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I was just saying that there is a better case to be made for a better performance by the Germans with a submarine fleet for September 1939 to June 1940 than for wonder missiles launched from wonder aircraft in 1943. They could have tried lying, painting the same numbers on more than one submarine, it wouldn't need a massive increase in the number of submarines just an application to the war in the Atlantic starting on the day UK and France declared war on Germany/ Germany's invasion of Poland.Doenitz might have built more U-boats if some of the big ships were canceled and the treaty did allow the Germans to build up to 100% of the RN submarine tonnage after the announced such an intention.
However such a shift in building programs would not have gone unnoticed and the British could have shifted their building program/s to more escorts sooner.
The B-29 was a poor performer compared to what Germany had on the drawing board in 1940, they just couldn't be bothered, preferring to build stuff that was much slower, short ranged and overweight with exactly the same engines.A b-29 could have operated from France and got up around Iceland and back. To do so they are needing to face interception from the UK, Faroe Islands and Iceland itself. All place with existing or build able airstrips for interceptors. If this sort of thing worked once then radar picket ships and land based radar will be tracking the bombers to augment intercept. What do the Germans escort these wonder planes with? The B-29 is challenging to intercept, but it can't go top speed to the middle of the Atlantic and back. Attacking closer to the UK to allow higher cruise speed ensures a cloud of interceptors going after the weapons and the bombers.
I was just saying that there is a better case to be made for a better performance by the Germans with a submarine fleet for September 1939 to June 1940 than for wonder missiles launched from wonder aircraft in 1943. They could have tried lying, painting the same numbers on more than one submarine, it wouldn't need a massive increase in the number of submarines just an application to the war in the Atlantic starting on the day UK and France declared war on Germany/ Germany's invasion of Poland.
Having followed this thread for a while and just rereading all the posts. Here are my thoughts:
1) The German war time industrial base did not have the capacity to build a B-29 class bomber, let alone be operational by 1943. It is a common misunderstanding to assume that the B-29 was like any other plane. At the very least, Germany would need to create a magnesium industrial base to manufacture the lightweight parts that made the B-29 possible, among other things.
2) The most likely launching platform would be a HE-177 family aircraft. A four engine version seems more than doable. Alternatively, someone has mentioned the JU-488. This would be possible as well. An anti shipping four engine HE-177 carrying two HS-293 would have plenty of capacity for additional full to extend range out over the Atlantic.
3) Allied Air Craft Carriers - I don't see the Allies suddenly massing large fleet carriers to escort convoys in the face of anti shipping air attacks. Escort carriers are incredibly important against U-Boats which I believe would remain the number 1 threat against convoys. My rationale is that U-Boats carry a couple dozen torpedoes while an anti shipping aircraft is carrying two missiles and can loiter with the convoy for extended periods of time.
4) Overly Optimistic Expectations of Weapon System Effectiveness - Its pretty common to overstate the accuracy of precision and guided weapons especially during their infancy in the 1940's. IIRC - The HS-293 during training was about 50% accurate. That number will go down in combat. If just 1 in 4 missiles comes close enough to its target to do any damage, that seems like a poor return on investment.
5) Long Range Interception of Flight Paths - I haven't seen this mentioned anywhere, but the Allies would have been more than able to intercept the flight paths of the proposed anti-shipping formations from England, Newfoundland, Ireland, Iceland, and maybe the Azores. The aircraft to do this already exists in 1943, the Mosquito. Long range high altitude interceptors could be adapted from modifications already done for photo recon. Its hard to believe that un-escorted bombers out over the Atlantic would look forward to the prospect of a running battle with fighter Mossies.
6) Counter measures - This to me is a critical advantage for the convoy fleets. First off, electronic countermeasures against the HS-293 were developed and were remarkably effective during the war, pretty much ending the use of such weapons. Allied mastery of radar and radio warfare is a decided advantage here and the proposed anti shipping campaign would come to a quick end. Vision Obscuring - Since the German glide bombs were all vision guided, it would be relatively easy to use smoke screening to greatly reduce accuracy. An earlier comment suggested that this had never been done against air attacks, however, this is incorrect. Nazi defense forces were highly adept at using smoke pots to hide targets from view of the Eight Air Force daylight bombing force and greatly affected bombing accuracy. If this tactic can be used to affect bombing accuracy against large stationary industrial plants it certainly can be used to protect much smaller moving targets being targeted from a greater distance. It is possible that Germany would have developed radar self guided weaponry but not on a timeline any faster than the Allies in 1945.
I don't mean to sound rude or condescending but is your friend 15 years old? I mean come on, this was the type of "debate" I used to hear back in middle school study hall ca. 1970 from self proclaimed experts of the that age group.Hi all, so many arguments and details! Please excuse if not everybody is spoken to in personal and no every argument is answered in detail.
"Smoke screen"
There is a continuing proposal for laying a smoke screen. This figure comes from sea warfare and I have to say, this is nothing useful to protect ships from jeopardies which come from above. Smoke screen can help a number of ships to retreat in an around 90 degree ankle to the screen. I wonder has there ever been an attempt to hide a ship by a smoke COVER.
Furthermore, such screens won't last very long. They are easily blown away by wind and rip while the ships to hide keep on moving forward parallel to it. They hamper the sight of helmsmen and lookouts, the sight of the AA gunners, and hamper own aircraft from taking off. Also, they are not a method to avoid radar detection. More, the probably big number of small warships necessary to lay the screen cannot do submarine hunting at the same time. So I mean, this idea quickly dissolves into smoke.
"VT ammo aka Proximity Fuses"
The Hs 293 is created to keep the carrying aircraft out of the ship AA range. If this condition holds being true, there is no difference in the way the grenade explodes. It simply hits nothing.
"CIWS"
Nothing found for this before the 1973 Phalanx system. Please quote.
P pbehn
Of course, this scenario requires a radical change in German politics and strategy, including defense of the bomber bases and attacking the forces which could try to hit them. For finding and shadowing the convoys, the Messerschmitt Me 261 stood ready for production. Creating convoys was a great invention of WWI. Dissolving them would mean to refrain from their advantages and make ships an easier prey for U-boats. The flat-deck of a carrier is not easy to camouflage, especially in moments when aircraft are to operate from it. The anti-convoy offensive takes about a year to prepare. If Hitler is toppled in September 1942, it may have worked. The scenario is in late 1943, one year after Stalingrad, and the aircraft are assumed newly having been produced. And had Hitler been toppled, the battle of Stalingrad had not necessarily happened at all.
"The Corsair's Radar"
As Koopernic says, not service-ready before mid-1945. The tactis of hiding in the clouds and attacking with a tv-guided Hs 293 still has timeframe to be promising, although it were surely difficult to perform.
"Armament in General" ( S Shortround6 )
Careful investigation by my friend and me showed:
material: was there, if the Germans kept the manganese mines of Nikopol
manpower: was there, especially if soldiers returned from a silented Eastern Frontier
factory space: was not there. But could have been built up within months.
"Reliability of the He 177"
Contrary to the wide-spread opinion, the A-3 became reliable for use at the end of 1942, and so did the A-5 at the end of 1943. Only minor engineering faults remained, which could have been eraded by equally minor engineering efforts. The DB 605 engine was close to edge of technical posibilities, not only its double version DB 610. Both A-3 and A-5 still are not comparable to a B-29. For me, further upgrading of the He 177, e.g. by using DB 613 engines, is hard to imagine to be realized by autumn 1943. And even if this had taken place, these aircraft still were vulnerable against contemporary fighters like the Corsair, especially while carrying weapons as external load.
"U-boats"
would profit from a successfull air offensive as well. Of course, a combined air-and-submarine offensive would have been foreseen.
GrauGeist
Imagine the first massive He 177/Hs 293 strikes hit a convoy little or nearly unprotected by carriers (the ones accompanying it hosting only some antisubmarine aircraft). This and maybe some of the next convoys literally get slaughtered. So then? What the hell do you try to find on Tarawa Island at that time? My friend says, there must be some limited operations against Japanese posessions in New Guinea before changig anything considerable. What? New Guinea?
I say, from the first catastrophic events in the Northern Atlantic, the Allies would stop the convoys and leave Britain alone. But only for a short while. Then they would come back and protect the convois by a massive carrier force!
@Anybody
If it is your opinion the Americans would rather give up Britain than to stop other operations, tell us!
Hope you still enjoy, and regards,
RT
The B-29 was a poor performer compared to what Germany had on the drawing board in 1940, they just couldn't be bothered, preferring to build stuff that was much slower, short ranged and overweight with exactly the same engines.
Greetings Koopernic and Thank you for your response,The Germans were actually way ahead of the USA in terms of magnesium. Very far ahead. See this video "Americas iron giants".
The German were of course way behind in turbo chargers.
The Ju 288 spars were to be produced in one piece by forging.
The He 177 was meant to be in combat service in early 1942 and it was meant to be attacking shipping in 1942 with "Special Bombs" such as the Hs 293 and Fritz-X. Due to the delay of the He 177 the Do 217 had to be modified with extended wings so that the bombs could be launched from an altitude safe from anti aircraft.
Ernst Heinkel pushed for the He 177 to be converted to a 4 separate engine design in 1939. The paired engine arrangement was kept by the RLM/Luftwaffe only because of the dive bombing requirement created aeroelastic issues on 4 distinct engines in a steep dive. Many people though it a "mania" and irrational. At the time it was thought the Ju 88, also shoe horned into the dive bomber role, would have much more range than it actually turned out to have. When the Ju 88's range turned out to be a disappointment the He 177 was not ready because of the delays caused by the dive bombing requirement. Not just the engines but endless dive tests.
There was also a strong push to abandon the He 177 in favour of the Ju 288C at the time. The Ju 288C would have used the same DB610 engines as the He 177A5 but been 160kmh/100mph faster for the trouble. The Ju 288C could have been in service in around the same time.
The Ju 488 was a mixture of Ju 288 (tail) and Ju 388 parts. The BMW801TJ version was estimated to have a service ceiling of 48500ft. It is a 1945 aircraft but could have been a 1943 with standard BMW 801.
The Actual plan was to conduct raids against convoys using 'special weapons' from 1942. The Fw 200C using Lofte 7 bomb sight managed about a 50% hit rate per gravity bomb run from about 14000ft. The Fw 200 had some success, such as the attacks on convoy Faith. The He 177 (with 4 engines) would have had greater capability to attack convoys. For instance at 25000ft with Fritz-X (cruisers and battle ships)
As we know the bombers weren't ready till later in 1943.
Fritz-X seemed to be very reliable and accurate. CEP was 18 meters. Hs 293 had a lot more trouble in terms of reliabillity. I would say this was a quality control issues. Missiles must be incredibly thoroughly tested. I suspect that had raids commenced in 1942 the issues would have been resolved.
4 missiles per target is a very good return. I would assume 8:1 was good since you need to allow for training rounds.
Long range interception worked when there was enigma decrypts. Else it didnt work so well hence attempts by Britain to develop an AWACS type aircraft.
Ive got a lot of information on this because I have Friz Trenkle;s books. Basically there were about 5 allied attempts at jamming only the 4th (partially) and 5th attempt likely worked. They did so because the allies captured a missile at Foggia The 4th attempt likely worked only sometimes because the Germans had added a single in flight frequency change and it couldn't be tracked easily. Often the jammers started jamming each other rather than the missile. The final plan jammed all frequencies simultaneously and only worked because the allies had the command codes from the captured missiiles and were able to spoof it with false commands rather than jam it
The Germans had contingency plans in the case of allied jamming but they never detected jamming, in part due to the loss of a sniffer aircraft and in part due to a case of sabotage on the first occasion the allies used jamming. The core of multiple coaxial wires had been cut in carrier aircraft and the missile malfunctions were blamed on this as this weakened the signal.
There were several backup plans
1 kits had been stocked to change the kehl Strasbourg frequency radically to make the allied jammers obsolete. The kits doubled wavelength.
2 The "B" in the Hs 293B meant it was prewored to work of wire spools in the wings. Hollow bobbins of insulated piana wire that flaked of.
3 An FM based system had been developed to replace the AM modulated system in case of jamming
4 The Kogge-Bigge system developed for surface to air missile could be used. This use a 24.5cm directional radio beam that was hard to jam since it was directional and impulse modulated.
So the allies might have success but counter moves were expected.
Surely laying smoke might obscure part of the convoy but the warships laying the smoke themselves would not be able to hide? They would be lucrative targets.
The real problem was inteception and lack of escorts.
That kind of reminds me of my father, who was fond of saying "If the Queen had balls, she'd be king"If my Uncle had had just one wheel then He would have been a wheelbarrow.
Italian proverb translated into English.
Greetings Koopernic and Thank you for your response,
I guess I will start by saying that I try to answer these sort of questions by staying as close as possible to what was actually in use/available during the war rather than possible weapon systems or industrial capacities. That said, I really don't see Germany producing a heavy bomber early in the war that is significantly better performing than the HE-177. The one obvious change would be to build a four engine version eliminating the problems with the coupled engines. This is no different than the genesis of the Lancaster and seems well within reach at the time. Sure, there were planes on drawing boards of exceptional performance but how many of these were ever actually flown. All one has to do is to look at the Bomber B program to realize how difficult it is to develop aircraft that promise sizable performance and technological leaps.
The range required to carry out such an anti shipping campaign in the mid-Atlantic would also require a HE-177 derivative to possibly trade bomb load for fuel. Originally, I thought such a longe range plane could carry two HS-293 or Fritz-X weapons, but I think its more likely one to allow for extra fuel capacity. One plane, one bomb seems pretty inefficient. On paper, the HE-277 seems more capable, but then again its on paper. I also, don't see the German industrial base being capable of a sizable project such as the HE-277, let alone a next class up B-29 equivalent. The HE-277 also relied on the BMW 801E, which as I understand it was not widely used, nor available until 1943(?). So, based on what was realizable at the time, its pretty much a four engine HE-177 without the better performance at high altitude.
I agree that Germany was the world leader in magnesium production at the start of the war, however, that quickly changed. While Germany did lead the world in the ability to forge large scale magnesium parts, it did not maintain its lead in the use of magnesium throughout aircraft parts, etc. This can be seen in a couple ways. First, in simple production quantities:
View attachment 587981View attachment 587982
You can see that in 5 years, US production of magnesium has eclipsed Germany by several fold. Secondly, I recently read a research paper that did chemical analysis on aircraft parts in the war and unsurprisingly the US parts had nearly twice the magnesium content in the alloys than those from Europe making them stronger and lighter. (If I can track it down I will post.) The B-29 required high levels of magnesium in all its parts in alloys to be possible. Germany may have been the leader in 1938, but it certainly didn't have the resources to support that level program.
I have some more thoughts, but need to organize them better before I reply.
Kk
That said, I really don't see Germany producing a heavy bomber early in the war that is significantly better performing than the HE-177. The one obvious change would be to build a four engine version eliminating the problems with the coupled engines. This is no different than the genesis of the Lancaster and seems well within reach at the time.
Boeing B-29A Superfortress
Specification of the Boeing B-29A Superfortress:
Economical cruising speed 220 mph at 25,000 feet.
Greetings RT, I admire your enthusiasm for this thread. Here are some additional thoughts regarding this proposal. As stated earlier, I am basing my thoughts on technologies and weapons systems that were realizable in 1942-1943. From the German side that means either FritzX or HS-293 in combination with an HE-177 variant. In this case, a four engine version as was proposed early in the development of the project. While this aircraft didn't exist, it was historically possible and doesn't rely on the development of a "what if" aircraft. Under that assumption we are looking at an HE-177 with two underslung HS-293 guided missile/bombs. The deployment of these requires direct visual observation and a steady and level flight path in the same flight direction as the weapon. Can be launched as far away as 8.5 kilometers (28,000ft) at an altitude of 6.5 Kilometers (16,000ft) Clean, the HE-177 has a cruise speed around 250mph, with underslung weapons would be less.Thank you again for your answers.
K Koopernic
According to Wikipedia, the B-29s cruise speed is 220 mph. Would it run 342 mph, within 5 minutes it would go 28 miles! At 220 mph, it still does 18 miles. How much time would the missile operator need for selecting the target, launching and aiming? It must happen very fast, otherwise the bomber is miles off!
The bomber must fly low for operating the Hs 293. Against this, carrier fighters need no special climbing performance.
For biologists: "Zitterochen" is electric ray, not stingray.
The Junkers Ju 288 originated from the "Bomber B" program. This meant a medium bomber, although in the end (C-version) it used the same engines as the He 177. For the latter's range I read 5.600 km, while the Ju 288 sported only 2.600. Also, the Ju 288 C was ready for troop testing only in April 1944 (but discontinued anyway). For a longe-range Ju 288 service-ready in late 1943, you need a further variation of the scenario.
I already stated the Fritz X was not an option in the North Atlantic weather conditions.
Interesting picture: If there is a convoy underway from west to east, and the wind usually blows from west, for launching the fighters the carriers need to turrn into the opposite direction, what would slow down the convoy as a whole...
P pbehn
"Over the convoy" means in AA range. No option, maybe only by hiding in the clouds and using the tv-guided Hs 293.
The region where you live is not moving.
Burning oil rags, and the following ship runs directly into the smoke. Interesting idea.
Detecting the bombers is one thing, getting them is another.
Did I say the US would give up GB? No way! I say this scenario is not suitable to cut GB from supplies.
You use to live under an overcast consisting of crap?Hopefully you don't live in a sewage treatment plant!
N NevadaK
Surely you need escort carriers also against U-boats. But what if combined Air-sub-attacks are performed?
The Mosquito was a well-performing aircraft. It was fast, but not fast enough and not persistent enough to hunt and catch bombers over long distances and vast areas. Also, its radar did not reach enough to perform this task. The Mosquito would get some of the bombers, but not in numbers.
Peter Gunn
Yes, sometimes my friend is a difficult person. But he is a specialist for engines and materials science, so he knows things which I don't.
The Tirpitz in her fiord harbour also was a stationary target.
For the thesis the US would give up GB, see above to PBehn.
If I missed any argument, please tell me.
Regards, RT
According to Wikipedia, the B-29s cruise speed is 220 mph.