You are struggling with basic concepts. It's really not that complicated.
Good to know I am the problem again. It is really not that complicated from my end. You appear to only have access to the Shores Et. Al. book to figure out losses. Therefore that list must be used and considered correct. Even enhanced. The gap between what the book says and the air force records say was lost 8 February is ignored. Not used an example of verifying what the references are reporting.
So a simple explanation. As Shores points out a number of times tracking down total losses has problems at times. I add these problems are essentially the same for aircraft damaged badly enough to require removal from the unit, in both cases paperwork tends to be generated, aircraft movement cards updated. Adding aircraft that were repaired in unit throws open a major source of errors. You are now reliant on the individual unit records, what the person doing the reporting thought important, those people change and they can be told to change what to report. If you have seen examples of the reports you would know they cover a wide variety of styles and information. Then whether the Shores book reports all it finds.
All the above assumes the RAF, RA and Luftwaffe had compatible systems for reporting losses and damaged aircraft, as well as the usually very bad assumption the axis air force records for the time are as complete as the allied ones. And you want to include as losses an aircraft that was damaged but flew again in under 3 days, with the possibility it did not fly on day 2 because it was not needed that day. Include repaired in unit aircraft and the list is most probably worthless unless those losses are separated out. As another point, did either axis air force have rear area repair depots, the number of abandoned aircraft suggests not, so every axis repair was a by unit one? In the desert war the British Army tended to have lots of equipment captured by the axis, but the air force very little, the axis was the other way around.
Getting into what the ultimate fate of a plane which was shot down or crash landed ultimately was can become a huge and open-ended endeavor, and you will find that you can't always determine what happened to a given aircraft. If you try to do this for say, an entire year of air combat you are going to be spending weeks figuring it out. There can also be a fine line between shot down and crash landed. Crash landed doesn't necessarily mean at the friendly base, for example, or that the aircraft was recovered. Sometimes it was, sometimes it wasn't.
On the basis of the above all loss lists are a waste of time. Instead I read it as Shores list, end of story, if the book says crash landed it equals loss.
You seem to have access to the data, if you want to make your own list and only count aircraft listed as shot down, or shot down + MiA + FTR, by all means feel free to do so, and post it as an alternative to mine. I'd be interested to see the numbers. I do not think the ratios will be any different. I stated what my criteria were at the outset, and I used consistent criteria. I think that is the most effective way to use the data based on the discussion at hand.
The spreadsheet I posted has such data by month for the Allies. Thanks for the interest. The file I am working from also has non combat losses. Your criteria is mentioned in Shores, less those with a couple of key words, you have zero idea of what the Shores criteria are or how complete that data is. To use every entry in Shores means you are comfortable all aircraft damaged enough not to fly again for 2 to 3 days (and maybe available earlier than that) are recorded for all units on both sides.
You made a claim about fighter cover being annihilated often and failed to back it up. You are struggling with basic concepts, like having evidence to back the claims.
List of Italian shipping lost 1940-43
Nice list, seems to have been drawn from the post war allied studies, which have 465 Italian ships of over 500 GRT listed by name and even more German.
HMA if you can go through all the pages has allied submarine attacks.
the relatively ineffectiveness of the Bf 110 as a day time fighter.
The Bf110 versus the Beaufighter was not that uneven.
In April and May, while the Luftwaffe controlled the central Mediterranean, Axis convoys lost only 2.7 and 5.8 percent, respectively, of their tonnage during the passage to Libya. In June, losses shot up to 35 percent. The Axis did slightly better in July as the Luftwaffe made an unsuccessful attempt to reverse Malta's revival. In August, 35 percent of supplies did not reach Libya. In September the total was 30 percent. In October more than 50 percent, including most of the fuel, went to the bottom."
Bragadin notes different figures, April to October 1942, 0.78%, 7.24%, 22.14%, 6.45%, 33.03%, 20%, 44.2%. Remembering of course ships were lost sailing both ways.
"I'd say this is a pretty categorical support of what I've been saying about a pivot point in mid 1942, and drastic increase in losses of fuel and supplies for the Germans, directly attributable to Allied air attacks, although we still need to look at what percentage was due to submarines."
According to Australian Archives AWM66 109. Percentage of loss on African Convoy routes due to naval action April to October 1942, 100.00, 100.00, 27.28, 25.72, 51.42, 31.76, 37.02, 25.26, which of course can be calculated from the spreadsheet already given, but not used.
"After Rommel called off the offensive on 3 September, strike aircraft harried the German withdrawal, making ten raids comprising 1u80 aircraft. Heavy night bombing followed. Vehicles, artillery, and antiaircraft positions suffered heavy damage. The most heavily hit units lost almost all of their vehicles."
I'd say this once again underscores the devastating, decisive impact of DAF air strikes.
So how many vehicles and how many units qualify for most heavily hit?
The night raids on DAK position started over a week before Rommel's last attack, inflicting few casualties but made sure sleep was hard to get.
On night/day one of the attack DAK discovered the British minefields were thicker than expected, as a result their gaps took until the morning. Seems some of the gaps remained under artillery even machine gun fire. A morning dust storm provided relief, but the terrain had a lot more soft sand than expected, British Armour was not engaged until nearly dusk, which meant DAK saw the British anti tank gun line far too late. Unlike previous battles allied artillery kept shelling all night. Night air raids particularly hurt the reconnaissance battalions on the eastern flank. The few lanes through the minefields were under armoured car and occasional artillery fire besides being too small to start with and obvious targets for attacking aircraft. The next day and night were the same as the previous one, continual artillery shelling and air raids, DAK moving and probing attacks. Then day three came news a supply convoy of 300 vehicles ran into part of 7th Armoured Division, losing 57 trucks and the rest scattered. DAK was down to 1 petrol issue, good for 100 km over good going, maybe half that on soft sand. There does not seem to have been many losses during the withdrawal. Casualties, Killed, Wounded, Missing, Allied 1,750, German 1,859, Italian 1,051, 38 Panzers, 11 Italian tanks, 67 British tanks.
In short the night air raids, in conjunction with night artillery fire, reduced the chance for DAK to rest and inflicted losses, most Panzers were lost to ground fire, day raids did not stop combat formation movement or inflict heavy casualties, the allied ground units and air force operated effectively against the axis tactical supply system though again the effect of air seems to be less mobility, rather than large casualties.
Before the attack the DAK health report noted widespread jaundice, commonplace trachoma and amoebic dysentery, those devastating, decisive mobile bath units did it again.
Rommel would not be the first general to decide most of his defeat was due to enemy airpower, not the opposing general, one who had laid down a plan that was followed and who stayed in control of the situation. For devastating and decisive the losses to airpower need to be split from those inflicted by the ground forces, plus dealing with the way DAK kept moving until it hit resistance on the ground, not in the air.