This is from an Air Classics Article, Aug., 2002 by Lee K. Carr
"RECALLING A LITTLE-KNOWN BATTLE BETWEEN AMERICAN P-38s AND SOVIET YAKS
This mission was flown by the 82nd Fighter Group 95th, 96th and 97th Fighter Squadrons - with the lead squadron being the 95th. Duration of mission was four hours. This mission was a request by the Russians, as a repeat support mission to be flown by the same group. The Russian ground forces had the Germans in retreat and, on the previous missions, the P-38s had done tremendous damage.
The mission was briefed to attack enemy columns and rail movements between Sejenica, Novipasar, Baska and Nitrouica in Yugoslavia but before I comment any further on this mission, I would like to make it clear that Group Commander Colonel C.T. Edwinson, an experienced pilot with more than 4000 hours and a veteran of 27 combat missions, personally led the mission. Some of the information in this article comes from three outgoing messages then confidential and top secret, but now declassified.
The first report was dated 13 November 1944 and was from Allied Forces Headquarters, Caserta, Italy, and directed to the War Department. This report gave an account of the mission after a detailed investigation concerning attack by USAAF Lightnings on a Soviet column in Yugoslavia on 7 November 1944. This report stated, "At about 60 miles southwest of Sejenica, the squadron split up and hit the deck and headed for their respective assignments. Colonel Edwinson's squadron arrived at what he thought to be Novipasar, found the road heavily trafficked and proceeded with his strafing - actually as verified by our camera later, he began his strafing at Krusevac and continued through Cicevan, to Nic." The report continued, "As his squadron completed its strafing and pulled off they were attacked by Red Air Force Yaks and in the first pass one Lightning was shot down. Colonel Edwinson immediately recognized the attackers as Yaks but, in the ensuing airfight before he could disengage and assemble his fighters, another Lightning and two, three or more Yaks were shot down. As his squadron was assembling, the Yak flight leader slid up to him and the two flight leaders confirmed mutual identification. Throughout this time the top cover squadron did not join the fray This was when Col. Edwinson immediately ordered the 95th Squadron to disengage. "It's the Russians, let's get the hell out of here," he radioed. I figure it was about this time that Captain Koldunov must have closed in with Col. Edwinson and flew formation until identities were clearly confirmed and all fighters immediately broke off combat. If this is what happened, it was very courageous. We all know it's rather hard to stop a fight after several blows have been swapped.
I have wondered where the Yaks were when we started strafing. We did more damage on this flight than any strafing mission I was on in my 50 missions.
Of the two P-38s that were lost: One was shot down in flames by a Yak, but we don't know if the second P-38 was shot down by a Yak or ground fire. The two pilots were Lt. Eldon E. "Gene" Coulson and Lt. Phillip Brewer. Lieutenant Keith Armstrong was hit by ground fire which knocked out one Allison, but he returned to base on single engine. Incidentally, during the aerial combat I might add Lt. George A. Bowers, Jr., was chasing a Yak and the pilot did his best to shake the P-38. The Russian did some barrel rolls so Lt. Bowers could only fire at him at the bottom of the roll. Finally, the Yak hit the deck and flew across an airfield in hopes of having the Russian antiaircraft shoot the P-38 off his tail. These were old German tricks but Lt. Bowers, seeing the planes on the airfield beneath him, dropped his nose and strafed across the field. This was never mentioned in any report. Lieutenant Bowers broke off at this time when he heard the Colonel's call.
I didn't know what these fighters were until we returned to our base in Foggia, Italy. We all went through a very special interrogation on an individual basis with the brass from Wing Headquarters. Colonel Edwinson asked us to identify on a map the exact location we thought we had been strafing. I found where I was from a location of a church I kept as a point of reference. I was in the wrong area, but I still contend we could have been led into the wrong valley by strafing this convoy which had advanced too far. It has been commented that the Russians had failed to advise Foggia that, between the previous day's support mission, Russian ground forces had advanced the battle line by 100 kilometers.
We were always, as a rule, three days behind the Russian intelligence, we had very little Russian aircraft identification, and we never had liaison between the air and ground forces involved on any Russian front. I was of the opinion we had a 50-mile line from any of the known Russian lines and after this incident officials set up restrictions prohibiting tactical operations closer than 80 miles from known Soviet positions.
I could never blame Col. Edwinson. I still feel as I look back that such a mission was inevitable sooner or later and the law of averages would catch up with us. The many missions on which we supported the Red Forces, with very heavy German destruction, must not be overlooked."