What if the LW had adopted a different doctrine/strategy?

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The problem as nicely put by Parsifal, is you had a government made up of little fiefdoms, now the allies had the same problems but to a far lesser degree. So not only do you require a complete change of doctrine, but indeed a complete change of political machinery.

As well I suspect a far bit of ability to see to the future. After all look at the start of strategic bombing, everyone got it wrong. The British took heavy enough losses to move to night bombing, the US got hammered until they accepted the need of escort fighters.

And the mess that was the BoB from the German side, switching to the useless bombing of London instead of useful military targets.

I think you would have to take this to what if the Germans were run by a competent government and then went to 4 engined bombers. But now you have moved into the realm of complete fantasy.
 
What makes you say the 1940 Luftwaffe attacks on the Port of London were useless? Do you have historical data to show that port throughput was not significantly effected by the German bombing?
 
London as a target in terms of a port is a reasonably viable target but the effort in put against it was a waste. I will have to look up the percentage of aircraft used against London vs other targets, but as I remember it was out of proportion to the value of the city as a target. Indeed dropping mines randomly in the Thames estuary might have been more useful.
 
Dave, you have pedlled this idea about how successful the bombing of London was, on the basis that the effects on its throughput could not be established. it has previously been pointed out to you, that as a percentage of total caargo movements, the port of London, along with all other non-western approaches ports, accounted for less than 20% of cargoes transported, and that relative to pre-war movements, total cargo movements were only about 50% of what they could be. In other words, London as a port of destination was irrelevant, and unimportant to the british war economy.

But never let it be said that you will let a little truth get in the way of spinning a good yarn. Despite this overwhelming boduy of evidence that clearly indicates the port of London as completely unimportant as a tartget, you still peddle this argument that it must have been devastating because you cannot find any evidence of the effects on its throughput. That is such a dumb argumentm, and is only achieving traction now because nearly everyone has given up trying to explain to you, and explain to you....and explain to you.....
 
yes, you are right, I was playing the man and not the ball. Sorry guys.


Perhaps to rephrase, I dont think there is any evidence to support the notion that bombing the port of London caused any serious economic damage to the region. Not when imports were down hugely compared to prewar levels.
 
I dont think there is any evidence to support the notion that bombing the port of London caused any serious economic damage
Click to expand...
Where is the historical monthly throughput data for the Port of London and other major British seaports during 1940?

The critical evidence has yet to be presented. That's why we should be withholding judgement as to whether Luftwaffe air attacks on British seaports were effective.
 
You have the hypothesis that critical damage was inflicted, then you have to present evidence.
 
It was brought up that the Luftwaffe bombing of London was not a good change in tactics as they could have been still attacking the airfields of the RAF. You brought up the port of London, now you are talking about all British sea ports. Since you are the one focusing on the attacks on British ports, the onus is indeed on you to provide the data. You cannot argue a point without supporting data.
 
@parsifal: "... yes, you are right, I was playing the man and not the ball."

Play the man not the puck is the way hockey is played. Parsifal - you just lapsed into hockey mode for a moment.

MM
 
My understanding was that the UK diverted most of the cargos normally sent to London to Liverpool for a number of reasons.
a) It was pretty safe from attack by air including the dropping of mines
b) It gave direct access to the Atlantic
c) There was space to form convoys
d) There was less risk from sea attack by S Boats and similar.

It wasn't because of the damage to the docks caused by bombs
 
IIRC during the BoB late July/ early August, convoys were stopped and most freight handled by train - at least in the battle zone. Losses to shipping especially to RN ships was too much and they were withdrawn. With this in mind, my opinion would be that the ports in the Battle zone - i.e., London, Portsmouth, etc. weren't used much or at least precious cargo wasn't brought through there.
 
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