WW2 USN Strategic Bombing Capability
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Old Wizard
2nd Lieutenant
In December 1941, there were Canadian troops in Hong Kong and suffered terribly after the British defeat.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
Even if off topic I'd like to go back to the question about how the Japanese could contemplate trusting Stalin. The short answer is they didn't, and then again.
Think about it, what is the point in negotiating a non aggression pact if you don't trust the power you don't trust to any degree (except hoping the other to trust you and then stab them in the back)? As Stalin (I'm working on memory here) replied when Ribbentropp suggested their non aggression pact to last a 100 years, nobody could take that seriously as they had been involved in the moist acidly propagating against each other, so 10 years seemed more realistic. Anyway, did Hitler then really trust Stalin, and did Stalin really trust Hitler? I think they did in the short term, Barbarossa surely came as a surprise for Stalin, but arguably more the time than the willingness to break the treaty. Good sense would suggest that Great Britain should be out of the war first, and anyway I belong to those that think Stalin believed the Red Army to be stronger than the Wehrmacht. But the longer the 'capitalist' countries could fight each other, the better for USSR.
Though fighting several of the same enemies, Japan and Germany is often seen as conducting parallel wars rather than being allies in the same war. To be sure they did lend each other a hand on occasion, but any extensive real strategic cooperation was lacking. If their only goal was that the axis should win the war, close cooperation may have given them a chance, luckily we'll never know. But both powers went to war without the benefit of hindsight, and both powers had more immediate goals than winning a global conflict. Hitler seem to have hoped for a nice little war against Poland (what clever ruse by Chamberlain, strange conspiracy theorists haven't seized on that one).
Anyway apart from fighting communists, Japan had little to gain from attacking the USSR, and with the oil embargo had to fight for oil (and other critical resources) or not at all, including giving up ambitions in China. How easy it is to forget that Japan was already deeply involved in China and then decided (or at least enough Japanese decided) to fight the USA and their European and pacific friends at the same time. There's also the question whether the Japanese could really trust Hitler with his racial ideology, and Hitler the Japanese, should they ever acquire a common border.
As we all know Japan opted for the desperate (however well planned and executed) lash out at the western powers, and in the short term the peace between Japan and USSR was more or less a given. Some Japanese may have hoped that Stalin would be grateful that Japan didn't stop land lease supply over the pacific, and othervise adhered strictly to their agreement. Counting on Stalins gratitude seem worse than counting on at least a tactical willingness to adhere to formal agreements. But now we get to the Japanese late war hope of getting the USSR to mediate between Japan and the Western powers.
Well, what alternative did they have, short of surrendering unconditionally? Conversely, whet did they have to loose? Anyway they were no more trusting than still keeping a substantial army along the Soviet border, but of course that army was no real match for the by now well bloodied and equipped Red Army. One lesson learned in 39 (and I fully appreciate that neither the USSR or Japan used all available resources, although Zhukov definitely enjoyed a substantially larger amount of support from his central government than his IJA counterpart), was that especially Japanese armor wasn't up to the job. At least going by technical specifications Japanese tanks weren't impressive at any time before and during the war. Given Japans late industrialization and limited population base, it's no surprise they couldn't be in the front of technical development everywhere, and in some areas they did very well indeed.
'Trusting' Stalin in 45 on balance seem like one of the more reasonable gambles by the axis powers during the war. After all, what exactly did they stand to loose that they hadn't lost already? To be sure a large army on the Asian main land, but as observed before in this thread the means of getting the troops to where they could matter (the Japanese home isles) had by and large been lost, as well as pretty much everything else. Japanese leadership had been divided from the beginning, and it's anybody's guess what kind of negotiated peace was, or could be, contemplated. The hopes as they were may well have been as unrealistic as the hope that the western powers wouldn't risk the casualties involved in an invasion, or indeed find a viable alternative to an invasion. (They knew about the possibility of atomic bombs, as one author put it, Japan was the only main power that didn't have an atomic program for the simple reason that it had two, the army's and the navy's). If cynical (or indecisive) enough they could simply have starved them out.
Which gives me a possibility to end on-thread.
Given that the defenders eventually ran out of food and aa shells, naval dive bombers would be a marvelous economical means of destroying worthwhile targets, the main challenge being finding worthwhile targets. Not that economy in material was that big a problem for the USA at this point, but still. What a strategic target is, is partly dependent on context. If there's no more big factories, and in any case no more strategic materials to use in these factories (the aircraft and engines factories destroyed by B-29's and, as luck would have it earthquakes were in any event on the end run because of lack of raw materials). If any industry (and target) is sufficiently spread out and small scale, this could be a strictly (not to say extremely) hypothetical example on continued usefulness of dive bombers. And a suggestion that what may really have made the dive bomber obsolete is the helicopter. To briefly dig into another thread. Anyway it's hard when keeping up with this excellent forum by neccessity becomes a holiday pastime.
Think about it, what is the point in negotiating a non aggression pact if you don't trust the power you don't trust to any degree (except hoping the other to trust you and then stab them in the back)? As Stalin (I'm working on memory here) replied when Ribbentropp suggested their non aggression pact to last a 100 years, nobody could take that seriously as they had been involved in the moist acidly propagating against each other, so 10 years seemed more realistic. Anyway, did Hitler then really trust Stalin, and did Stalin really trust Hitler? I think they did in the short term, Barbarossa surely came as a surprise for Stalin, but arguably more the time than the willingness to break the treaty. Good sense would suggest that Great Britain should be out of the war first, and anyway I belong to those that think Stalin believed the Red Army to be stronger than the Wehrmacht. But the longer the 'capitalist' countries could fight each other, the better for USSR.
Though fighting several of the same enemies, Japan and Germany is often seen as conducting parallel wars rather than being allies in the same war. To be sure they did lend each other a hand on occasion, but any extensive real strategic cooperation was lacking. If their only goal was that the axis should win the war, close cooperation may have given them a chance, luckily we'll never know. But both powers went to war without the benefit of hindsight, and both powers had more immediate goals than winning a global conflict. Hitler seem to have hoped for a nice little war against Poland (what clever ruse by Chamberlain, strange conspiracy theorists haven't seized on that one).
Anyway apart from fighting communists, Japan had little to gain from attacking the USSR, and with the oil embargo had to fight for oil (and other critical resources) or not at all, including giving up ambitions in China. How easy it is to forget that Japan was already deeply involved in China and then decided (or at least enough Japanese decided) to fight the USA and their European and pacific friends at the same time. There's also the question whether the Japanese could really trust Hitler with his racial ideology, and Hitler the Japanese, should they ever acquire a common border.
As we all know Japan opted for the desperate (however well planned and executed) lash out at the western powers, and in the short term the peace between Japan and USSR was more or less a given. Some Japanese may have hoped that Stalin would be grateful that Japan didn't stop land lease supply over the pacific, and othervise adhered strictly to their agreement. Counting on Stalins gratitude seem worse than counting on at least a tactical willingness to adhere to formal agreements. But now we get to the Japanese late war hope of getting the USSR to mediate between Japan and the Western powers.
Well, what alternative did they have, short of surrendering unconditionally? Conversely, whet did they have to loose? Anyway they were no more trusting than still keeping a substantial army along the Soviet border, but of course that army was no real match for the by now well bloodied and equipped Red Army. One lesson learned in 39 (and I fully appreciate that neither the USSR or Japan used all available resources, although Zhukov definitely enjoyed a substantially larger amount of support from his central government than his IJA counterpart), was that especially Japanese armor wasn't up to the job. At least going by technical specifications Japanese tanks weren't impressive at any time before and during the war. Given Japans late industrialization and limited population base, it's no surprise they couldn't be in the front of technical development everywhere, and in some areas they did very well indeed.
'Trusting' Stalin in 45 on balance seem like one of the more reasonable gambles by the axis powers during the war. After all, what exactly did they stand to loose that they hadn't lost already? To be sure a large army on the Asian main land, but as observed before in this thread the means of getting the troops to where they could matter (the Japanese home isles) had by and large been lost, as well as pretty much everything else. Japanese leadership had been divided from the beginning, and it's anybody's guess what kind of negotiated peace was, or could be, contemplated. The hopes as they were may well have been as unrealistic as the hope that the western powers wouldn't risk the casualties involved in an invasion, or indeed find a viable alternative to an invasion. (They knew about the possibility of atomic bombs, as one author put it, Japan was the only main power that didn't have an atomic program for the simple reason that it had two, the army's and the navy's). If cynical (or indecisive) enough they could simply have starved them out.
Which gives me a possibility to end on-thread.
Given that the defenders eventually ran out of food and aa shells, naval dive bombers would be a marvelous economical means of destroying worthwhile targets, the main challenge being finding worthwhile targets. Not that economy in material was that big a problem for the USA at this point, but still. What a strategic target is, is partly dependent on context. If there's no more big factories, and in any case no more strategic materials to use in these factories (the aircraft and engines factories destroyed by B-29's and, as luck would have it earthquakes were in any event on the end run because of lack of raw materials). If any industry (and target) is sufficiently spread out and small scale, this could be a strictly (not to say extremely) hypothetical example on continued usefulness of dive bombers. And a suggestion that what may really have made the dive bomber obsolete is the helicopter. To briefly dig into another thread. Anyway it's hard when keeping up with this excellent forum by neccessity becomes a holiday pastime.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"....did Hitler then really trust Stalin, and did Stalin really trust Hitler? "
The M-R agreement of September, 1939 gave both Stalin and Hitler regional leverage to move towards larger political goals ... and both men knew that each held views and long term objectives that were not mutually compatible. Ending Nomonhan in time so that M-R could be signed with Japan's Axis partners, thus 'fixing' Japan in place, revealed Stalin the chess player .... the man we would see later at Yalta and Potsdam.
The M-R agreement of September, 1939 gave both Stalin and Hitler regional leverage to move towards larger political goals ... and both men knew that each held views and long term objectives that were not mutually compatible. Ending Nomonhan in time so that M-R could be signed with Japan's Axis partners, thus 'fixing' Japan in place, revealed Stalin the chess player .... the man we would see later at Yalta and Potsdam.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
First of all, the defenders had not run out of food. There were shortages and hardships, but they were not laying in the streets dying like the citizens of Stalingrad or Leningrad had been.
There were also no lack of military targets across the home islands. There were shipyards, munitions factories, aircraft assembly plants, military command and communications centers, military supply depots and on and on. Add to that, the Japanese had employed civilians to produce weapons and essential components in a dispersed "cottage factory" scheme, shipping the articles to a central area for assembly.
The Japanese AA remained a potent force to be reckoned with right to the last days of the war and were exacting not only a toll on the Allied bombers, but the Allied fighter sweeps, too.
Add to that, the fact that Japan had relocated all their most modern and potent fighters to the home islands, concentrated "kamakaze" defenses at key locations (both air and naval), stockpiled munitions and supplies and were ready to aggressively repulse any attempt at Allied invasion of home soil.
So to say that Dive Bombers could have just wandered in over Japan proper and picked off targets at their leisure is completely unrealistic - had any actual attempt to do so along the lines that you're suggesting, would have been a complete disaster, even had they done so with a fighter escort.
The helicopter wouldn't see itself as a combat platform until the Korean war and it would even still be another decade before they developed into an effective combat platform.
The only operational helicopters in WWII were:
Focke-Anglis Fa223
Flettner Fl282
Sikorsky R-4
and the IJA's autogyro, the Kayaba Ka-1
And of all of those, only the Fa223 was armed with an MG15 in a defensive nose position. (although the Fa223 and Ka-1 were equipped to drop bombs/depth-charges)
So no, helicopters were not even close to replacing the dive bomber during WWII.
Shortround6
Major General
Helicopters didn't really become viable close support platforms until powered with Turbine engines. The idea came much earlier but the payload/range combination was somewhat lacking with piston engines.
"strategic bombing" by carrier aircraft really wasn't viable until the last few weeks of the war and even then the losses have to be looked at carefully.
"strategic bombing" by carrier aircraft really wasn't viable until the last few weeks of the war and even then the losses have to be looked at carefully.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
Exactly my point, they 'trusted' it not to be broken immediately. and last as long as it was beneficial for both partners. Then again, in 1940 Stalin and Molotow clearly overplayed their hand.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
This goes to both you and GG.
Again I entirely agree. My speculation was an what if, in this case that the war had continued for a year or so. I'm sorry if I didn't make that clear.
Cut off from overseas supplies, Japanese stocks of most kinds were likely to be progressively declining, not only fuel, making the proposal of pin point 'strategic' (note the qualifier) a future possibility. The cost was likely to, on average, go down.
Also to be sure the maturing of the helicopter certainly took even longer time to happen. However, I claim that the dive bombers limitation was connected to survivability (in terms of capability to survive both interception and aa fire) and specialization. Both the Val, the Dauntless and the Stuka (to mention a few) achieved remarkable results, and as platforms for highly accurate delivery of bombs i doubt they were much surpassed by never designs during the war.
Fighter bombers improved survivability, probably at the cost of precision. However they were far more versatile, and given abundance of materiel it made sense to convert fighters which in Europe were running out of targets in the air, or in the pacific was present in an increasing percentage on carrier decks because of the kamikaze threat, to an additional role that made sure available planes and pilots were being utilized more fully. The increased amount of attacks (from more planes than a special build dive bomber) and cumulative effect of more planes surviving a strike, is likely to at least to some extent make up for some loss in precision, and I'm not claiming that fighter bombers couldn't hit anything. Apart from material results is the psychological effect on ground troops being under what may to them seem like contineous attack. Air to surface rockets also seem to have improved results.
In all this I am presuming that a 'true' dive bomber is able to conduct its dive nearly vertical. Of course some confusion arises when different kinds of non horizontal bombing are considered to be dive bombing. How shallow a dive can we allow?. Rule of thump should be that a steeper dive is likely to increase precision (and probably vulnerability). In this I am assuming the Ju 88 as pin point attacker to be in practical terms less efficient than a Stuka but more than fx the Blenheim. As soon as we come to strafing, every fighter have a large inbuild potential.
Conversely the dive bomber was, if not an entirely specialized weapon, less versatile. I believe that the Dauntless being used as fighter was more a question of opportunity than policy. I may be wrong, but the situations I recall is from the pacific battles in 42 with Japanese and American formations passing each other on their respective missions. The Val is said to have been used in the same way on such occasions, I believe non of them were worth that much against fighters, even though any plane with guns shooting forward is likely to send a burst against an overshooting or otherwise 'unlucky' fighter.
What I meant in the helicopter making the dive bomber truly obsolete (not directly replacing it) was that the same kind of precision was achieved if not hugely (depending on the value of 'hugely') surpassed, though surpassed it was. Likewise a helicopter is vulnerable against well defended targets, as they compared to fighters still are sitting ducks (though I doubt even a Skua was ever that easy to down). Other improvements the helicopter offers to a dive bomber is the kind of versatility that comes with its VTOL capability. Aircraft as the A10 of course also springs to mind (and I do admit it wasn't just about to enter service in august 45). And of course the tactics being used by these machines is a world apart from the Stukas near vertical dive.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
Stalin certainly was at Potsdam, but as not being at war with Japan USSR wasn't included in the declaration.
That's was why he was the man to ask (or USSR the country). It was one of the only possibilities still open, however much it was grasping at straws. On the other hand, the initiative hardly could make matters worse, and of course Stalin was going to attack anyway to earn a right to be included in the next talks, even if he was also delivering on an old promise. He got quite busy after Hiroshima, even if the attack was long planned.
Shortround6
Major General
DIve bombing lost a lot of it's appeal as light automatic cannon proliferated. DIve bombing gets it's accuracy from a steady speed (that's what the dive brakes are for) steady course (minor corrections aside) dive lasting thousands of feet with a pull out just high enough to ensure the dive bomber does not hit the ground. Ensuring means that there is hundreds of feet (if not over a thousand) of margin of error. It also keeps the dive bomber out of small arms fire for the most part. This meant that the dive bombers flight path, even after dropping it's bomb/s was rather predictable. As light AA progressed from rifle caliber machine guns on pintle mounts to 12.7-13mm guns and 20-25mm cannon to 37-40mm cannon capable of firing 120-160rpm dive bombing became much more dangerous. The large increase in scale of issue didn't help the dive bomber either. A 5-6 G pull out bleeds off a lot of speed which also doesn't help the dive bombers chances against AA.
Raising the height of the release and pull out helps avoid the lighter AA and reduces the firing time and accuracy of the bigger stuff (big being the 37-40mm) but also reduces the accuracy of the bombs.
Most of the dive bombers successes were early in the war against light AA although even then the handwriting was on the wall. Allied attempts to bomb the German bridges/bridgeheads in France for instance even though not true dive bombing attacks.
Against high value targets the risk was thought to be worth the gain (how many dive bombers lost for an enemy carrier or cruiser or bridge) but as a general army support weapon it was losing ground. How many aircraft lost for a road junction that could be driven around in short order? Or suppressing an artillery battery for a short period of time (destroying the guns took almost a direct hit).
Trading aircraft for trucks was losing game unless the losses were really lopsided.
Different countries often viewed the aircraft differently. The Dauntless was an "SBD" SCOUT BOMBER. Not a "BSD" bomber scout.
It could perform long range recon/search missions carrying max fuel, it could perform "armed reconnaissance" carrying a 500lb bomb with a bit less fuel (less range) and could perform strike missions with 1000lb bombs or multiple bombs at even shorter distances. Heavier loads came later and the really large bomb loads listed in some sources should be take with a large dose of salt. Possible but range/radius is likely to be minimal.
The VAL had similar duties, the JU 87 did not.
Use of dive bombers as fighters was due to desperation and positive results depended a lot on luck and circumstances. The few times Dauntless were actually launched with the idea of flying patrols instead of firing at targets of opportunity it was as anti-torpedo plane patrols which obviously limited the altitude and speed of the intended targets (Kates).
The Helicopter as a true attack platform (and not just a few MGs strapped to it or firing out the door) was 10-15 years after the dive bomber went out of favor. (Skyraiders aside and they weren't true dive bombers). They also required a new generation of rockets and guided missiles to become effective (stand off weapons) instead of iron bombs.
Raising the height of the release and pull out helps avoid the lighter AA and reduces the firing time and accuracy of the bigger stuff (big being the 37-40mm) but also reduces the accuracy of the bombs.
Most of the dive bombers successes were early in the war against light AA although even then the handwriting was on the wall. Allied attempts to bomb the German bridges/bridgeheads in France for instance even though not true dive bombing attacks.
Against high value targets the risk was thought to be worth the gain (how many dive bombers lost for an enemy carrier or cruiser or bridge) but as a general army support weapon it was losing ground. How many aircraft lost for a road junction that could be driven around in short order? Or suppressing an artillery battery for a short period of time (destroying the guns took almost a direct hit).
Trading aircraft for trucks was losing game unless the losses were really lopsided.
Different countries often viewed the aircraft differently. The Dauntless was an "SBD" SCOUT BOMBER. Not a "BSD" bomber scout.
It could perform long range recon/search missions carrying max fuel, it could perform "armed reconnaissance" carrying a 500lb bomb with a bit less fuel (less range) and could perform strike missions with 1000lb bombs or multiple bombs at even shorter distances. Heavier loads came later and the really large bomb loads listed in some sources should be take with a large dose of salt. Possible but range/radius is likely to be minimal.
The VAL had similar duties, the JU 87 did not.
Use of dive bombers as fighters was due to desperation and positive results depended a lot on luck and circumstances. The few times Dauntless were actually launched with the idea of flying patrols instead of firing at targets of opportunity it was as anti-torpedo plane patrols which obviously limited the altitude and speed of the intended targets (Kates).
The Helicopter as a true attack platform (and not just a few MGs strapped to it or firing out the door) was 10-15 years after the dive bomber went out of favor. (Skyraiders aside and they weren't true dive bombers). They also required a new generation of rockets and guided missiles to become effective (stand off weapons) instead of iron bombs.
How could Japanese leaders know such hindsight as you mention in above ever without spies there ?
No name of Soviet Union in the declaration simply meant Soviet Union was still neutral.
Therefore they trusted Stalin on mediation for the peace talk with the allies.
For your satisfaction, Just Schmidt,
The "they" meant Kantaro Suzuki and Fumimaro Konoe who were closer to Emperor Hirohito.
The army regarded them suckers but no ways as being defeated in the war.
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Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
There's lot I could blame the Japanese leadership for, but I'm not blaming them for trying an option seemingly open to them. It made sense. Im not a native English speaker either, and I'm sorry if i don't always succeed in making my points clear. And of course they couldn't be sure of Stalins intentions. Few people could at any time.
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
Our msg's crossed each other. I'm sorry for the off topic part, what i was commenting was someone (in this tread) asked how the Japanese leadership could trust Stalin. I commented that it was probably not so much a matter of trust (but maybe hope), but of exploring any possible option. And observed that the cost of failure connected with this initiative was extremely small, as Stalin would have launched the Red army at Manchuria anyway.
