WW2 USN Strategic Bombing Capability

[GregP]

Not to kick a dead horse, but somewhere back early in this long topic someone said a B-29 was hauling a very light bomb load. Something on the order of 6,000 pounds or so. It would take an hour to find it.

Here is a link to a B-29A manual:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/B-29A_Superfortress_SAC_-_19_April_1950.pdf

On page 4 it show s 20,000 pound bomb load could be hauled 2,583 miles, for a radius of 1,428 miles. There are 3 other missions shown with 10,000 pound bomb loads, but I have seen earlier WWII manuals with many missions at 15,000 pound bomb load and some impressive ranges.

Not saying anything except the B-29 could haul a LOT of bombs if the situation required it to do so.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure. It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.

Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.

In both cases, the U.S. was drug into the conflicts because of ties to Allies and the U.N. but because of politics (and perpetual U.N. passive mediations), was limited in the amount of force needed to suppress the enemy.
Case in Point: the USS New Jersey was recalled after hammering the eff out of North Korean positions, because the North Koreans complained to the U.N. and it was determined that the Jersey was "unfair & unconventional" and demanded that she had to be withdrawn.

In both cases, the U.S. should NOT have been there, it wasn't our problem and it wasn't our fight, but obligations to Allies and the U.N. was the black hole that sucked us in.

I'll leave it at that, and Joe can expand on it if he likes, but you get the picture.

Couldn't have said it better myself!

 

[Robert Porter]

That has always been one of my pet peeves, yes treaty obligations dragged us in, but as soon as active French participation evaporated so should our own involvement. Over and over, we (the US) and every other European power has paid the price for failed colonial exploitation. I agree, we had no business there and we paid a huge price in blood for what was essentially a lost cause.

 

[Zipper730]

I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...

I'm mostly just interested in the historical facts...

The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure.

That's weird, but interesting

It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.

Wow

Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.

Didn't he come to the US at some point?

In both cases, the U.S. was drug into the conflicts because of ties to Allies and the U.N. but because of politics (and perpetual U.N. passive mediations), was limited in the amount of force needed to suppress the enemy.

Basically we were drawn in over alliances to other nations.

Case in Point: the USS New Jersey was recalled after hammering the eff out of North Korean positions, because the North Koreans complained to the U.N. and it was determined that the Jersey was "unfair & unconventional" and demanded that she had to be withdrawn.

How was it unfair and how was it unconventional?

In both cases, the U.S. should NOT have been there, it wasn't our problem and it wasn't our fight, but obligations to Allies and the U.N. was the black hole that sucked us in.

Some people subscribe to the attitude that right lies in force...

While Japanese AA was not as concerted as German AA, it was still very capable.
They had several layout patterns for their installations and these would include a blend of types: 75mm, 105mm, 120mm and 155mm.

I would assume one or two hits from any of those would be fatal?

That were able to easily reach altitudes of 26 to 30,000 feet and there were many reports from B-17 and B-29 crews that verified that Japanese AA was reaching their altitudes of 32,000 feet and even witnessed bursts as high as 36,000 feet.

I didn't know that

I should add that the AA batteries were also protected by a perimeter of 7mm and 13mm MGs as well as 20mm and 25mm pom-pom to protect the batteries from low altitude attack.

So basically light stuff on the outside to the big stuff in the middle?

Shinpachi gave the account and it's been a long time since the discussion, but in summary, there was a lone patrol on the morning of the Nagasaki mission. The pilot (Shinpachi has his name and Sentai info) spotted the B-29 and thought it to be an American recon mission (there was actually several B-29s per Atomic mission) and disregarded it. However, he was at altitude and in a position where he could have intercepted the unescorted B-29s as they turned towards Nagasaki.

But as luck would have it...

I didn't know we had multiple planes for atomic missions: I did know we had the bomber and a plane in trail and offset to the side...

Any USN aircraft that had the prefix "S" was intended for Scouting duties as one of their primary missions.

I always thought scouting was predominantly artillery direction...

Curtiss SOC-3 for example, shows it's primary mission is Scouting.

I never understood the SO designation as they were overlapping, but if scouting is non-photographic reconnaissance, and O was artillery direction it makes perfect sense.

The Douglas SBD was a Scouting Bomber and while it was designed as a Dive-Bomber, it's designed purpose was an armed Scout.

It was designed as a dive-bomber first (Northrop's BT, which was then modified into the BT-2, then the SBD)

In those, the scouts were the eyes of the fleet, no matter who had radar and who did not.

Did the Japanese have scouts of this sort?

Dave - French and British can be accused of this or that, but Korea was not within either countrie's sphere of influence, let alone a former colony of those countries. Korea was a place where Russian/Soviet, Chinese and Japanese influences over-lapped, many times the Koreans drawing a short straw in the process.

So you have a sort of Venn diagram where the PRC and USSR cris-crossed each other?

The big worry in Korea, especially after the Chinese jumped in, was that the Soviet Union would get directly involved and escalate a regional conflict into World War lll.

As they were both communist powers.

We had abruptly demobilized after War ll, and had neither the preparation nor the stomach for another big one.

What was the motivation for the demobilization? I'm pretty sure I know the answer (so draftees can go home to their families, and we could throttle down military costs)

In Vietnam, Kennedy, Johnson, and especially McNamara started out helping a (not very worthy) ally stem what they thought was a minor insurgency, and just couldn't comprehend the facts on the ground and the level of commitment of the Vietnamese people to unification.

Why did they not comprehend?

They clung to the illusion that by manipulating military actions and diplomatic initiatives they could discourage the North from their unification campaign.

Why?

The Dauntless was spec-ed and designed at a time when there weren't a lot of long range patrol options available to the fleet. PBY-class aircraft were just coming into being, and battleships and cruisers each had a couple of seaplanes, but a carrier's flock of scout bombers were the backbone of the fleet's search capabilities.

Okay, I get it now...

I think the USN had always thought of its aircraft as multi-mission platforms

There's logic to that

possibly more so than the USAAC

I think it was just in different ways

The USN merged level-bombing and torpedo bombing from the outset it seems into one aircraft type (TBs), by the late 1930's they'd decided to merge the dive-bomber and scout role together into the scout-bomber (SB), though they'd tried merging scout's and fighters into scout-fighters (SF), as well as increasing the capability of fighters to carry dive-bomber loads (F11C to BFC/BF2C) before just reclassifying them as regular fighters again (the exception was that Cruisers, Battlecruisers, and Battleships, had the Scout and Observation roles merged into Scout/Observation or SO).

As time went on the level-bomber component of the dive-bomber mission was seen as largely useless, the torpedo role persisted for a little bit longer, but the torpedo-bomber planes found themselves being used as ASW, AEW, and COD's (level bombing did see effectiveness in land-based campaigns), the dive-bombers eventually were joined together with the torpedo-bomber role (there was some toying with a torpedo-bomber scout or TS), and starting in 1946 dive-bombers, dive-bomber/torpedo-bombers, torpedo-bombers, and anti-submarine warfare aircraft were stuffed into the attack-mission.

Eventually the multi-role torpedo bomber planes were developed into specialized COD's and AEW's as time went on.

The USN did have a shot at scout-fighters, in the Grumman SF, and one wonders how that would have played out had the navy continued that into the monoplane world.

Did they require two man crews?

The advice, allegedly, was more along the lines of 'first change the government of South Vietnam into something that the people might support'.

I did not know that, but that does make sense (in this author's opinion, it seems preferable to avoid sticking one's nose where it doesn't belong unless absolutely necessary because of the cost in human life, and generates enmity that all too often results in blow-back) to change the regime into something the public would accept rather than the ham-handed job we did.

Regime change was a traditional British strategy as a cheaper way to achieve goals and with less casualties.

Correct, though if I recall they had problems with the Malayans...

Then harry and isolate the Vietcong on the ground so that they have to concentrate upon survival not attack. Fire power is not a substitute for an infantry/intelligence/police war.

True

 

[yulzari]

Correct, though if I recall they had problems with the Malayans...
True

The Malayans were no problem. It was the Chinese communists. Under Chin Peng aka Ong Boon Hua who was appointed to the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work against the Japanese before he turned terrorist.

It was easier in Malaya when his support was principally from only one of the four principal ethnic groups and principally from the urban members at that. Easily isolated and penetrated by Intelligence, forced to withdraw into the jungle and chased around by specialist troops. To be fair taking communist heads by Iban trackers was a bit non PC.

 

[Zipper730]

The Malayans were no problem. It was the Chinese communists. Under Chin Peng aka Ong Boon Hua who was appointed to the Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his work against the Japanese before he turned terrorist.

What's OBE (I've seen it a lot), and why did he turn terrorist?

It was easier in Malaya when his support was principally from only one of the four principal ethnic groups and principally from the urban members at that. Easily isolated and penetrated by Intelligence, forced to withdraw into the jungle and chased around by specialist troops. To be fair taking communist heads by Iban trackers was a bit non PC.

What do you mean not PC?

 

[fubar57]

What's OBE (I've seen it a lot), and why did he turn terrorist?
What do you mean not PC?

GOOGLE

 

[Zipper730]

So it's a type of perage?

 

[Robert Porter]

Good grief yes!

 

[Zipper730]

Okay, back to topic

 

[swampyankee]

It's always fun to blame the UN, but in Korea, it was more the US dragging the UN in than vice versa.

Also, not every military action is a total war against an existential threat. Not intervening in Korea would have been embarrassing, and possibly cause the US be seen as abandoning the world,as it did post-WWI, but there wouldn't have been stalinists taking over Alabama or California, nor would Red Chinese troops be coming ashore in Washington.

Back on topic.

I'm not quite sure where to put the dividing line between tactical and strategic bombing (is attacking the yard where ships are built tactical or strategic? How about the facilities at a naval base?), but I think it's arguable that the USAAF's emphasis on strategic bombardment resulted in a broadly-based tendency to view it as the only tool, instead of part of an armamentarium of methods to bring defeat to an enemy. In the war against Japan, we saw the USN and its allies using a mix of direct combat and strategic warfare -- submarines attacking shipping, for instance -- to defeat Japan. Late in the war, that would have involved direct attacks by USN aircraft on "strategic" targets, like factories or powerplants. Is it "tactical" when it's a dive bomber but strategic if it's a B-29?

 

[Shortround6]

About the only time attacking an aircraft factory is tactical is if your Army is sitting across the street/down the block and the factory building is being used as a defensive position.

Definitions of strategy and tactics (and grand tactics) have changed out of necessity over the years.
For example
"To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops." Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, 1838.

and "...there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy."

Obviously the scale of operations in time and distance from the end of Napoleonic wars to WW II changed considerably with the changes in transportation and communications.

One might argue that bombing the enemy's means of production it strategic or grand strategic. Deciding to bomb airframe factories vs engine factories or oil production might be grand tactics while deciding wither to use low altitude bombers vs high altitude bombers or HE bombs vs incendiaries is a tactical decision.

Now notice the change in meaning of the word tactical between the 1st sentence of this post the the last sentence of the previous paragraph.

I think we often get hung up on the words and don't consider the context or situation.

 

[ChrisMcD]

What's OBE (I've seen it a lot)

"Order of the British Empire" - hence the irony!

Usually taken to be "Other Buggers Efforts"

 

[ChrisMcD]

I know the Brits can be blamed for meddling in most countries that had a seaboard, but I am fairly confident that we had very little to do with Korea!

AFAIK Swampyankee is right that the US dragged the UN into the Korean war. But, it was a question of grasping an opportunity. The Russians had walked out of the security council and their veto power was not invoked at the critical vote.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 - Wikipedia

Also, on Malaya, we just wanted to hand the country back to the majority population with minimal bloodshed after the debacle with the partitioning of India and Pakistan. OK, special circumstances, but we did win a jungle guerrilla war!

 

[Zipper730]

Also, not every military action is a total war against an existential threat.

That was often the problem with independent air-forces... their operations were based often around the idea of total war.

Not intervening in Korea would have been embarrassing, and possibly cause the US be seen as abandoning the world,as it did post-WWI, but there wouldn't have been stalinists taking over Alabama or California, nor would Red Chinese troops be coming ashore in Washington.

Correct -- there are certain wars which we can choose to engage in or not engage in.

I'm not quite sure where to put the dividing line between tactical and strategic bombing

The term came from an inability to describe the type of warfare waged in WWI by Zeppelins and then bombers against cities.

Truthfully when you use the correct definitions of tactical and strategic: There were many bombing raids deemed tactical that might very well have been strategic.

Definitions of strategy and tactics (and grand tactics) have changed out of necessity over the years.
For example
"To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops." Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, 1838.

and "...there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy."

Fascinating.

While this one will be seen as controversial: It seems that there's little an independent air-force can do that an air-arm of an Army or Navy cannot.

"Order of the British Empire" - hence the irony!

Usually taken to be "Other Buggers Efforts"

That's a good one!

AFAIK Swampyankee is right that the US dragged the UN into the Korean war. But, it was a question of grasping an opportunity. The Russians had walked out of the security council and their veto power was not invoked at the critical vote.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 84 - Wikipedia

Also, on Malaya, we just wanted to hand the country back to the majority population with minimal bloodshed after the debacle with the partitioning of India and Pakistan. OK, special circumstances, but we did win a jungle guerrilla war!

Understood

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Why did they not comprehend?

McNamara was a statistics geek. He thought wars could be won by the number of bombs dropped and bodies counted. He and Kennedy and Johnson thought of the war as one country trying to conquer its neighbor, not one people striving to be united under their own government and to kick out the foreign exploiters.

Why?

How the hell would I know?? I'm guessing they (McNamara certainly) were wedded to the concept of cost/benefit analysis and just took for granted everybody else was too. Thus if you could make the cost of invasion too high, you could deter aggression. And with all our high-tech weaponry, that should be no problem, right? The willingness of the Vietnamese to fight on against all odds and withstand staggering losses was incomprehensible to them.

 

[ChrisMcD]

Not to kick a dead horse, but somewhere back early in this long topic someone said a B-29 was hauling a very light bomb load. Something on the order of 6,000 pounds or so. It would take an hour to find it. Not saying anything except the B-29 could haul a LOT of bombs if the situation required it to do so.

I'm with you Greg. Fat Man was only a 10,000 pounder, but they did try out two Grand Slams!

 

[Old Wizard]

 

[Zipper730]

McNamara was a statistics geek. He thought wars could be won by the number of bombs dropped and bodies counted.

Wars don't always work that way, with insurgencies, you are going to want to win hearts and minds. This was not a new concept as the US Marine Corps used counterinsurgency tactics as well as the traditional whoop-ass

He and Kennedy and Johnson thought of the war as one country trying to conquer its neighbor, not one people striving to be united under their own government and to kick out the foreign exploiters.

I'm just surprised they didn't realize that was what was going on.

How the hell would I know?? I'm guessing they (McNamara certainly) were wedded to the concept of cost/benefit analysis and just took for granted everybody else was too.

Some people don't care about losses as long as they get their way.

The willingness of the Vietnamese to fight on against all odds and withstand staggering losses was incomprehensible to them.

They didn't know much about Korea and the Chinese hordes simply absorbing bullets by the thousands and thousands

I'm with you Greg. Fat Man was only a 10,000 pounder, but they did try out two Grand Slams!

I know the Silverplate was modified with only one bomb-bay in lieu of two. Did the B-50's have such an arrangement?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Wars don't always work that way, with insurgencies, you are going to want to win hearts and minds.

How do you quantify "hearts and minds"?? As far as Johnson and McNamara were concerned, if you couldn't put a number on it, it didn't exist. McNamara was a whiz-kid from Detroit who made his chops saving a car company from bankruptcy and leading it to market dominance through the power of statistical analysis.

This was not a new concept as the US Marine Corps used counterinsurgency tactics as well as the traditional whoop-ass.

Counter-insurgency? Uncle Sam's Misguided Children?? Don't make me laugh, it hurts too much!! "NVA's are in that treeline, top of the hill. Frontal assault, CHARGE!"
My ROTC company in college was trained in counter-insurgency operations by our Green Beret Major advisor at a time when Army doctrine and training were all about a tank war in Europe. When the other kids were off watching the football game or going to weekend parties, we were crawling around in the thules doing recon, ambush, booby traps, camouflage, and eating snakes and wild leeks.

I'm just surprised they didn't realize that was what was going on.
Some people don't care about losses as long as they get their way.
They didn't know much about Korea and the Chinese hordes simply absorbing bullets by the thousands and thousands

The Chinese in Korea fit K, J, and M's image of a nation-state committing conventional military aggression against a neighbor. The situation in Vietnam of an insurgency of the people, aided and supplied by the "other half" of the people north of the DMZ just didn't fit into their world-view. They never realized how little support the rank and file citizenry had for our "friends" in the RVN government.