Top 3 mistakes per country, in field of military aviation

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Need, whether absolute or not, arose in second half of 1942.
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No, losses were growing but I already quoted above a report Lt. Cdr. Mitsuo Kofukuda. He indicated that protection for the fuel tank is needed. As the Navy lagged behind in development of rubber protection the first and immediate solution was a CO2 fire extinguisher which was widely produced since 1943 and you could find it on aircraft like J2M, A6M, G4M ...

Japanese still felt that (despite the losses) situation is not alarming. Until second half of 1943 that was rather true.

It could. The Zero carried one drop tank (66 gals?) and ~150 gals of fuel internally. Use two drop tanks and 170 gals internally. With Ha-41, a bit more with Ha-109 or Kasei.
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I dont really want to break the bubble but Ha-41 and Ha-109 were 110 milometers wider, first one was 100 kg and second one 200 kg heavier. I dont even bring Kasei, which ... you know what they had to do to keep J2M as aerodynamic as possible.
But heavier and wider engine would require wider fuselage (and increase of frontal area would be the case) and weight of the engine would require at least stronger mounting.
Second of all, usage of two under-wing fuel tanks would require some strengthening of the wing structure. Those were not used until A6M5b I believe which had new A6M5 wing with additional strengthening added in model 52a.

That is a weight increase resulting also in increase of stall speed.

The only thing I really see here is usage of Ha-115-II. For unknown reason Sakae 31 had major issues with water injection, and yet almost the same engine (just different variation) was perfectly working for the Army. And that had decent increase of produced power along with great increase of time you can run engine at maximum power (pilots commented that Ki-43-III could be run up to 50 minutes at 100 % engine performance due to implementation of ADI).
I'd follow Ki-43 armoring/protection pattern in which case it was done gradually and had did not affect performance greatly. Ki-43-III while heavier still gad great maneuverability, range, 3 armored plates and well protected fuel tanks. And it used same engine, just newer variant.

So we have two problems. One is well known - Army and Navy don't love each other, no information exchange. Another - 4 years until Army is installing meaningful protection, compared with eg. 1 year for RAF? Another year for Navy.
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Army installed first protection actually earlier, first fuel tanks with basic protection were adopted in second year of Ki-21 production (so with Ki-21-Ib) which is actually before British or American bombers received such features. Some attempts to provide armor were also made. Last produced Ki-27b as I mentioned also were tested with rubber coated fuel tanks.
Besides, 1 year ?
RAF indeed caught it fast, but they had a lot greater technology and resources to use. Their development reached practical level in 1939.
But that was rather first generation type of protection.

And most importantly, they only did so because of the experiences. Japanese Army did so in less than a year after the outbreak of the war.

Agreed.
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Here is a very cool website in English presenting differences between early and late models of A6M5 : Variation of Zero fighter
The first models kicked out of factory were not much superior in performance to A6M3 model 22, however they had much better roll rate and some other characteristics that made them decent upgrade over older aircraft. Though some pilots were reluctant, and apparently it was happening, that veteran pilots kept older A6M2s and A6M3s due to tighter turn and ability to dodge easier.
 
Not everything revolves around Zero. BTW, people were installing radial engines on a V-12 fighters, worked just fine.

A brand new fighter needs to be designed around Ha-41. 170 gals, 2 cannons, 2 HMGs, 2 (later all 4 cannons), protection for fuel tanks and pilot, drop tanks, Fowler/butterfly flaps (keeps wing size down, and hence drag, for same or better maneuverability and low speed handling). Nothing beyond the scope of Japanese industry of early 1940s.
 
tomo pauk said:
Not everything revolves around Zero.
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Absolutely, I have a bit of a feeling that we have hijacked the thread

A brand new fighter needs to be designed around Ha-41.
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Thank it is a different story, I thought it was about fitting a bigger engine to the Zero fuselage. But Ha-41 is not a good choice, it was shortly out of production as Ha-109 replaced it.
 
Ha 41 and Ha 109 are the members of same familiy of engines, Nakajima's NAL. The Ha 109 makes greater RPM and has 2-speed S/C. Thing is that Ha 41 is available one year earlier, 1940 instead in 1941 (for token number of engines), so the airframe designes can start with their job earlier. Once Ha 109 is available, switch to that engine; altitude power was in the ballpark with BMW 801C and ASh-82, but with far better reliability than BMW.

I know that we disagree, Zero (and Ki 43) needed better engines by mid/late 1942 than what they received. Having 4 carriers sunk by air power in one day looks like emergency to me, though Zero is only partly to blame for that.
 

Mechanisation was one way that the British compensated for the chronic lack of skilled labour in the aircraft industry. Machines are more precise than humans, if the holes are in the right place someone with an hours training can place the rivets.

The shortage of skilled labour was already evident in the mid 1930s as the relatively modest re-armament schemes were adopted. A 1935 report showed that skilled labour using handwork methods took from 10 to 50 times longer than semi skilled labour using mechanised production processes to perform comparable tasks.

The firms had good reason to introduce semi skilled or unskilled labour. There is a common misconception that the British aircraft companies were running extensive training programmes to produce suitably qualified workers, but this is not so. In April 1940 only one airframe firm, Rootes at Speke, was operating a long term training programme.
What the companies did was 'dilute' their work forces with semi and unskilled labour. This was enabled by several means, principally by more extensive jigging and tooling and the subdivision of operations. Some semi-skilled workers were upgraded to more skilled jobs (union problems here). The craft based nature of British Trade Unions meant that in one aircraft factory there were 24 unions active in one department alone!

As early as 1928 as the move towards metal construction was being discussed it was agreed by several leading aircraft firms that
"aircraft work is for the most part (perhaps 75-85 per-cent) semi-skilled work."
Vickers Aviation was the moving force behind the drive for dilution. By 1935 most aircraft firms still had a proportion of skilled labour in their work forces of around 50% whereas at Vickers it was just 27%.
One reason for this was that Vickers, being relatively prosperous in the early 1930s had the means to invest heavily in plant and machinery than smaller, independent, companies making small numbers of aircraft. Not all aircraft companies were the same.

There were problems involved in de-skilling a work force, notably with Trade Unions, and it did cause difficulties. It didn't stop the British aircraft industry consistently and largely out producing its German counterpart. Production was lost to industrial action in Britain, that would not have been an option for a German worker.

Cheers

Steve
 
That is what I'm aware of. Point is that there are three problems I can think of :
- dry weight of Ha-109 has increased by 100 kg over Ha-41
- Ha-109 fuel consumption is higher by 20-30 liters
- Ha-109 has second critical altitude 5200 meters, thats lower than Sakae 21. And I thought one of the issues to address is altitude performance ?

I know that we disagree, Zero (and Ki 43) needed better engines by mid/late 1942 than what they received. Having 4 carriers sunk by air power in one day looks like emergency to me, though Zero is only partly to blame for that.
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Wait, I thought the idea was to design new fighter around Ha-41/Ha-109, thus improving Zero would be pointless.

Having 4 carriers sunk by air power in one day looks like emergency to me, though Zero is only partly to blame for that.
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I dont see any reason to blame A6M2 for the loss of the carriers. From the perspective of numbers of aircraft they shot down or damaged in relation to own losses A6M2 performed exceptionally well.
 
GrauGeist said:
When the U.S. switched to a wartime production, numbers of produced units escelated dramatically, of course.
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True Graugeist but the point I was making was that you design and operate differently for different production volumes. When the spitfire was designed war was a possibility when the P51 was designed it was a fact and when the P51B/D were designed orders for thousands were guaranteed and the government was throwing up 1million sq/ft fatories to do it. Even now you do not set up a production line for small scale production, the cost and inflexibility make it counter productive.
 

Main thing is to adress performance at all altitudes. So we don't have a situation where Allies deploy fighters with 1500-2200 HP at low level, with only IJA/IJN fighters with 1100-1150 HP to compete. We also avoid situation where a 300 mph bomber slips by and performs mast-height or skip bombing.
Sakae 21 makes 980 HP at 6 km, the Ha-109 will do ~1100 HP there (all metric HP, ie. CV).
Most of the fighter aircraft that name received heavier and more powerful engines as war progressed. Hurricane, Bf 109, Spitfire, P-51, MC.200, indeed Ki-44 and host of Japanese and Soviet fighters. One of the things that made them better than prevoius types. The 'no free lunch' rule applies as ever.

Wait, I thought the idea was to design new fighter around Ha-41/Ha-109, thus improving Zero would be pointless.
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Improving Zero is an insurance in case the new fighter encunters problems during design, production and/or service. It was done by all major ww2 participants.

I dont see any reason to blame A6M2 for the loss of the carriers. From the perspective of numbers of aircraft they shot down or damaged in relation to own losses A6M2 performed exceptionally well.
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I don't blame Zeros exclusively. The blame starts from Yamamoto and his staff, the submarine flotilla chief, then goes down through the chain of command.
Purpose of fighters was not to make great victory:loss ratio (that would mean Germany won the ww2), their purpose is to deny the enemy from their goal. American fliers scored their goals.
Let's recall that IJN fighter screen, made up by Zeros, was penetrated by Blenheims, B-17s and B-26, flying without fighter escort.
 
Ok, I see what you meant.
 
Ok, so lets suppose this could happen. Lets suppose such fighter was possible.
Who would make it than ?
Mitsubishi is engaged in process of upgrading Zero, building J2M and until 1943 wont have enough engineers (including Horikoshi) to dedicate to a new project. Besides, Mitsubishi should work hard on replacement for this 1400 HP stopgap, aka they should keep doing what they were doing with A7M, just without Navy "suggestions".
Interestingly Horikoshi wanted initially to built A7M as much faster aircraft than it ended up, with smaller wingspan and wingarea - sort of similar to F8F.

Nakajima had last experience with Naval fighter in mid 30s and new aircraft would most likely require few years of polishing until in a good state.

Kawanishi, Aichi and Kawasaki are companies without any experience in this field

Improving Zero is an insurance in case the new fighter encunters problems during design, production and/or service. It was done by all major ww2 participants.
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Ok, that occupies more resources but could be that way.

The amount of victories in this operation in tasks they were dedicated to, indicates that Zeros did exceptionally well in protecting their own fleet. Better than F4F certainly.
I think you put that blame wrong, fighter is only a machine piloted by a human and directed by other human on board of Aircraft Carrier. With no radar there was no possibility to envision where next wave is coming from, and they were coming from various directions and at various altitudes. SBDs really had some luck. But luck is also needed

Indeed B-26s penetrated it, but at a price of one machine shot down in flames, other carried torpedo attack from too great distance and their fish scored no hits. Then another one was shot down.
In regard to B-17s, they were flying high and entered the scene while Zeros were already fighting Major Henderson SBDs.
 

There is no J2M in my scenario. Mitsubishi designs a next-gen naval fighter, that will be also used from ground bases, and, if we're that desperate, as a floatplane fighter/recon.

Nakajima had last experience with Naval fighter in mid 30s and new aircraft would most likely require few years of polishing until in a good state.
Kawanishi, Aichi and Kawasaki are companies without any experience in this field
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RAF, or any other air force, never used Supermarine's fighter before Spitfire, yet that one went to the greats. Fw 190 - 1st Focke Wulf's fighter, also great. Bf 109 - 1st fighter by BFW. P-38, 1st Lockheed's fighter, turned out to be pretty good. So let's give the japanese designers some credit, they did come out with good stuff more times than not.


As before - only a part of the blame (but still) is with Zero as a fighter aircraft. It was incapable to deal with B-17s, only one of four B-26s was downed before entering the torpedo launch zone, the cannon ammo capacity was insufficient to the point of letting the bombers, that dropped their weapon, to escape. The LMGs won't cut it. No BP glass means rear gunners can still kill or wound the precoius pilots, before we talk about no fuel tank protection that will see the Zero desintegrate if a heavy burst hits home.
The US torpedo bombers were slaughtered because of several things - lousy torpedo launch envelope (heads should've rolled all around Rhode Island and DC because of the torpedo scandal), way too slow TBs on themselves, bad defensive armament, many inexperienced crewmen,next to no escort. Several US squadrons never saw the enemy. So there is more to the loopsided loss of US aircraft than just Zero.
Let's also recall that Zeros were fully unable to forestal any SBD attack, other than from green Henderson's squadron that came too low for real dive bomber, yet too high to somehow hide themselves behind the horizon
The B-17s were coming towards Kaga and Soryu from NW, while Henderson's squadron came from almost opposite direction, the two attacks being separated by quite a distance. Yet Zeros were not capable to climb up to 20000 ft in order to hit the B-17s, that is no single Zero.
 


Holy Mother of God, so how many AT-6 Texan/Harvards rolled out of Inglewood in the time it took the lederhosen wearing Messerschmidt boys there to fit together that 108? 17? 18? Just... Wow...
 
Peter Gunn said:
Holy Mother of God, so how many AT-6 Texan/Harvards rolled out of Inglewood in the time it took the lederhosen wearing Messerschmidt boys there to fit together that 108? 17? 18? Just... Wow...
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There were 15,000 AT-6 produced and 885 Me108. If you ask a company to produce 885 aircraft in 10 years it will be done as in the video, if you want 15,000 in the same time you do it as NA did it.
 
There is no J2M in my scenario. Mitsubishi designs a next-gen naval fighter, that will be also used from ground bases, and, if we're that desperate, as a floatplane fighter/recon.
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Alright, poor Raiden, one of the more interesting designs, but very well. It's your idea.

I give them a lot of credit. Especially that many of them became after the war in some car business or rocket research like Hideo Itokawa.

And it took quite a few years for Supermarine to develop Spitfire and put it into production. Same for Focke Wulf. Developing takes time when your start from the scratch. Look again how long it took Kawanishi to finally make a worthy aircraft from N1K.

It was incapable to deal with B-17s, only one of four B-26s was downed before entering the torpedo launch zone, the cannon ammo capacity was insufficient to the point of letting the bombers, that dropped their weapon, to escape.
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It was incapable to deal with decent formation of B-17s flying at 20,000 feet when all CAP was already engaged much lower by SBDs.
And B-26 was quite fast bomber, racing over the water for torpedo run it they could have been quite challenging for Zeros.

The case with cannon ammo insufficient is true, but so could be said about MG FF in Bf 109s or Hispano cannons in Spitfires II and V, until later models which received greater capacity loads. That certainly though hindered the defensive abilities, as Zeros had to land and rearm once in a while.

No BP glass means rear gunners can still kill or wound the precoius pilots, before we talk about no fuel tank protection that will see the Zero desintegrate if a heavy burst hits home.
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Still few were even shot down by defensive fire.

Many of this things could be said about B5N as well you know, with the exception to torpedoes and crews however. And yet they scored hits in their desperate attack. Despite lower number of aircraft.

And in regard to escort, VT-8 had escort in form of 10 VT-6 Wildcats. Only one to blame for lack of cover at the approach was Lt. James Gray. He also missed their own VT-6's call for assistance minutes later.


Let's also recall that Zeros were fully unable to forestal any SBD attack, other than from green Henderson's squadron that came too low for real dive bomber, yet too high to somehow hide themselves behind the horizon
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Henderson deliberately choose the "skip bombing". He was flying the way he decided to due to limited skills of his unit.
And yes, Zeros failed to intercept SBDs before they managed to drop their bombs (even though shortly after that SBDs suffered losses) as they were already engaged in dealing with VT-6, then materialized attack from VT-3. High above VT-3 were flying VB-3 covered by clouds. Not to mention that VT-3 actually had some escorts that engaged Zeros, and according to Thach he managed to concentrate on him almost a third part of the CAP.
Zeros were simply lower and under continuous action, being spread due to attack from various directions and distances. For a fighters without any kind of vectoring provided by Carrier that is very hard to predict another threat. And Carriers could provide no more details due to absence of radar.

That's not true. First of all the entire CAP was exactly at the mentioned opposite side engaging Henderson.
Second, B-17s actually were attacked and damaged although not seriously by nine Soryu Zeros and few more from Kaga, which went after them in a steep climb and made firing pass. From Shattered Sword :

Again, I see no particular lack of Zeros here as interceptors except for limited ammunition for Type 99 cannons. The true lack was in absence of radar.
 
I would note that the Japanese were adopting 60 round drums at just about the time the Germans and British were giving up on them.
There was actually some overlap but the Germans had shifted to the engine mounted cannon (15mm) with 200 rounds in the Spring of 1941. The British were also moving away from drum feed guns in late 1940 and into 1941. Some aircraft took a bit longer than others, Spitfires getting belt feed guns in Oct 1941.
The Japanese waiting until 1942 to fit a larger drum or mechanized box magazine is rather behind the times.
American pilots complained about Wildcats with 240rpg ( 18 seconds firing time) when they switched to 6 guns. The 20mm cannon on the Zero were good for about 7 seconds. Larger drums were available from before the war if anybody cared to use large bulges over the larger drums.
Using essentially the same armament as a 1940 109E in the summer of 1942 is showing a definite lag (although head and shoulders ahead of the Army)

The delay in Mitsubishi programs due to the head designer being ill just points to the whole Japanese aviation industry being stretched way too thin.
The J2M may have been "interesting" but it was not only an unnecessary complication, it was unnecessarily complicated. Too much was sacrificed in order to get the last 10-15mph out of the design.
With a shortage of design staff trying to use trick engine installations and trick engines just slows things down. In the end (just like the Americans) the extended shaft engine and really pointy cowl on a radial engine were give up as unworkable. Engine design staff working on contrarotating props didn't help speed things along either.
Trying to "out clever" the opposition seldom really works. Americans tried a number of "trick" airplanes (including but not limited to the XP-54, XP-55, XP-56) and all of them "crashed and burned" in a figurative sense. Americans just had enough engineers that these dead end sidetracks didn't actually delay service aircraft (at least not much.)
The Japanese just couldn't afford such side shows no matter how clever/inventive they were.
 
And if Saburo Sakai had bullet proof glass, he may not have sustained near-fatal injuries from defensive fire.
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Pappy Boyington had the known and sturdy F4U with all kinds of protection and yet he and his wingman were shot down in flames.
I am for all the protections, since dead pilot does not fight anymore, but was just pointing that during the Midway operation only few losses were inflicted by defensive gunners.

For a Wildcat six .50 caliber guns were main armament to fire any time. For a Zero there were only two 7.7s, as cannon was considered a weapon to finish the target. Thus if pilot conserved his 20 mm rounds and used them only when he had good firing position, this could be enough to take down 2-3 enemy single engine aircraft.

But absolutely, the low capacity drums were an issue. Luckily for the Japanese 100 round magazines arrived 7 months after Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese just couldn't afford such side shows no matter how clever/inventive they were.
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Indeed, but thats something someone should tell the Navy. They were the ones forming a new programs for new machines.
 
Peter Gunn said:
Holy Mother of God, so how many AT-6 Texan/Harvards rolled out of Inglewood in the time it took the lederhosen wearing Messerschmidt boys there to fit together that 108? 17? 18? Just... Wow...
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And that fuselage construction, with the 'frames 'pressed into the edges of the skins, as opposed to attaching the skins to a jigged frame work, was a very clever method of construction and lent itself easily to the later mass production of the fuselages of the Bf 109, Bf 110, Me 210/410 and even the Me 262.
Of all the German manufacturers BFW/Messerschmitt designs lent themselves most readily to mass production, far more so than for example Supermarine's Spitfire.

That film reflects what you would have seen in a British airframe factory at a similar period, when it was already established that a skilled man hand working parts (plenty of tin snips visible) took from 10 to 50 times longer than a semi skilled man or woman using machinery to accomplish a comparable task. That machinery and tooling costs money and firms need to have an incentive to invest. British firms only got that incentive with the late production schemes following the Anschluss and Munich crisis which guaranteed orders for significant numbers of aircraft.

It was actually worse for the Germans erratic and constantly revised planning (just read the various programmes promulgated through the 1930s) made it difficult for the industry to make any long term plans. After the war started, between September and December 1939 the entire German aircraft industry only produced 1,961 aircraft. This despite a substantial lead in manpower and facilities, not efficiency, that the Germans enjoyed in the mid 1930s. In 1935 German airframe plants employed 51,106 people against Britain's 15,000. For aero engine plants the figures are 17,788 for Germany and 12,000 for Britain.

It was much easier for the US with more than two years warning of what was to come to make plans and preparations for its industry.

Cheers

Steve
 
It is also worth remembering that the British and Canadian production in the first four years of the war was coping with losing campaigns in Norway, France and the Low countries, defending Britain against direct air attacks by day and night, extending bombing attacks into continental Europe, covering a host of maritime demands across the world, establishing (in contrast to the Luftwaffe) a huge aircrew training programme that extended across North America, the Caribbean and Africa, run an extensive Fleet Air Arm, fight in campaigns in North Africa, Greece, Crete, East Africa, Iraq and Syria whilst sending production also to the Soviet Union and helping arm initial USAAF fighter squadrons. Also maintain (poorly) combat air resources in India, Burma and Malaya and later increase Indian support after Japanese attacks. Also support landings and the land campaign in Algeria. Did I leave anything out? Meanwhile with their third hand in their extensive spare time.............

The Luftwaffe (bar minor diversions to help prop up the Italians) carried out four campaigns but consecutively. Namely Poland, the assault in the west which went on to be an air campaign over Britain, swap these resources to the clearance of the Balkans and only then send them to attack the Soviet Union. Of course they had some maritime demands in the NE Atlantic and the White sea and home defence plus a training regime but they could, and did, have to concentrate their air resources to achieve effective numbers in any chosen campaign. Whilst they boosted production in later years this was frittered away in poor pilot training and diluted by having to increasingly fight on multiple fronts. Italy, Russia, Balkans, home defence night and day, the land war in NW Europe.
 

Nobody will deny that early war Bf 109 was hampered by limitation of it's armament. Spitfire received belt-fed cannons by mid/late 1941. The MG FFM and Hispano were with higher MV, so both could be used unison with LMGs installed, not the case for Zero's armament until 1943.
Lowe MV means that a seasoned flier/marksman is needed to use the cannon to the fullest, the seasoned pilots need to be looked after, and it will took time for green pilots to bacame good marksmen, that is if they live ling enough.

Many of this things could be said about B5N as well you know, with the exception to torpedoes and crews however. And yet they scored hits in their desperate attack. Despite lower number of aircraft.
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Why making the exception of torpedoes and crews? Japanese torpedoes were far better than American until late war, meaning they could be launched at higher speed and altitude. That greatly improves bomber's chances to avoid interception/downing, either by fighers of AAA. Seasoned crew will make more hits than inexperienced under same circumstances. Low number of aircraft was attacking single CV, in one 'slice' of time. F4F was no great shakes in raw speed, it was even slower than Zero, and not all US fighters were concentrated over Yorktown when Kates arrived.
B5N was also a newer TB than Devastator.

And in regard to escort, VT-8 had escort in form of 10 VT-6 Wildcats. Only one to blame for lack of cover at the approach was Lt. James Gray. He also missed their own VT-6's call for assistance minutes later.
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The story of US fighters doing escorts went better as war progressed, but at Midway they were not doing a good job. Including VF-6 (VT-6 is torpedo squadron), that lost sight of VT-8 Devastators as they started descend.


Henderson went for glide (shallow 'version' of dive bombing, say 35-50 degrees) bombing, not skip bombing (bomber flies low and fast, drops bombs that bounce on water surface in order to hit ship's side). Lack of engine power between sea level and 20000 ft meant Zero (and F4F for that matter) meant that interception of enemy aircraft above 15000 ft, like SBDs, let alone B-17s, will not be the easy task.


As before - nobody is blaming just Zeroes for the loss of carriers.


That lack of engine power is a major fail. Disballanced weponry, at least in 1942, is another. We've also seen that, once even the small part of US fighter units (and F4F was never rated as equal to the Zero, let alone superior) got they act together, the Zeros went speechless. This is also where lack of protection was felt.
Reliable radios, for all the Zeroes? Really folding wings?[/QUOTE][/QUOTE]
 
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