably 9 of the month? Would that make any difference considering that 156.000 allied soldiers landed on D-day alone? As for the deception it is probably true that the cancellation of the order to move 1st SS
was due to a double agent who claimed that attack on Calais was imminent.

 

[mikewint]

ctrain, do I detect a whiff of consensus?

 

[ctrian]

ctrain, do I detect a whiff of consensus?

How do you mean?