WW2 bombers. If Germany had the allies heavy bombers would they have won the war?

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Key word: "known".

The IJN had spies in various locations (including Pearl) and the Japanese intelligence community knew the areas where the carriers *might* be, but they did not know exact locations or destinations.
As it turns out, the spy at Pearl did communicate the departure of the two carriers out of Pearl, but word did not reach the IJN task Force.
So yes, the IJN was most likely aware that the Yorktown, Wasp, Hornet, Long Island and Saratoga were in port.
They also most likely knew that the Ranger was in the Atlantic and that the Lexington and Enterprise were in the Pacific - but they did not know where.
The third planned attack wave was cancelled because the Japanese did not know where the carriers were. *IF* the Lexington and Enterprise were in Pearl the morning of the attack, you can rest assured the third wave would have been executed.
Also of note: of the 15 Heavy Cruisers assigned to the Pacific, only one was in Pearl that morning (CA-32) with 11 at sea, which also made Nagumo nervous.
 
XBe02Drvr said:
So, Admiral Y, what should we do, cancel Pearl Harbor and send Kido Butai to the Atlantic, or let The Empire run out of fuel in 6 months?
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Carry on with the attack, but hit the fuel farms. If you can't critically wound the USN's offensive capability (carriers, not old battleships) then do your utmost to destroy Pearl Harbour's utility as a base. By not taking out Pearl Harbour, the base was ready to field the USN at Coral Sea and ultimately at Midway. Permanently disabling PH is not feasible, the fuel farms would be rebuilt and replenished in a few months, but leaving the base essentially intact was nuts. Imagine sending your best troops to attack an enemy's primary, yet isolated fortification and supply depot, after you hit the fort and disable its defences, you then leave the magazines and supplies for the inevitable reinforcements?

And put some IJN submarines off Puget Sound to torpedo or mine USS Saratoga. The Japanese know the ship is there.
 
Those "old battleships" were still a very real threat to the IJN.
As it tuens out, some of the USN's oldest battleships participated in the largest surface battle of WWII, at Surgaio Straight:
USS West Virginia (BB-48) sunk at Pearl
USS Maryland (BB-46) damaged at Pearl
USS Tennessee (BB-43) damaged at Pearl
USS Mississippi (BB-41) wasn't at Pearl
USS California (BB-44) sunk at Pearl
and the Grand Daddy of them all:
USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) at Pearl, light damage.

A so tell me about those "old battleships" again?
 
Dimlee said:
Most of the industrial sites in the Povolzhye (Volga Region) and the Volga River itself as the major shipping route.
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Where would Luftwaffe heavy bombers be based? Berlin to Moscow as the crow lies is 1600km. Berlin to the Ural region is 3000km You can save maybe 1000km by operating out of occupied territories. Berlin to Vladivostok is 7500km by air. Soviet factories can presumably be setup anywhere in between. The Ju 290 had a range of between 6000 and 6600km and was available by 1942 as the BMW 801 became reliable. 1942 also the 1450hp Jumo 211J is available.
 

Range is Point A to Point B. Combat radius is what counts, Pt A to Pt B to Pt A. The range stated is for the recon version.
 

The initial comment was about the existing 2-engine bomber force in 1942. In the real history that force did strike the industrial areas I mentioned.
 
The battle at Surigao basically produced nothing but to confirm the status quo to both sides: BB's were too vulnerable in direct action with the enemy, and too valuable to risk. Basically the theme of Battleships for the entire first and second world wars.

The Pacific (and Atlantic, and Mediterranean) war had already demonstrated that BB's were assets that had to be protected from air power, submarines and carriers at all costs.
They were kept around as long-shot insurance against a carrier coming too close to an enemy BB, for shore bombardment, but mostly to satisfy admiralty on all sides that couldn't cognitively overcome 100 years of battleship doctrine. But the real material strategic value in these roles is debatable. Shore bombardment can be accomplished by aircraft and cruisers at less penalty. A BB will rapidly run out of primary ammunition in this role, not to mention wear out it's guns. Then it's back to port for new barrels.
Battleship to battleship combat never materialized as envisioned. For any contributions BBs made they still had to be gingerly shepherded around their theatres drawing off considerable resources in aircraft, carriers, cruisers and destroyers. Hardly offset by actual combat gains imho. (This applies to the BBs of all nations in WWII, not just the US).

After Bismark and PoW/Repulse, no commander was going to risk it. The symbolic defeat of a BB sunk was too great. They were, and still are, overly romanticized symbols of national might.

I would argue that the most successful BB, and least if a hindrance to it's own navy, was the Tirpitz. It existed as a threat in being tying up considerable allied resources and intelligence for a long while.
The best use of a BB was to park it somewhere where it couldn't really sink and force the enemy to fret over it.

ANY of the principal combatant navies, given a moment of profound foresight many years prior, would drastically have increased their effectiveness had they scrapped or converted every single BB and BC into carriers. Had Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed into the Denmark Straight and been intercepted by two fast carriers, it would have been pretty one sided show. The same had PoW and Hood been trying to intercept Eugen and a fast German Carrier.

Similarly, had PoW and Repulse been two fast fleet carriers, they would have stood a much better chance at surviving the South China Sea. Provided they kept the Fulmars up and prowling for every daylight hour the ships were under Japanese airfields.
 
Indeed, had the entire KGV class never been built, and instead five more Ark Royals or Illustrious class the RN would have brought much destruction to its enemies. Imagine Taranto not with just Illustrious and 20 Swordfish, but five carriers.
 
RW Mk. III said:
The battle at Surigao basically produced nothing but to confirm the status quo to both sides: BB's were too vulnerable in direct action with the enemy, and too valuable to risk...
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The Battle of Surigao Strait provided a consoderable amount of irony even while a chapter was closing in Naval history.

Firstly, all but one of the USN Battleships present were attacked at Pearl Harbor and they were the key players in the battle. These very warships the Japanese had intended to eliminate at the start of the war.

The balance of these Battleship were WWI vintage yet still proved their worth both in many surface battles as well as providing taskforce protection (including AA) and attacking enemy ground targets.

And most importantly, the Japanese Naval doctrine had always been to draw out the USN for one great battle and when that glorious moment came, they were not prepared for it.

So in the end, the attack at Pearl Harbor was a wasted exercise.
 
To be clear I am not saying the battleships weren't effective and valuable. I am saying I believe the resources and logistics they represented, having been redirected at least ten years prior to the war (in the case of any battleship navy in WWII), into heavy cruisers or preferably carriers, would have been better spent and created a more potent force.


Edit: reading this I realize I've brought us wayyy off topic. Sorry!
 

By the time the Iowa class came into service, the IJN's surface fleet was broken. Not having them would have made essentially no difference to the outcome of the war, except there wouldn't have been a cool new battleship to use as a place for the surrender documents to be signed.



As far as Japan was concerned, in the long run, the attack on Pearl Harbor was probably a net negative for Japan. The invasion of the Philippines and mandated US territories in the Pacific would not generate the sort of fervid emotional response as did the attack on Pearl Harbor. The US would declare war over the Philippines, but I doubt if people would particularly care, which may permit the IJN to attack a USN battlefleet at sea.
 
Milosh said:
Those BBs also gave good shore bombardment, which allowed more fighters to be carried on carriers.
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Although it's important to remember that battleships usually shipped about 100 rounds per gun on the main batteries. (Iowa's had ~130 I think?) And somewhere around 300 shots per gun was the barrel life before you have to put in to port to replace the barrels, a major task. I believe the safety and accuracy of the barrels also really started to deteriorate on the back leg of that lifespan but I could be mistaken.
Battleships would also generally not go anywhere near depleting their main gun ammunition as then they would be a pretty toothless dog. So shore bombardment, although very effective, has some definite limitations compared to aerial attack. As a carrier generally carries much, more bombs, and is not really limited in how many attacks it can launch before it heads back to port in the same way big guns are.
 

Carriers do have a limit on sorties, and would be less effective in poor weather. Battleship guns would also tend to be more effective on well-hardened targets, when fire can be corrected.


Experience with shore bombardment showed that the effect of individual shells increased much more slowly than shell weight. RN experience with their monitors found four six inch shells had similar effect to one 15 inch shell, despite the 15 in shell weighing about 17 times as much as the six inch;(Buxton, Big Gun Monitors) one would expect the USN's results would be similar.

Replacing the Iowa class battleships with a mix of carriers and cruisers could have been a more effective use of resources.
 
For those who are interested in the nut and bolts (literally), the attached Bureau of Mines paper goes into lurid detail on the Bergius process.
Also I previously posted a wartime booklet which includes illustrations of the processes used to produce avgas in the USA and I am posting it again. The enormous size of the US avgas program becomes apparent. Without it the Combined Bomber Offence literally never gets off the ground. The Germans could never hope to have a bomber fleet remotely comparable to the USAAF and RAF.
 

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By my personal point of view certain questions of the what-if kind can be interesting, but always when they have at least a small amount of correspondence with reality.
The German aviation industry was stretched to the limit and far beyond: one of the reasons of the decline of the German pilots skill during the WWII was the lack not only of the avgas allocated to the flying schools, but also of trainers, that in those circumstances are of course exposed to a very rapid wear.

So Lufwaffe was more than happy to put his hands, after the Italian surrender Sept. 1943, on some hundreds of trainers used by Regia Aeronautica, say Saiman, Caproni of various kinds etc., that certainly were not as cool as Macchi 205 or Fiat G55 (or even SM82...), but nevertheless very useful, given the circumstances.
So a good part of the German pilots training was made, after 1943, in Northern Italy, also to profit of the better weather than that of Germany. But Italian planes had the throttle to the contrary of the German standard, and accidents were frequent.
After all, even in the mid '30s, German pilots went (secretly) to Italy to train (Adolf Galland).

A huge fleet of German 4-engine bombers, where not even a sufficient number of trainers could be built? Uhmmm...
 
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This is rather time (and ship) dependent. During WW I the main limitation was barrel wear, As a gun got near the end of it's life the velocity and accuracy both fell off which greatly reduced the effective range of the guns. In WW I this could be in as little as 120 full charge rounds,

By WW II they had better steel in the barrels and better propellants (this varied from Navy to Navy) and gun life was sometimes double what it was in WW I. The US in particular developed high capacity bombardment ammunition and accepted different ballistics than the AP ammunition. This allowed for smaller charges and greatly increased barrel life. The capacity of the magazines became a real thing as opposed to barrel life. In WW I the rule of thumb had been to fire few enough rounds that the ship could still engage in ship to ship combat and expend her magazines without exceeding the barrel life. This also meant some ships went years without firing their guns.
A battleship might hold 800-1000 shells for it's main guns. Most Battleship shells actually carried a rather small amount of explosive.

It was a rare or very large carrier that carried that quantity of large bombs.
Load out for the Range in 1941 was given as
100lb bombs=600 (used by fighters)
500lb bombs=515
1000lb bombs=177
325lb DB..........=200 (Depth Bomb)
No torpedoes.

Battleships could also use secondary guns for shore bombardment.
 
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