What did the P51s have over the German fighters?

[alejandro_]

There were heavy losses both operational and non- operational....By December 1941, the LW, according to murray had lost the equivalent of two full airforcesssine 1939....or about 8-10000 a/c. losses in the East from June to December were running at about 2000 a/c. Losses in the BoB were about 1800, and in the period 1939 to the end of June 1940 about 2000 or so as well. adding all that up,

You were talking about British Isles and the Channel in your previous post:

1940-42, the LW was still mounting challenges to the control of the vital air space over the british isles and Western Europe. The sustained....and costly....attrition battles played force back on the LW gave control of the vital air space to the allies and inflicted enough attrition on the LW to make them adopt unsafe pilot replacement programs, and suffer chronic fuel shortages from as early as 1942.

the estimated total losses for the LW Jan-December 1941 in the west (and MTO) were in the order of 3000 a/c.

Extremely unlikely. German aircraft destroyed and damaged to all causes in front line service between June and December 1941 were 4.653 aircraft. 3.827 of these were lost in the Eastern Front. In the link below you can find some data of German aircraft lost and damaged in 1941:

Strategy for Defeat: The <i>Luftwaffe</i> 1933-1945

 

[Aozora]

Getting right back to the subject, here's an interesting article on the development of the American long range escort fighter 1914-45, including some information on the development of self-sealing fuel tanks and drop tanks (page 39 "Range Extension: The Development of an Idea); it's interesting to note that as early as 1942 the USAAF anticipated that the Germans would fit heavier weapons to its fighters, including the thought that the Fw 190 might be armed with 37 mm cannon. Discussion of the P-51 starts with Chapter III, page 124:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAFHS/AAFHS-136.pdf

 

[drgondog]

LW was weak to face at the same time raf AND vvs AND american heavy bombers AND american escort bfighters
Returning to the topic , if we would like to see the true greatness of P51 we should take 10-20-100
P51s and put them in fight with 10-20-100 german fighters with NO bombers attracting the attention of LW
P51 was a good fighter that was blessed by the circumstances

Jim - there are many examples in which smaller numbers of Mustangs attacked a larger force of Me 109s or 190s completely separated from the bombers. Fighter sweeps in which the fights were alone with each other, interceptions 30-50 miles away from the bomber stream... ditto P-47 and P-38.

One may parse LW victory credits and set aside issues of over claiming and look to how few scored three victories in a single day against US fighters in Europe. Conversely there are more than 70 such examples of 3 or more by US fighters against German fighters... despite being 'undergunned' in the opinions of many.

 

[jim]

Jim - there are many examples in which smaller numbers of Mustangs attacked a larger force of Me 109s or 190s completely separated from the bombers. Fighter sweeps in which the fights were alone with each other, interceptions 30-50 miles away from the bomber stream... ditto P-47 and P-38.

One may parse LW victory credits and set aside issues of over claiming and look to how few scored three victories in a single day against US fighters in Europe. Conversely there are more than 70 such examples of 3 or more by US fighters against German fighters... despite being 'undergunned' in the opinions of many.

Mr drgondog
LW for three years was facing low level airforce in the east and low/mid level airforce in west and south. The coming of the americans brought another requirement -high altitude fights. Lw proved weak to adjust in time to this new threat. It was natural. did not have enough engineers,to design or factories and raw to produce new fighters to face the high altitude americans and at the SAME time keep fighting in the east and the RAF
The introduction of Both D9 and ta 152 was delayed because of fear of losing production. Many improvements for the 109 were delayed or never introduced for the same reason .Me 262 was late because of raw materials shortages
So, yes, P51 was a very very good design. Yes in early 44 clearly had an advantage over 109G6 and Fw190A . But only because war circumstances prevented the normal evolutin of the german fighters. In my opinion P51 was inferior to Bf109k4 in a classic dogfight ,using same fuels. K4 could be introduced in january 44 but production issues did not allowed it. Also the Fiat G56 ,that was rejected only on production concerns ,would be also a formidable opponent for p51. Or turbosupercharged Fw190s cancelled only because lack of raw materials.
In this sense i consider the succes of P51 ,to a degree, circumstantial
I firmly believe that judging airframes only by combat results can be misleading.
PS I repeat i consider the P51 top class fighter. I just finished reading a thread about its cowling system.Genius. And i would like to congratulate the administrator(=creator?) of this site for the amazing amount of informations that this site provide us.

 

[Civettone]

Most of the German pilots were woefully undertrained rookies. Easy bait for the any well trained American pilot.

Also, keep in mind that the job of the P-51 was to shoot down 109s and 190s. The job of the German fighters was to shoot down bombers. Many German fighters were shot down while trying to close in on the bombers.

I have already expressed my great respect for the qualities of the P-51. But the absolute number of kills gives a much distorted picture. Let's stick to one on one comparisons, please.

Kris

 

[drgondog]

Most of the German pilots were woefully undertrained rookies. Easy bait for the any well trained American pilot.

Also, keep in mind that the job of the P-51 was to shoot down 109s and 190s. The job of the German fighters was to shoot down bombers. Many German fighters were shot down while trying to close in on the bombers.

I have already expressed my great respect for the qualities of the P-51. But the absolute number of kills gives a much distorted picture. Let's stick to one on one comparisons, please.

Kris

Kris - you missed the point.

Jim was musing about the fate of Mustangs in 'even battles' numerically with LW in fighter to fighter combat away from the bombers. I responded to that directly.

 

[parsifal]

VVS and RAF in 41-43 only provided training for german pilots. The vast majority of german aces began their carrers at this period. It was the happy times. Jg 26 and JG2 in the west suffered minimal losses and even less deaths

Not according to either Murray, or the LW quarterly returns. The following is taken from Murrays book

TABLE XVII
German Losses, All Causes--1941 (Not Including November)

Aircraft Authorized, Jan 1941 5,273
Actual Strength; 4,297
Losses due to enemy action 2,849
Losses not due to enemy action: 2,153
Total Losses 5,002
Percentage of Initial Force Structure: 115%

in addition, the Quartermaster was reporting that more than 3500 aircraft had been damaged by more than 50% in 1941, in the East, most of those that were damaged and left at the front were lost in the Soviet counteroffensives.

Despite nhaving produced more than 11000 aircraft, the Luftwaffe had actually contracted in size during the year...from 4300 to just over 4000. Moreover, pilots were being lost at such a rate that by the end of 1941, "German aircraft production and crew training programs could no longer keep up with losses; and by January 1942, conditions forced frontline units to rob transition schools of crews a month before their scheduled course completion" (Murray Page 94)

(Murray again)....

"Compounding the difficulties was a supply and maintenance system that revealed little capacity for functioning over the long distances that the Luftwaffe now covered. What had sufficed within the limited frontiers of prewar Germany could not meet the needs of an air force committed from the Bay of Biscay to the gates of Moscow and from the North Cape to North Africa. The supply system, particularly in Russia, no longer functioned effectively. Milch in a visit to the eastern front discovered that hundreds of inoperable aircraft were lying about on forward airfields. They had either broken down or been damaged in combat, and spare parts were not flowing forward to repair these aircraft.122 Because supply and maintenance were separate from operational units, a wide gulf had grown up between frontline units and their logistical support establishment in the Reich. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe's organizational structure divorced supply and maintenance from operations, thereby hindering vital communications between these two divisions. More often than not, the special needs of one were not meaningfully addressed by the other.

The pressure of continuous air operations on the Luftwaffe's maintenance infrastructure also had its effect. Over the winter of 1940-41, the Germans experienced a considerable period without combat in which to reconstitute and to rebuild flying units strained by the fighting in 1940. The bombers, however, with their heavy commitments in the night offensive against British cities, did not enjoy such recuperation. But beginning in April 1941, with the campaign in the Balkans, the demands of far-flung campaigns burdened the entire structure. The result was a slow but steady decline in the Luftwaffe's "in-commission" rates to a nadir in the winter of 1941-42 .

Besides maintaining aircraft "in commission," the Luftwaffe had the concomitant problem of filling cockpits. The loss rate, as already suggested, had reached the point where the Luftwaffe pushed pilots out of training schools as rapidly as possible to bring aircrew strength to acceptable levels. What now happened was that operational units completed what the schools could no longer finish. The process in many units involved working new pilots into squadron operations on a gradual basis while hopefully minimizing their exposure to hazardous missions. Then as experience increased, squadrons assigned the pilots to more dangerous tasks until they were fully combat-ready. Such a system was undoubtedly the only one that frontline units could follow given the state of pilot

The attrition over the summer and fall of 1941 led to a steady deterioration in the experience level of aircrews. From the summer of 1941, the Luftwaffe entered a period in which losses proceeded at such a pace that a recovery in terms of crew flying experience could only come with a long halt to operations. However, failure in Russia in 1941 virtually insured that the Luftwaffe would never receive a respite. In fact, the increase of Allied air efforts in the Mediterranean and west meant that the demands on the German air force would continually increase, thus exacerbating an already serious situation. This deterioration of aircrew skill level shows up most clearly in Table XIX in the two column summarizing losses not due to enemy action".

The numbers of combat ready aircrew also dropped throughout 1941. Again, Murray says that In commission rates fell from about 75% at the begining of the year to just over 50% at the end of the year. Some of this was due to the falling readiness rates of the crews themseves, which Murray also discusses in detail

Despite your wishes ,RAF activities in the west was of little nuissance for the germans. Their twins bombers carried too light bomb loads to cause real damage. Training units were established in France by LW with no problems by RAF

LW losses for 1941 amounted to over 5000 a/c, and a further 3500 damaged (by more than 50%). More than half of those losses were due to activities in the west. If untroubled by the RAF, LW must make terrible pilots as they seem to keep losing aircraft and pilots for no apparent reason.

 

[bobbysocks]

...... Returning to the topic , if we would like to see the true greatness of P51 we should take 10-20-100
P51s and put them in fight with 10-20-100 german fighters with NO bombers attracting the attention of LW
P51 was a good fighter that was blessed by the circumstances

fighters are always going to be providing cover ( bombers, troop transports, ground troops ,truck convoys, etc) or pursuing some sort of attacker. there are few scenarios where you will get a purely fighter vs fighter confrontation without anything else being the target of one side or the other. the few times i can think of where larger battles between them happened ( where no "bombers" were involved) was during mass invasions or troop movements like overlord or market garden...but again the allied fighters were covering ground ops or harassing enemy supply lines. the closest thing i could find to your scenario off hand was sept 18, 1944 during market garden. ~60 ac from the 357th FG tangled with a mixed force of ~60 109s and 190s north of maastricht and south of a drop zone for airborne troops. since they were covering the troop drop they were flying at low altitude and the battle raged from 16000 ft to the deck. no other allied ac were involved according to the accounts i read. the 357th scored 26 to 2 loses. there is one other account i recall off the top of my head where they ( the 357th FG...most of my research revolves around them ) bounced a large group ( of equal size or better ) of 109s forming up near an airdrome and they they came out on top...but i will have to dig for the date and stats.

"The Yoxford Boys" Olmstead pg 43 and 44

 

[parsifal]

plus you need to look at the total losses, not just those in the air. its a wet dream scenario for the LW enthusiasts, and one they consistently get wrong because they dont look at the whole picture.

During the Polish campaign for example, it is often quoted that the germans completely dominated the skies and at little cost. Its a hotly debated topic, with divergent views. i happen to think that the germans did win air superiority and that their airpower did have a profound effect on ground operations, but it was anything but a cheap or easy vistory. Most sources now suggest that the germans lost over 500 a/c in that openeing campaign when losses to all causes are taken into account.


This is the bottom line for the LW boys that they need to accept. Germany during the war lost over 116000 a/c . in 1944-5 they lost about 49000 a/c. Where and when were the other losses suffered? all this talk of "easy" victories, and "untroubled" by their opponents is simply not supportable. the LW never had an easy war, or a light time of it. Losses were never one sided, except perhaps in the opening months of Barbarossa, but even then own losses were never light......over 1200 aircraft in three months.

And fighters were there for a reason, a purpose. The German had their purpose, and failed in it, the Americans had their fighters and a purpose for them, and theirs did not fail. therein lies the basis of your discussion.

 

[Civettone]

there are few scenarios where you will get a purely fighter vs fighter confrontation without anything else being the target of one side or the other

This is simply not true. Fighter sweeps were very common missions in WW2.
Also, we can loosen up the requirement of 'no bomber escort': part of the fighter escort flew ahead of the bombers and had liberty to attack at will, while part of the interceptors were designated to take on the escort fighters, while their buddies went for the bombers.

Germany during the war lost over 116000 a/c . in 1944-5 they lost about 49000 a/c.

Germany lost 116k aircraft? That is more than it produced in WW2 plus that what was operational prior to it.

Most of these 'lost' aircraft were worn out or lost in non-combat actions.

1944-1945 losses give a totally distorted view on what was going on: most combat losses were suffered on the ground. Add to that, totally undertrained pilots who would have been shot down, no matter which aircraft they were flying.


Kris

 

[Tante Ju]

Germany lost 116k aircraft? That is more than it produced in WW2 plus that what was operational prior to it.

Indeed the thread is taking an increasingly surreal turn regarding the inflating of German air losses...

 

[JtD]

Not every loss was a complete loss as in burning pile of wood and metal on the ground. A lot would be repaired, send back to the front, and be "lost" again. So it's not impossible to have more losses than aircraft produced.

It is also a fact that the Luftwaffe statistically got completely destroyed several times a year, with loss ratios easily exceeding 200% per year. However, this was also true for say the British bomber command, which in 1943 had a near 300% loss ratio.
---
Has anyone pointed out that when the P-51 entered combat in early 1944, the Luftwaffe was pretty much on its relative technological low? It was fielding aircraft that performed as good or worse than the aircraft it fielded in late 1941, early 1942, as the development in the past 2 years had mostly focussed on making their fighters multirole aircraft, adding armament, radio equipment, fuel capacity and whatnotelse. As a matter of fact, a Bf 109G-6 with gunpods gave considerable worse performance in early 1944 than a clean Bf 109F-4 in early 1942. The same can be said about the Fw 190A-8, not yet using the erhöhte Notleistung, and the early 1942 Fw 190A-3. This only changed later in 1944, but then it was too late to have a noticeable effect.

In particular against the fairly numerous gun podded Bf 109, a P-51 without drop tanks would have pretty much all performance advantages that count. It was a good weapon, and it appeared at the right time.

 

[parsifal]

Germany lost 116k aircraft? That is more than it produced in WW2 plus that what was operational prior to it.

Ah no. germany produced about 94000 a/c (combat types) from indigenous sources,and took delivery or expropriated about another 5000 or so from foreign sources. but on topo of that 94000 there were at least 25000 trainers and other non-combat types. The losses also inlcude those surrendered at the end of the war....about 8500 a/c.

Most of these 'lost' aircraft were worn out or lost in non-combat actions.

This is a spuriour defence. Exactly the same argument can be mounted for the amazing kill tallies inflicted on germany's enemies. for the russians, for example, in 1941, how many of their a/c were lost or burnt on the ground. i would suggest...think of a ridiculously high number, then double it, at least.

1944-1945 losses give a totally distorted view on what was going on: most combat losses were suffered on the ground. Add to that, totally undertrained pilots who relative to your opponents. would have been shot down, no matter which aircraft they were flying.

And the russians flew under those conditions for more than half the war. its still a loss, and how do you suppose the germans got into the position of using rookies in the first place. it was because of the losses they sustained prior to 1944....it was unsustainable for them to maintain training standards with the losses they were suffereing, even when they had abundant numbers of experienced flyers.

war is unfair and often one sided. thats the objective of good strategy...to work to achieve good position...the germans fought their war essentially as short sighted opportunists, which gave them salad days early on, but caught up to them as difficulties increased. trying to cut out, or ignore what happened in the late war period is trying to deny the mistakes they made early on when they squandered their great advantages

 

[Balljoint]

fighters are always going to be providing cover ( bombers, troop transports, ground troops ,truck convoys, etc) or pursuing some sort of attacker. there are few scenarios where you will get a purely fighter vs fighter confrontation without anything else being the target of one side or the other. the few times i can think of where larger battles between them happened ( where no "bombers" were involved) was during mass invasions or troop movements like overlord or market garden...but again the allied fighters were covering ground ops or harassing enemy supply lines. the closest thing i could find to your scenario off hand was sept 18, 1944 during market garden. ~60 ac from the 357th FG tangled with a mixed force of ~60 109s and 190s north of maastricht and south of a drop zone for airborne troops. since they were covering the troop drop they were flying at low altitude and the battle raged from 16000 ft to the deck. no other allied ac were involved according to the accounts i read. the 357th scored 26 to 2 loses. there is one other account i recall off the top of my head where they ( the 357th FG...most of my research revolves around them ) bounced a large group ( of equal size or better ) of 109s forming up near an airdrome and they they came out on top...but i will have to dig for the date and stats.

"The Yoxford Boys" Olmstead pg 43 and 44

Most military strategy is a version of Rock, scissors, paper, i.e. tanks against infantry, artillery against tanks, interceptors vs. bombers, escort vs. interceptors etc. Thus the chance of both sides concurrently seeking a fighter vs. fighter air supremacy engagement is remote.

In fact the Eighth's Operation Argument, circa February 1944, had the specific intent of matching masses of long range air superiority fighters against the LW's fighters tasked with bomber interception by using the bombers as bait to lure the LW into mass against mass combat. Galland took the challenge with perhaps a thousand fighters massed to defend the homeland. But the LW's objective was the Eight's bombers and Eight's objective was to destroy the LW and gain air superiority. By June 4th the Allies did establish air superiority over Western Europe.

The point being that a LW pilot engaging the (mostly) P-51 opposition was doing so out of necessity or against orders. It's not really possible to judge on the basis of results that were not the goal of the LW.

 

[bobbysocks]

This is simply not true. Fighter sweeps were very common missions in WW2.

kris, i agree, and that is one of the few scenarios it where "could" happen. but how often during these sweeps did equal forces meet and tangle? if you know of some please share. that parity ( same number of 51s vs same number of lw ac minus bombers) was what i was looking for as per jim's proposed match up. on sweeps like that one side or the other usually had the upper hand. i can find a lot of stories where the squadron found 4, 8, etc. 109s or 190s and attacked. but have yet to find many where bombers werent involved where the 2 met in equal or where the 51s were at a numeric disadvantage. i could use gentile and godfrey's encounter where4 they got lost and the 2 of them attacked 100 do 217s and an equal number for se fighters....but bomber were involved there as that group was going to meet them. i think jim was wanting a match up where forces were equal and the bombers werent being used as bait. some of the other guys who are better versed in this may be able to come up with occasions but in my limited research i cant find many.

Also, we can loosen up the requirement of 'no bomber escort': part of the fighter escort flew ahead of the bombers and had liberty to attack at will, while part of the interceptors were designated to take on the escort fighters, while their buddies went for the bombers.

again, we agree but i was trying to remove both bomber bait and the high alt as goals...IF you include this it is hard to isolate the same number of each sides fighters as some will claim the skies were full of mustangs

Kris

balljoint said, "Most military strategy is a version of Rock, scissors, paper, i.e. tanks against infantry, artillery against tanks, interceptors vs. bombers, escort vs. interceptors etc. Thus the chance of both sides concurrently seeking a fighter vs. fighter air supremacy engagement is remote. "

that is what i was trying to say. and while after doolittle took charge he gave the fighters a freer reign to separate from the box to seek out and attack the lw....most of the planes they found were still going after the bombers...or were numerically less.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Indeed the thread is taking an increasingly surreal turn regarding the inflating of German air losses...

Germany built approx. 119,000 military aircraft of all types. Of that approx. 116,000 were lost of which 70,000 were total losses.

 

[Civettone]

Parsifal, for some reason you are making the case that the Luftwaffe suffered significant losses during the first half of the war, while it is often portrayed that the LW was having a walk in the park. I think you are completely right. The LW did suffer.

However, I object to the numbers you use. Most of the losses you talk about are non-combat and retired (worn out) aircraft. While significant in its own right, it does say very little about enemy actions.
Likewise, aircraft destroyed on the ground or aircraft manned by undertrained pilots, says nothing about the qualities of the aircraft. And I believe that is what this thread is about.

So again, I am not disagreeing with you, but I would like you to use to appropriate numbers.

Also, I am strongly disagreeing with the notion that fighters were always protecting bombers/recon or attacking bombers/recon. Just check up on LW doctrine and you will see that the primary task of the LW is to regain air superiority. This means attacking air fields and shooting down planes. In Poland, France, the LCs and Russia, this was achieved very early on. From that moment on, the fighters were free to chase. Also, read Gallands biography and you will see that a large part of the fighter missions were fighter sweeps. After 1940 most bomber missions over Britain were night missions with LW fighters going on the defensive against RAF fighter planes flying rhubarb missons. Later in the war, it was common for the Allies to fly both escort for bombers as well as launch large fighter sweeps. The latter would usually go unopposed by the LW. ("LW did not show up.") Finally, on the Eastern front, it was common til quite late in the war to send bombers without escort. This was possible due to the large extent of the front lines and the air space surrounding them. LW fighters would go on small hunting missions, hoping to find an enemy. Soviet AF had a doctrine of ground support for all aircraft. As such, Soviet fighter planes would often fly on their own, strafing enemy ground forces.

As can be seen, fighter vs fighter was quite common during WW2, like it was in WW1 and in more modern times.
Kris

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal, for some reason you are making the case that the Luftwaffe suffered significant losses during the first half of the war, while it is often portrayed that the LW was having a walk in the park. I think you are completely right. The LW did suffer.

This suggest that we are not that far removed from each others POV on this issue. I am heartened by that. For the record, so too did the allies, they suffered significant caualties. im not trying to say they didnt. What generated my response was the claim (not made by you) that the LW had an easy tiime of it and was untroubled by its losses early in the war.

However, I object to the numbers you use. Most of the losses you talk about are non-combat and retired (worn out) aircraft. While significant in its own right, it does say very little about enemy actions.

But that holds true for the allies (particulalry the Soviets) as well. For the record, the Soviets lost a total of 109000 a/c to all causes, of which, according to Krivosheev, 45000 (or thereabouts) were combat realted. About 58% of Soviet combat losses were due to ground fire, and then we have issues like "Did not returns" or "engine failures" which may or may not be listed as a combat loss. This diminution works both ways. If you want to discount, or not include losses not relating to enemy action, for the germans, then you really need to apply similar standards to their opponents.

For the record, about 70% of german losses were the result of enemy action. thats remarkably consistent with everyone else, except the Soviets....who claim that 65000 of their losses wer not combat related.....i have my doubts.

Also for the record, the british total losses were 22000 for the war, whilst the Americans were about 18000, of which 4000 were in the PTO

Likewise, aircraft destroyed on the ground or aircraft manned by undertrained pilots, says nothing about the qualities of the aircraft. And I believe that is what this thread is about.

Your absolutely right, but as always, rememeber what sparked this response from me....claims that the germans had it easy, that their loss rates were insignificant that it all fell apart only in 1944, and only because they were facing impossible numbers and in impossible conditions. Some of that is true, but there were reasons why, and these tend to be parpere over or concealed by people trying to hide the truth...


So again, I am not disagreeing with you, but I would like you to use to appropriate numbers.

Also, I am strongly disagreeing with the notion that fighters were always protecting bombers/recon or attacking bombers/recon. Just check up on LW doctrine and you will see that the primary task of the LW is to regain air superiority. This means attacking air fields and shooting down planes. In Poland, France, the LCs and Russia, this was achieved very early on. From that moment on, the fighters were free to chase. Also, read Gallands biography and you will see that a large part of the fighter missions were fighter sweeps. After 1940 most bomber missions over Britain were night missions with LW fighters going on the defensive against RAF fighter planes flying rhubarb missons. Later in the war, it was common for the Allies to fly both escort for bombers as well as launch large fighter sweeps. The latter would usually go unopposed by the LW. ("LW did not show up.") Finally, on the Eastern front, it was common til quite late in the war to send bombers without escort. This was possible due to the large extent of the front lines and the air space surrounding them. LW fighters would go on small hunting missions, hoping to find an enemy. Soviet AF had a doctrine of ground support for all aircraft. As such, Soviet fighter planes would often fly on their own, strafing enemy ground forces.

As can be seen, fighter vs fighter was quite common during WW2, like it was in WW1 and in more modern times

.

Kris, i never made this claim. All air operations are either about control of the air space, or the use of the air space. "Fighter Sweeps" are about air denial, and relate most directly to either achieving air superiority or denying air superiority. In 1941 in the west, people often equate the shelacking the RAF received over France as evidenece of German air superiority. but by definition, its not air superiority the Germans possessed. They were quite unable to operate at will over the air space and undertake other operations as they needed. all they could do is mount air denial operations on a selective basis...ie when they wanted and when it was deemed useful to do so. Galland recognises this in his book....the Germans were finally and utterly presented with the knowledge that in the west they were on the defensive. Its akin to Lees battles in the seven days campaign of 1862.....Lees actions were brilliant, but he was still strategically on the defensive, and that inherently meant he was limited in his ability to manouvre and act with initiative. .
Kris[/QUOTE]

 

[alejandro_]

Ah no. germany produced about 94000 a/c (combat types) from indigenous sources,and took delivery or expropriated about another 5000 or so from foreign sources. but on topo of that 94000 there were at least 25000 trainers and other non-combat types. The losses also inlcude those surrendered at the end of the war....about 8500 a/c.

In the book "German aircraft industry and production" there is a table with total losses and damaged aircraft (until 10%). You can see it in the link below. Also, Allies captured a very large number of aircraft towards the end of the war which are not included. British captured 4.810; in Poznan Soviets captured around 700. Commander of 1TA could not believe it and he ordered to check again...

Historia y tecnología militar: Pérdidas de la Luftwaffe en la SGM, 1939-1945

 

[parsifal]

What do the words in the table mean?


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