Which is the better fighter, P-40F or Typhoon?

[Schweik]

Marseilles was an extraordinary pilot with a method of attack that was probably unique, he would drop into a Lufbery circle flying slower on a tight radius and fire with huge deflection,

Agreed, several of the other experten commented that nobody else seemed to be able to use this strategy safely.

it is for others to explain why P-40s would form up in Lufbery circles when only faced with Bf 109s.

Bad tactics, according to the Germans themselves - and poor training on the type according to aces like Caldwell and Bobby Gibbes who did what they could to improve the situation. There is also a sense of abandoning the Colonials to their fate which was felt by both Australian and South African pilots and commanders in particular. The Aussies made a lot of changes and took ownership of the situation, which along with certain more flexible DAF commanders like Neville Duke, led to changes across the DAF.

It's notable for example that during the early months of the Desert War - the heyday of Marseille- the RAF were flying antiquated 'vic' formations and didn't move to flying in pairs / finger four until mid 1942 and also tended to fly very low (6-8,000 ft) even when on escort, and more or less ignore the Luftwaffe - allowing the latter to pick the time nad place of the fight, as the DAF concentrated on destroying German tanks. A more Strategically astute target but at considerable detriment to their own pilots.

However the Americans changed the strategy, flying at higher altitude in general and also focusing on attacking German air bases with medium bombers, forcing a fight. This turned out to work much better. The DAF also started using finger 4 / pairs and simultaneously adopted the tactic of turning into attacks at that same time (Summer 1942) which proved effective and greatly improved combat outcomes.

 

[pbehn]

Agreed, several of the other experten commented that nobody else seemed to be able to use this strategy safely.



Bad tactics, according to the Germans themselves - and poor training on the type according to aces like Caldwell and Bobby Gibbes who did what they could to improve the situation. There is also a sense of abandoning the Colonials to their fate which was felt by both Australian and South African pilots and commanders in particular. The Aussies made a lot of changes and took ownership of the situation, which along with certain more flexible DAF commanders like Neville Duke, led to changes across the DAF.

It's notable for example that during the early months of the Desert War - the heyday of Marseille- the RAF were flying antiquated 'vic' formations and didn't move to flying in pairs / finger four until mid 1942 and also tended to fly very low (6-8,000 ft) even when on escort, and more or less ignore the Luftwaffe - allowing the latter to pick the time nad place of the fight, as the DAF concentrated on destroying German tanks. A more Strategically astute target but at considerable detriment to their own pilots.

However the Americans changed the strategy, flying at higher altitude in general and also focusing on attacking German air bases with medium bombers, forcing a fight. This turned out to work much better. The DAF also started using finger 4 / pairs and simultaneously adopted the tactic of turning into attacks at that same time (Summer 1942) which proved effective and greatly improved combat outcomes.

Do you make things up just for a laugh, or do you believe what you post? During 1940 there were several leading RAF pilots who recognised the value of the German fighter tactics and tried to bring about change within the RAF, but to no effect. Tuck,.Malan, Dutton and Crossley all introduced local variations within their own Squadrons but got no further. The RAF heirachy was against variation of the standard Vic formation (Bader by the way always used the Vic formation in the September and October battles of 1940). Ultimately RAF Fighter Command did modify it's tactics in 1941 under the leadership of Sholto Douglas, who finally recognised the raised angry voices of many Squadron Commanders. Bader was by that time a very vocal supporter, but only one of many. Interestingly though RAF Fighter Command could not just accept that German tactics were superior to their own. Consequently the official use of the 'finger four' (a term coined by an anomous person) went through several mutations eg the Weaver, then the Trail (or line astern). The finger four was finally officially introduced into the training regime in early 1942 - by which time it was long being used by frontline Squadrons.

 

[Schweik]

Do you make things up just for a laugh, or do you believe what you post?

I don't make things up unless I'm joking, in which case I make it obvious, even for somebody like you. I'm not a liar and unlike you, I admit when I'm wrong.

Do you talk like that to people in person or just online when you are anonymous?

During 1940 there were several leading RAF pilots who recognised the value of the German fighter tactics and tried to bring about change within the RAF, but to no effect. Tuck,.Malan, Dutton and Crossley all introduced local variations within their own Squadrons but got no further. The RAF heirachy was against variation of the standard Vic formation (Bader by the way always used the Vic formation in the September and October battles of 1940). Ultimately RAF Fighter Command did modify it's tactics in 1941 under the leadership of Sholto Douglas, who finally recognised the raised angry voices of many Squadron Commanders. Bader was by that time a very vocal supporter, but only one of many. Interestingly though RAF Fighter Command could not just accept that German tactics were superior to their own. Consequently the official use of the 'finger four' (a term coined by an anomous person) went through several mutations eg the Weaver, then the Trail (or line astern). The finger four was finally officially introduced into the training regime in early 1942 - by which time it was long being used by frontline Squadrons.

It didn't show up in the DAF squadrons until mid (I believe June) 1942.

 

[pbehn]

By the way, if a 30 mph advantage in speed was always more important than turning and rolling ability, then the P-51B would be a much better fighter than a Spitfire Mk IX... is that what we really think? It would make a MiG 3 superior to the Bf 109E. It would make a P-39 far superior to an A6M. But that is not how it typically shook out.

Actually yes, every time., there are many anecdotes of pilots in mock combats with P-51 and MIXs but they were goofing about doing what pilots enjoy doing, they weren't trying to kill each other. In a combat situation there is no way for a Mk IX can force a combat, the P-51 can just say goodbye. It is a different matter with the Griffon engine Mk XIV which had an advantage or parity in almost every department, except of course range.

 

[michael rauls]

I think the abouve two narratives are not mutually exclusive as pinning down exactly when a tactic was " adopted" is not so easy. Is it when 30% of the units are using it or maybe 50%. How about 70%? I don't know and not sure there is a specific right answer. It's not like someone hits a switch and all of the suden everyone starts using it the same morning. I imagine in most cases its a process. How about variances by theater?
Ok, I'll get off my " everybody should respect everyone elses opinions" soap box now.
Just my thoughts.

 

[pbehn]

I don't make things up unless I'm joking, in which case I make it obvious, even for somebody like you. I'm not a liar and unlike you, I admit when I'm wrong.

Do you talk like that to people in person or just online when you are anonymous?



It didn't show up in the DAF squadrons until mid (I believe June) 1942.

You have worn me out with fanboyism, people much better read than me have pointed out fundamental errors in your arguments but it makes no difference. You seem to see wing loading and minimum turning radius as the deciding factors in aircraft design and combat outcome. Throughout the war the pursuit was for speed and climb. The Spitfire doubled in weight and in some cases reduced its wing area therebye increasing wing loading, oh and it doubled its power and was much faster. If we were speaking in person and you continued to maintain that a P-40 was superior to a Typhoon I would certainly laugh out loud and ask you if you were making stuff up.

 

[pbehn]

I think the abouve two narratives are not mutually exclusive as pinning down exactly when a tactic was " adopted" is not so easy. Is it when 30% of the units are using it or maybe 50%. How about 70%? I don't know and not sure there is a specific right answer. It's not like someone hits a switch and all of the suden everyone starts using it the same morning. I imagine in most cases its a process. How about variances by theater?
Ok, I'll get off my " everybody should respect everyone elses opinions" soap box now.
Just my thoughts.

With the finger four, the question is what was used and what was trained from the start, it was used in the BoB by some squadrons it became part of RAF training doctrine in 1942 but remember many RAF pilots were trained outside the UK especially in Canada.

 

[pbehn]

I'm not going to speculate what you are obsessed with but once again you are trying to shift the argument a little. All I said upthread that started this particular side argument was that the Spitfire Mk V could out turn the Fw 190, I didn't say the Fw had no advantage - clearly it did.

Yes each pilot would use his aircrafts advantages and exploit his enemies weaknesses, turning was one of the main advantages of the Spitfire and it was no slouch at rolling either.

Me 109s couldn't out turn a Spitfire either, or to be more specific, certainly the 109E could not out turn a Spit I and no Bf 109 could out turn a Spit V. I stand by that there assertion you can love it or lump it bruh.

Turning causes drag, if a plane has 30MPH speed advantage then obviously the power required for that 30MPH is in the fastest planes pocket. It can turn, using that excess power at a speed its opponent can only maintain for straight an level flight. This advantage is maintained down through the speed range. at actual combat speeds turn rate equates to climbing rate, at the lower end turn rate equates to stall speed. On minimum turn radius I think a hurricane would be the best monoplane fighter in the Battle of Britain obviously bested by the Gloster Gladiator and the Italian bi planes that were sent over and hammered for a day or two.

 

[Shortround6]

By the way this is a (to me) amazing photo of Caldwell standing in front of his badly damaged P-40 after his epic battle with Shulz and his wingman. Note the fuel leaking out of the rear fuselage tank, the flat tire and cannon hole in the right aileron and right wing trailing edge.

It is an amazing photo, thank you.

I would suggest that the fluid leaking out of the plane is oil and not gasoline however. On the long nose P-40s the oil tank was behind the rear fuel tank. The filler caps where in the rear canopy with fuel filler being in the first section and oil filler being in the rear section. Fuel would probably evaporate fairly quickly in the desert. Oil is forever

 

[Glider]

Actually yes, every time., there are many anecdotes of pilots in mock combats with P-51 and MIXs but they were goofing about doing what pilots enjoy doing, they weren't trying to kill each other. In a combat situation there is no way for a Mk IX can force a combat, the P-51 can just say goodbye. It is a different matter with the Griffon engine Mk XIV which had an advantage or parity in almost every department, except of course range.

I know we have all read examples but one here I enjoyed was a report from a Spit IX unit that were attacked by a pair of 8th Air Force P51's. The Spits evaded and were under standing instructions not to shoot back when this happened. However these two had a second attempt and again the Spits evaded. When they didn't get the hint and tried a third time the Spit leader told his people to fire back but only with the LMGs., which they did and after taking some hits the P51's cleared off.
The RAF pilots wondered what stories they told when they got back home.

 

[MIflyer]

In one book the author, a P-51 pilot in the Med, said that when he got there the unit, which had been equipped with Spits before, were still flying Vics. But they were flying vics of two plane elements, as in a vic made up as Rottes.

As the veteran pilots left, and were replaced by USAAF trained pilots, they switched to flying the finger four.

I have not heard that anywhere else the RAF adopted a Vic of Rottes. It is an interesting adoption of two different approaches and I wonder how much of it was experience and how much just tradition unrelieved by good sense.

 

[pbehn]

I know we have all read examples but one here I enjoyed was a report from a Spit IX unit that were attacked by a pair of 8th Air Force P51's. The Spits evaded and were under standing instructions not to shoot back when this happened. However these two had a second attempt and again the Spits evaded. When they didn't get the hint and tried a third time the Spit leader told his people to fire back but only with the LMGs., which they did and after taking some hits the P51's cleared off.
The RAF pilots wondered what stories they told when they got back home.

But as I said, how would the Spits draw the P-51s into combat in unfavourable terms? Why didn't they just go home? Because they cant being slower.

 

[slaterat]

it is for others to explain why P-40s would form up in Lufbery circles when only faced with Bf 109s.

I have read an explanation for this, but I can't remember in what book, so I will try to paraphrase it.

In Malta the defending Hurricanes never had enough warning to gain an altitude advantage to intercept the German 109s, the 109s always had the altitude advantage. In North Africa the DAF was extremely active in supporting the ground war and hence once again were always operating at a lower altitude than the 109s. Also keep in mind that the 109 E and especially the 109 F could easily out climb the Hurricane and even more so the P-40.

The standard tactic for the slower RAF fighters to evade the diving 109s, if spotted early enough, was to make a controlled dive in formation away from the attackers, and then at the right time make a controlled 180 degree high speed turn, in formation to force a head on merge with the attackers. Now if performed correctly a tactical disadvantage has been turned into an even head on draw. Rather than accept the head on attack the 109s would pull up, using their energy advantage and their superior climb rate to regain the altitude advantage and repeat the attack. After multiple B and Z attacks like this, the defending Hurricanes or P-40s, co ordinated formations would begin to break down and eventually find themselves flying in a Lufbery, or what looks like a lufbery. Once in a lufbery the defending fighters are pretty much stuck there until the attackers run out of ammo or hit bingo fuel and depart.

 

[Schweik]

You have worn me out with fanboyism, people much better read than me have pointed If we were speaking in person and you continued to maintain that a P-40 was superior to a Typhoon I would certainly laugh out loud and ask you if you were making stuff up.

I don't know where you live or how old you are, or really anything about you, but in some places it is risky to be a rude to somebody especially when you don't know what you are talking about. Or who they are or anything about them. Cool your jets.

 

[Schweik]

I know we have all read examples but one here I enjoyed was a report from a Spit IX unit that were attacked by a pair of 8th Air Force P51's. The Spits evaded and were under standing instructions not to shoot back when this happened. However these two had a second attempt and again the Spits evaded. When they didn't get the hint and tried a third time the Spit leader told his people to fire back but only with the LMGs., which they did and after taking some hits the P51's cleared off.
The RAF pilots wondered what stories they told when they got back home.

My money would be on a Spit IX over a P-51 three times out of four. You could make arguments either way but clearly it's not so cut and dry is it? People love to reduce everything to a short hand and the simplest possible elements, but human conflict (especially in the air) is much more complex than that.

It's much less a linear progression and much more paper scissors rock. The key to victory is to try to figure out what options you really have and which one your opponent has before the fight starts.

 

[Schweik]

In one book the author, a P-51 pilot in the Med, said that when he got there the unit, which had been equipped with Spits before, were still flying Vics. But they were flying vics of two plane elements, as in a vic made up as Rottes.

As the veteran pilots left, and were replaced by USAAF trained pilots, they switched to flying the finger four.

I have not heard that anywhere else the RAF adopted a Vic of Rottes. It is an interesting adoption of two different approaches and I wonder how much of it was experience and how much just tradition unrelieved by good sense.

Yeah obviously it took a while to disseminate through all the units, and there were all sorts of far more complex formations and experimental strategies being used. It was life and death and everybody was looking for an angle (literally and figuratively).

In the Med certain units (as I said before, notably the Aussies) were more anxious earlier on to find a solution that worked to their problem than others. The shift and beginning of the end for the Germans had a lot to do with both a change in Tactics and Strategies.

 

[wuzak]

My money would be on a Spit IX over a P-51 three times out of four. You could make arguments either way but clearly it's not so cut and dry is it? People love to reduce everything to a short hand and the simplest possible elements, but human conflict (especially in the air) is much more complex than that.

It's much less a linear progression and much more paper scissors rock. The key to victory is to try to figure out what options you really have and which one your opponent has before the fight starts.

The point pbehn was making is that the P-51 can break off and run for home at will, while the Spitfire IX can't, because it can't out-run the P-51.

The P-51 could force a combat, the Spitfire IX couldn't.

 

[Schweik]

The point pbehn was making is that the P-51 can break off and run for home at will, while the Spitfire IX can't, because it can't out-run the P-51.

The P-51 could force a combat, the Spitfire IX couldn't.

If you are talking F-86 vs. Spit IX, then sure, every time. P-51 vs Spit IX, the speed difference isn't enough to offset the other advantages which for the Spit also includes climb as well as all the things that comprise maneuverability. And crucially, in dive, they were basically equivalent. I'm not sure which one had the higher dive speed but per my unanswered question upthread, once you are diving at 500 mph it doesn't take long to hit Sea Level.

Maybe the P-51 can force or refuse combat more often, but what happens when they do engage? They can try a very safe strategy of hit and run only in optimal conditions but they can't protect bombers (or defend enemy bombers) that way. If they take losses with every serious engagement the operational advantage of being faster is basically checked.

A P-51 that decides to disengage can try to pull away with that 30 mph speed advantage, but that means they will probably be in range of the guns on the Spit for enough time for a burst or two, and that sure is a risk.

Speed is an advantage, but it's not the only advantage. Only an idiot thinks it's that simple.

 

[Schweik]

I have read an explanation for this, but I can't remember in what book, so I will try to paraphrase it.

In Malta the defending Hurricanes never had enough warning to gain an altitude advantage to intercept the German 109s, the 109s always had the altitude advantage. In North Africa the DAF was extremely active in supporting the ground war and hence once again were always operating at a lower altitude than the 109s. Also keep in mind that the 109 E and especially the 109 F could easily out climb the Hurricane and even more so the P-40.

The standard tactic for the slower RAF fighters to evade the diving 109s, if spotted early enough, was to make a controlled dive in formation away from the attackers, and then at the right time make a controlled 180 degree high speed turn, in formation to force a head on merge with the attackers. Now if performed correctly a tactical disadvantage has been turned into an even head on draw. Rather than accept the head on attack the 109s would pull up, using their energy advantage and their superior climb rate to regain the altitude advantage and repeat the attack. After multiple B and Z attacks like this, the defending Hurricanes or P-40s, co ordinated formations would begin to break down and eventually find themselves flying in a Lufbery, or what looks like a lufbery. Once in a lufbery the defending fighters are pretty much stuck there until the attackers run out of ammo or hit bingo fuel and depart.

They had some situations like that in the early war, though you are confusing earlier and later tactics.

There was one famous incident in 1941, per Shores (A History of the Mediterranean Air War, Volume 1, Casemate, 2012. Page 329)
, they were in a real bind as the Germans were able to land and then take off again and more German units joined the fight as it went on all day. But the Germans were experiencing frustration too:

On November 22, 1941 there was a significant engagement in which the Tomahawk was put to a hard test by the Bf 109F. At 1540 nine Tomahawks of No. 112 Squadron RAF were joined by thirteen Tomahawks of No. 3 Squadron RAAF for an offensive sweep over the Tobruk-El Adem area. At roughly 1600 hours they were intercepted near Bir Hacheim by 20 Bf 109Fs attacking from 3,000 feet above . During the subsequent hour long engagement, which took place near two German airfields, JG 27 fighters landed and refueled to rejoin the fight. In the melee DAF fighters claimed three Bf 109s shot down and four "probables", while JG 27 claimed 11 P-40s. The actual losses were 6 Bf 109F-4s and 7 Tomahawk IIbs shot down and 1 badly damaged (the aircraft of future RAAF Ace Bobby Gibbes) . In the aftermath of the bloody fight both sides were shaken. The Germans believed they had come out ahead but felt the losses were unacceptable , and therefore made the decision not to dogfight the Tomahawk with the Bf 109F in the future, and instead to rely on 'boom and zoom' tactics, which while effective, imposed certain Tactical limitations. Some Commonwealth pilots began to call into question the tactic of the Lufberry tactic though it would be another 5 months before that began to change.

However they basically gave up on the Lufberry circle by Mid 1942 except in the most dire emergencies. That is also when they changed the Tactic to the one I described upthread where the whole squadron would turn into an attack, and if the Germans broke away before getting in range they just ignored them and resumed their mission of escorting bombers or fighter bombers. Which was their actual purpose.

 

[wuzak]

P-40F and L pilots alone shot down nearly twice as many enemy aircraft as pilots flying Typhoons, even though more Typhoons were produced and the Typhoon was in combat longer.

Yes, Typhoons were in service longer, because they were rushed into service in small numbers to combat certain threats.

You keep bringing up production numbers, but you are unwilling to recognise that those greater numbers were produced over 5 years against approximately 1 for the P-40F/L.
Additionally, airframe production ran well ahead of engine production such that during 1943 many airframes were flown to maintenance units, where the engine would be pulled and sent back to the factory to be fitted to another airframe.

Many of these would later be sent back to teh factory to be modified to the latest spec (eg, fitting the 4 blade prop).

Of the 3,300 or so Tyhpoons built, how many actually saw squadron service? I'm betting less than the P-40F/L.

And by the time the bulk of the Typhoons that saw active service had got to squadrons, their role had mostly changed to A2G.

The Typhoon was equipped with a very powerful engine and was heavily armed & fast.

It also had a 41' wingspan with a notoriously badly designed wing that was far too thick and created very high drag. This had all kinds of knock on effects.

It turned poorly with a high wing loading and had one of the poorest roll rates of any single engined fighter flying in 1943.

It was extremely heavy and suffered from catastrophic structural failures.

The Typhoon did suffer structural failures, but those were soon fixed.

Usually a good fighter either rolls well or turns well. The P 40F could do both, and dive 500 mph. Pilots said they trusted it to get them home. How many Typhoon pilots said the same?

Since the Typhoons would dive to deliver bombs or rockets, or strafe, I'm sure that there was plenty of trust in its ability to dive and its structural strength.


Now, by 1944 neither the RAF or USAAF would have considered operating the P-40 (of any variant) in the ETO (my understanding is that Italy was/is still considered part of the MTO).

But the Typhoon operated exclusively in the ETO, mostly in the A2G role.