What if the U.S. and the USAAF had paid attention?

[FLYBOYJ]

From the various Flying Tiger books I read oh so long ago, I don't believe the AVG actually encountered any actual Zeros. They were operating in IJAF territory and often encountered "the new retractable gear KI27". I think that was the KI43, which in the swirl of a dogfight could be easily confused with a Zero if you've only seen the recognition posters.
IIRC, Nationalist Chinese troops captured a Zero and Chenault traveled to that location and inspected it, and he described it to USAAF, probably in similar glowing terms to what our own Greg P uses when describing his museum's Zero.
Given that Chenault was driven out of USAAC for the heresy of questioning sacred doctrine, his input from overseas would likely not be greeted with open arms and willing ears, especially as it flew in the face of prevailing bias.

100% correct - the AVG never encountered the Zero, just showing the timeline. Agree with all other points

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Two tips from Chenault that could have made a big difference if they had been implemented in good time throughout the PTO:
1) Implement boom and zoom training in addition to round 'n round fighting, and don't forget deflection shooting.
2) Set up a robust network of ground observers with good communications around every airfield and likely target. Slow climbing American fighters need plenty of warning to get into boom and zoom position.
Many of the early days losses were the result of climbing into the fight from below.

We didn't have to wait for Pearl Harbor to do these things. Just think if MacArthur had a half hour warning of the Japanese raid on day one.

I think you'll find that some of the units in the SWP (V Fighter command) in the spring/ summer of 1942 quickly adopted this. As mentioned, V Fighter Command (9th and 39th FS) actually held their ground with their P-39s and P-40s until the P-38 came on line.

 

[Glider]

I think we should include the RAF into the title of the thread

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I think we should include the RAF into the title of the thread

I think that would make an excellent thread all by itself.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I think you'll find that some of the units in the SWP (V Fighter command) in the spring/ summer of 1942 quickly adopted this. As mentioned, V Fighter Command (9th and 39th FS) actually held their ground with their P-39s and P-40s until the P-38 came on line.

That's closing the barn door after some of the horses have already escaped. If the Phillipines and Australia/PNG had set up observer networks in August or September 1941, the early days of the war might have gone a little differently.

 

[The Basket]

Type 93 Torpedo and Yamato were other technology that was dismissed.

I would say the underestimate of the Japanese was the cause for the defeats of the early war period.

 

[MikeMeech]

There are actually two questions here. The discussion of this topic by it's nature must be highly speculative but firstly, I would like to know what happened to the reports coming out of China after the middle of July 1940 about the new fighter that the Japanese were fielding. We know that Chennault was sending in all the information he could gather on Japanese bombers, on the Ki-27, the A5M and the little he could scrounge on the A6M. It is a matter of record that General George Marshall listened and took what Chennault was saying seriously. There are reports of other U.S. people in China doing the same and of other highly placed peoplein the U.S. getting that information. But ultimately no one did anything. Why?
Secondly, if the reports on the A6M had been taken seriously what could have been done?

Hi
For information, here are some open source comments contained in aircraft recognition books, first the forward from 'Aircraft Identification' of February 1943, note comments from the 1922 British Air Mission to Japan on the Japanese:

Also the comments on previous 'underestimation' in John Stroud's book 'Japanese Aircraft' of 1945:

Mike

 

[The Basket]

Treacherous?
Eh?
Anywhoo the Hayabusa and the Zero looked very similar so can't be too harsh on the mix up.

 

[GrauGeist]

The AVG didn't engage the A6M, but the Chinese Air Force did.
One was downed early in '41 over Chengdu. It was reconstructed (as best as possible) and as much intel was gathered from it as possible.

This is the one that Chennault was warning the Army about.

 

[pbehn]

This is circa 1939 - when Australia's 'fighter' force consisted of 3 Bristol Bulldogs and 58 Hawker Demons...

View attachment 629994

(Compagnoni tapes)

I find it funny that someone would report an attacking aircraft as looking slow. Imagine telling the people of London sleeping in Underground stations that a Heinkel 111 is only capable of 180MPH, what a comfort that would be, eh?

 

[swampyankee]

The most enduring lies are the ones you tell yourself. The general zeitgeist of the US was very much one of white supremacy (so, for that matter, was that of the European powers), which made it very difficult for any evidence that Japan could produce aircraft and aircrew the equal of anything from the US would be dismissed as patent nonsense.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

That's closing the barn door after some of the horses have already escaped. If the Phillipines and Australia/PNG had set up observer networks in August or September 1941, the early days of the war might have gone a little differently.

How different? Unless there was a massive buildup of bodies and equipment (and even then the Japanese still had the advantage) the outcome would have been the same. Maybe prolonged the surrender at Bataan?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

How different? Unless there was a massive buildup of bodies and equipment (and even then the Japanese still had the advantage) the outcome would have been the same. Maybe prolonged the surrender at Bataan?

Two thirds of the Phillipine USAAF was wiped out on the ground in the first Japanese raid, seriously handicapping opposition to their later raids and troop landings. A half hour of warning could have gotten most of those planes in the air. It would have been a helter skelter scramble, but moving targets are harder to hit and pursuing them would have dissipated the attacking force escorts.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Two thirds of the Phillipine USAAF was wiped out on the ground in the first Japanese raid, seriously handicapping opposition to their later raids and troop landings. A half hour of warning could have gotten most of those planes in the air. It would have been a helter skelter scramble, but moving targets are harder to hit and pursuing them would have dissipated the attacking force escorts.

Do we know that for sure? Will we ever? And even so, the Japanese still had the numerical and logistical advantage, had they suffered more resistance/ losses they had the opportunity to simply send in more equipment.

In hindsight, it's very sad that Chennault was ignored but again, even taken seriously was it really going to change the final outcome much?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Do we know that for sure? Will we ever? And even so, the Japanese still had the numerical and logistical advantage, had they suffered more resistance/ losses they had the opportunity to simply send in more equipment.

In hindsight, it's very sad that Chennault was ignored but again, even taken seriously was it really going to change the final outcome much?

Second only to new information and perspectives, "what ifs" are the most entertaining part of this diverse and eclectic forum we have here, and questioning the plausibility of them is half the fun.
The final outcome, of course, was pre-ordained by resources and logistics, but I would submit that the two suggestions I made might have contributed to an earlier victory and a shorter butcher's bill. Earlier attrition of IJNAF assets can never be a bad thing.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Second only to new information and perspectives, "what ifs" are the most entertaining part of this diverse and eclectic forum we have here, and questioning the plausibility of them is half the fun.
The final outcome, of course, was pre-ordained by resources and logistics, but I would submit that the two suggestions I made might have contributed to an earlier victory and a shorter butcher's bill. Earlier attrition of IJNAF assets can never be a bad thing.

"a shorter butcher's bill" Good term!

Agree.

 

[Greg Boeser]

From what I have read, Cdr Jimmy Thatch had seen the reports on the Zero and spent a lot of time developing tactics to counter an aircraft he believed would be superior to the F4F. The final result was the "Thatch Weave" which was first implemented at Midway, but would not be adopted fleet wide until the Solomons Campaign.

 

[Akuma]

Do we know that for sure? Will we ever? And even so, the Japanese still had the numerical and logistical advantage, had they suffered more resistance/ losses they had the opportunity to simply send in more equipment.

In hindsight, it's very sad that Chennault was ignored but again, even taken seriously was it really going to change the final outcome much?

The race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but that's the way to bet. (Various sources)

 

[FLYBOYJ]

From what I have read, Cdr Jimmy Thatch had seen the reports on the Zero and spent a lot of time developing tactics to counter an aircraft he believed would be superior to the F4F. The final result was the "Thatch Weave" which was first implemented at Midway, but would not be adopted fleet wide until the Solomons Campaign.

Amazing how Thatch had his "ducks in a row" but yet we hear how Chennault was ignored and then how long to actually implement tactics (in some cases)

 

[swampyankee]

There may have been a lot that the US command in the Philippines did wrong, but they were also faced with a highly competent, determined, and numerically superior enemy. The time to win -- or lose -- wasn't the winter of 1941; it was when the Philippine forces weren't being properly trained or equipped years earlier.