fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Hit the nail square on the head there Juha
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First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.
My wife would beg to differ...
If a tank is damaged by the enemy action, unable to move, and it's spare parts can't get to that tank (since enemy prevents logistics efforts), methinks enemy action has a lot to do with the abandonment.
First of all, US troops had first stopped the point of KG Peiper and then captured Stavelot behind it, so no supplies got through. Then US troops defeated all German attempts to recapture Stavelot to reopen the supply route of the KG so Peiper decided to give up Stoumont and concentrated his KG at La Glaize. He waited there for help but the other KGs of 1.SSPzD could not get through the US forces, so KG Peiper had no other option that abandon its vehicles and trek through hills to the German lines. Notice that they didn't march along the road they had came, because it was blocked by US troops but sneaked through hills at night. So IMHO KG Peiper's AFVs were lost because of the actions by US forces.
I've not seen too many revisionists at work here John, so I'm not sure I go along with this.
Wiki mentions the historian James Corum and he does make a very fair point about the 'weather window'.
The Stephen Bungay book (The Most Dangerous Enemy.........I'd recommend as an excellent read if you've not had the pleasure) does argue that alternate Luftwaffe tactics might have won the BoB for them, he especially mentions using the Me110 as a fast fighter-bomber intruder to make pin-point attacks on various high value targets (and as you mention radar especially).
He also talks about whether a more limited and local air superiority around the SE coastal area was possible and if that would have been sufficient to enable invasion (although that also brings in the variable not seen at that time, the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe having to take that on).
But Bungay does show with each sides production and training schedules that the RAF did not come close to defeat - even during the airfield attack phase of the battle, and that with their loss rates they were on a hiding to nothing doing what they were doing.
German production at this stage is surprisingly low.
It's worth mentioning that it was largely only 11 group suffering the majority of losses, even with rotation this was far from the bulk of the RAF.
It also has to be remembered that German intelligence during the battle was utterly hopeless (perhaps surprisingly so given that at that stage they had been doing so well) and the British intelligence services were starting to make serious inroads with Ultra.
I would agree that to say there is no way the Luftwaffe could ever have won the BoB is a silly claim to make........but given how things were on each side (and standing head and shoulders above everything about the BoB - besides the RAF having adequte numbers of trained fighter pilots and machines largely the equal or, arguably, at that stage a little better than anything the Luftwaffe had - was the worlds first modern radar equipped fully integrated air defense system and above all it was properly understood operated as such) I think it is fairly difficult to see how the Luftwaffe could have truly won without one 'projecting' modern radically different tactics to it.
I say this not meaning to minimise or down-play the damage and danger or the terrible mauling Britain took during those dark days. ....or do similar to the young men on the German side and their courage and skills.
In fact I'd say that this (in reverse) is a well known myth (the RAF came within a hair's breadth/a few days/week or couple of weeks of losing the BoB)
This reminded me of something I'd read.
I've mentioned the book before but in 'The Final Hours: The Luftwaffe Plot Against Goring' by Johannes Steinhoff, in the preface he makes an interesting and rather scathing remark concerning one of his fellow inpatients inthe hopspital he was at, a member of a Tiger crew who had also had his face largely burned off.
"Not all Tigers destroyed thousands of Russian tanks".
So many myths.....
The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.
Allied, please; however much contempt you might have for the RAF and British Army, there were many other countries involved, all with a deep loathing for the Nazi regime.The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action..
But they weren't, so it wasn't, so it's rather academic, isn't it?Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers
No, it didn't, because 11 Group was not a rigid organisation, and Squadrons, once exhausted, were moved out, and replaced by other Squadrons who'd had a chance to rest, reform, and replenish their numbers. From 8-8 to 7-9, there were 34 Squadron movements between various Groups. As an example, 8-8, 41 moved from Hornchurch to Yorkshire, then returned to Hornchurch on September 3rd, 54 going in the opposite direction each time.While I may agree with the notion that the RAF - as a WHOLE -weren't going to lose the BoB, 11 Group sure came close to extinction (especially that first week of September) which would have hampered RAFs ability to continue BoB. Production and aircraft numbers were rolling along for England but those planes were being distributed throughout the kingdom - they would definately NOT be concentrated along the east coast of Britain.
Six out of seven sector airfields were heavily damaged. Another five advanced airfields were also destroyed. Telephone and communication lines were disrupted or totally destroyed and the general destruction was confusing the handling of squadrons in the air. The fighter losses from the day before again exceeded aircraft production. And Fighter Command could call upon only about 700 pilots.
On the subject of killing tanks, I've posted something like this before so I'll do it again ('cos I like repetition).
When I was a lad in uniform, there were different types of "kill" associated with heavy armour. The two I distinctly remember were the M-Kill for mobility kill and K-Kill for total destruction. I believe there was also a term associated with destroying the main armament (could have been A for armament or perhaps W for weapon - can't remember clearly 'cos they were pretty rare).
As others have noted, tanks are a huge logistics drain. They can be great in battle but getting them there and keeping them supplied is bluddy hard. Turning a tank into a smoking hole in the ground isn't the only way to eliminate an armoured capability. Looking at a tank formation as a target system (which includes logistics), one can try to take out each individual tank but they are hard targets because they're hard to find and very difficult to kill completely. The logistics chain is a much, much softer target - the fuel for several tanks can be eliminated by a single shot which blows up a tanker - and it's easier to find because fuel tankers drive on roads.
If a tank was immobilised by AT fire, or HEAT rocket then it would be listed as lost to enemy action even if the crew survived and it didn't brew up. It would not be listed as abandoned or self destructed.
There are seperate listings for mines, AT hits, RPG, mechanical failure. Parsifal seeded the meme that abandoned or self destroyed meant immobilised by enemy action. Those tanks were recorded under gunfire, mines, Hollow charge rounds or mechanical failure. The categories are clear.
From what I remember from Bungay's book RAF had biggest problems when Bf 110s damaged some radar installations and did some surprising attacks on key air bases of 11th Air Group(though Germans didn't know that). He elaborates that using Bf 110s all the time during the battle for this task and not to escort the bombers would be most useful for Germans.
But that's just from the back of my head.
This rather beats about the Bush. Peipers tanks were not defeated in battle, or destroyed by enemy action: they were abandoned for supply starvation, the supply issue being fuel.
The fact that they were cutoff from supplies is a result of US air superiority intefering with what was a critical supply situation anyway as much as US Army action. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain local air superiority a certain amount of fuel and ammunition would have been air dropped in parachute containers.
In fact LW tried to drop some fuel (1.5 tons?) and some ammo to Peiper, but dropped almost all into Stoumont, which was already recaptured by US troops, so they helped US forces. In any case you have interesting oppinion.