Were kamikazes effective?

[Twitch]

Bullockracing is right in that is what the Japanese logic was to the letter. It was always a big "if" a plane got through the fleet defensive screen. Theey knew it wouldn't be as simple as that of course but the actual trade off in human lives expended for human lives taken was in the favor of the Japanese in most cases.

If the Okas would have been able to be launched from a greater distance they might have caused more damage. As it was, of course, the Bettys hauling them were easy pickings.

 

[syscom3]

Well they were effective enough that the USN was very concerned about them.

During the planned invasions, the havoc they would have incurred on the lightly protected transports and amphib vessels would have been enormous.

 

[timshatz]

The math should also take into consideration economies. Not to say a Zero is equal to an Aircraft Carrier in relative cost. That would never work. But losing 3-400 aircraft to hit one carrier (and not even sink it) when you can not replace the aircraft and you are not destroying the Carrier, is at best questionable.

On the other side, the Kamikaze was weapon of desperation born of the inability of the IJNA/IJAA to affect the Allied fleet. By that standard, 3-400 conventional bombers were being destroyed for no gain anyway so the kamikaze becomes an oddly logical step forward.

 

[timshatz]

Well they were effective enough that the USN was very concerned about them.

During the planned invasions, the havoc they would have incurred on the lightly protected transports and amphib vessels would have been enormous.

It's been a long time since I read deeply into Operation Downfall and what it entails. But I would be amazed if there was not some type of deception plan to "falsestart" the defenses (specifically the Kamikazes) before the actual invasion. Something along the lines of a feint or fake invasion (along the lines of the fake paratroopers dropped on D-Day and the advancing dummy radar targets at Calais) to confuse the Japanese. A kamikaze is probably the ultimate in "fire and forget" weapons. And, give the training of the pilots, experience level and general confusion, once they were up, they were probably pretty much gone (at least by late 45).

Communications would've been horrible. And even in places where communications have been good, rumors and false reports would've gotten everyone going (something like the false alarms the British had in late sumer 1940 with the Church bells being the signal for the invasion). Given the gaps in contact with higher ups, any report would be difficult to counter. And the Allies may not've done just one feint, but many. The idea being to confuse and disorient as well as lull. Any of the those affects would be acceptable.

But even with feints, the invasion would've been a bloody affair. Just too many machines and weapons, operated with too much skill and too much dedication on all sides to have anything else happen. If the invasions previous to Downfall would've been "Mini-Stalingrads" as one historian once said, the actual Invasion of Kyushu would've been WORSE than Stalingrad.

 

[Twitch]

You are correct Syscom3. There was an estimated 3000-5000 kamikaze attacks during the battle of Okinawa alone, and 36 ships were sunk with 368 damaged by this tactic. 40% of the Americans killed were the result of kamikaze attacks. 20%- 5,000- of all US Navy casualties endured in the war were suffered at Okinawa.

The Navy had good cause to be concerned. I look at it like if 40 planes are shot down attempting to kamikaze into ships the one that gets through and kills 127 guys on a carrier (an insignificant amount relative to the whole crew) they are still a nasty semi-effective weapon.

During any sort of invasion scenario we would have suffered huge casualties.

 

[syscom3]

It's been a long time since I read deeply into Operation Downfall and what it entails. But I would be amazed if there was not some type of deception plan to "falsestart" the defenses (specifically the Kamikazes) before the actual invasion. Something along the lines of a feint or fake invasion (along the lines of the fake paratroopers dropped on D-Day and the advancing dummy radar targets at Calais) to confuse the Japanese. A kamikaze is probably the ultimate in "fire and forget" weapons. And, give the training of the pilots, experience level and general confusion, once they were up, they were probably pretty much gone (at least by late 45).

Communications would've been horrible. And even in places where communications have been good, rumors and false reports would've gotten everyone going (something like the false alarms the British had in late sumer 1940 with the Church bells being the signal for the invasion). Given the gaps in contact with higher ups, any report would be difficult to counter. And the Allies may not've done just one feint, but many. The idea being to confuse and disorient as well as lull. Any of the those affects would be acceptable.

But even with feints, the invasion would've been a bloody affair. Just too many machines and weapons, operated with too much skill and too much dedication on all sides to have anything else happen. If the invasions previous to Downfall would've been "Mini-Stalingrads" as one historian once said, the actual Invasion of Kyushu would've been WORSE than Stalingrad.

The Japanese had figured out what the likely invasion beaches were going to be and planned a defense in depth strategy like they had for Okinawa and Iwo Jima.

Many people forget that Japan is a mountainous country and attacking forces would have to get funneled up valleys and ravines with the attendant risks.

 

[Simba]

Kamikaze effective? Sure, it sank ships when conventional attacks couldn't because it was so difficult to deter a pilot who was totally focused on hitting his target. An aircraft that got through the defences was going to damage anything it hit to some extent.

But more effective still would have been the development of a naval air force that could secure air superiority sufficient to enable aircraft with stand-off missiles to range close enough to hit their targets and return safely to re-arm and repeat the process.

Whatever their effectiveness, those Special Attack pilots were brave boys.

<S>

Simba.

 

[syscom3]

Kamikaze effective? Sure, it sank ships when conventional attacks couldn't because it was so difficult to deter a pilot who was totally focused on hitting his target. An aircraft that got through the defences was going to damage anything it hit to some extent.

But more effective still would have been the development of a naval air force that could secure air superiority sufficient to enable aircraft with stand-off missiles to range close enough to hit their targets and return safely to re-arm and repeat the process.

Whatever their effectiveness, those Special Attack pilots were brave boys.

<S>

Simba.

The Japanese didnt have the technology to develope stand off missles.

And since the USN had dominating air superiority over the Japanese and shot them down by the hundreds, does that mean we employed disproportional force?

 

[timshatz]

The Japanese didnt have the technology to develope stand off missles.

And since the USN had dominating air superiority over the Japanese and shot them down by the hundreds, does that mean we employed disproportional force?

HAH! Good one. Gotta go easy on those Kamikazes, they are an oppressed minority. Imagine the nerve of the USN putting it's ships in the way of their diving aircraft! Call Kofi Annan and get a measure pushed through the UN condemming the USN.

Good one Syscom.

 

[timshatz]

The Japanese had figured out what the likely invasion beaches were going to be and planned a defense in depth strategy like they had for Okinawa and Iwo Jima.

Many people forget that Japan is a mountainous country and attacking forces would have to get funneled up valleys and ravines with the attendant risks.

Accurate points. The Japanese were not confused about where the invasion would happen, only when. In that realm, the Allies had leeway. The defenses, once set, were imoble. The initiative lay with the Allies to attack when they wanted. That include methodology, spoofing, misdirection, all were up to the Allies. Once fixed defenses are set, there is little more you can do but wait.

Also, in agreement with your point, the Japanese (while having very few if any survivors from the invaded islands that made it home) did have a good idea of how the US invaded. Hence the casualty rate for Okinawa and Iwo Jima. By that time, the method of how the US attacked (and we're pretty much talking the US here as the British were more focused on getting their old colonies back) was known and defensive measures had been tried from Tarawa to Okinawa. In that time span, the defenses had been refined. Interestingly, in both Iwo and Okinawa, both at the beach defense in depth and inland defense in depth, both defenses failed. Granted, they were bloody (and that was the Japanese goal by this time) but they did not defeat the invasion in either place. At no place did the Japanese defeat an American invasion.

Defense in depth in hilly, mountain or broken terrain is easily the best for defensive purposes. There, the terrain does most of the work for you. An example would be the Gustav line and Monte Cassino. And the Japenese would've made it bloody for all. There have been estimates of 1000 dead on both sides for every hour of the invasion during the first day to day and a half. However, every defense can be defeated and eventually, at great cost, the Allies would've broken through the Japanese defenses, severe though they may be. At that point, all the advantages (mobility, supply, firepower, airpower) really came to the forefront. There, past the beaches, the war would've enjoyed a measure of mobility found only in the Phillipines Campagne. I've often thought that the Pacific War would've been a lot shorter if the Japanese and the Americans had fought it in North Africa. There, and not on a small, jungle covered island, is where the advantages of production, mobilization, planning, supply and weaponry really would've come to the forefront. But that is not how it worked out.

 

[syscom3]

The Japanese strategy was to make the invasion as costly as possible.

Maybe even bloody enough to force a stalemate.

If there was a problem with the planning and logistics of the invasion, it was its shear size. You simply cannot play around with feints and stunts and hope that things will go according to plan.

 

[timshatz]

The Japanese strategy was to make the invasion as costly as possible.

Maybe even bloody enough to force a stalemate.

If there was a problem with the planning and logistics of the invasion, it was its shear size. You simply cannot play around with feints and stunts and hope that things will go according to plan.

True, but not my intent. Wasn't thinking of the mititary equivelant of card tricks. The intention of the feints was to confuse the Japanese and get them swinging at the curve. This thing was going to be bloody, no doubt about that. But the Japanese ability to replace losses (and in some ways the problem with the Kamikaze itself) was very limited. The B29s had firebombed every city with a population of over 50K. Given they were a cottage style industrial power, destroying the cities destroyed the industrial base. Feints, spoof and false attacks had the intent (if they were to be used at all, I do not have definite information one way or the other) of getting them to commit limited resources in on an attack without substance. If you get a false alarm called on a bombardment force and 500 to 1000 aircraft are expended on heavily armored/ heavy air cover (essentially something of a Kamikaze trap), you have that many fewer to deal with later. It is worth trying.

I know that all plans produced now have a deception element built in. That was not generally the case in WW2 but Overlord/Fortitude proved deception was a viable concept for military planning. Whether that carried over to Downfall is unknown to me at present. It is an interesting question though. What was, if any, the deception plan for Operation Downfall.

 

[syscom3]

In the book "Downfall", the IJA knew that their mobility was going to be limited during the daytime, so whatever forces were in place, where essentially going to stay there.

Plus they werent going to commit the kamikazi's and suicide boats untill the invasion was under way.

 

[timshatz]

In the book "Downfall", the IJA knew that their mobility was going to be limited during the daytime, so whatever forces were in place, where essentially going to stay there.

Plus they werent going to commit the kamikazi's and suicide boats untill the invasion was under way.

Got so wound up after posting last night that I went bought the books from Franks (and another guy) need to re-read them as I did it during vacation, lent them to a friend and never saw them again. Sneaky bugger!

As for mobility, definitely the static defenses and defenses in depth were immobile. But the reserves would have to move to the point of the threat. By attacking in echelon (even over a period of days), feints, ect, they could keep the reserves tied down to a place long enough or, in the opposite case, get them committed to an attack that was not the main force. The possibility presented by attacking echelon, increasing the force with each attack as the invasion progresses, doesn't give the defenders a good picture of where the next attack is coming. Or even when the attacks are truely over. Again, very similar to D-Day and holding the German forces in Calias. It is possible, by various feints, to keep the Japanese frozen until the static defenses are breached. It doesn't get a lot better after that, but it would get better. For one thing, it would bring the Japanese out in the open. The US Military was a great believer of the Axiom that Firepower kills (still is). Such a situation would be to their advantage.

About static defense on Kyushu, they could not go on forever. At some point, they have to tail off. Also, I have heard that the Japanese beach defenses were just a little too far back. But, they were very substantial.

This is all armchair warrior stuff but it makes for interesting posting.

 

[Twitch]

The invasion of Kyushu would have been nothing remotely like D-Day Europe and its 5 measly landing beaches. Operation Olympic had 35 beaches! Kyushu is 17,135 square miles and was honeycombed with underground, interconnected fortifications that made previous islands complexes look like child's play. They had underground aircraft hangars, kamikaze boats in coastal caves and nearly 1 million fighting men at the ready.

The dogged Iwo Jima campaign took place on the island of less than eight square miles in area for five weeks and cost 7,000 American and 22,000 Japanese lives. Okinawa is just 611 square miles and cost 12,000 American and 200,000+ Japanese dead (includes 100,000 civilians) during the 11-week fight. How long would it have taken to vanquish a million fighting men in an area 17,000 miles square?

Shikoku is just 7,258, Hokkaido is 32,246 but Honshu is a whopping 89,194 square miles! There were 10 year mop up contingency plans to eradicate all hostiles that would have gone guerilla after a successful invasion.

One little-known factor that is never discussed is the fact that the worst typhoon in US Naval history swept the proposed armada assembly area off Okinawa on October 9, 1945! 403 ships were either sunk, destroyed beyond repair or scrapped. Countless aircraft were ripped to pieces in the 150 MPH winds along with hangars, other buildings and tents housing 150,000 troops. Harbor facilities were ruined, power was out and supplies blown away.

In relative terms, as it was, there was sparse damage considering a depleted American presence due to the fact that the war was over and personnel were greatly reduced. Had Typhoon Louise set upon the 22 divisions of more than half a million invasion-ready personnel along with some estimated 5,000 ships and 4,000 aircraft, the devastation would certainly been worse and would have no doubt delayed the November 1st date to invade Kyushu.

The Americans thought there were less than 2,000 combat aircraft left when they had over 12,000. They knew nothing about the 9,800 kamikaze boats. They thought Kyushu had 350,000 men at arms when in fact they had over 900,000. They had absolutely no intel on the fortifications. And they never remark on Typhoon Louise. These things were discounted or swept aside and given less impact than they should since the A-bombs ended things differently. The silence helps perpetuate the myth of Allied invincibility.

 

[syscom3]

And they never remark on Typhoon Louise. These things were discounted or swept aside and given less impact than they should since the A-bombs ended things differently. The silence helps perpetuate the myth of Allied invincibility

The typhoon would have been a setback, but it would not have changed the outcome.

Lots and lots of eqmt was stockpiled throughout the Pacific and the loss's could be made good.

Any aircraft destroyed by the typhoon would have been replaced the next day by the tens of thousands of aircraft the US had stationed around world.

The question of the Japanese defeat was simply of when, and at what cost.

 

[timshatz]

The invasion of Kyushu would have been nothing remotely like D-Day Europe and its 5 measly landing beaches. Operation Olympic had 35 beaches! Kyushu is 17,135 square miles and was honeycombed with underground, interconnected fortifications that made previous islands complexes look like child's play. They had underground aircraft hangars, kamikaze boats in coastal caves and nearly 1 million fighting men at the ready.

The dogged Iwo Jima campaign took place on the island of less than eight square miles in area for five weeks and cost 7,000 American and 22,000 Japanese lives. Okinawa is just 611 square miles and cost 12,000 American and 200,000+ Japanese dead (includes 100,000 civilians) during the 11-week fight. How long would it have taken to vanquish a million fighting men in an area 17,000 miles square?

Was well aware that the Normandy invasion was much smaller than the proposed invasion of Japan. Used it strictly as a successful example of a deception plan that worked. Also, to re-enforce you point, the Normandy invasion traveled from England to France, a distance of maybe a couple of hundred miles at most (for units operating out of Northern England, if that were the case). For the invasion of Japan, the distances extend all the way from the US West Coast to Okinawa. All of them greater distances than D-Day.

My point is that you, using deception, try not to fight all 1 Million of the Enemy's troops. Or you fight them in detail, one group after another. Or, you try to catch the enemy moving from one spot to another. Once a defense i set, the initiative moves to the attacking side. It can choose, where, when and how it wishes to attack. The defense, no matter how large or extensive, can only react until the attacking force has exhausted itself. Thereafter, the initiative moves to the formerly defending side in the form of counter-attacks or counter offensives.

The Allies would have to fight to their strengths, and try to avoid getting into a protracted slogg. This would be extremely difficult with a layered defense in depth. The Japanese, as pointed out earlier by another post, knew they were limited with regards to mobility. For the Allies, mobility was their strength. In places like the Phillipines, the US managed to fight a war of manuver against the Japanese. This allowed for a better exchange rate with regards to casualties. That, to my mind, was the goal of the Allied forces and is the goal of all strategy. To get the opposition to see the battlefield as you do, as benefits you.

 

[Twitch]

Yes the typhoon would have set back the invasion schedule but the inevitable outcome would have been the same only in that Japan was conquered. The huge f*cking cost of lives would have sent this country reeling. The conservative estimates and the realistic lesser-known, little spoken of sobering estimates were both dramatic. Maximum possible casualties would have been staggering especially to the Japanese.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff April 1945 estimates implied that a 90-day Olympic campaign would cost 456,000 casualties, including 109,000 dead or missing. If Coronet took another 90 days, the combined cost would be 1,200,000 casualties, with 267,000 fatalities. Since no one knew of the secret manufacture ability, thousands of planes and other sea-borne kamikazes were never considered or projected into calculations so the casualty number certainly would have inflated if they had.

Inside and outside the government sources studies concluded 1.7- 4 million American casualties, including 400,000–800,000 fatalities, and 5 to 10 million Japanese fatalities assuming a large-scale participation by civilians in the defense of Japan.

Wonder how many in the US would be buying those marvelous little japaneze cars had we suffered that many deaths?

 

[evangilder]

Good point there, Twitch. The Typhoon is very often not even mentioned, nor is the fact that the intel about the enemy was that poor. It would have been very costly for all participants and could have even possibly wiped out the Japanese culture.

 

[syscom3]

I wouldnt put too much stock on the civilian participation in the battle.

A 45 yo. woman with a spear just isnt going to intimidate a 24 yo. battle hardened marine with an M1 and bayonet.

Plus, quite a few civilians were already fed up with the war.

Its a good thing that the war ended in August. Since all the important cities had been burned to the ground, the 20th AF and the FEAF B24's next targets were the coastal railroads and roads that carried the bulk of Japans food supplies. By the end of 1945, the Japanese were looking at mass starvation.

Either way, yes the casualities would be severe on both sides, but once the invasion started, the allies werent going to stop.