USAAF/RAF vs VVS 1945

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As this thread has developed since first posting there are a few things that I hadn't initially considered that would I believe play into the course of such a conflict and affect how successful the western allies would be in gaining control of the air in the 60 day window. These are in no order. Kudos to the posters who originally made these points.

1. The VVS would have a significant range and endurance deficit and would be unable to operate outside of the air coverage of the western allies. Where the USAAF/RAF would be able to operate bases well outside of the VVS, the VVS bases would all be well within reach of USAAF/RAF forces. This would impact operation staging and recovery. As had happened with the LW in 1944/45 the endurance of western fighter aircraft would also be a factor given the ability to loiter over target until VVS aircraft had to return to base and becoming vulnerable during landing and on the ground.

2. Recon - At the start of such a conflict the USAAF/RAF would have a comprehensively detailed map and aerial photography record of the entirety of Europe extending from France to the eastern Polish border. Every railing and potential route for supplies would have been mapped giving the Western Allies a significant intelligence advantage of the USSR. Airbases, roads, bridges, rail lines, chokepoints, etc. It would be difficult for the USSR to develop a surprise route for any material moving towards the front.

3. Radar - This was brought up before, but in the context of air control and air defenses. We shouldn't overlook the role radar also played the accuracy of bomber navigation especially in night bombing. While its not precision bombing, it would have an impact on the ability to target larger things such as airfields, supply concentrations/depots, and coal bunkers.

4. Radar 2 - I mentioned this earlier, but I believe proximity fuzing is underrated in its impact on the war. If such a conflict had begun, certainly proximity fuzed AA would be a factor, but proximity fuzed artillery and bombs would be especially impactful. If one were bombing large troop concentrations, PF bombs would increase effectiveness by several factors. The tendency of the USSR armies to employ large concentrated masses of artillery/tanks/men to overwhelm points of attack would also make them vulnerable to carpet bombing and PF bombs would be especially effective.

5. Close Air Support - Not being very knowledgeable about this, but my understanding is that there had been significant advances in close air support technology and operations by the western allies by the end of the war. Would this be realizable against the USSR/VVS in contested air space, or does this require control of the air?

Just my additional thoughts. Take them for what they are worth.
 
Good question but there are several variables here I need to ponder. Was Stalin aware of the A-bomb being built? Probably yes. If it did not exist, would his post war plans be different? What was Truman's feelings about Stalin prior to Potsdam Conference? Would he mistrust him, and not being backed up by the A-bomb, would he, and the military, be prepared for aggressive acts of Stalin in Germany? What was the impact of the Soviet Union losing 8 to 10 million soldiers in their four year bloody fight with Germany. What was the status of their military equipment after the fall of Berlin.

In the book "The Candy Bombers", it said that in 1948, when Russia blockaded Berlin, that if Russia attacked the west, the military estimated that it would take them two weeks to reach the Atlantic/English Channel. Of course this was after the major disarmament of the West military, setting up for an embarrassment in Korea a few years later.
 
-Two points I didn't see mentioned above: the Allies can also attack the Soviet Union from the Pacific. Perhaps some of the Soviet industrial might that moved east after Operation Barbarossa kicked off would be in B-29 range. Another, albeit possibley minor, consideration would be the loss of Allied Lend-Lease supplies: hardware, spare parts and food.
 
I have never understand what the western alleis were afraid from the soviet armed forces in 1945. And from that fear gave to stalin half the europe.
I would give vvs bomber and close support units 15 days against the western alleis and the fighter units another 15 days. After that time frame vvs would have ceased to exist
Vvs was unable to stop the He 177 s in 1944 and only lack of fuel stoped the heinkels. Massive raids by b17s, b24s, a26, mosquitos would eliminate the ground structure of the vvs from the 1st week. Even if the western bombers would operate without escort, soviet fighters had neither the altitude performance, neither the armament , nor the armor to engage the bomber streams effectively.
Sturmovik raids would be located by western radars while still well into soviet territory. Then would face Tempests, F8fs, Furys, spitfires 22, all with 4x20mm cannons. The soviet fighters would have to face radar controlled p51s with 150 grade fuel.
Vvs ,in 1945, against the kurland pocket was operating 2000 aircrafr. Lw had only the crippled jg54 operating a few dozens ancient and obsolete fw 190A8s, still the vvs failed to destroy the supply ports, and the pocket in general! Ju 52s were operating in anti mine operations till the very last day! How then, vvs would face the combined allied forces? And possibly some ex lw units.
In my opinion, stalin, has been the greatest pocker player in history. He had 20 million deads from the germans, 2 million deads from his own hands, a destroyed economy, no atomic bomb, and still , somehow, split equally the profits with the americans , that had everything in their favor
 
Glider said:
Russian fighters were short ranged, lacked altitude performance, often poorly armed and would be at a serious disadvantage trying to attack the B17's, B24's and inevitably the B29's that could have been brought to bear.[/QUOTE
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Russia was a threat before the German capitulation. In fact, after the signing of surrender documents in Reims, France, the Russians demanded that another set of documents be signed in Berlin. The US did not give Stalin anything that had not already been negotiated for at one of the various Conferences in Cairo or Tehran. The world was carved up before the end of the war in Europe. Stalin knew about the atomic bomb but acted unimpressed when told. General Patton dislike the Russians and said the Russians were a threat. After the surrender of Reinhard Gehlen to the Americans, along with part of the staff of Fremde Heere Ost [Foreign Armies East], and the recovery of German aerial reconnaissance photos of Russia, Stalin was at a disadvantage. The Americans would have reactivated parts of the German Army and the Waffen SS, who had some experience fighting the Russians. German radar could supplement whatever they had.
 
The P63 was certainly a threat but the P51 held a number of advantages in particular speed at altitude which is critical when attacking heavy bombers, plus of course spares would quickly become a problem if the conflict had dragged on.
 
Another problem for the VVS is fuel, a lot of the lend-lease aircraft are dependent to greater or lesser degree on 100/130 fuel.
The P-63 is using 100/130 plus water injection.
Trying to add more lead alone to Russian fuel isn't going to get the required performance even if it does help somewhat. It is also going to require more spark plug changes and cleaning (which was never 100% effective).
How much fuel the Soviets had stockpiled is subject to question. several weeks worth or several months?
 

I think one of the great misunderstandings in the post-war era is comprehending how large the Soviet Army was at the end of the war and how the sheer size threatened the western allies. If I recall correctly, 80% of German forces were engaged in fighting in the eastern front and were still significantly outnumbered. Numerical superiority is a difficult factor to overcome even with major technological advantages. If a conflict had begun in 1945, the Russians had enough resources to win a short conflict of attrition, especially when they could overwhelm opposing ground forces. I think the assumption that western airpower could achieve dominance within a short (two week) period of time is overly optimistic. Soviet weaknesses related to supply lines would need extended disruption to impact front line troops and the Soviet's had demonstrated great ingenuity at overcoming difficult challenges.

The loss of lend-lease would severely hamper Soviet forces in the long run, but probably not before a Soviet offensive could secure the entirety of the European continent. Control of the air prior to that would be essential for a different outcome.
 

Just some remarks.
1 and 3 - VVS airfields would be under threat both day and night. Attrition will be in the air and on the ground. Night bombing could be bigger threat, probably. If Luftwaffe could disable Poltava airbase in 1944 in just one air raid, Bomber Command with all their experience and equipment would certainly be able to do something similar.
2 - and VVS has no means to stop air-recon operations, neither over occupied territory nor over the USSR. It's like the 1950s without MiG-15/17.
5 - probably it would be this "CAS contest" which will be the most difficult for Allies to win. Equipment and communication are probably better on the Allied side, but the Soviets have an overwhelming advantage in numbers at the start.
 
Snautzer01 said:
How about the aircraft carriers? I do not think the S.U. could compete even a bit.
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They don't have to if they stay in Europe.
In 1945-46 the Soviet Union has very little ability to put subs into the North Atlantic or even the North sea and the Soviet Union has about zero ability to put any surface ships there.
However British and American carriers can not do a lot to influence a land war in Europe either. If they get close enough in the Baltic or Adriatic they are in range of Soviet land based air.

With the Allies having thousands of planes available from land bases the Carriers really don't bring much to the table.
 
one important results of a follow-on to a Russian attack would be that they would have never received the Nene jet engine which would delay the development of the post German WWII type engines, generation 2?, several years.

If the war started immediately with the Russians pressing pass the agreed to lines, Patton would jump with joy! The air would be swarming with fighters and bombers from both sides. I don't think the Russians could match the performance of the hoard of P-51Ds and P-47D-25s with high octane fuel, and certainly not much of a match for the P-47Ms (the Ns were probably in the Pacific), P-51Hs (not too many of these) or the late model Griffon powered Spits. Then the second wave of Western fighters that the Russians would have no answer for, P-80s, and Meteor IIIs would start appearing overhead. I don't think the Russians would be able to turn German jet technology around fast enough and even that was behind the American and British jet engine technology. It would be a bloody hard fought battle, but I think American and British fighters would dominate the airspace 100 miles past the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) to the detriment of Russian infantry and armor.
 
Sail to the black sea.
 
During the intervention of the British, French, US, and Japan into the Russian Civil War, at least one British unit mutinied. Would it be too optimistic to assume that units of the USAAF/RAF would be able to maintain morale and discipline after completing the only mission they'd been given for the past several years when they're told to attack an erstwhile ally for no apparent reason except ideology?
 
Snautzer01 said:
How about the aircraft carriers? I do not think the S.U. could compete even a bit.
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Agree that the USSR would not be able to compete with USN air power at sea, however, in the premise that the conflict is critical on the ground in the first 60 days, I don't see how you could get carrier forces in theater in time to be effective. In my opinion, carrier forces would be more important if the western allies were able to maintain a foothold on the European continent and later had to rely on additional air coverage to protect supply convoys that were forced to operate under a VVS air umbrella. Another thought is that if the western allies did hold part of the continent, a significant fleet presence would be needed to support any kind of flanking invasion from the sea.
 
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