USAAF/RAF vs VVS 1945

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Sail to the black sea.

This would be a hard "no" unless the western allies were incredibly secure in the ability to control the straights between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. All it would take is a few sunken ships in the straights and your fleet is isolated or worse stuck in the straights. Given the location of Soviet forces at the end of the war, its more likely that the USSR would overrun the straights and use it for warm weather access to the sea. Again, assuming the USSR felt secure enough to send ships through.
 
I think the USA and the British would have more the enough naval power to secure the straight. USSR would ot have been capable to stop it with their navy. If trying it would have been slaughtered by a force not only fastly superior but also with years of battle experience. Not only ship to ship or air to ship but also big scaled landings. Also any shipping merchant or Navy would now face a well equipped submarine force around all of their ports. Take Crimea establish runways capable of the heavy bombers and now you can attack anything.
 

At the end of the war in Europe, Soviet troops were stationed in Bulgaria on the Turkish border about 150 miles from the straight, well within range of the VVS. Its hard to imagine that either the Royal or United States Navies would risk sending their fleets into that environment. As another poster stated, at the very least the Soviets would mine the straight. Given its strategic importance I have no doubt that the Soviets would invade to control access to the Black Sea.

Additionally, the Dardanelles would present an additional bottleneck along with the Bosphorus. Combined, its around 100 miles of narrow straights for any navy to navigate.
 
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I think that you are missing one point, i.e. that the USAAF and RAF would be defending not attacking, and few units in History have ever mutinied and refused to defend, when faced with a surprise attack
 
Actually, many of the American troops had been fighting for less than a year, June, 44 to May, 45. This is more likely to be a problem for the Russians since they had been fighting for four years and have been butchered, 8-10 million dead.
 
Assuming that the British and Americans were not deliberately running down their ammunition stocks as the war ended (they were slowing down aircraft production as they could see the writing on the wall) they have a large advantage over the Russians in artillery, especially compared to the Germans. The Germans were in an almost chronic state of ammunition shortages.
The British and Americans were rather generous with their ammunition allocations.

The Soviets were well known for their use of massed artillery but a lot of their fire plans were rather inflexible. British and American fire plans were much more flexible and sometimes junior officers were able to command a formidable array of artillery. The forward observers were given a lot of latitude in asking for guns to fire in support of a certain mission or against a certain target. Should a target be deemed important enough a forward observer could sometimes call on every gun in range with vry little dealy.
In part this was enabled by the widespread use of radios in the western armies. radios in the British army had gone from around 40 per division in 1939 to around 1000 per division in late 1944/early 1945.
The Russians might not be prepared for the intensity of artillery support or the intensity of air support the western allies could bring to bear on a fairly consistent basis.
 
I think that you are missing one point, i.e. that the USAAF and RAF would be defending not attacking, and few units in History have ever mutinied and refused to defend, when faced with a surprise attack

The OP mentioned nothing about who was attacking. There seems to be some people in the West who felt, even as soon as 1945, that doing so would be a good idea.
 
The OP mentioned nothing about who was attacking. There seems to be some people in the West who felt, even as soon as 1945, that doing so would be a good idea.

Greetings SwampYankee,

That is correct, I did not outline who would be the aggressor in such a conflict. The paper I read that inspired this what-if scenario considered a range of possible scenarios, the USSR as aggressor, the US as aggressor without the UK, a joint US/UK aggression. It was pointed out that each of the scenarios that had a distinct aggressor were considered to be the least likely given a number of factors such as political will, support of the people, perceived advantages and weaknesses, commitment to the completion of the war in Asia. The scenario that was deemed to have the most likely outcome of a conflict between eastern and western allies was that a conflict would arise from inadvertent clashes between the USSR & US/UK as the two armies were engaged in conflict in close proximity to one another, escalating tensions due to these clashes, political missteps, and theater level misjudgments (think Patton gone rogue). The original post was written to avoid the "who started it" narrative and focus instead on how such a conflict proceed once a conflict had begun. The original paper proposed the following:

1) The overwhelming advantage in strength and offensive combat skill would give them an immediate advantage on the ground against the western allies.
2) The western allies would have around 60 days to stabilize the front, or risk losing the European Continent, assuming that Soviet forces would advance at an average of 10 miles per day or less.
3) Weaknesses in the Soviet Army would take time to become apparent. Such as: the immediate end of Lend-Lease would take weeks to months to be fully impact Soviet operations. the length of the supply chain could be exploited by the Western Allies but would take time to fully disrupt, the irreplaceability of Soviet transportation (US made trucks/locomotives) would take time as well.
4) The Western Allies air forces had distinct advantages over the VVS not least of which was the capacity to wage a strategic offensive campaign at an altitude that was disadvantageous to the Soviet forces.

There were more, but it has been quite a while since I was in college.

Thanks for your comment.
 

Good points and I appreciate the clarification. Taking them one at a time

1) The overwhelming advantage in strength and offensive combat skill would give them an immediate advantage on the ground against the western allies.
The part about the strength is unquestionable, but the second part regarding offensive combat skill is marginal at best. Considering the numerical and material strength that the Russian army had over the German forces both on land and in the air they didn't do well. They took time to plan and massed attacks were the norm right until the end and the initial assaults often failed. The allies despite being smaller in many ways to the Russians were at least the equal of the German forces and were far better equipped logistically and had greater flexibility in thier ability to move and deploy what forces they had.
2) The western allies would have around 60 days to stabilize the front, or risk losing the European Continent, assuming that Soviet forces would advance at an average of 10 miles per day or less.
This I agree with you which is why in my first posting I did say that Russia had to win quickly or face serious and potentially catastrophic setbacks. The question is could they? I would argue that in terrain which is frequently built up with lots of large villages and towns which are idea for a defending force that is unlikely. They would almost certainly slow down and break up an attacking force.
3) Weaknesses in the Soviet Army would take time to become apparent. Such as: the immediate end of Lend-Lease would take weeks to months to be fully impact Soviet operations. the length of the supply chain could be exploited by the Western Allies but would take time to fully disrupt, the irreplaceability of Soviet transportation (US made trucks/locomotives) would take time as well.
Again correct and again unarguable apart from the point about how long it would take to disrupt the supply chain. The storage depots supporting any assult wouldn't take long to identify with the Allies PR capability and I am sure they would have been target no 1. The part about spares I do agree with.
4) The Western Allies air forces had distinct advantages over the VVS not least of which was the capacity to wage a strategic offensive campaign at an altitude that was disadvantageous to the Soviet forces.
The biggest advantage that I believe the Allied air forces had was the flexibility and speed with which it could be deployed. I would have expected the first airstrikes to have been launched with two to three days of an assult.
 
The Russians might not be prepared for the intensity of artillery support or the intensity of air support the western allies could bring to bear on a fairly consistent basis.
I read on Wikipedia that the Germans were not particularly impressed by the American soldiers (although the Germans that ran into the 101st Airborne at Bastogne would probably not agree), or armor, but feared American artillery. I had also read somewhere that one of the German comments on American artillery was that they could see a soldier pick up a radio and all of a sudden artillery would start falling on their heads.
 
The S.U. had advantages, and some serious disadvantages. Not yet mentioned:
1: Operate carriers and battle fleets into Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, rendering the Kara peninsula including Leningrad vulnerable to attack.
2: If a landing force takes Murmansk, the Finns can be supplied directly from the North.
3: Since we have Denmark, the Baltic is our pond. Liberation Movements in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be supported. Finland can be supported directly.
4: If a landing force takes Arkhangelsk, Moscow is 600 miles South. This would divert divisions from the Western Front to secure the Northern Front. The threat of doing this would divert forces.
5: The Finns have no love of the Soviet Union, and Allied air groups operating from Finland could hit most of Soviet industry.

Advantages:
1: Stalin knew all these things. He held on to half of Europe because we (U.S. Gov't) were sympathetic to the Bigger-Nazis-Than-German-Nazis. Plus, Hitler had done more to unify the disparate peoples of the S.U. than Stalin had.
2: Stalin did not care for the blood of his people, so long as he won all was good. So the S.U. appeared ready to 'go the second mile'.
3: Another question is Morale: How much fight did the Americans have in them at this time? The Nazis were the objective and it was obtained; continuing to Moscow "wasn't signed up for". Since England and France hadn't vilified the Soviets for Poland's sake, the false message of Stalin being our ally stuck. Stalin "the Father of Nations" (his words) has no allies, only subjects, enemies, and useful idiots. England and Germany were rather exhausted, France cared only for France, and the loyalties of the peoples and governments of South Europe are not well known to me.

Cheap Philosophy: Don't start a war unless you can't afford not to win. Don't start a war you can't afford to lose.
Perhaps this train of thought shaped decisions at the time.
 
I think you misunderstand the thinking behind communism and what caused its collapse in Europe.
 
Patton may well have wanted to attack Russia but in a democracy there is no way he would have got wish.

Looking at the advantages that Russia had

1: Stalin knew all these things. He held on to half of Europe because we (U.S. Gov't) were sympathetic to the Bigger-Nazis-Than-German-Nazis. Plus, Hitler had done more to unify the disparate peoples of the S.U. than Stalin had.
I agree with the first part, but the second part is almost a disadvantage to the Russians. Had the allies start to make advances then we can be certain that the people of Russia wouldn't have been treated as they were by the Germans and would have welcomed the allies. So the question is how much fight would have been in the Russian army.

2: Stalin did not care for the blood of his people, so long as he won all was good. So the S.U. appeared ready to 'go the second mile'.
This I largely agree with

3: Another question is Morale: How much fight did the Americans have in them at this time? The Nazis were the objective and it was obtained; continuing to Moscow "wasn't signed up for". Since England and France hadn't vilified the Soviets for Poland's sake, the false message of Stalin being our ally stuck. Stalin "the Father of Nations" (his words) has no allies, only subjects, enemies, and useful idiots. England and Germany were rather exhausted, France cared only for France, and the loyalties of the peoples and governments of South Europe are not well known to me.
Had Russia attacked then I don't see morale as an issue. When attacked, people defend themselves and enough was known about Russia to know what was at stake, they only had to look how the conquered German people were treated. Certainly Churchill was very aware of the risk and I also think its a mistake to believe that the allied armies stood still at the end of the war. The British army were being equipped with Centurion and Comet tanks just as fast as they could. The RAF were getting large numbers of Jet fighters with I believe approx. 15 squadrons so equipped in 1946, plus some Vampire fighter squadrons. A similar situation existed in the USA with modern tanks and Jet aircraft entering service, whereas Russia were far behind in the air, less so on land.
 
A lot this depends on the exact timing.
If the conflict breaks out in May-June of 1945 it is one situation entirely. If it breaks out in the historic summer of 1946 with little or no warning it is a vastly different situation. If it breaks out in the summer of 1946 after 9 months of escalating tension it is rather different 3rd situation.

A lot the attack from the flanks of the Soviet Union schemes would take months to implement. Even getting a really large force of bombers to Iran would take quite a while, the planes can get there fairly quickly but the ground crews, support, fuel, and so on would take quite a bit longer.

Do the forces in Europe have months? How fast was the draw down after V-E day? Soviets drew down slower than the west?

Actual state of supplies for both armies/air forces in late May of 1945?

Goal/s of the Western forces?
1. Keep what they have in western Europe?
2. Kick the Soviets out of Eastern Europe?
3. Establish new "border" and where?
4. Drive to Moscow?
5. Get rid of Stalin and negotiate with new Soviet leader?

Stalin may not have cared about the blood of his own people but according to some reports he was running out of that blood. Soviet army in the last months of the war was running into a manpower shortage, just not as bad as the Germans, British too had a manpower shortage, maybe the Americans but they were running out slower?
 
As I've said before, it's not like the USSR was radically different in the way it treated its neighbors than was the Russian Empire: one only need look at the statements of the Whites to see how they would have treated Finland, the Baltics, etc, and it wasn't a heck of a lot different than how the Bolsheviks did. Do you really think the Whites would have treated the country that originated the Latvian Rifles would be treated kindly?

Indeed, the behavior of the USSR post-WW2 wasn't that different than the behavior of Russia after the Napoleonic Wars. It was only a different variety of tyranny they were enforcing.

Back to the Soviet-Western War immediately after WW2: no -- and I mean no -- sane politician would try such a thing. At most, a bit of sharp diplomatic language. The only way that a US or UK government would attack the USSR in 1945 would be had they been allied with Hitler in 1939.
 
It is rumored that Stalin had efficient information control and dissent detection and suppression mechanisms in place and fully functioning. </understatement>
O.P. carefully did not indicate who attacks first nor why, only that the sitrep is "Catbox fully engaged in air conditioning"

Certainly Churchill
While you're correct in analysing Churchill's attitude, Attlee was P.M. at this time.

I know the allied equipment was tank-for-tank, plane-for-plane superior, and available in larger quantities, and replaceable at a faster pace; how exhausted England was matters but I cannot quantify. Since Stalin knew all he had to do to win was not to lose (just hold on and I win), the question (outside the OP's scenario) "If the Allies initiated combat, then what?" Had we insisted Stalin get out of Poland (the Poles wanted their country back) to 1938 borders, and started shooting because Stalin refuses, then what?
 
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