It's better to keep it simple guys.
In January 1943 the Bf 109G-5/6 was on its way so let's start from there.
Its main problem was the aerodynamical picture. They were partially solved at the end of 1944. These changes could possibly have been introduced much sooner. An aerodynamical hood instead of the bulges. A retractable tail wheel with a long strut.
One more option is adding wheel bay covers which would make the aircraft substantially faster.
Another main shortcoming was the 1.3 ata level of the DB 605. Daimler Benz should make it priority nr 1 to at least bring the ata level back to the level of the DB 601.
These simple changes would bring the max speed of the Bf 109G to at least 670 kmh. Also range would be improved.
Other changes are the Erla Haube and the standard fitting of the cheap MK 108 cannon.
Good post, Civettone, and I agree completely.
Introducing new types is not easy, both production and operational-wise, and I think many underestimate the problems involved. The thesis of this thread is that the Germans know what is coming at them in 1944, so they have a year to try to come up with a solution for this.
Regarding the aerodynamic changes, these were quite simple, and ready to be implemented by mid-1943 the latest. The streamlined cowling was ready, the retractable tailwheel and the wheel well doors (the latter actually already proposed before the Bf 109G, hence the squarish wheel bays) were known. Priority should have been given to fix some of the minor mechanical problems with these improrements, which alone would yield some 20-30 km/h speed increase.
I guess you could not do anything about the DB 605A, DB had a hand on the lubrication problems, and solved these completely between June and September 1943. Since the problem was the engine's mechanical endurance, until the lubrication problem was solved, MW 50 boosting is not possible (since the engine cannot yet take these loads).
I don't think the complete replacement of the 109G with FW 190A is a good solution, for two reasons: 109s could be produced in 2/3rd the time that it took to produce a FW 190.
Secondly, since the RLM knows that for 1944, requirements will be to for fighting at higher altitudes, ca 8km against American bomber streams, they will require a good performance high altitude fighter, which the FW 190 cannot fill, even with the FW 190D with its medium altitude engine.
So IMHO the correct decision would be:
- Priority for aerodynamic improvements for Bf 109G, introducing these on all present aircraft before waiting for the Bf 109K (whichs development BTW started in early 1943, so kinda mirrors it. The failing was the lacking of energetic introduction of these developments into production sooner)
- Most importantly, since we know that the 1944 fights will be about fighting at high altitude, cease production of DB 605A engined Bf 109Gs and produce only fighters with the DB 605AS. This is easily done since in effect it only means fitting existing DB 605A's with a DB 603 supercharger and results in a fighter that is comparable if not superior to any known foreign types at altitude.
- Cancel Me 410 production alltogether. This plane is simply not needed, and its roles can be fullfilled by other types, namely the Ju 88/188. The surplus production capacity at Mtt can be used to produce more 109s, and the surplus DB 603A engines to produce a FW 190D equivalent with the DB 603A (note that DB 603A and Jumo 213 were both interchangable, and of very simimilar output).
- Cancel He 111 production, the type should be replaced by Ju 88. Its a superflous type, as again the Ju 88 can fullfill any of its roles, as well as useful as a night fighter airframe.
Regardless of all the above, by far the most important task would be a large scale expansion of the training programme, which was of far greater concern to the Germans - who never really had a lack of available aircraft - than the lack of pilots.
Simply to put, IF we know that 1944 will be about large defensive fights (and this was not too hard to predict by 1943, with the USAAF starting to deploy in Europe, and giving an edge to the Allied air offensive, which was
until then rightfully ignored due to the rather impotent nature of RAF 'probing raids'
in France.) the correct strategic decision should have been drawn in 1943, and to tailor the production and the Luftwaffe force to a defensive nature. Fighter production should have received priority, as well as fighter training programmes, instead of waiting with all that until mid-1944.
IMHO there was a fairly good chance to reverse or at least, largely mitigate the devastating air superiority that the USAAF have won, albeit at a great cost in the spring of 1944, largely due to insufficient German fighter forces in the West. That was simply an air war of attrition, and the Luftwaffe, not having sufficient fighters to maintain air superiority on all three fronts, lost the numbers game. With sufficient number of fighters and fighter pilots, they had a fairly good chance to make these offensives so costly that their effects would be largely reduced, either over the Reich or over the battlefields of Normandy. Of course damage would be still done, but given the peaking out of the armament industry in 1944, it would be probably tolerable for them.