What if the U.S. and the USAAF had paid attention?

[GrauGeist]

If you look at the events leading up to the Japanese attack in the Philippines, you'll find that the Army felt that just having B-17s at Clark would be a deterrent.
Up to December, they had about 35 with more coming.
Add to that, the complications created by President Quezon's insistence for Neutrality.

B-17s and neutrality were not going to stop the Empire of Japan...

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think the stereotype of East Asians being skilled at copying but unable to produce effective designs of their own predates the war by some time. Perhaps it had its roots in the Meiji Era when the Japanese looked to the UK to build their first modern warships (not to mention more pertinent to this discussion the development of their aviation industry in the 1920s), and the Germans to help reorganize their army?

Even in my own lifetime -- in the 1970s and early-mid 80s -- I've seen instances where Japanese, and Chinese, industry as well were regarded as able copyists but unoriginal designers.

But further back:

Deeply rooted views of Asians as inferior framed the enemy threat in racial terms in the United States and other Western countries. Even before the war began, the media often depicted the Japanese and other Asians as animals, madmen, or childlike figures, and these views had long bolstered discriminatory policies at home and abroad.

[Emphasis added -- Thump]

https://www.ww2classroom.org/system/files/essays/wip019_0.pdf

"Childlike" certainly implies simple copyists who learn from others, as that is how children learn, the world over.

 

[R Leonard]

Thach! Thach! THACH! GD it, one GD T

 

[wlewisiii]

We didn't have to wait for Pearl Harbor to do these things. Just think if MacArthur had a half hour warning of the Japanese raid on day one.

He would have still screwed it up because he was an incompetent who should have been court martialed and jailed for life after losing the PI.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

He would have still screwed it up because he was an incompetent who should have been court martialed and jailed for life after losing the PI.

I think Sutherland interposed himself between Brereton and MacA, which resulted in the destruction of USAAC on Manila at the beginning of the war.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey wlewisiii,

re "He would have still screwed it up because he was an incompetent who should have been court martialed and jailed for life after losing the PI."

The US high command had decided as of ~1936-37 that there would be no serious effort to prevent the Japanese capture of the PI, or any hurried campaign to retake the PI. This decision was based on the belief (due to results of multiple wargame scenarios and the predominant beliefs of the commanders) that there was no practical way to prevent an invasion. The PI were just too far away to prevent them from being taken by the Japanese. They figured that any rushed reinforcements might serve to prolong the time it took the Japanese to complete the invasion (but not necessarily) while significantly increasing the US ground losses, and greatly increasing the chance of significant US Navy ship losses.

And as far as MacArthur's level of responsibility is concerned - the high command did not tell him of their decision - and the decision was subsequently kept secret. Incidentally, this bit of information is recorded in the official US Armed Forces records, ie the official History of the US Navy, Official History of the US Army, etc. - and is mentioned in the official history of War Plan Orange.

 

[Graeme]

I think the stereotype of East Asians being skilled at copying but unable to produce effective designs of their own predates the war by some time.

And not even good at copying - according to Popular Science - March 1945.

 

[GrauGeist]

Remember Quezon was adamant that MacArther not provoke the Japanese because he had been "assured" by the Japanese that they would honor his neutrality.

Mac was literally between a rock and a hard place.

 

[swampyankee]

Part of MacArthur's remit was to make sure that the Philippine forces were adequately trained and equipped. The latter may have been outside of his ability, due to budget constraints (but Quezon did have a half million dollars to give MacArthur as a bonus....), but the former was likely well within both his remit and his budget. Many of the early failures of the defense of the Philippines was due to that lack of training.

 

[GrauGeist]

Part of MacArthur's remit was to make sure that the Philippine forces were adequately trained and equipped. The latter may have been outside of his ability, due to budget constraints (but Quezon did have a half million dollars to give MacArthur as a bonus....), but the former was likely well within both his remit and his budget. Many of the early failures of the defense of the Philippines was due to that lack of training.

There was also the issue of the nature of training.
The Japanese did not fight like a European nation, which was the U.S. Army's school of thought.
It seems that the lessons learned from Native American and Confederate Army tactics were lost until US elements engaged the Japanese in earnest and then the steep learning curve kicked in.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey Swampyankee,

This is from Wiki, but most of it is almost directly lifted from the History of the US Army/Air Force/etc, just edited down to a more concise narrative:

"Philippines campaign (1941–42) - Wikipedia"

Although the entire entry is quite interesting, check out the part starting under 'Defenses' about a 5th of the way down.

I am not particularly a fan of MacArthur, but he has gotten a bad rap, primarily as a target for the apologists for why the US armed forces were initially beaten so badly by the Japanese. It should be noted that nearly all the US ground forces in the PTO were beaten soundly by the Japanese, despite any lack of poor training by MacArthur. As GrauGeist points out above, the US armed forces were not expecting the type of warfare they ended up facing. Also, based on the records of the time, the US armed forces (with perhaps the exception of the USN Surface fleet) were also not particularly well trained. I realize that this last statement has a huge potential for argument, but is not intended that way.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

It should be noted that nearly all the US ground forces in the PTO were beaten soundly by the Japanese, despite any lack of, or poor training

Especially true of garrison troops, many of whom were slow to shake off the lethargy and easy living habits of peacetime soldiering in the tropics. When intensely trained amphibious warfare units began to show up in the Solomons and PNG, that changed significantly.

 

[P-39 Expert]

I think we should include the RAF into the title of the thread

And the Navy.

 

[swampyankee]

Hey Swampyankee,

This is from Wiki, but most of it is almost directly lifted from the History of the US Army/Air Force/etc, just edited down to a more concise narrative:

"Philippines campaign (1941–42) - Wikipedia"

Although the entire entry is quite interesting, check out the part starting under 'Defenses' about a 5th of the way down.

I am not particularly a fan of MacArthur, but he has gotten a bad rap, primarily as a target for the apologists for why the US armed forces were initially beaten so badly by the Japanese. It should be noted that nearly all the US ground forces in the PTO were beaten soundly by the Japanese, despite any lack of poor training by MacArthur. As GrauGeist points out above, the US armed forces were not expecting the type of warfare they ended up facing. Also, based on the records of the time, the US armed forces (with perhaps the exception of the USN Surface fleet) were also not particularly well trained. I realize that this last statement has a huge potential for argument, but is not intended that way.

I agree there is a lot of blame being placed on MacArthur that should be placed higher in the chain of command, but the Philippine -- not regular US Army -- forces were not adequately trained for any kind of combat against a competent enemy. They may have been adequate for operations against bandits, but nothing more.

Part of MacArthur's remit was also to prepare a Philippine Army for an independent country, as that was to have been granted in 1943.

 

[taly01]

Two thirds of the Phillipine USAAF was wiped out on the ground in the first Japanese raid, seriously handicapping opposition to their later raids and troop landings.

The surprise raids on Clark Field PI, etc came from unheard of ranges at the time. It was thought not possible to do.....

But there was nothing wrong with 1941 P-40C and B-17D, they compare well with Japanese planes of the time. Only the A6M2 Zero was really superior.

 

[Peter Gunn]

And the Navy.

Totally agree. We've been discussing mostly just fighters and some bombers but the USN could have done WAAAY better in the Solomon's in 1942 and early '43. The night battles in The Slot really exposed peace time practices and captains.

One example from "Neptune's Inferno" by James Hornfischer, Captain Jenkins of Atlanta at the November 13 Battle of Guadalcanal, a Japanese destroyer illuminated Atlanta with its searchlight, Jenkins reacted as he had been trained in peacetime: "Counter Illuminate" he shouted. His gunnery officer, Lt. Cdr. Nickelson shouted into HIS headset "Fuck that! Open fire!".

And this was almost a year into the war and after surface actions at Savo Island in August and Cape Esperance in September, and after Admiral Scott had already been training the surface fleet in the complexities of night combat.

No, the USN had a LOT to learn and even when it was starting to catch on you get the ridiculous flustercluck that led to the bumbling action off Tassafaronga.

Not believing that Japanese could build suitable fighters and bombers is an issue certainly, but when you totally underestimate (and dismiss) your enemy's capabilities for a major campaign, well you're really in for it. Even as late as Tassafaronga Admiral Wright, who was put in charge of Task Force 67 (replacing Kinkaid) on the eve of what the USN knew was an upcoming battle (great move again, akin to replacing Norman Scott with Dan Callahan just before the November 13 battle), refused to believe that the havoc unleashed on his cruisers was the result of Japanese torpedoes launched from destroyers and cruisers.

Nearly a year into the war and four months into a bitter campaign, that an American Task Force commander was still ignorant of the capabilities of Japanese torpedoes is incomprehensible. Three weeks before Pearl Harbor, the commander of the Houston (Captain Rooks) had sent reports of the prowess of Japan's torpedo combat and described their aggressively realistic night battle training. Norman Scott had specifically called it (Long Lance performance) to Halsey's attention in October 1942.

The reports and information was there to be read, but if no one is reading them or more importantly, not believing them well...

At the end of the day, Admiral Wright put down the fiasco at Tassafaronga as submarine attacks. Really?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

But there was nothing wrong with 1941 P-40C and B-17D, they compare well with Japanese planes of the time. Only the A6M2 Zero was really superior.

Unfortunately the Zero was what could make the trip. And the Japanese found the B17 a tough nut to crack in the air.

 

[GrauGeist]

The KI-43 had comparable ranges to that of the A6M, too.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The KI-43 had comparable ranges to that of the A6M, too.

Yes, but Formosa was IJNAF territory. IJAAF was pretty busy on the mainland. Besides, the 199 Ki43s in service at the end of 1941 didn't have the long range tanks that came on later versions.

 

[SaparotRob]

Time for a "Which is better, Ki-43 or the A6M?" thread?