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You don't need battleships to sink carrier. Japan's very capable heavy cruisers were more than adequate. Yamamoto doesn't know that the US is reading his messages so he should not be basing his decisions on not scaring the Americans.One more case, perhaps, of a bad read of the enemy by Yamamoto. One of the big reasons behind split up forces, and the main body being so far back was Yamamoto thought if they knew the entire combined fleet was at Midway, the USN might just stay home and leave Midway to its fate, and of course the Japanese wanted the decisive battle and chance to sink the USN carriers once and for all.
It's easy for us to look back in hindsight and point out all the blunders, knowing what we know. At the time, Yamamoto continued to misread the enemy and think they wouldnt come out and fight if they face too great odds. And one has to wonder, if the entire force of 6 carriers of the Kido Butai is there (what if they also had Junyo and Ryujo and Zuiho, for NINE carriers?), and the US has basically 2.5 carriers and largely ALL their carriers in the pacific at the time, DO they come out to contest Midway?
I find it amazing that after Midway, the IJN kept Nagumo in charge of their carrier force for the October 1942 Battle of Santa Cruz.
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands - Wikipedia
Was Nagumo politically connected? Was he really the best Admiral available?
Best way for Japan to kill the USN's carriers was their big, long range, lance-armed submarines. Instead of Pearl Harbour. And Japan should know where they are, WA, CA, etc.You don't need battleships to sink carrier. Japan's very capable heavy cruisers were more than adequate. Yamato doesn't know that the US is reading his messages so he should not be basing his decisions on not scaring the Americans.
If the Americans were willing to abandon Midway, Midway was the wrong target
Best way for Japan to kill the USN's carriers was their big, long range, lance-armed submarines. Instead of Pearl Harbour. And Japan should know where they are, WA, CA, etc.
Japanese submarines did take out Wasp and applied the coup de grace to the Yorktown.The Japanese were certainly trying that. It was part of the Japanese submarine doctrine. Submarines were to accompany or proceed the fleet and either cause attrition before the battle or take part in the battle. Japanese submarine doctrine was not biased towards supply ships/merchant men.
However Japanese submarines did NOT have the big 24in torpedoes that the cruisers and destroyers had.
They used a 21 in torpedo about 1000kg lighter, Still very dangerous but Submarines also have limited visibility when submerged. They can't shoot at what they can't see and a periscope a few feet above the water cannot see anywhere near as far as crewmen in the upper works or masts of surface ships. If submerged it was also almost pure luck if the enemy ship would pass close enough for a torpedo shot.
Japanese could have done a better job of mining US harbor inlets/outlets.
All the more reason to grab it and prevent another Doolittle. These Doolittles, they worry His Majesty.Probably because Midway was still in American hands when the Doolittle raid launched? Just sayin'...
How was Yamamoto supposed to know that?If the Americans were willing to abandon Midway, Midway was the wrong target
Submarines sank at least eighteen carriers, including USS Wasp, Yorktown, Block Island, Liscome Bay; HMS Ark Royal, Courageous, Eagle, Audacity, Avenger; and IJNS Chuyo, Shinano, Shinyo, Shōkaku, Taihō, Taiyō, Unryū, Unyō and the IJAS Akitsu Maru. The best way to sink a carrier does seem to be with a submarine.Japanese submarines did take out Wasp and applied the coup de grace to the Yorktown.
I'm saying he shouldnt shorten his bench so as not to scare the Americans. You always go into battle with as much as you have.How was Yamamoto supposed to know that?
Maybe, but sometimes their Intel fell a little short of the mark.And Japan should know where they are, WA, CA, etc.
You don't need battleships to sink carrier. Japan's very capable heavy cruisers were more than adequate. Yamamoto doesn't know that the US is reading his messages so he should not be basing his decisions on not scaring the Americans.
If the Americans were willing to abandon Midway, Midway was the wrong target
Each carrier's air group operated independently, which is one reason why Zuikaku was not with Kido Butai at Midway: her air group had been depleted at the battle of Coral Sea. Had the IJN adopted a philosophy of co-operation/co-training between air groups, she could have taken aboard Shokaku's remaining air group and/or transferred other air groups aboard to bring her numbers up to operational strength.
In fact they were in denial. The history of US torpedoes is sad stoy.
I wonder about that. If Mavis had been patrolling out of Midway, do you think the Doolittle strike force would have got by undetected? I bet Yamamoto and maybe some others were wondering the same thing. Mavis had pretty long legs.
The fifth column turned out to be a myth.Maybe, but sometimes their Intel fell a little short of the mark.
The funny is for your prior post as well. Can't give more than one award to a post.Probably because Midway was still in American hands when the Doolittle raid launched? Just sayin'...
Japanese submarines did take out Wasp and applied the coup de grace to the Yorktown.
I'm saying he shouldnt shorten his bench so as not to scare the Americans. You always go into battle with as much as you have.
Zuikaku had the remnants of Shokaku's air group when she returned to Japan - did she integrate Shokaku's air group into her own?Have to differ with you. The Japanese carrier air groups operate as divisions of two. They were way better than the Americans at forming, travelling, and striking in a coordinated fashion than the USN in mid-1942. They did make coordinated strikes, TBs or DBs striking from two directions at the same time.
Contrast that with the USN strike at Midway, where each carrier`s air group scattered, each element moving toward and attacking the enemy more or less alone.
That does not sound very coordinated to me.
- Each TB squadron attacked alone, each subsequent squadron arriving after the other one had been destroyed. only 1 squadron had any escort, and that was only 1 flight of the four that had been detailed to the attack.
- Hornets DB`s and fighters were together - but flew off in the wrong direction, the CAG leading them far enough away that mot of the fighters were lost by ditching.
- Enterprise`s fighters reached the target at altitude but saw no CAp to fight - they had all dived to beat up the TBs and other random aircraft attack from Midway. After waiting for a signal from their TB squadron that they never received, they flew back without having one anything.
- The Enterprise DBs, having lost their escort and flown past the Kido Butai spotted a Japanese DD in a hurry to go somewhere and got lucky on two counts - having spotted the destroyer, and after the CAp was down low, having beaten up the USN TBs. Yorktown`s DBs showed up a few minutes later - also without fighter escort, by luck rather than plan or instruction.
The USN did have a more coordinated defense, in that radar provided them a single picture of the whole area, and they had appointed one fighter director to coordinate for the area, a all three task forces operated at some distance from each other.
The USN got better at coordinated strikes by Santa Cruz.
USN organizational doctrine did make it easier to change air groups and squadrons than the IJN, making it easier to bring a carrier back up to strength by swapping whole units. The Japanese would rebuild by bringing new air crew into the existing units, which remained operational. Training up whole spare carrier air units was not a luxury the Japanese could afford.
Uncle Ted
I was waiting for someone to post that about U.S.S. Saratoga. Talk about mission kill.... not to mention torpedoed Sara a couple of times in 1942 (once off the West Coast, as Beez was suggesting should be done); and sank the CVE Liscome Bay in 1943.