WW III....
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
... very impressive, IMO
Old Wizard
2nd Lieutenant
Interesting!
Mmmmm...Interesting...
michaelmaltby
Colonel
Personally, I don't believe the Allies would have accepted an "armistice" .... I think Moscow would have been nuked, multiple times if required, but after such a catastrophic series of wars the only way the democracies could have ended the conflict .... justified the sacrifice .... would have been with the defeat of Stalin ... the elimination of Stalin.
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Fighterguy
Airman
The video lost all credibility at the point it says, "Truman declares war..." Looks like a bunch of typical "Russia is the greatest" nonsense that comes out of them periodically. The Soviets had an over-reliance on sure weight in numbers as a general strategy. German forces usually out fought them using skill. But like a Judo master against ten Sumo wrestlers, there's only so long the Judo master can hold out. But not before five Sumo wrestlers are dead on the mat. Russia lost upwards of 60 million because of this bull headedness. Britain and the U.S. had superior equipment, leadership, and the ability to fight smarter. These little "would if" exercises have a tendency to focus purely on numbers while conveniently ignoring the other factors. Then there's the atom bomb. The good thing about such a scenario is we would've seen the end of the most devastating ideology in the world, communism.
mikewint
Captain
A very popular misconception. While the Red Army was outnumbered by Axis forces in 1941 at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Soviet mobilization efforts and steady German losses began to change the force ratios in 1942, but the Red Army only had a roughly 2:1 advantage from February 1943 until mid-1944 before maxing out at a little over 4: 1 at the very end of the war.
The Red Army in the field actually peaked in size in mid-1943, but the ratios continued to shift in its favor due to Germany's inability to replace losses. The Red Army didn't keep getting bigger, but it maintained its size while the Wehrmacht steadily lost ground, literally and figuratively.
A 2:1 advantage is significant, but falls short of the 3:1 force ratio that is generally regarded as necessary for attacking forces, and it's a long way from the double-digit advantage that is often claimed. Both sides were able to temporarily achieve greater numerical advantages in certain times and places by concentrating forces.
Consider force ratios during the Battle of Stalingrad. During the defensive phase of urban warfare (August through mid-November 1942), the Red Army was outnumbered about 1.6:1. The Red Army reversed the odds in its counteroffensive in November 1942, achieving about a 2:1 advantage during Operation Uranus.
In actual fact the Soviet Union was not able to draw on a bottomless well of recruits to achieve these ratios. The Soviet Union had a larger population than Germany in 1939 — about twice as large. But the Soviet Union that fought World War II was not the Soviet Union of 1939. In 1941 the Axis occupied about a third of Soviet territory where 45 percent of its population lived — nearly 90 million people out of 190 million. Some refugees fled the occupied zones. The best estimate is that 110 to 120 million people remained in the unoccupied areas of the Soviet Union. For nearly two years, the Soviets actually fought with a lower population base than the United States.
By the end of the war, the United States and the Soviet Union actually had just about the same size total military forces (12 million) and the same size armies (6 million). However, the Soviets mobilized more troops during the course of the war, nearly twice as many. They fought longer and had to replace far more casualties. They did it by stripping the civilian and agricultural workforces, which dropped by 40 to 60 percent.
In 1990, John Ellis wrote Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War in which he suggested that American, Russian, and British commanders alike "seemed unable to impose their will upon the enemy except by slowly and persistently battering him to death with a blunt instrument."
Ellis detailed the advantages of the Allies. For example: once American troops began landing in North Africa in late 1942, the Allies quickly achieved rough parity with Axis forces, and by March 1943 had a 3:1 overall advantage in divisions in North Africa. The Allies had more divisions in Italy than the Axis from July 1943 until the end of the war, at times achieving a ratio there of 1.5:1.
The Allies achieved parity with Germany in number of divisions in Northwest Europe by September 1944. The ratio changed steadily in the Allies' favor in 1945 to 2:1. At the Battle of the Bulge, the Allies were initially outnumbered nearly 1.8:1, but in less than ten days gained the upper hand in troops and a 4:1 advantage in tanks. Within the span of four weeks, the Allies reversed the troop ratio and attained an 11:1 advantage in tanks. The Allies also had quantitative superiority in the Pacific, where they had more divisions than the Japanese from late 1942 until the end of the war, achieving advantages of 1.5:1 in 1943, 2:1 in 1944, and 2.6:1 in mid-1945.
In short, the United States and the United Kingdom often had numerical superiority in World War II — and often in a similar ratio to that enjoyed by the Soviet Union.
The Red Army in the field actually peaked in size in mid-1943, but the ratios continued to shift in its favor due to Germany's inability to replace losses. The Red Army didn't keep getting bigger, but it maintained its size while the Wehrmacht steadily lost ground, literally and figuratively.
A 2:1 advantage is significant, but falls short of the 3:1 force ratio that is generally regarded as necessary for attacking forces, and it's a long way from the double-digit advantage that is often claimed. Both sides were able to temporarily achieve greater numerical advantages in certain times and places by concentrating forces.
Consider force ratios during the Battle of Stalingrad. During the defensive phase of urban warfare (August through mid-November 1942), the Red Army was outnumbered about 1.6:1. The Red Army reversed the odds in its counteroffensive in November 1942, achieving about a 2:1 advantage during Operation Uranus.
In actual fact the Soviet Union was not able to draw on a bottomless well of recruits to achieve these ratios. The Soviet Union had a larger population than Germany in 1939 — about twice as large. But the Soviet Union that fought World War II was not the Soviet Union of 1939. In 1941 the Axis occupied about a third of Soviet territory where 45 percent of its population lived — nearly 90 million people out of 190 million. Some refugees fled the occupied zones. The best estimate is that 110 to 120 million people remained in the unoccupied areas of the Soviet Union. For nearly two years, the Soviets actually fought with a lower population base than the United States.
By the end of the war, the United States and the Soviet Union actually had just about the same size total military forces (12 million) and the same size armies (6 million). However, the Soviets mobilized more troops during the course of the war, nearly twice as many. They fought longer and had to replace far more casualties. They did it by stripping the civilian and agricultural workforces, which dropped by 40 to 60 percent.
In 1990, John Ellis wrote Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War in which he suggested that American, Russian, and British commanders alike "seemed unable to impose their will upon the enemy except by slowly and persistently battering him to death with a blunt instrument."
Ellis detailed the advantages of the Allies. For example: once American troops began landing in North Africa in late 1942, the Allies quickly achieved rough parity with Axis forces, and by March 1943 had a 3:1 overall advantage in divisions in North Africa. The Allies had more divisions in Italy than the Axis from July 1943 until the end of the war, at times achieving a ratio there of 1.5:1.
The Allies achieved parity with Germany in number of divisions in Northwest Europe by September 1944. The ratio changed steadily in the Allies' favor in 1945 to 2:1. At the Battle of the Bulge, the Allies were initially outnumbered nearly 1.8:1, but in less than ten days gained the upper hand in troops and a 4:1 advantage in tanks. Within the span of four weeks, the Allies reversed the troop ratio and attained an 11:1 advantage in tanks. The Allies also had quantitative superiority in the Pacific, where they had more divisions than the Japanese from late 1942 until the end of the war, achieving advantages of 1.5:1 in 1943, 2:1 in 1944, and 2.6:1 in mid-1945.
In short, the United States and the United Kingdom often had numerical superiority in World War II — and often in a similar ratio to that enjoyed by the Soviet Union.
parsifal
Colonel
The reasons behind soviet success against the germans had something to do with the numerical advantages she possessed, but also in the ability of the Russians to 'play" the frontlines, using their superior mobility and better manpower reserves. They were sometimes referred to as "Zhukovs symphanies" or "Zhukovs operas". in stark contrast to the German methods of concentrated points of breakthrough, the Soviets favoured a broad front attack across 100kkm of front or more. moreover as the war wore on the Soviets would 'play the music" so to speak by working up and down the German lines with a series of rolling offensives designed to keep the heer off balance. they were highly successful at this. hitler is often criticised for his inflexible stand fast orders, but the truth is that after Kursk, the Germans had no choice other than stand fast in the face of overwhelming numbers. most of their MT and draft animals were dead or lost after 1942, and they could only move their logistic tails slowly at this time, by series of gradual steps. Russian offensives were generally crude affairs. and were really dependant on massive concentrations of artillery and weeks or months of build up as huge stockpiles of ammunition were made ready. When offensive began the artillery would basically fire until they had run out of shells and then the tanks with tank riders would pour through the gap, whilst the Soviet Infantry advanced with arms linked for morale purposes firing from the hip. If there was any German resistance remaining, they would be smothered by the swarms of tanks and Infantry, committed to the breakthrough.
the Germans retained a few mechanised formations that remained the key to their defence. These would usually inflict a heavy toll on the advancing Soviets, but not nearly enough to be decisive.
The Soviets would punch through and drive their tanks for as far as the fuel would allow them, and never envisaged resupply of advancing formations in an attack. They would advance until they ran out of fuel and/or ammunition, at which point the tank became an immobile pillbox. This limited the depth to which Soviet offensives could penetrate to no more than about 200 km. Anything beyond that was beyond their capabilities. After an offensive had run its course it would take a very long time before further advances in that sector was possible. soviets relied heavily on the rail network for supply, and were not particularly good at restoring the local networks in Europe outside of the USSR because of the differences in the rail networks they encountered in1944 central and western Europe.
At this time (May 1945), what little of the Soviet logistic lift capability that existed was deploying to the Far East, something that began in November and was continuing right up until August 1945. In the east, the Soviets by adjusting their modus operandi and avoiding direct battle were able, with the help of air supply able to push through a corps sized unit through the Gobi and attack the Japanese where they did not expect it. This was remarkable but it was also the exception to standard soviet procedures.
Against a mobile armed force like the allied armies in Europe Soviet methods would have struggled. Western artillery was more numerous and more flexible, moreover, allied formations were all fully mechanized highly mobile and crucially fully trained. If the Soviets were ready for offensive action, which they were not after the battle of berlin, they might have penetrated to the Rhine but would have struggled to even get there .
Soviets knew about the A-bomb, but did not know how many were available. I don't know where this video gets its ranges from but I sure aint from reality. in 1945, Persia was occupied nd turkey had joined the Allies. Both these places were capable of supporting B-29 deployments, and from here all points of the urals were within their range.
This video I would place in the category of a nice piece of fiction....
the Germans retained a few mechanised formations that remained the key to their defence. These would usually inflict a heavy toll on the advancing Soviets, but not nearly enough to be decisive.
The Soviets would punch through and drive their tanks for as far as the fuel would allow them, and never envisaged resupply of advancing formations in an attack. They would advance until they ran out of fuel and/or ammunition, at which point the tank became an immobile pillbox. This limited the depth to which Soviet offensives could penetrate to no more than about 200 km. Anything beyond that was beyond their capabilities. After an offensive had run its course it would take a very long time before further advances in that sector was possible. soviets relied heavily on the rail network for supply, and were not particularly good at restoring the local networks in Europe outside of the USSR because of the differences in the rail networks they encountered in1944 central and western Europe.
At this time (May 1945), what little of the Soviet logistic lift capability that existed was deploying to the Far East, something that began in November and was continuing right up until August 1945. In the east, the Soviets by adjusting their modus operandi and avoiding direct battle were able, with the help of air supply able to push through a corps sized unit through the Gobi and attack the Japanese where they did not expect it. This was remarkable but it was also the exception to standard soviet procedures.
Against a mobile armed force like the allied armies in Europe Soviet methods would have struggled. Western artillery was more numerous and more flexible, moreover, allied formations were all fully mechanized highly mobile and crucially fully trained. If the Soviets were ready for offensive action, which they were not after the battle of berlin, they might have penetrated to the Rhine but would have struggled to even get there .
Soviets knew about the A-bomb, but did not know how many were available. I don't know where this video gets its ranges from but I sure aint from reality. in 1945, Persia was occupied nd turkey had joined the Allies. Both these places were capable of supporting B-29 deployments, and from here all points of the urals were within their range.
This video I would place in the category of a nice piece of fiction....
mikewint
Captain
At that time the US had 3 atomic bombs, two plutonium and one uranium. One plutonium was used in the Trinity test which left the US with just two bombs. Those first 3 bombs cost close to $2 billion in 1945 dollars closer to $35 billion today. However the Manhattan Project was not about just building those bombs it was more about building a weapons production system, i.e.
At the Oak Ridge site facilities included: K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant; Y-12 Electromagnetic Plant; Clinton Engineer Works; Clinton Laboratories; and the S-50 Thermal Diffusion Plant
At Hanford, the Engineer Works (nuclear reactor) and the Heavy water plants. The cost of all the above accounted for 80% of the $2 billion amount. But the US now possessed an Atomic Bomb assembly line.
It was a system so large that Niels Bohr referred to it as a country-sized factory
So while it is true as stated in the video that the US had only three it is also a fact that two more Fat Man assemblies were ready, and scheduled to leave Kirtland Field for Tinian on August 11 and 14, and Tibbets was ordered by LeMay to return to Albuquerque, New Mexico, to collect them. At Los Alamos, technicians worked 24 hours straight to cast another plutonium core. Although cast, it still needed to be pressed and coated, which would take until August 16. Therefore, it could have been ready for use on August 19.
In addition while those two Russian plants were technically out of range that would be for a two way trip. Look at the Doolittle Raid, while there were landing sites in China the planes took off before they had reached their planned departure point and it was problematical they they could land yet they did go
At the Oak Ridge site facilities included: K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant; Y-12 Electromagnetic Plant; Clinton Engineer Works; Clinton Laboratories; and the S-50 Thermal Diffusion Plant
At Hanford, the Engineer Works (nuclear reactor) and the Heavy water plants. The cost of all the above accounted for 80% of the $2 billion amount. But the US now possessed an Atomic Bomb assembly line.
It was a system so large that Niels Bohr referred to it as a country-sized factory
So while it is true as stated in the video that the US had only three it is also a fact that two more Fat Man assemblies were ready, and scheduled to leave Kirtland Field for Tinian on August 11 and 14, and Tibbets was ordered by LeMay to return to Albuquerque, New Mexico, to collect them. At Los Alamos, technicians worked 24 hours straight to cast another plutonium core. Although cast, it still needed to be pressed and coated, which would take until August 16. Therefore, it could have been ready for use on August 19.
In addition while those two Russian plants were technically out of range that would be for a two way trip. Look at the Doolittle Raid, while there were landing sites in China the planes took off before they had reached their planned departure point and it was problematical they they could land yet they did go
Glider
Captain
The allies would have control of the air from the start and the often forgotten PR advantage would be critical. Russian attacks were planned in detail and involved a significant build up of forces to be unleashed on the enemy. The PR units would see the build up of Russian forces and the airforces flatten them.
People often look at the number of aircraft and not at the training and command and control abilities which often make a huge difference.
The Il-2 would have suffered huge losses as would their escorting fighters. Local build up of forces and supplies would be vulnerable to the B25/B26/Boston/Mosquito's and strategic build ups at significnat risk from the heavy bombers. The Russian airforce didn't come close in a large number of areas.
Lets also not forget the transport capabilites of the Allies, the Russian transport capability was almost negligable. When considering the distances invovled when fighting in Russia this would have been a really important advantage
People often look at the number of aircraft and not at the training and command and control abilities which often make a huge difference.
The Il-2 would have suffered huge losses as would their escorting fighters. Local build up of forces and supplies would be vulnerable to the B25/B26/Boston/Mosquito's and strategic build ups at significnat risk from the heavy bombers. The Russian airforce didn't come close in a large number of areas.
Lets also not forget the transport capabilites of the Allies, the Russian transport capability was almost negligable. When considering the distances invovled when fighting in Russia this would have been a really important advantage
mikewint
Captain
an Army moves on its belly in many ways. Out of total 205,000 trucks produced, 150,400 were consumed by the military. So, on 22 June 1941 the Red Army had around 270,000 trucks, and received another 745,000 during the war. Out of these, 150,000 were new domestic production, 221,500 trucks drafted from the industry and agriculture sectors, 60,600 captured enemy's trucks and 312,600 lend-lease trucks.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
I remember reading that the Manhattan Project could produce about one bomb per month at the time.
I know a lot of people speculate about how an Allied attack on the USSR would the best thing ever, but would anyone trust any government that turned on any ally after a joint victory?
I know a lot of people speculate about how an Allied attack on the USSR would the best thing ever, but would anyone trust any government that turned on any ally after a joint victory?
Glider
Captain
An excellent point and its worth noting that a number of the post war russian trucks were based on the lend lease ones they received. I don't want to even think of the number of trucks the allies produced, it would have been staggering.
parsifal
Colonel
Britain and the commonwealth built about 450000 truck, the US just over 2 million. Numbers may not be fully comparable, some countries reported all MT in their soft skinned vehicle production figures, others just lorries, whilst others just report vehicles for the military. The figures are rubbery for sure, Wiki reports that the allies in total produced 4.5 million military soft skinned vehicles to 670000 vehicles (military and civilian) for the axis. These included about 100000 relatively inferior foreign types mostly of French or Dutch origin. It includes Japanese and Italian production.
These are crude figures but they do give an idea of the relative mobility of each side. Further with around 330000 vehicles available to them, the germans attempted to provide a motorised element to about 500 divs. We don't know the precise divisional numbers in the red army, though Gehlen estimates in the red books that about 550 divs were raised. Thanks to her centrally controlled command economy nearly all of the 450000 odd vehicles available to the Soviets were for military use. The US army raised just over 100 divs, whilst the British and the CW raised about 90.
The Germans mis-used their MT assets. Unlike the soviets, it appears they allocated transport for both front line as well as rear area activities. The front line units suffered very heavy attrition, made worse by the non-standardisation of the vehicle park, and the non-military specs of many types like the French vehicles, that made them susceptible to wear and tear. In contrast, all of the Soviet vehicles were used for tail support greatly reducing their wastage. It did mean that Soviet formations lacked a lot of depth……..a unit once it had used the supplies it was carrying would take a long period to return to combat readiness, but this didn't seem to worry STAVKHA. Troop s would often forage (code for loot) for food, something expressly prohibited in the west. The extensive use of plethora of rugged US types in the east, coupled with avoidance of front line attrition, kept Red army attrition of itsd soft skinned vehicles at a fraction of those in the German Army. But neither the German Army or the red Army were anything like the motorised marvels of the allies. This would have been decisive in a 1945 scenario of battle between East and West
These are crude figures but they do give an idea of the relative mobility of each side. Further with around 330000 vehicles available to them, the germans attempted to provide a motorised element to about 500 divs. We don't know the precise divisional numbers in the red army, though Gehlen estimates in the red books that about 550 divs were raised. Thanks to her centrally controlled command economy nearly all of the 450000 odd vehicles available to the Soviets were for military use. The US army raised just over 100 divs, whilst the British and the CW raised about 90.
The Germans mis-used their MT assets. Unlike the soviets, it appears they allocated transport for both front line as well as rear area activities. The front line units suffered very heavy attrition, made worse by the non-standardisation of the vehicle park, and the non-military specs of many types like the French vehicles, that made them susceptible to wear and tear. In contrast, all of the Soviet vehicles were used for tail support greatly reducing their wastage. It did mean that Soviet formations lacked a lot of depth……..a unit once it had used the supplies it was carrying would take a long period to return to combat readiness, but this didn't seem to worry STAVKHA. Troop s would often forage (code for loot) for food, something expressly prohibited in the west. The extensive use of plethora of rugged US types in the east, coupled with avoidance of front line attrition, kept Red army attrition of itsd soft skinned vehicles at a fraction of those in the German Army. But neither the German Army or the red Army were anything like the motorised marvels of the allies. This would have been decisive in a 1945 scenario of battle between East and West
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
" ...I know a lot of people speculate about how an Allied attack on the USSR would the best thing ever, but would anyone trust any government that turned on any ally after a joint victory?"
Stalin .... and trust .... oxymoron
Stalin .... and trust .... oxymoron
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"...This video I would place in the category of a nice piece of fiction...."
Of course it is .... but having read widely on the eastern war of late, I am struck by the timeframe portrayed. The events are all plausible but not at the speed that the creator has them moving .... and .... an armistace motivated by fear of outrageous losses when you are in possession of the A bomb and have used it already is just a cop-out ending.
By May 1945 the Russian Army had learned from the very best -- paid in gallons of blood -- but in Communist Russia -- blood, lots of blood was the expected cost of any venture -- and the Americans would not have been shy of a fight -- a fight only George Patton could lead.
Of course it is .... but having read widely on the eastern war of late, I am struck by the timeframe portrayed. The events are all plausible but not at the speed that the creator has them moving .... and .... an armistace motivated by fear of outrageous losses when you are in possession of the A bomb and have used it already is just a cop-out ending.
By May 1945 the Russian Army had learned from the very best -- paid in gallons of blood -- but in Communist Russia -- blood, lots of blood was the expected cost of any venture -- and the Americans would not have been shy of a fight -- a fight only George Patton could lead.
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swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,022
- Jun 25, 2013
Trust of Stalin isn't the issue. It's the trust in the Western allies.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
... sorry, trust is a mutual state .... after Molotov Ribbentrop there is no trust in Stalin ... deals with Nazis, deals with capitalists .... trust of the western allies is hardly an issue.
