Yes you seem to be having a problem with part of this discussion. In order to quantify the data, you have to have pretty simple criteria and be consistent about it. To me, 'shot down' = 'can't fly any more after being attacked'. To keep it simple. So long as you use the same criteria for both sides, I believe it's valid. It's not like I'm only counting crash landed planes on the Allied side. On that Feb 8 date the Allies didn't even make any claims IIRC.
I'm also not trying to second guess Shores here, and I'm not trying to follow the audit trail of every crash-landed aircraft.
Good to know I am still the problem. Which means everyone has to put up with your interpretation and description of the Shores Et. Al.'s interpretation and description of losses and what to include in a book, not a statistical survey. It also means there can be no easy comparison to the official air force figures.
So on 8 February 1942 Shores has 2 Hurricanes strafed to destruction, the air force says they survived, Shores has a Kittyhawk "tail shot away", the squadron says it landed with tail damage and flew again 3 days later. How does an aircraft make that clean a landing with no tail? At its core the loss list in Shores should be very good, that is the lost and heavily damaged aircraft, given all air forces generated documents on these and the checking that has gone on. If you are going to include lightly damaged aircraft then welcome to garbage in. Like most people I have problems with garbage in approaches. Since no axis losses are included on 8 February is the conclusion all 8 allied pilots that attacked completely missed? At the very least an explanation of the differences on 8 February is needed, and it does not need you adding a third strafing victim.
Adding aircraft that are repaired doesn't introduce any errors if you are just counting aircraft that were shot down.
Assuming the definition in the book is consistent of course and for both sides with similar levels of data and after the 8 February 1942 data check that is doubtful.
Really? Fighter cover wasn't annihilated on several of the days I already listed? You are calling me a liar here basically. Maybe we need to plunge deeper into some of those 'bad days'.
From Message 120 "But the Axis was still able to blunt Allied air attacks and prevent the Allies from doing the effective longer ranged strikes. Even when the bombers weren't shot down they often had to eject their bombs and run for home when their fighter cover was annihilated."
Provide the proof, not the accusation, the number so we can all see what often and annihilated are defined as.
The shipping loss figures clearly vary between sources and they have the additional problem if someone is trying to define if the ship was on the African run. However none of the figures support the Swordfish 50,000 tons per month story.
Casualties, Killed, Wounded, Missing, Allied 1,750, German 1,859, Italian 1,051, 38 Panzers, 11 Italian tanks, 67 British tanks. Barrie Pitt, Crucible of War, looking at other sources they are around the same. Add 395 or so trucks.
Rommel's opinion is not the last word, but it's certainly a data point. The key thing is I think you will find people on both sides who share his opinion on the role of Air Power in El Alamein, but I'll get deeper into that too.
I know, then again look at how exaggerated the Germans though the level of air attack was. Plus the amount of allied artillery fire and the raids on Axis supply lines by ground troops.
The rules of engagement as the Germans thought they were as of early July 1942. Allied command was slow, the faster the battle could be fought the more likely an axis win. German armour could move at night, or at least in pre dawn and post dusk, and would have supply come to them during the night, Allied armour would not move unless it was daylight and would retire towards supply before dark. This meant the Germans were on the move first and tended to stay on the battlefield, where they would use visual signals during the night to stay in touch, normally without attracting attention from the enemy. Allied armour would normally fight without (much) support and could be relied to move towards axis armour. Allied infantry and artillery prepared positions were tough and best bypassed but the positions were not normally mutually supportive and allied command was too slow to send support, so a strong assault with the Luftwaffe acting as heavy artillery could be expected to eliminate the position at the cost of time and operations becoming more static for a time. Allied airpower on the battlefield was a manageable problem.
August update, Allied artillery was now operating in numbers rather than individual units, allied combined arms doctrine was still poor, allied ability to put together divisional or larger attacks still poor. Allied battlefield airpower was more of a problem. An attack hooking round the southern end of the line would work if once again the allied armour could be defeated heavily enough to create holes in the defences and/or an exposed flank causing the battle to turn mobile. The allied southern front was patrolled rather than defended by 7th Armoured division
Sun and moon set and rise GMT, at London, which is 5130 N 0, adjust as appropriate for Alamein roughly 3050N 2900E. Full moon was on 26 August.
30-Aug-42 Sunrise 0509, Moon set 1002, Sunset 1852, Moon rise 2101
31-Aug-42 Sunrise 0510, Moon set 1109, Sunset 1849, Moon rise 2128
1-Sep-42 Sunrise 0512, Moon set 1212, Sunset 1847, Moon rise 2159
2-Sep-42 Sunrise 0513, Moon set 1313, Sunset 1845, Moon rise 2233 (third quarter moon)
3-Sep-42 Sunrise 0515, Moon set 1409, Sunset 1843, Moon rise 2312
4-Sep-42 Sunrise 0517, Moon set 1501, Sunset 1841, Moon rise 2357
It seems Rommel's fundamental plan was having the Allied armour attack the axis positions, not the axis punch through the defences, at least not until the Allied armour was largely disposed of.
This is sort of a synthesis from some reports on the Alam Halfa battle, built around the New Zealand Official History. About a week before the battle the allied air force starts the new tactic of bombing DAK positions at night, casualties are caused but the main effect is to deprive the troops of a good night's rest. A planted map incorrectly detailing the terrain and allied minefields in the south has made its way to DAK but it seems the axis never entered the incorrectly marked terrain in strength at least.
On 27 August Rommel sets the attack date as 29 August, the original plan allowed 5 days to concentrate, and it required a 24 hour delay to 30 August to complete, a tanker arrived on 30 August, the Luftwaffe began a fuel airlift. New Zealand official history, about Alam Halfa supply, "Nehring records how the Luftwaffe lifted some 400 cubic metres of fuel but delivered less than 100 at the front, the balance being consumed on the journey" or 3 units to move 1, which sounds right for air delivery, road delivery wold be less. This appears to be for transferring fuel from the rear to the front in Africa. While the Jerrican had many virtues its weight was an addition burden and so fuel cost to move, the can was about a quarter of the total filled weight when used for fuel.
On 30 August the axis formations moved into their final positions, fuel for 100 miles for tanks, 150 miles for other vehicles. The attack started at 2200 starting with heavy shelling of the first allied minefield area, all movement was planned to be complete by 0530, forming a front line 15 miles long facing north, threatening the allied rear. Axis attacks on allied airfields late on 30 August did little damage. Allied night reconnaissance picked up the movement and by 0300 air attacks began, lasting until dawn. The minefields were thicker than expected, units failed to navigate correctly. Air attacks caused most delay in the march, 21st Panzer reporting 18 attacks, and the terrain slowed things down as well, while the time required for forcing back the 7th Armoured division patrols delayed the minefield clearances. Allied artillery kept firing during the night.
As of 0500 31 August there were narrow gaps in the minefields but they were bottlenecks, vehicles had bogged or broken down and some had been damaged by allied shelling or bombs. As of 0900 21st panzer was finally leaving the minefields, but Littorio was further behind. As Rommel expected the initial British plan was to use their infantry and artillery to defend. The dust storm arrived at 1130, imposing a delay that meant it was 1400 before 15th Panzer began moving, while Littorio caught up to 21st Panzer but in the divisional assembly area, imposing another hour's delay. Allied air attacks were continual, as was the shelling. The New Zealand division reporting firing over 12,000 rounds by darkness 31 August, while the division AA units claimed 3 Ju87 and 3 Bf109 shot down, two pilots taken prisoner.
The axis attack was recast as a shorter hook, to clear the ridge line to their north, after destroying some allied tanks creating an apparent hole the panzer divisions moved towards the ridge and into the anti tank line, retiring when allied armour was spotted heading towards the line at speed. The allied armour stopped at the front line. Throughout the night allied air and artillery attacks continued.
1 September the axis position was roughly where it was planned to be a day earlier. Allied armour was apparently dispersed and could be dealt with in sequence. The supply routes were becoming better. However the reconnaissance group "was scarcely battle-worthy. In the approach march its vehicles had suffered severely from ground and air action, mines, and mechanical trouble. In its laager overnight near Samaket Gaballa, it had been caught in the light of Air Force flares and pattern bombed. Now about a third of its vehicles was completely destroyed or in need of repair and it had a large number of casualties to be evacuated to the rear." While 15th Panzer could attack, 21st needed fuel which took until mid afternoon to arrive, but the early attack stopped at a false crest and destroyed some allied armour that broke cover. The inexperienced British 8th Armoured Brigade moved to join the 22nd but had one regiment run out of fuel almost immediately, at 0830 it hit the German gun line, mostly ex USSR 76.2mm ones, decided they were 88mm and halted in order to call in support to withdraw. A heavy axis air attack managed to disrupt the HQs of 13 corps, 10th Armoured and 44th Infantry Division, resulting in 8th Armoured retiring east instead of into the defences. The situation on the ground in the area hardly changed all day, 15th Panzer between the two British armoured brigades. Allied artillery continued to fire "Two prisoners of
90 Light Division who were gathered in by a 23 Battalion patrol just after dark told a story of a hard day. Two parties, of about thirty-six men altogether, had set off that morning from the vicinity of Dier el Munassib with orders to advance to the north-east. Under heavy artillery fire the men had halted until they were joined by six tanks. The tanks then led off again but, after one had been knocked out, the rest retired, leaving the infantry under fire in the open. By evening all but three of the men were casualties."
Evening 1 September DAK down to around 90 running panzers and was largely where it started the day. New Zealand history: "On the night of 1–2 September, with the enemy's situation well reconnoitred during daylight, the Air Force stepped up its bombing programme. For the first time in the desert war, a 4000 lb bomb was dropped on the enemy columns, and among the thuds and rumbles of gunfire and bombing, the detonation of this one bomb was clearly heard by the New Zealanders in their box some miles to the north. The support and supply vehicles of the Axis troops, no longer strung out along the line of march as on the previous night but laagered in closer concentration around unit headquarters, felt the weight of the air assault severely. Their records, previously complaining of the moral effect rather than of material damage, now listed men, guns, and vehicles as casualties. Apart from this bombing, a comparatively small amount of Axis air activity, and the customary artillery harassing fire, this night passed with no minor incidents recorded."
By morning of 2 September nothing much had changed the axis had dug in and men were reluctant to move fuel given the mostly air attacks they were under, that afternoon part of 7th armoured division caught a supply convoy of 300 trucks, destroying 57 and scattering the rest, with the result the axis front line forces were down to 1 issue of fuel, good for 100 km on good terrain, probably half of that in their current situation.
The axis began to fall back. "By the middle of the morning the field guns of 10 Armoured and 44 Divisions were falling silent as few targets remained within range. The armoured division then took some of its batteries from their dug-in positions and set them up further to the south. By midday a thick dust-storm was raging, hindering observation both from the ground and the air. Several New Zealand artillery observation officers took advantage of the dust to settle themselves in better vantage points overlooking the line of the depressions on the south of the box and, when the dust began to settle about two o'clock, reported a wealth of targets as numerous enemy columns, also taking advantage of the low visibility, were moving to their positions for the withdrawal. On orders from Eighth Army for maximum harassing fire, all British guns within range maintained constant fire until dusk, several batteries expending over 1000 rounds each during the afternoon and evening."
On 2/3 September 'the British guns, on Montgomery's instructions, harassed the enemy constantly throughout the hours of darkness, while seventy-two sorties were flown by the Air Force between dusk and dawn. Two 4000 lb bombs were dropped this night, both causing large fires to show that they had found targets of some kind. According to the German records, 300 aircraft dropped 2400 bombs and caused such damage to transport that some units were nearly immobilised."
3 September DAK had about 120 tanks operational. The Allied attack on the night of 3/4 was helped by 90 minutes of bombing starting 2030. It provided a guide for the attackers, but the operation was overall a failure, a local counter attack was effective. The allied artillery and airpower seem to have done little damage to axis forces on 3 September.
"the Desert Air Force, which was beginning to feel the strain of the heavy bombing programme, to lay on a two-hour raid on the concentration of vehicles observed at dusk in Munassib. This raid, on the evening of the 4th, was the last major air effort of the battle."
CHAPTER 11 — Summary of the Battle | NZETC Page 176 starts a summary of allied air operations. Total truck losses are put at 395, the New Zealand history says 400.
