Were kamikazes effective?

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syscom3 said:
Its a good thing that the war ended in August. Since all the important cities had been burned to the ground, the 20th AF and the FEAF B24's next targets were the coastal railroads and roads that carried the bulk of Japans food supplies. By the end of 1945, the Japanese were looking at mass starvation.
They were also facing a Russian invasion of Hokkaido, the northern island. They (Russians) were massing to strike. If the war had dragged on just a couple of weeks longer, we might have been looking at a divided communist/democratic Japan, the way Korea is to this day. Imagine that.
 
It would have been ugly any way you look at it. I agree that a person armed with a spear or knife is not much of a threat, if approached properly, they could have the element of surprise. I think the Russian invasion of Japan plan also accelerated the allied plan to use the bomb.
 
One thing to remember that the Japanese surrender had a lot to do with the USSR entering the war as did the A-bomb. Soviet infantry would have slaughtered the Japanes population by the hundreds of thousands. And as for the possibility of high casualties....2-300thousand were a drop in the bucket to the Soviets (remember they suffered over 200,000 casualties in taking Berlin). With all the effort the Japanese were doing in repeling the Americans, there northern flank would have been more exposed.
 
A couple of points.

The one about the Marine facing the Woman with the spear. Agree. Depends on what kind of day the guy had if he pops her or just slaps the spear out of her hand or whacks her upside the head and sends her on her way. However, 20 women with polls topped with spears is a problem. 200 is an tactical threat and 2000 is a human wave. That IS a problem (reminds me of an Infantry joke from the Korean War, "How many Chinese in a Hord?"). The Japanese mobilized their home population to face the invasion based on the idea of the battle being their opportunity to bleed the Allies and bring them to the bargaining table with terms acceptable to Japan. To do so, they were willing to expend a sizeable part of their population. Like the Kamikaze, this was a strategy of desperation.

Points not covered in common history that would've affected the proposed invasion should include the Typhoon. It would've probably done more damage to the Allied fleet than the attacks off Okinawa. It was a very bad one and odds are the invasion fleet would've been in it's path. Many of the transport and the supply ships came from yards with the idea of focusing on how quickly they could supply the front and less, though not ignored, how they handled heavy seas.

Starvation is another very, very good one. The rice crop failed in the fall of 45. For people working 12-14 hours a day (hard work) and consuming 1,000-1,400 calories, that spelled disaster. While starvation would've been a major killer as the year progressed and '46 dawned, the attendent diseases (Typhus, various plagues, tuberculosis, beri-beri, rickets, scurvy, ect) would've decimated the population.

The bombing of the communications systems would've amplified the affects of the starvation plus induced diseases such as cholera.

Civilians, unfortunately, could have on a limited affect on the battle but a major affect on the casualty list. Their general ineffectiveness in the face of massed firepower coupled with little training outside that useful in a human wave lead them to be cannon fodder pure and simple. Once the Allies faced their first couple of human wave attacks, the population in general would've been considered fair game, making Kyushu a free fire zone.

Another point, Gas. Both sides had stockpiled and were willing to use it.
 
pgm1962a said:
One thing to remember that the Japanese surrender had a lot to do with the USSR entering the war as did the A-bomb. Soviet infantry would have slaughtered the Japanes population by the hundreds of thousands. And as for the possibility of high casualties....2-300thousand were a drop in the bucket to the Soviets (remember they suffered over 200,000 casualties in taking Berlin). With all the effort the Japanese were doing in repeling the Americans, there northern flank would have been more exposed.

I agree with the point that the North would've been exposed to invasion in 46 by the Soviets. But think the Japanese surrender was affected more by the isolation of Japan from it's raw material resources, dropping of the bomb, firebomging and general air supremecy and threat of invasion that the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviets.

Manchuria was not one of the home islands, it only came under Japanese control less than 14 years before. It was a source of Raw Materials for Japan, specifically metals. It was also a safe place to train aircrews. It's affect was economic, not (for lack of a better word) personal. Firebombing the cities of Japan dehoused ("Bomber" Harris terminology) the people, as well as destroyed the cottage industry most of them relied on to survive. Manchuria is far away from that effect.

Cutting off the Japanese homeland from raw materials via Submarines, mining by B29 and surface blockade (as well as the conquest of Manchuria by the Soviets) destroyed Japan's ability to fight. However, the will to fight (and in direct line the reason to fight) was negated by the Atomic Bomb. It was a weapon for which the Japanese had no answer. Specifically, the Japanese warlords. Lose the inner and outter ring of islands defending Japan?-beef up the defeneses to face the invasion and bleed the Allies white to get acceptable terms. Destroy industry and the ability to arm troops?- turn the entire population into solidiers and arm them with spears. Lose Manchuria to the Russians?- It was of limited use anyway. But the Bomb produce an unanswerable question. For that, the military had no response. The peace party in Japan held their feet to the fire, the emporer informed them he wanted peace and that was pretty much it.

Short and choppy history perspective.
 
timshatz said:
....
Points not covered in common history that would've affected the proposed invasion should include the Typhoon. It would've probably done more damage to the Allied fleet than the attacks off Okinawa. It was a very bad one and odds are the invasion fleet would've been in it's path. Many of the transport and the supply ships came from yards with the idea of focusing on how quickly they could supply the front and less, though not ignored, how they handled heavy seas. .

The typhoon would have caused damage but it wasnt going to destroy the allied amphib force. The shear size of the invasion meant many of the troops and associated eqmt was also going to come from the Mariana's and the PI.
 
My neighbor in Florida was on the destroyer USS Laffey at Okinawa on picket duty when she was hit by several Kamikazes. My neighbor was in a five inch gun turret. He and one other man were the only ones who survived out of the twenty five men manning the turret. He said blood was ankle deep in bottom. If you want to understand what it was like on that ship during the attack, below is a very good narrative.

TheHistoryNet | Air Sea | USS Laffey: Attacked Off Okinawa in World War II
 
syscom3 said:
The typhoon would have caused damage but it wasnt going to destroy the allied amphib force. The shear size of the invasion meant many of the troops and associated eqmt was also going to come from the Mariana's and the PI.

True, this invasion was so big that there were parts of it coming from the West Coast of the US. It would've been a masterpiece of planning and logistics. The Typhoon would've done a good deal of damage to those parts of it that were in it's path but the sheer size would've meant many parts of the Armada saw nothing of that storm.

Good point.
 
I wrote an article on the account of the Laffey which suffered 22 kamikaze attacks in 79 minutes.

There were a total of 2,350,000 men at arms in Japan in August 1945 and 3 million on the Asian continent ready to come home for defense. Over 900,000 were bolstering the Kyushu defense and we thought there were 250,000. There were 12,000 aircraft when we thought there were less than 2,000. We never knew of the 9,800 kamikaze motorboats or 500+ kaiten mini-subs. The National Volunteer Combat Force which consisted of 28 million people and not all were old women. A boy 15 can kill you as well as a 25 year old woman or 60 year old man using not only bamboo spears but old firearms, satchel charges, mines, bows, axes and Molotov cocktails. There as a contingent of volunteers willing to strap on ceramic containers with bubonic plague, cholera, smallpox, botulism, anthrax, and so on developed by the infamous Unit 731 along with chemical agents from Ubit 516. Another cadre was willing to strap satchel charges to their bodies for kamikaze on a more personal level.

We keep returning to the Allied propaganda we've heard for decades about how the Japanese had no food or ammo and all the rest of the "ready to give up" stuff when they were in fact planning massive suicidal defenses and offenses. Kyushu had massive amounts of ammo and foodstuffs sufficient for months yet we keep playing the propaganda card of not telling the complete truth regarding the Japanese state of defenses. I simply do not understand why we continue to downplay the Japanese capabilities in the face of the evidence. Why must we paint the Japanese as victims?

Kyushu has 35 landing beaches not just 5 like Normandy. It was a humungous honeycomb of the land mines, caves, pill boxes, mortars, barbed wire, snipers, suiciders in spider holes and underground aircraft hangars all linked together. Picture fortified Okinawa times 27 in size!

The number of deaths on both sides combined would have overshadowed all else since they would have occurred in a relatively short time unlike Europe's totals.

Our planners expected that after we took our lumps and laid waste to Japan that it would take 10 years to mop up the guerilla groups that would take to the mountains after what would have been the greatest bloodletting in human history.
 
Although much has been made about Japan ready to repel the U.S. invasion of Kyushu and Honshu there are several factors to consider. It would have been imposible for Japan to bring home most over overseas armies since most of the navy was occupied being sunk. The air transport system would have been completely overwhelmed. Japan WOULD NOT have fought to the death. True early on many would, however as in all nations no matter the culture there would have been those who would have surrendered, chose not to fight, or possibly join the allies. A Soviet invasion of northern Honshu would have been a collosal catastrophe for the Japanese with possibly hundreds of thousands of deaths. It is true that there would have been high casualties for the allies, there is just no getting around that. However the casualties for the Japanese would have been biblical, and an utter anhialation of there society (the US was prepared to obliterate Japan if it would not surrender).
 
The Japanese wouldn't have devised planes like these if this kind of tactic didn't work. Check out photo's of direct hits by Divine Wind... It still scares the hell out of me...:shock:
 

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Okha bombs were actually ineffective as they had to be carried to their target by a mother ship which turned out to be meat on the table for USN fighters. The few that did get through were devastating, one cut a destroyer in half.
 
At that stage of the war, Japan was pretty much throwing mud at the wall and seeing what would stick. The effectiveness of a tactic was answered by one question, did it kill Allied Soliders. If it did, it was effective. The japanese themselves were considered expendible and giving their lives in the defense of the nation. What did it matter to the commanders if 20, 30 60 or 100 Japanese died for each Allied death? In the abstract, it didn't.

The Japanese started the war focused on the concept of the grand climactic battle. They'd gotten one at sea with the Russians back in 1905 and it had colored the thinking of the planners from there on in. They believed they could do the same with the US (after the attack on 12-7 did not shock the United States into submission) and had tried to set it up via fleet actions from Midway to Leyte Gulf. At sea, their attempts failed.

The invasion would've given the Army that opportunity. Given the Japanese Army would've outnumbered the invading troops, but had inferior mobility, firepower and logistics, the end result can only be a catastrophic defeat for the Japanese. Given that the Allies were outnumbered, facing a fanatical foe willing to lose millions in defense of their homeland, had a good knowledge of the American plans for invasion (from previous experience) and considered all persons save the Emporer as expendible, the conclusion is inevitable that the Allies were facing a catastrophic victory.

This was going to be a battle with no winners and only millions of casualties.

That's the reason the vets who knew the score back then say, without a trace of revisionist irony, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb". They knew the bomb changed the war to a war Japan could not even compete in. It gave them the opportunity to surrender.

Lucky for all they took it.
 
don't forget one small thing, the Sovetes were ready to pounce at any time had they been given the green light, so Japan in all it's self-proclaimed glory would of felt the heat from another point besdies the usual PTO Allies
 
Erich said:
don't forget one small thing, the Sovetes were ready to pounce at any time had they been given the green light, so Japan in all it's self-proclaimed glory would of felt the heat from another point besdies the usual PTO Allies

Yeah, it is a point mostly forgotten. The Soviets probably would've crossed to the top two islands and there was nothing up there to stop them. All of it was in the south. Have another North/South situation like in Korea.

The Soviets looked at invasions much like large river crossings. In this, they were very similar to the Germans. Against a defended beach head, it is problematical that it would work. Against norther Japan in late 45/early 46, it probably would've worked.
 
timshatz said:
The Soviets looked at invasions much like large river crossings. In this, they were very similar to the Germans. Against a defended beach head, it is problematical that it would work. Against norther Japan in late 45/early 46, it probably would've worked.

If the Soviets thought that invading Japan would be like another large river crossing, then they would be in for a surprise.

Invading Japan in early 1946 would mean amphibious operations in an area of the world with notoriously horrible winter weather. And I dont think they had the amphib and supply resources required to do the job.
 
No one said that an invasion would be easy. However the Soviets had every intention of taking Hokaido Island (northern most of the home islands). As for not having the resources for such an assault...the Soviets were if anything inovative and very persistent. Just ask the Germans.
 

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