Glider
Captain
I notice that the 122mm gun impact is numbered 1 and a load of smaller hits are numbered in the 40's to 60's. Wouldn't that imply that they started with the bigger guns and worked their way down, not the other way?
USA and DDR penetration about D25T gun
- Thread starter TempestMKV
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
It seems that this is a completly other turret, than the one with the many holes. The Tiger 2 with the great number of shots had a Zimmerit coating, the one with the 122mm holes numberd 1 and 2 didn't.
btw, the last tank with the 122mm holes looks like a Panther turret...
Regards
thrawn
Last edited:
alejandro_
Airman 1st Class
- 281
- Jul 4, 2005
So, why is always this test referred? Soviets also examined Pz-III and they were extremely impressed by it. The same with Stug or Tiger-I. I do not know whats surprising about Tiger-II problems during Soviet testing and the model was plagued by mechanical problems and even sabotage.
I don't think removing the tracks is going to have much effect on the glacis resistance, to put an example.
Did you read what mkenny said about British Tiger-I tests?
That picture is of a Panthers side turret as far as I can tell Glider, so it doesn't apply to the Tiger.
Referred to by whom? Not by experts that's for sure. They only rightly note that the test was carried out in a poor fashion and that the Soviets had no way of properly maintaining a tank like the Tiger or drivers with any knowledge on driving it. Hence their poor results.
The Pz.III was also a simple tank to operate and maintain, it didn't demand an experienced crew.
Sabotage? AFAIK no Tiger tanks were assembled by slave labour, they had highly skilled labourers for that.
Name the 'experts' who say Soviet tests were flawed.
Absurd. The Soviets had far more experience with 'heavy' tanks than the Germans. They had far bigger tank Armies and had much more experience than the Germans. They did comment on the poor quality of the TII's they had for testing (2) and for the cardinal sin of attacking this great tank they are vilified.
No nation had more experience destroying Tigers than the Soviets. Around 75 % of the Tigers built were destroyed in the East. They did it in spades
Look closer and you will see the one on page 15-17 has not even got a turret.
Rexford and Livingston to name a couple. They mention the odd approach taken by the Soviets, for example by starting out by weakening the glacis by firing 7.62, 8.5 15.2cm shells at the thing only to fire the 12.2cm 10cm gun at it afterwards. This provided flawed results in their opinion.
lol, you're the one being absurd now m_kenny! The Soviets despite what you claim had no way of properly maintaining a tank like the Tiger Ausf.B, it was a far more complex machine than any they had ever built or operated, and also heavier. They had no spare parts for it, they had no trained drivers for it, in short they had ZERO experience operating it! But I don't expect you to understand the importance of this ofcourse..
And as for destroying Tigers in spades, no need to overreact, I think you should check the actual number of Tigers built as-well as the final fates of most of them. You'll probably be more than just a little surprised to see that most Tigers lost weren't so due to direct enemy action.
Duly noted, however the Brits didn't pepper the tank in as unpurposeful a manner as the Soviets. The Brits were actually very keen on getting something out of their tests.
I had a feeling you were going to say that. So far it seems this one book is the only thing you have.
I remember the debates when these two first started going on about the mythical 'shatter gap'. The scientific Forums were full of people taking them to task. Perhaps you were around then?
One of them is a poster over at Tanknet if you are interested.
Name me the other 'experts' that slate the Soviet tests.
Maybe you can now give me the results of the Soviet tests?
To say they are flawed obviously means you have studied them.
What were the Kubinka results for the TII armour?
Yes it would have been much smarter to fire a 122mm round at a target then follow it up with75/85mm rounds - providing they could have avoided the gaping holes left by the 122mm rounds!
They were using it as a target. What on earth has anything else you mention got to do with penetration resistance?
alejandro_
Airman 1st Class
- 281
- Jul 4, 2005
In reality Tiger-II was far more vulnerable in 44/45 than Tiger-I back in 1943. SPzAb 424 was completely wiped out in Poland and in a few days lost all Tiger-II.
Not even to mention that the stuff shown in battlefield.ru is just a part. In Svirin work you can find more data, articulated sight was given positive comments, same with driver position and fire extinguishing systems.
It seems the tank was a struggle for the Germans too, as with proper maintenance, they lost 37 out of 45 on the way to battlefield. Tiger-II was underpowered and its mechanical systems were not up to the weight of the vehicle. Thats the problem of using a medium tank engine and having Hitler asking for armour to be added.
It was simply a far better design.
Go to Jentz (an expert) and read about the use of "semidiluted" personnel during tank production, or engine's tendency to burn. SchJgdPz 653 reports also mention that HL 230 engines came with sand in oir filters and stuff like that.
Jentz book provides a whole list of "small problems" like exhaust system badly designed and causing fires, weak tracks...
alejandro said:
Only problem with that theory is that the Germans didn't provide proper maintenance for the Tiger, and that because they simply couldn't. There wasn't enough spare parts, and shortages in fuel oil meant that the tanks often had to run with too low an oil level for extended periods of time, greatlly wearing on the engine transmission. And this affected the whole German armoured force, the reliability of tanks such as the Pz.IV, which up until 1944 had served as a very reliable tank, suddenly hit rock bottom and proved worse than that of the Tiger tank battalions.
In short, that the Tiger Tiger II were big, slow and unreliable pillboxes is pure fabrication and myth, it has no basis in reality. Both were very mobile tanks that if properly maintained were as reliable as the other tanks in service, as proven the few times when they actually got regular maintenance.
That having been said it is true that the final drive wasn't ideal for a 70 ton tank, but it worked just fine when an experienced driver was behind the wheel, which is what matters. You don't put a cesna pilot behind the controls of a Harrier jumpjet for the same reason.
Last edited:
And I had a feeling you would grasp at straws by dismissing them as amateurs when infact they know more about metallurgic science than any one of us here.
Ah so now you don't think I know about the Soviet metallurgic tests done with the Tiger's armour or what?
That is about the most ridiculous counter argument I have heard in a loooong time.
And so now you automatically assume I was only talking about that one and only tank? For your information they drove the tank as-well m kenny, and they described it as very unreliable as it broke down after just a short stroll. Problem is the driver had no clue how to properly drive the thing, and the soviets had no clue how to maintain it either.
That's rich! Someone is getting desperate I see.Oh btw, regarding the two last pictures shown by m kenny of the #25 entry exit hole: #25 entry exit hole was inflicted by a single 8.8cm PzGr.39/43 projectile fired from a KwK43 at the tank from 400m away. The projectile went straight through the turret at both ends, penetrating a combined 285mm of RHA armour.
alejandro_
Airman 1st Class
- 281
- Jul 4, 2005
Myth? you got a source for that? lets see what the book "Combat History of German Tiger Tank Battalion 503 in World War II", by Franz-Wilhelm Lochmann and Richard Freiherr von Rosen:
The maneuverability of the Tiger was seriously inadequate. The most significant contributor to that deficiency was the low power to weight ratio of 10 horsepower / ton (T-34 = 18 hp/ton.) The inmediate consequence of that deficiency was a very low march speed (a theoretical 38 km/hr, which was never actually attained in practice). Ten km/hr was the rule in driving cross country.
Page 22, but there is a whole section. This by the way refers to Tiger-I.
I simply told you (as you seem unaware of the fact) that their conclusions were hotly disputed.
I also asked for the other 'experts' who said the Soviet tests were useless.
Can you please provide another source confirming this claim.
Until such time as you supply the information from those tests then I am unable to give an informed answer. Perhaps you can end the speculation and share your info?
So you also have the detailed automative test results as well?
Please share the conclusions. Failing that do you have the Soviet Archive reference number so we can check ourselves.
No, I have plenty more
Alejandro,
Franz is refering to the early Tiger Ausf.E's which featured 600 hp HL210 P45 engine and suffered from numerous teething problems. Later versions used the 700 hp HL230 P45 engine and had many of the earlier teething problems worked out, and cross country speed was 20 km/h.
But as already explained in another thread, a tanks mobility is not determined by how much horsepower is available pr. ton, A LOT of other things determine the actual mobility of a tank, such as the amount of torque available and how it is transferred to the tracks, ground pressure, suspension design etc etc. And it might surprise you to know that the Tiger Tiger II were both capable of negotiating larger obstacles steeper gradients than the Sherman.
And I've got plenty of sources, my primary being Thomas L. Jentz.
You can actually read a lot on the Tiger's mobility here:
PzKpfw VI TIGER I
The info presented there is the same as in Jentz's books, and much of it is actually taken directly from Jentz. Note the operational percentage from May 44 to March 45, the Tiger tanks actually in general proving more reliable than any other German tank then in service.
Franz is refering to the early Tiger Ausf.E's which featured 600 hp HL210 P45 engine and suffered from numerous teething problems. Later versions used the 700 hp HL230 P45 engine and had many of the earlier teething problems worked out, and cross country speed was 20 km/h.
But as already explained in another thread, a tanks mobility is not determined by how much horsepower is available pr. ton, A LOT of other things determine the actual mobility of a tank, such as the amount of torque available and how it is transferred to the tracks, ground pressure, suspension design etc etc. And it might surprise you to know that the Tiger Tiger II were both capable of negotiating larger obstacles steeper gradients than the Sherman.
And I've got plenty of sources, my primary being Thomas L. Jentz.
You can actually read a lot on the Tiger's mobility here:
PzKpfw VI TIGER I
The info presented there is the same as in Jentz's books, and much of it is actually taken directly from Jentz. Note the operational percentage from May 44 to March 45, the Tiger tanks actually in general proving more reliable than any other German tank then in service.
Last edited:
m kenny, grow up and get over your obsession. I have grown sick and tired of your childish games further demonstrated by your desperate attempts to support your ridiculous claims by simply posting a few pics of destroyed tanks as if that is proof enough. You are only showcasing the argumentative skills of a child.
If you wish to know what the Soviets concluded it is a simple matter of clicking yourself to this very well known place: Was the Tiger really "King?" - THE RUSSIAN BATTLEFIELD
That site has been up for years upon years, and the content within for even longer. Much of the information on the site has been disputed and criticized as highly biased by many experts, as you undoubtedly know as a member of the Axis History Forum but are unwilling to admit.
That having been said I am through with you m kenny, you will see no further responses from me to you, it only ends in conflicts every single time anyway and the mods here have mentioned that more than once.
If you wish to know what the Soviets concluded it is a simple matter of clicking yourself to this very well known place: Was the Tiger really "King?" - THE RUSSIAN BATTLEFIELD
That site has been up for years upon years, and the content within for even longer. Much of the information on the site has been disputed and criticized as highly biased by many experts, as you undoubtedly know as a member of the Axis History Forum but are unwilling to admit.
That having been said I am through with you m kenny, you will see no further responses from me to you, it only ends in conflicts every single time anyway and the mods here have mentioned that more than once.
Last edited:
Lets compare the Sherman Tiger B in terms of maneuverability on the battlefield:
Tiger Ausf.B:
Max fording Depth = 1.6 m
Max vertical Obstacle = 0.85 m
Max trench crossing = 2.5 m
Max gradient climbing = 35 degrees
Minimum turning radius = 2.08 m (i.e. Pivoting)
Ground pressure = 0.76 kg/cm^2
Ground clearance = 0.5 m
Average cross country speed = 20 km/h
Top speed = 41.5 km/h
Sherman M4A3:
Max fording Depth = 0.91 m
Max vertical Obstacle = 0.61 m
Max trench crossing = 2.3 m
Max gradient climbing = 30 degrees
Minimum turning radius = 19 m
Ground pressure = 1.07 kg/cm^2
Ground clearance = 0.43 m
Average cross country speed = 20 km/h
Top speed = 48 km/h
Tiger Ausf.B:
Max fording Depth = 1.6 m
Max vertical Obstacle = 0.85 m
Max trench crossing = 2.5 m
Max gradient climbing = 35 degrees
Minimum turning radius = 2.08 m (i.e. Pivoting)
Ground pressure = 0.76 kg/cm^2
Ground clearance = 0.5 m
Average cross country speed = 20 km/h
Top speed = 41.5 km/h
Sherman M4A3:
Max fording Depth = 0.91 m
Max vertical Obstacle = 0.61 m
Max trench crossing = 2.3 m
Max gradient climbing = 30 degrees
Minimum turning radius = 19 m
Ground pressure = 1.07 kg/cm^2
Ground clearance = 0.43 m
Average cross country speed = 20 km/h
Top speed = 48 km/h
Last edited:
This is a classic case where looking at the actual numbers gives you a clearer picture of the situation.
For the West in May-Sept 1944 Jentz gives figures of 67-98% readiness for the Tigers.
However if you cross check this with the information given in Zetterling for SS 101, SS 102 and Heer 503 you get an entirely different result.
For SS 101 (using only those figures that give an In service/In repair figure and thus ignoring all the written off tanks) you get a high of 80% readiness for 1st June but then they were not in action.
From the day they first entered combat then the figure goes as low as 0 (none) to 20 tanks available. This means a readiness rate of 80% down to 35% (ignoring the periods when no Tigers were available which would drag the average right down)
Note the figures are arrived at by adding together the total of tanks in service and in repair. The destroyed tanks are ignored that is why you get '20' as 80% of '25' rather than '20' which is 45% 0f 45 which is the full strenght figure for SS 101.
SS 101 80% -35% readiness
For SS 102 the figures fluctuate from 69%-40% readiness.
Heer 503 range from 78%-32% readiness.
Do the maths with Zetterling's tables and it averages out at 55-60%. The numbers are all there any anyone is able to double check. Unfortunately Jentz gives no references for his data so I am unable to comment on his conclusions.
I do know of the site however I was under the impression you had the full results of these tests. The site has only the briefest details and not enough information for anyone to reach a firm conclusion. Your confidence in your claims assured me you must be in possesion of much greater detail or even the report itself. It appears I was mistaken.
I beg to differ. There have been a number of sustained attacks of the Russian site and its information. Some years back there was an organised attempt by members of the old Achtung Panzer Site (no longer running) to close it down. Many wild claims were made such as all the photos of destroyed Panthers ect were fakes and had the holes added after printing. This was shown to be an invention and in the end 1 (one) photo was shown to be a fake and it was removed. There are a few threads over at AHF about the Russian site but I saw no experts condeming it. Quite a few people got upset with the Tiger II test results and to this day there are those who try and claim they are faked or manipulated. It would seem this crusade is still active.
alejandro_
Airman 1st Class
- 281
- Jul 4, 2005
Not really, it's a general comment. As I said there are more sections dealing with these problems. No HL 230 developed 700CV. Nominal value was 690CV but this was at max regime (3000rpm). Risk of fire was just too high and reduced to 2500rpm. This would give 600CV, not very healthy for a 70 ton tank. Read Jentz:
Maximum speed for the Tiger-I decreased to 37.8km/h and for the Tiger-II to 34.6km/h after November 1943 when HL 230 motor was regulated not to exceed 2500rpm.
Tiger-I and II combat tactics, by Jentz
The Tiger values are simply wrong.
Not really, Jentz trilogy on Tiger is far better.
Anyway, Tigers were operated in independent battalions because they demanded much more maintenance and were far more complicated than other tanks used in Panzer divisions. As mkenny pointed out (excellent message), availability was higher very often because Tigers saw less combat. Some more information.
Soldiers of the fuel section of the battalion during a formation. These soldiers were kept very busy satisfying the "thirst" of a Tiger [I}, which consumed 500 liters of fuel for every 500 kilometers of cross country movement. (Pag 219)
By the way, that value 500 litres/ 500 kms is what the Russians measured in Kubinka.
A march unit composed of the 2nd Company, Tiger Tank Battalion 503, in the spring of 1943. The Tigers take a maintenance halt. Maintenace halts were proscribed for every two hours of march and lasted thirty minutes. (Pag 226)
The combat history of German tank battalion 503 in World War 2
More
At 1000 hours on 9 July 1944, the battalion was ordered to conudct a road march to Deguciai, a distance of 50 kilometers.[...] The battalion after-action report stated:
Towards 1900 hours, the combat elements of the 2d and 3d Companies arrived in the sector ordered with a large number of road march break-downs (motor damage, running gear damage). These were bound to occur as a result of the high temperature adn the long march distance. Of the 22 Tigers that originarlly participated in the road march, only five Tigers from the 2d Company and three Tigers from the 3d Company were combat ready.
This meant that 64 percent of the Tigers broke down during a 50-kilometer roadmarch along a primary road
Finally, some information on quality:
"IS-2 vehicles, most likely from the 13th Heavy Tank Regiment, skirmished with the Tigers from 424 sHPzAbt near Lisow. The advancing Tigers were greeted by powerful and accurate fire from tanks and ant-tank weapons. The armor, made from lower quality steel (due to problems with raw materials) could not withstand the 122mm, 25 kilogram projectiles and the attack broke down. The battalion commander, Major Saemisch was killed and numerous tanks were lost."
Kielce 1945" by Norbert Baczyk.
