MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
Attached is one man's analysis of what went wrong at Boeing. He has asked for maximum distribution of this, so here it is.
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Defense side of things, totally different animal.
Chris agreed and depending upon what kind of testing I would agree that the people doing that work are cognizant of the fact that this is a warcraft in combat at some point. However my point was that even though the aircraft has been tested and found combat ready, at some point a component is going to fail and have to be replaced. That's when these money hungry sub-contractors come into play:Most testing of military aircraft today is a decade long process
Chris agreed and depending upon what kind of testing I would agree that the people doing that work are cognizant of the fact that this is a warcraft in combat at some point. However my point was that even though the aircraft has been tested and found combat ready, at some point a component is going to fail and have to be replaced. That's when these money hungry sub-contractors come into play:
During the 1991 Gulf War an F-18 jet launched off the U.S. carrier Theodore Roosevelt on a combat mission that was cut short less than an hour later after a jet engine gearbox failed. The $40-million plane lurched out of control and crashed into the Persian Gulf, according to a confidential Navy investigation report. The pilot ejected and was later rescued.
The faulty gearbox was produced by Lucas Aerospace, a British firm that pleaded guilty last month to 37 counts of criminal fraud, admitting that it supplied defective gearboxes, bypassed required inspections and falsified test records at plants in City of Industry and Park City, Utah. When federal agents searched the firm's plants, they found 81 gearboxes ready for delivery--all with defective parts.
After paying a record $18.5-million criminal fine, Lucas officials insisted that the gearboxes performed up to Navy requirements and never caused a safety problem. But prosecutors said in interviews that Lucas' frauds were particularly egregious and triggered not only the Persian Gulf incident but scores of other flight emergencies
From approximately April 2010 through January 2014, the DoD issued purchase orders to Boggs & Associates for a variety of military parts and components used on various military weapons systems including aircraft, vehicles and vessels. The parts were required to meet certain military specifications. The majority of these parts are considered critical application items. A critical application item is defined as an item essential to weapon system performance or operation, or the preservation of life or safety of operating personnel, as determined by military services.
Boggs knowingly supplied non-conforming parts to the DoD through purchase orders issued by the Defense Logistics Agency.
The Agency's testing center found that parts from 30 different purchase orders were non-conforming. Specifically, the parts were made from unauthorized substituted material, were dimensionally defective, used unauthorized inferior fittings, not heat treated properly, not plated properly and/or did not pass specified testing requirements
Ross Hyde, 63, has been charged in federal court with making false claims about the type of aluminum he provided under a contract for aircraft landing gear. His latest company, Vista Machining Co., has supplied the Pentagon with parts for tanks, aircraft and other military equipment — mostly hardware and machined metals — since 2008. But inspectors said many of his products were cheap replacements, some illegally obtained from China, which he tried to hide from the government. Hyde billed the government $12,897 for a part that he falsely claimed used a superior type of aluminum. In fact, he substituted a weaker and less expensive variety of the metal. The contract was for aircraft landing equipment, according to a federal contract database. Vista also used vendors not authorized to receive "technical data that discloses critical technology with military and space application." The Fort Worth company had obtained quotes from approved vendors but instead chose low-bidders from Chinese companies, the agency said. In one case, Vista paid another company to "grind off" a marking indicating the part was made in China, the agency's report said.
Chris agreed and depending upon what kind of testing I would agree that the people doing that work are cognizant of the fact that this is a warcraft in combat at some point. However my point was that even though the aircraft has been tested and found combat ready, at some point a component is going to fail and have to be replaced. That's when these money hungry sub-contractors come into play:
During the 1991 Gulf War an F-18 jet launched off the U.S. carrier Theodore Roosevelt on a combat mission that was cut short less than an hour later after a jet engine gearbox failed. The $40-million plane lurched out of control and crashed into the Persian Gulf, according to a confidential Navy investigation report. The pilot ejected and was later rescued.
The faulty gearbox was produced by Lucas Aerospace, a British firm that pleaded guilty last month to 37 counts of criminal fraud, admitting that it supplied defective gearboxes, bypassed required inspections and falsified test records at plants in City of Industry and Park City, Utah. When federal agents searched the firm's plants, they found 81 gearboxes ready for delivery--all with defective parts.
After paying a record $18.5-million criminal fine, Lucas officials insisted that the gearboxes performed up to Navy requirements and never caused a safety problem. But prosecutors said in interviews that Lucas' frauds were particularly egregious and triggered not only the Persian Gulf incident but scores of other flight emergencies
From approximately April 2010 through January 2014, the DoD issued purchase orders to Boggs & Associates for a variety of military parts and components used on various military weapons systems including aircraft, vehicles and vessels. The parts were required to meet certain military specifications. The majority of these parts are considered critical application items. A critical application item is defined as an item essential to weapon system performance or operation, or the preservation of life or safety of operating personnel, as determined by military services.
Boggs knowingly supplied non-conforming parts to the DoD through purchase orders issued by the Defense Logistics Agency.
The Agency's testing center found that parts from 30 different purchase orders were non-conforming. Specifically, the parts were made from unauthorized substituted material, were dimensionally defective, used unauthorized inferior fittings, not heat treated properly, not plated properly and/or did not pass specified testing requirements
Ross Hyde, 63, has been charged in federal court with making false claims about the type of aluminum he provided under a contract for aircraft landing gear. His latest company, Vista Machining Co., has supplied the Pentagon with parts for tanks, aircraft and other military equipment — mostly hardware and machined metals — since 2008. But inspectors said many of his products were cheap replacements, some illegally obtained from China, which he tried to hide from the government. Hyde billed the government $12,897 for a part that he falsely claimed used a superior type of aluminum. In fact, he substituted a weaker and less expensive variety of the metal. The contract was for aircraft landing equipment, according to a federal contract database. Vista also used vendors not authorized to receive "technical data that discloses critical technology with military and space application." The Fort Worth company had obtained quotes from approved vendors but instead chose low-bidders from Chinese companies, the agency said. In one case, Vista paid another company to "grind off" a marking indicating the part was made in China, the agency's report said.
Sorry Mike - but this is cherry picking. No doubt there have been many defense contractors, especially mid-sized subcontractors who have done some extremely underhanded things but this is more the exception than the rule. Understand that in this day the money hungry sub-contractor comes under a lot of scrutiny and government oversight. Shenanigans still occur but I think that many of these folks will play nice as they now know what will happen to them if they are caught.
Now with that said, this is on an a different level than what the OP put out. The playing field is a lot different when building commercial aircraft.
So what's new? Back in the 80s, our airline ran Fokker F27s and Shorts SD30s, so we were stuck with Lucas parts on 2/3 of our fleet. Expensive, troublesome, not ergonomic, and prone to failure. Our SD30s had PT6 - 45s, and our 1900s had - 65s, which were essentially the same engine, just running at different temperatures and power outputs. The - 65s used Lear Siegler starter/generators at $13K a pop, which generally lasted 1500-2000 flight hours, failed incrementally, generally avoiding emergency situations, AND could be rebuilt in our own shop. The Lukes on the - 45s, OTOH, cost $41K each, seldom went more than 5-600 hours, had a way of failing suddenly and spectacularly, then had to be packed off to Montreal for an exchange unit. On American designed airplanes, both -# PT6s used Lears, but the Short was originally type certificated in the UK and by manufacturer spec Lears were not approved on it. Messy job changing out a Luke, as they tended to ooze a toxic black gunk over everything. "Prince of Darkness" strikes again!Lucas Aerospace, a British firm that pleaded guilty last month to 37 counts of criminal fraud, admitting that it supplied defective gearboxes, bypassed required inspections and falsified test records