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U 25 sailed in accordance with Operations Order No. 18. Naval War Staff has extended the orders for the conduct of the war in certain areas. U 44, which should at present be southwest of Ireland, has been ordered to remain off the western approach to the Channel for a few days, and then proceed to the west coast of Spain at about the same time as U 25.
Nothing to report.
"The British "reserve their full belligerent rights in order to fight the menace presented by German action and policy and to defend that conception of law and that way of life, which they believe to be as dear to the peoples and Governments of America as they are to the peoples and Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations."
Nothing to report.
ArrivalsU 30 entered port. She sank a patrol vessel type Agatha on her way out and scored a hit on "Barham". The minelay off Liverpool went off well and according to plan. It required a lot of dash, thought, ability and determination. It was carried out in shallow water strongly patrolled. By the 16th 3 mined areas had been declared off the port.
On the day of his return the Commanding Officer had the satisfaction of knowing that the whole of Liverpool harbor had been temporarily closed because of mines.
U 31 sailed for her operations area according to Operations Order No. 20, after completing trial runs off Heligoland.
A conference was held in Wilhelmshaven with representatives of the Torpedo Experimental Command because of renewed unexplained torpedo failures. The main matter under discussion was the suspicion held by B.d.U. for some time now that MZ could fail to fire, even if shot under. There have been repeated cases of shots fired at close range with good firing data which have not brought results and the reasons have been obscure even to the Torpedo Inspectorate (U 470). These cases have increased particularly recently (U 24, U 15, U 20, U 59, U 60). The Director of the Torpedo Experimental Command reports that U 20's shots cannot be explained. Even if the speed had been wrongly estimated, at least one shot should have hit. The only possible explanation for the failure of the 3 torpedoes to fire would be the fact that the size of the ship had been very much over estimated. The Commanding Officer of the boat denies this possibility. I have reached the following conclusions with regard to these and similar failures!
All the Torpedo Experimental Command's analyses of shots are possible for the particular case under consideration and possibly correct in some cases. But I cannot believe that, with a whole series of failures of this kind, there are other reasons in every case. I am convinced that there is a connection between all these so-called unexplained shots and there is a common cause for their failure which has not yet been discovered. Up to now I have believed that in many cases boats have fired past, due to misinterpretation of the firing data or aiming mistakes. In individual cases I have sent the boat for further training. But now, with these failures of shots fired under the most simple conditions by a series of the best-trained Commanding Officers and torpedomen, I cannot accept this explanation any longer. Some of these C.O.'s have undergone 2 years of training in peacetime and all of them, when reexamined, were found to have good or very good skill in firing.
From now on, I shall regard all such shots at closest range, where a detailed examination of the circumstances and the firing data exclude the possibility of a miss, and which so far have been regarded as unexplained, as failures of the firing unit. It has happened again and again in these cases that the Torpedo Inspectorate has held the view that the boats have missed or made incorrect observations, only because the reason for the possible failure was not known and could not therefore be made to apply and that afterwards their view was turned out to be incorrect. See, for instance, premature detonations, detonations half-way through the run, firing under with impact firing. The attitude to be adopted to this problem is therefore, other unknown causes of failures are possible. Otherwise we shall never get anywhere.
The British at Gibraltar detain both the US passenger liner 'Manhattan' and the US freighter 'Excambio'.His Majesty's Government find themselves unable to share the views of the United States government that their [the British] action in examining neutral mail in British or neutral shipping is contrary to their obligations under international law.
There is still uncertainty about the actual possibilities of supplying in Spain and a practical experiment is therefore necessary. U 44, at present off the west coast of Spain, can be used for this; she can then operate together with boats which are sailing up to 14 days after her. Supply has therefore been ordered for 25/26 in Cadiz.
Nothing to report.
Ice is beginning to have a direct effect on plans for operations. Firing and diving training in the Baltic will have to be suspended for the present. There is a choice between delaying the operation of several boats with new C.O.'s until the cold spell is over or sending them on to operations before they have completed the scheduled working up and firing practice periods. As they are all officers whom I believe already capable of handling difficult situations, I have decided to send them on to operations immediately. They will first of all go to operations areas where comparatively little patrol is to be expected. As soon as possible all boats will be transferred from the Baltic to the North Sea.
U 34 reported that she had carried out her minelaying operation off Falmouth. She has managed it very quickly.
Further sinkings indicate the presence of U 44 off the northwest coast of Spain. Several U-boat warnings show that the enemy is taking action.