- Thread starter
-
- #61
Watching this video, I keep imaginating how would be the hypotetical missions from the US to Germany in the B-36. =D
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruE8yhkHke8
Watching this video, I keep imaginating how would be the hypotetical missions from the US to Germany in the B-36. =D
Ok. I'll throw in the towel and say that Britain might have been able to stop B17 and B24 raids.(Personally I still think Britain didn't have the manpower or indutrial power to stand up to USAAF bombing but I will stop arguing) But Japan couldn't. B17's and B24's were able to defend themselves against Japanese fighters. Without German assistance Italy couldn't have stopped them and I don't think the Soviet Union could either.
before your Reich could play with its fanciful toys it would be a glass parking lots care of the nuclear weaponsThe B-36A was not a service ready aircraft, being unarmed and also not having a particularly high service or opperational ceiling. The B-36B was a little better in terms of performance, though not particularly the early engine rated versions, this being a 1948 aircraft. Hence the uarmed B-36A, if it had of been armed with say an improvised General Electric System borrowed from the B-29 was still within the upper interception envelope of even ordinary German fighters such as the Me 109K4 and He 162 while the far latter B-36B within the envelope of aircraft such as the Ta 152H-1
Of course if Britain had fallen and if the B-36 was the only means to attack the Reich then it would certainly have been somewhat accelerated, though its hard to see the R-4360 being accelerated.
I suspect the fate of the B-36 in 1946 would have been terrible: bisection by the EMW Wasserfall Surface to Air Missile which was designed to handle a 2G manouvering target at around 48,000ft. Most of the 'ducks were lined up' in terms of guidance for this missile: the Germans having selected beam riding over command guidance due to its resistance to jamming.
From my understanding the B-36's performance was exaggerated by SAC to bluff the soviets, much as the soviets tried to bluff the number of missiles and bombers they had.
Not true although it was a maintenance nightmare.From my understanding the B-36's performance was exaggerated by SAC to bluff the soviets, much as the soviets tried to bluff the number of missiles and bombers they had.
"Worked fine" is IMO far too broad a stroke of the paint brush. The 20th initially respected potential heavy fighter opposition enough to employ very high altitude attacks, These stratosphere heights made interception extremely difficult for the handfuls (with a few exceptions) of interceptors that were thrown up against them. Also by the time the bombardments began the Japanese airforces had been well worn down. It has also been mentioned that the Japanese were hoarding aircraft as a reserve for a massive pulse against the expected invasion of the Home Islands. This makes comparisons with European conditions largely an Apples and Oranges thing.
So while combat losses were minimized by these factors, it was balanced by less than stellar results from the bombing campaign. Hence LeMay's switch to low alt night attacks. Therein lies another point. If the Self Defending Bomber concept was even half right......why didn't LeMay send in the bombers at low alt during the day?
It is true that Germany's air defense net was light years ahead of Japan's, but not to the point where someone, even a LeMay was going to recklessly fly over enemy territory. They also worked hard to take bases allowing fighter escorts by long range fighters.
Another point worth considering, but probably outside of the scope of this thread considering its about defensive armament, is finding the target. The RAF's poor results led them to 'area bombing' and again, the Britsh warned the USAAF about pinpoint attacks, but the Americans were convinced they had the answer in the Norden bombsight, but their navigation to the target was initially as poor as the RAF's, so while they might have had a brilliant bomb sight, if they couldn't find their way to the target, they were stuffed.
This may be stretching several points. The RAF were led to area bombing not just because of finding the target area, bout also because there was no capability to find a specific target in darkness, nor an ability for the bombardier to locate/track and release optically. The lack of 8th AF ability 'to navigate' was largely due to inexperience and inadequate training. LeMay studied the problem and led the lead crew of best squadron navigator/bombadier and pilots to find and bomb the target - with the rest of the squadron dropping on them.
The RAF pioneered and adaopted radio aided navigation and radar bombing - which worked fine for large targets with distinctive radar features. The USAAF trailed, adopted OBOE and H2S with mixed success when cloud cover prevented optical acquisition by the bomb site. In this comparison the Brits had superior results. However when compared to results against targets that were acquired by the B-17/B-24 bombsite, the USAAF results were much superior to RAF night area bombing.
It was the Luftwaffe that led the way in this aspect of bombing with their X-Gerat, Y-Gerat and Knickebein equipment in 1940 and 1941 that proved their superiority in finding their targets. It wouldn't be for another two years or more before the RAF and the Americans would achieve the same degree of accuracy in reaching their targets.
Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the targetAmericans wer finding targets just fine after several months operations in ETO. Speer was far more concerned about daylight strategic bombing than RAF area night bombing.
Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.
Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target
If you compare RAF night bombing results versus USAAF radar controlled PFF bombing in 10/10 cloud cover - yes. Clear visibility Norden versus H2S RAF unequivocally - No.
Having said this, the RAF developed a better daylight sight than the Norden and achieved excellent results with it during daylight missions after D-Day.
Finding is one thing hitting another , I`ve always been given to understand that the Bomber Command was more proficient at hitting the target
How in gods name would wind affect radio beams , thats why they invented ruddersThe bulk of Bomber commands bombs were miles of target. Even late war with oboe being used to lay markers and a clear night for those markers to be aimed at the majority of bombs fell around 2 miles from target, as soon as there was any cloud accuracy would deteriorate by miles. The accuracy you speak of can only be justified in terms of a few special raids, which are over emphasised because they are so spectacular and also propaganda. Propaganda could could come engineers and companies just trumping their product or it could be organised. Daylight bombing was still the most accurate method by far, so long as the visibillity was very good. Some semblance of accuracy could be maintained at up to 50% cloud cover with simultaneous use of H2X ground mapping radar (a bombardier and radar opperator working together to ofset bomb). Once the cloud cover exceded 50% bombing accuracy deteriorated drastically out to several miles again.
For instance oboe sent a dot/dash sequence to tell the pilot that he was either +/-17 meters from the NOMINAL centerline of his bomb run. In other words the width of the path that was used to guide the pilot was 2 x 17m (ie 34m about 40 yards). This was latter misconstrued as meaning that Oboe's accuracy was +/-17m. In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.
In fact the centerline could be of by much greater distances, while wind drift and surveying errors would add for inaccuracies. A good system nevertheless but its accuracy was measured in hundreds of yards not dozens.
How in gods name would wind affect radio beams , thats why they invented rudders
Pb is spot on. This system was very similar to the first non-precision instrument approach systems and in a cross wind you "crabbed" to compensate for this, just like you would when tracking this aural signal or when tracking an NDB.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I was under the impression that the bulk of RAF Bomber Command bombed visually, with the pathfinders using Oboe to mark the target with flares. A bombing leader would direct the bombing and call in corrections for wind drift or poor marker placement.
.