Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Are we talking about today or WW2???I don't think there is such a thing as accurately bombing "from altitude" unless the weather is perfect. Accurate bombing was done at low altitude unless you have guided munitions (and many of those require you to be at 10,000 ft or lower IIRC). Maybe with JDAM.
But it is possible to fly to a target at high altitude and then descend to a lower altitude to drop bombs.
I can't really support the claim the Mosquito was revolutionary. It replaced its predecessors in that it had greater performance than them, and as for its wooden structure, it was an evolutionary step in structural practices that de Havilland applied in the DH.88 Comet and DH.91 Albatross. It certainly carved a niche for itself and gave the RAF new dimensions in offensive capability, but it didn't introduce sweeping change on a revolutionary scale. As I've been stating, it introduced new options to old practices.
The Canberra was an excellent aircraft in my opinion, but it also didn't offer anything that we didn't already have with other aircraft long before the end of the Vietnam war. In terms of Recon we had not only the U2 but also the SR 71. The Canberra could fly fast and high, but it couldn't escape an SA 2 or a MiG-25. By contrast, a Mosquito could outrun the fighters of it's day.While it might not have been in the USAF, in the RAF the Canberra had the same impact that the Mosquito did. It proved itself very flexible and added a different dimension to the RAF's air capability. Until the U-2, the Canberra had a far higher ceiling than virtually every other aircraft in military service and Canberras made many overflights of the Soviet Union with relative impunity before the U-2 appeared on the scene. The last Canberras were retired from the RAF in 2006; PR.9 photo recon platforms with 39 Sqn.
Are we talking about today or WW2???
Look at the altitudes raids over Germany and Japan were commonly conducted. Only the Tokyo firebombing were conducted at what was considered low altitudes. The first major Ploesti raid is another exception
Not true!!!! You have a variety of smart bombs, laser and satellite guided systems that can hit targets easily from altitude.I am pointing out that even today it's not possible to bomb accurately from altitudes such as 20,000 - 30,000 ft.
Show us your reference for that!The reason that heavy bomber raids devolved into just bombing cities was because they had so much trouble hitting the actual factories, rail yards, production plants and so forth from altitude.
The doctrine changed after WW2 when you have aircraft AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS that can accurately deliver bombs at low altitudes and fast speeds. For the technology of the day the Mosquito was a very accurate bomber but you were still "bombing by hand" and there was a margin of error still induced. Post war delivery systems, smart weapons and eventually stealth technology changed the face of delivering a precision strikeThey also had relatively poor performance, and had to stick together for mutual protection, so that you wouldn't have a B-17 swooping down to lower altitude to strike and then soom climbing back out, whereas a fighter bomber or a fast bomber like a Mosquito could actually do that.
I already mentioned JDAM's as an exception to this. My understanding from the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan however is that the fighter bombers typically dropped their laser guided ordinance from around 10,000 ft, not 30,000.Not true!!!! You have a variety of smart bombs, laser and satellite guided systems that can hit targets easily from altitude.
GBU-15 Guided Bomb Unit
The Guided Bomb Unit or GBU-15 is an unpowered, glide weapon used to destroy high value enemy targets. It was designed for use with F-15E, F-111F and F-4 aircraft, but the U.S. Air Force is currentlywww.af.mil
Show us your reference for that!
The doctrine changed after WW2 when you have aircraft AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS that can accurately deliver bombs at low altitudes and fast speeds. For the technology of the day the Mosquito was a very accurate bomber but you were still "bombing by hand" and there was a margin of error still induced. Post war delivery systems, smart weapons and eventually stealth technology changed the face of delivering a precision strike
They have the capability to drop OVER 30,000 if required.I already mentioned JDAM's as an exception to this. My understanding from the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan however is that the fighter bombers typically dropped their laser guided ordinance from around 10,000 ft, not 30,000.
Well tell us! The written doctrine from General Arnold specified industrial targets, later cities were targeted but targets that produced war material was the goalSeriously? There are entire books written about it.
see aboveThe US was still trying to hit specific factories, rail yards etc. (in Europe) almost to the end of the war, while the English had already given up on that for the most part by 1942 or 43. The American raids tended to be so heavy and miss so often (thus had to be done again and again) that the cities were gradually pulverized, and they participated with the British in some of the fire bombing raids previously mentioned.
They were but free fall bombs were the primary weaponAccuracy obviously improved enormously with precision munitions, although as I'm sure you know they were already experimenting with radio, radar, and wire guided munitions during WW2.
Snowygrouch - The Ploesti Refinery complex was perhaps the single most important target for airpower doctrine for WWII. If the primary product(s) weren't Avgas (and they weren't), knocking it out would have reduced Germany's mechanized capability worse than a total loss at Schweinfurt. AvGas refining in other synthetic and crude refiners would have been required to reduce refining supply to Luftwaffe and shift production (if possible for some) to lower octane gas/petrol in order of priority to supply suface transportation and war fighting requirements.Virtually none of the oil that Germany got from Romania was of high enough quality to refine into aviation spirit economically, so while it is very important as a source
from a military perspective, from an aviation perspective, Romania was almost an irrelevance to the Luftwaffe. They of course hoped that would not be the case,
but thats actually how it turned out with what they were actually able to get from them.
By June 1944, the quantities from Romania also fell to the level of irrelevance.
View attachment 647524
Right, but JDAM's are pretty expensive. The laser guided bombs (also expensive, but quite so much) tend to be dropped from lower altitude.They have the capability to drop OVER 30,000 if required.
Well tell us! The written doctrine from General Arnold specified industrial targets, later cities were targeted but targets that produced war material was the goal
see above
They were but free fall bombs were the primary weapon
Is that your opinion or fact? Again they are CAPABLE of being dropped for altitudes in excess of 30'000 feet. You said this was not possible!Right, but JDAM's are pretty expensive. The laser guided bombs (also expensive, but quite so much) tend to be dropped from lower altitude.
And that coincides with my statementI'm not going to pull down books from the shelf and transcribe pages to prove an already very well known point for a side argument on this forum debate. But I'll quote from the Wiki:
"USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim of "precision bombing" of military targets for much of the war, and dismissed claims they were simply bombing cities. However the American Eighth Air Force received the first H2X radar sets in December 1943. Within two weeks of the arrival of these first six sets, the Eighth command gave permission for them to area bomb a city using H2X and would continue to authorize, on average, about one such attack a week until the end of the war in Europe.[171]
No argumentIn reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard. Conventionally, the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1,000 feet (300m) around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, overall, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area.[172] In the fall of 1944, only seven percent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point."
And again no argumentThe British terror or 'area bombing' campaign hinged largely on this specific paper, known as the "De-housing paper"
For sources I'd recommend the US Strategic Bombing Survey, Air War by Edward Jablonski (maybe a little dated now but I think it holds up pretty well) and Eagle Against the Sun by Ronald H. Spector for the Pacific Theater.
For the missions they were able to fly yes. If they were operated at altitude (Like you suggested earlier) the results would be the same as they had to drop their bombs at close to the same speeds as the heaviesI believe the Mosquito generally did a lot better than 7% in terms of bombing accuracy.
And again you miss the point that based on the technology and the mission of the day, the doctrine was to lob the most amount of bombs over a given target. When you had mass formations of Lancasters (14,000 pound bomb load) B-24s (5-8000 pound bomb load) and B-17s (45-8000 pound bomb load) it's obvious what the weapon of choice was going to be.yes but there is a huge difference between the above quoted statistics for high altitude level bombing vs. for example a Stuka or SBD dive bombing, or a fighter bomber or fast-bomber (like a Mosquito) bombing at low altitude. Small numbers of Mosquitos were able to hit precision targets on several occasions as we know, despite using unguided 'free fall bombs'.
Snowygrouch - The Ploesti Refinery complex was perhaps the single most important target for airpower doctrine for WWII. If the primary product(s) weren't Avgas (and they weren't), knocking it out would have reduced Germany's mechanized capability worse than a total loss at Schweinfurt. AvGas refining in other synthetic and crude refiners would have been required to reduce refining supply to Luftwaffe and shift production (if possible for some) to lower octane gas/petrol in order of priority to supply suface transportation and war fighting requirements.
To contemplate that 15th AF would actually send strategic forces to the 3rd heaviest defended target to Only bomb marshaling yards at Ploesti - as one our posters seems to thrive on - as part of the Transportation Plan, begs the question WHY? The USSR certainly wanted the rail centers at Bucharest and Ploesti bombed but they were not part of the Transportation Plan controlling USSTAF, RAF attacks on surface transportation networks - primarily in France.
I have to dig into some files long ago strored to see if there is evidence that 15th AF was explicitly ordered to limit attacks in Rumania to only M/Y.
The Transportation Plan specifically was tasked to disrupt in-country mobility (France/Brussels/Holland) and far east France on German border (Mulhouse) and far west Germany (Saarbrucken, Osnabruck) rail networks to move materials to the beach head. The attacks on German M/Y ceased two weeks prior to D-Day and 8th AF concentrated on airfields, viaducts, bridges though the end of May and into middle of June. I do know that 8th AF tasked 8th FC for many Fighter Bomber Sweeps that focused on surface targets including rail and M/Y and troop convoys -
Is that your opinion or fact? Again they are CAPABLE of being dropped for altitudes in excess of 30'000 feet. You said this was not possible!
No I'm suggesting they could fly in at high altitude for recon, and they could fly in at high altitude for raids too but drop to low altitude to perform their strike, then climb back up for the trip back home or fly back NOE.For the missions they were able to fly yes. If they were operated at altitude (Like you suggested earlier) the results would be the same as they had to drop their bombs at close to the same speeds as the heavies
And again you miss the point that based on the technology and the mission of the day, the doctrine was to lob the most amount of bombs over a given target.
Right, hence, make Mosquitos and more fighter-bombers (and maybe A-26s etc.) instead.When you had mass formations of Lancasters (14,000 pound bomb load) B-24s (5-8000 pound bomb load) and B-17s (45-8000 pound bomb load) it's obvious what the weapon of choice was going to be.
No your words - I think you have a tendency of posting your opinion on technical items rather than actually researching or knowing how they really workI said the following, originally: "I don't think there is such a thing as accurately bombing "from altitude" unless the weather is perfect. Accurate bombing was done at low altitude unless you have guided munitions (and many of those require you to be at 10,000 ft or lower IIRC). Maybe with JDAM."
I'm not going to write every post like a legal contract with footnotes for every single exception. You know what I meant.
OK - your opinionNo I'm suggesting they could fly in at high altitude for recon, and they could fly in at high altitude for raids too but drop to low altitude to perform their strike, then climb back up for the trip back home or fly back NOE.
You can say that with 20/20 hindsight 75 years later - that's easy! For the technology and resources available at that time and for what the mission was calling for, the heavy bombers were the answer. You were not going going to do this with an aircraft, be it very fast that carried a maximum 4,000 pound bomb load with a 600 mile combat radius! I agree the Mosquito "could have" been used in some raids where heavies were called in but in the bigger picture the goal was to deliver the maximum amount of bombs over target.Right - you are missing my point that this was basically a failed doctrine. I disagree with that doctrine and believe it was a mistake. I believe the Mosquito made it possible to pursue a different doctrine.
And even if you made more it would take 3 or 4 Mosquitoes to carry the same bombload as a Lancaster, this was pointed out before. And for that to time up with actual history the Mosquito "would have" had to be in full production at least 2 years before it actually was.Right, hence, make Mosquitos and more fighter-bombers (and maybe A-26s etc.) instead.
IMO - the question to be answered is how many Mosquitos would be required to destroy a Petroleum/Chemical facility (defined perhaps by reducing product delivery to 10% of capacity).Whew! Lot of posts going on. After reading all of this I just have a couple simpleton questions:
1) What does a mass raid with Mosquitos look like. Is it just large formation flying, but at a greater speed? Is it low altitude in squadron waves? IIRC low altitude air defenses, especially for static targets, were actually quite effective. I see a lot of arguments that the Mosquito would be different because of speed, but what would that actually look like in use.
2) So, this might be a little more controversial but I had a number of relatives who were in the ETO and a couple who were senior enough to be part of post-war military governance. They used to talk about how important it had been to comprehensively defeat Germany (as well as Japan). Their point was that Germany had to be made to want to surrender otherwise Europe would have devolved into an endless war. They all thought that the air campaign was a major contributor to that. I'm not advocating for this, but curious what the forums thoughts would be on that? And, how would greater precision and accuracy in bombing help or hinder that?
In regards to your number two in quote, absolutely. The Imperial Germany army suffered a pretty obvious a$$ kicking in 1918, but that was never brought home to the general populace, instead they got fed the "stabbed in the back" pablum and bought into it with disastrous results. Other than a shortage of food and many other goods, Germany did not feel the full sting of the defeat in the field. Cities and farmland were untouched by war and no real material damage was suffered in Germany proper. There were those that wrote at the time (1918-1919) that the Germans were NOT convinced they had been defeated militarily and that within twenty years or so another war would be in the offing.Whew! Lot of posts going on. After reading all of this I just have a couple simpleton questions:
1) What does a mass raid with Mosquitos look like. Is it just large formation flying, but at a greater speed? Is it low altitude in squadron waves? IIRC low altitude air defenses, especially for static targets, were actually quite effective. I see a lot of arguments that the Mosquito would be different because of speed, but what would that actually look like in use.
2) So, this might be a little more controversial but I had a number of relatives who were in the ETO and a couple who were senior enough to be part of post-war military governance. They used to talk about how important it had been to comprehensively defeat Germany (as well as Japan). Their point was that Germany had to be made to want to surrender otherwise Europe would have devolved into an endless war. They all thought that the air campaign was a major contributor to that. I'm not advocating for this, but curious what the forums thoughts would be on that? And, how would greater precision and accuracy in bombing help or hinder that?
The inference seems to be that if Mossies were used there would be no, or fewer, casualties. Would that be due to speed or structure? Certainly not due to defensive firepower. How many crippled acft would return to Britain with one or two engines shot out? How would an injured pilot be assisted at the controls to bring the plane home. Since it seems twice the number of acft would be required to do/deliver the job, would aircrew losses still be less?Is the cost more than 70,000+ dead Allied airmen, plus whatever carnage we aren't suppose to think about on the ground in Hamburg etc.?
The last part about 'almost welcoming to the occupying army' didn't often apply to USAF brats. My experience as an Air Force brat in Tokyo was that conduct (polite show of respect) versus thought (contempt for foreign American Devil) was prevalent. I was a Gai-Jin then and deep down no Japanese person feels inferior to another race. At least we don't top the hit parade of China and Korea. Gratitude and Thank You were transformed into to various forms of expression of obligation or owed debt - which translated to neutral (mild obligation) to resentment for your thoughtfulness. If gifts are exchanged your Japanese host will always try to 'give more' in concert with the framework of obligation. I recognize that 70+ years is plenty of time to weed out the 'old' and 'bring in the new'. (like US).In regards to your number two in quote, absolutely. The Imperial Germany army suffered a pretty obvious a$$ kicking in 1918, but that was never brought home to the general populace, instead they got fed the "stabbed in the back" pablum and bought into it with disastrous results. Other than a shortage of food and many other goods, Germany did not feel the full sting of the defeat in the field. Cities and farmland were untouched by war and no real material damage was suffered in Germany proper. There were those that wrote at the time (1918-1919) that the Germans were NOT convinced they had been defeated militarily and that within twenty years or so another war would be in the offing.
In WWII the German populace found out the full weight of defeat, not just food and goods shortages but massive destruction on a city wide scale, full occupation by conquering armies and total demilitarization, war crimes trials, the works. There's been no replay of German troublemaking in the last 80 years, I'll just leave it at that.
As for Japan, the people had been mislead and lied to so badly by their militaristic leaders one feels quite a bit of sympathy for them. But they too needed to feel the FULL weight of defeat lest revisionist ideologues begin stirring up trouble again and making them believe that they weren't REALLY defeated. In reading about the occupation of Japan immediately after the war (1945), it's interesting to see that the Japanese people themselves, after getting over the shock that the Americans were NOT barbarians with horns on their heads, were not only relieved to find that out but were quite gracious and almost welcoming to the occupying army.
Just finished Ian Toll's "Twilight of the Gods", the last book in his Pacific War trilogy, the last chapters deal with occupation of Japan, it makes for pretty interesting reading vis a vis Japanese/American relations in the immediate aftermath of the war.
Bill, you bring up excellent points that are continually missed in this discussion. Tactics would come into play but why take a hot rod and use it as a pick up truck?Related questions a.) For any given attack strategy, what are the CEPs expectations (documented testing/actual results for proposed attack strategy) for each attacking Mossie at 600 miles and b.) why do we believe that? c.) what is recommended attack plan - i.e. single Mossies in trail? Flight/Section sized force in formation? mass formation of Wing level strength? Daylight, Night? What missions are compromised by shifting Mossie inventory toward long range strategic attacks?
The RAF optical bombsight was probably as good as the Speery - but? Mossie cruise speed makes single a/C attacks harder to defend than formation sized force but the loss rate should still be high.
A reduced crew would minimize risks and possibly aircrew causalities but other considerations are brought into play as you point out. More airframes to complete the mission and the lack of dual controls are also big considerations.The inference seems to be that if Mossies were used there would be no, or fewer, casualties. Would that be due to speed or structure? Certainly not due to defensive firepower. How many crippled acft would return to Britain with one or two engines shot out? How would an injured pilot be assisted at the controls to bring the plane home. Since it seems twice the number of acft would be required to do/deliver the job, would aircrew losses still be less?
No your words - I think you have a tendency of posting your opinion on technical items rather than actually researching or knowing how they really work
You can say that with 20/20 hindsight 75 years later - that's easy! For the technology and resources available at that time and for what the mission was calling for, the heavy bombers were the answer. You were not going going to do this with an aircraft, be it very fast that carried a maximum 4,000 pound bomb load with a 600 mile combat radius! I agree the Mosquito "could have" been used in some raids where heavies were called in but in the bigger picture the goal was to deliver the maximum amount of bombs over target.
And even if you made more it would take 3 or 4 Mosquitoes to carry the same bombload as a Lancaster, this was pointed out before. And for that to time up with actual history the Mosquito "would have" had to be in full production at least 2 years before it actually was.
In regards to your number two in quote, absolutely. The Imperial Germany army suffered a pretty obvious a$$ kicking in 1918, but that was never brought home to the general populace, instead they got fed the "stabbed in the back" pablum and bought into it with disastrous results. Other than a shortage of food and many other goods, Germany did not feel the full sting of the defeat in the field. Cities and farmland were untouched by war and no real material damage was suffered in Germany proper. There were those that wrote at the time (1918-1919) that the Germans were NOT convinced they had been defeated militarily and that within twenty years or so another war would be in the offing.
In WWII the German populace found out the full weight of defeat, not just food and goods shortages but massive destruction on a city wide scale, full occupation by conquering armies and total demilitarization, war crimes trials, the works. There's been no replay of German troublemaking in the last 80 years, I'll just leave it at that.
As for Japan, the people had been mislead and lied to so badly by their militaristic leaders one feels quite a bit of sympathy for them. But they too needed to feel the FULL weight of defeat lest revisionist ideologues begin stirring up trouble again and making them believe that they weren't REALLY defeated. In reading about the occupation of Japan immediately after the war (1945), it's interesting to see that the Japanese people themselves, after getting over the shock that the Americans were NOT barbarians with horns on their heads, were not only relieved to find that out but were quite gracious and almost welcoming to the occupying army.
Just finished Ian Toll's "Twilight of the Gods", the last book in his Pacific War trilogy, the last chapters deal with occupation of Japan, it makes for pretty interesting reading vis a vis Japanese/American relations in the immediate aftermath of the war.