WW2 USN Strategic Bombing Capability

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Shin, you inquired about Canadians in China, and I only just saw your inquiry . :) Other than seamen who may have served on New England Yankee Clippers ... I don't think Canadians were trading with China ... Chinese items would have come to Canada as trade with Britain.

However, one Canadian who is a national hero and revered in China is Communist Doctor Norman Bethune.
Norman Bethune - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Seen here in China in 1939. Interesting read.
Norman_Bethune_China_1938.jpg
 
Anyone of that era who thought Stalin would be neutral at Potsdam, because he was the host, would have to be extremely naïve, or under the influence of wishful thinking..
 
Shin, you inquired about Canadians in China, and I only just saw your inquiry . :) Other than seamen who may have served on New England Yankee Clippers ... I don't think Canadians were trading with China ... Chinese items would have come to Canada as trade with Britain.

However, one Canadian who is a national hero and revered in China is Communist Doctor Norman Bethune.
Norman Bethune - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Seen here in China in 1939. Interesting read.
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I've just read the article.
I wonder how many people know about him today.
Thank you very much for your precious information.
 
Anyone of that era who thought Stalin would be neutral at Potsdam, because he was the host, would have to be extremely naïve, or under the influence of wishful thinking..

A person who owns accurate knowledge about the past is irreplaceable.
Please take care of your health and keep enlightening people as longer as possible, tyrodtom.
 
This goes to both you and GG.

Again I entirely agree. My speculation was an what if, in this case that the war had continued for a year or so. I'm sorry if I didn't make that clear.

Cut off from overseas supplies, Japanese stocks of most kinds were likely to be progressively declining, not only fuel, making the proposal of pin point 'strategic' (note the qualifier) a future possibility. The cost was likely to, on average, go down.
Again, the Japanese were ready to go the distance - every soldier, airman and sailor. Every man, woman and child.
They were prepared to sacrifice themselves to the end. Dwindling food stocks, lack of home heating or cooking fuel, any of that was all part of the sacrifice, right down to meeting the Allied invaders on the beach armed with sharp sticks.

Also to be sure the maturing of the helicopter certainly took even longer time to happen. However, I claim that the dive bombers limitation was connected to survivability (in terms of capability to survive both interception and aa fire) and specialization. Both the Val, the Dauntless and the Stuka (to mention a few) achieved remarkable results, and as platforms for highly accurate delivery of bombs i doubt they were much surpassed by never designs during the war.
As has been mentioned earlier, the Divebomber was no longer a viable option as anti-aircraft weapons improved during the war. Sending in TBM/TBF Divebombers against Japanese targets, whether inland or coastal, would have been a suicide mission. The Japanese had solid AA defenses and advanced fighters on the homeland and would have used them to devestating effect against Divebombers. Keep in mind that the second atomic bombing mission "nearly" got intercepted. This was in the closing weeks of the war.

Fighter bombers improved survivability, probably at the cost of precision. However they were far more versatile, and given abundance of materiel it made sense to convert fighters which in Europe were running out of targets in the air, or in the pacific was present in an increasing percentage on carrier decks because of the kamikaze threat, to an additional role that made sure available planes and pilots were being utilized more fully. The increased amount of attacks (from more planes than a special build dive bomber) and cumulative effect of more planes surviving a strike, is likely to at least to some extent make up for some loss in precision, and I'm not claiming that fighter bombers couldn't hit anything. Apart from material results is the psychological effect on ground troops being under what may to them seem like contineous attack. Air to surface rockets also seem to have improved results.
There were many types available late in the war, used to good effect against Japanese targets. These would be most U.S. Naval types (F4U, F6F, etc.), U.S. Army types (P-51, P-47, etc.) and the medium bombers like the A-26, B-25 and B-26 - add to that, the gunship varients of the A-26 and B-25 that could lay down devestating firepower against shipping, structures and troop concentrations. The advantage of the types I mentioned above, is that they were fast, hard-hitting and presented a difficult target against defenders.

In all this I am presuming that a 'true' dive bomber is able to conduct its dive nearly vertical. Of course some confusion arises when different kinds of non horizontal bombing are considered to be dive bombing. How shallow a dive can we allow?. Rule of thump should be that a steeper dive is likely to increase precision (and probably vulnerability). In this I am assuming the Ju 88 as pin point attacker to be in practical terms less efficient than a Stuka but more than fx the Blenheim. As soon as we come to strafing, every fighter have a large inbuild potential.
The Ju87 was one of the few truly vertical Divebombers, but even with that ability, it did not prevent defensive AA from shooting them down. The SBD was a solid diver at close to 70 degrees, but again, not invincible to defensive fire.
As has been mentioned, a Divebomber aquires it's target from altitude, deployes it's brakes and goes into it's dive. The length of the dive, the consistant speed and subsequent pullout make it an easy target for defenders.

Conversely the dive bomber was, if not an entirely specialized weapon, less versatile. I believe that the Dauntless being used as fighter was more a question of opportunity than policy. I may be wrong, but the situations I recall is from the pacific battles in 42 with Japanese and American formations passing each other on their respective missions. The Val is said to have been used in the same way on such occasions, I believe non of them were worth that much against fighters, even though any plane with guns shooting forward is likely to send a burst against an overshooting or otherwise 'unlucky' fighter.
The SBD was designed and built at a time when Scouting aircraft were the "eyes" of the fleet - it was a multi-purpose aircraft and was certainly more capable of defending itself from enemy fighters than most dedicated Divebombers.

What I meant in the helicopter making the dive bomber truly obsolete (not directly replacing it) was that the same kind of precision was achieved if not hugely (depending on the value of 'hugely') surpassed, though surpassed it was. Likewise a helicopter is vulnerable against well defended targets, as they compared to fighters still are sitting ducks (though I doubt even a Skua was ever that easy to down). Other improvements the helicopter offers to a dive bomber is the kind of versatility that comes with its VTOL capability. Aircraft as the A10 of course also springs to mind (and I do admit it wasn't just about to enter service in august 45). And of course the tactics being used by these machines is a world apart from the Stukas near vertical dive.
The helicopters of that time period were slow, clumsy and powered by piston engines. It would not be until the 1960's, when next generation jet engines proved to be a far better means of powering helicopters - this in turn allowed them to become a formidible battlefield component. But again, this wouldn't be until the 1960's.

There were far more STOL aircraft used in a ground attack capacity during WWII than helicopters and it pretty much would remain that way until the Vietnam war.

As for the "A10" reference, I think you meant the Douglas A-1 Skyraider?
 
As for the "A10" reference, I think you meant the Douglas A-1 Skyraider?[/QUOTE]
Grau Geist I said I believed you to be right, and I'll stand by that.

Let me reiterate that I never claimed helicopters to be used in tactical capacity during the war. I meant the kind of precision achievable by dive bombers wasn't achieved again before helicopters were able to do the job even better ( in quite different ways and long after the war). They really are relatively vulnerable too. The delivering one bomb on a small hard target in a surgical strike was largely abandoned altogether. A lot of bombs dropped with less precision could (statistically) do the same, and you mention the airplanes that were there to do it. For strafing, to name one example, fighterbombers and dedicated ground attack aircraft (and other aircraft packed with extra guns) were better than most dive bombers, if not all.

I was of course wrong that remarkable precision wasn't achievable by other means. Remotely controlled bombs (not sure if I get the term right) was first used on the surrendering Italian fleet in 43, if memory serves, though later models became increasingly sofisticated and probably will improve even further. Though the V-1 (Fi 103) can be seen as the first cruise missile, it can hardly be called accurate. I get the impression the modern ones can be quite accurate, and therefore the helicopter is only one of several bids for solutions to the same problem. A long time after.
It was also in that vein I thought about the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt. More a dedicated ground attack aircraft I'll grant, but with emphasis on effective delivery rather than ability to avoid damage from ground based defense systems. All weapons systems are compromises.

As for facing an invasion with pointed sticks, I believe a great many Japanese soldiers would have done it. However (and mind you not already in fall 45) starving people wields sticks less efficiently, and people already starved to death dosn't at all. But I can't say with confidence that japan could have been starved into unconditional surrender.
 
From an operational standpoint, I think B-29s on Attu would have been a disaster. Heavy weights, high landing speeds, short slippery runways with obstacles at the ends and no precision instrument approach system. Venturas and Harpoons are far more nimble airplanes than B-29s, which is hugely important if you have to fly a non-precision instrument approach in the fog into a short runway in mountainous terrain. Been there, done that. Piece of cake in a 1900 or a 99 or a King Air. Whole different animal in a Herc, a P-3, or any of the four engine piston pounders. It's all about weight, speed, turning radius, and climb gradient on the departure or the missed approach.
A very interesting thread, gentlemen! I am new to the forum, and with your permission, would like to add a couple of facts: B-29s, indeed, would be a disaster to operate from Attu with its mountains and short runways. This is why an airfield at flat neighboring island of Shemya was built, specifically to accommodate B-29s to support invasion from the North (Operation "Keelblocks"). (BTW, it still remains the only major operational airfield in the Western Aleutians). However, as it was rightfully noted, the range of B-29s was not enough to fly much farther than Hokkaido. So, the Americans kept asking Stalin for base rights in Kamchatka and Soviet Primorye for refueling. But since Uncle Joe was quite firm not to break neutrality with Japan, the plans to use B-29s were abandoned by the end of summer 1944. Plans of invasion were re-written in the summer 1944 (Operation "Keelblocks II") with the thoughts to bypass Shimushu and Paramushiro, and build an airfield suitable for B-29s on Matsuwa Island in the Central Kuriles. This would still require use of Soviet bases. But by December 1944, with advances in the South Pacific, the whole idea of invasion from the North was abandoned, and plans were revised again (Operation "Keelblocks III") It would be a scaled-down operation to provide the air and naval support to the Soviet troops in their attack on Japan using the port and the airfield in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. We all know the rest. Some more info on the subject: North Pacific Skies
 
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Also, if I may suggest, there are two excellent books on what has been discussed above:
 

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As bad as it sounds, the politicians did not allow the US to win - look at the both wars and the US fought with both arms tied behind its back.
I'm confused, I didn't know there was anywhere near as much restraint in Korea as Vietnam.

As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things): Sure we could have bombed every city into fiery ruin without even dropping a nuke with our B-52's and probably a great number of fighter bombers.

The Japanese had solid AA defenses and advanced fighters on the homeland and would have used them to devestating effect against Divebombers.
What altitudes could the AAA go up to?
Keep in mind that the second atomic bombing mission "nearly" got intercepted. This was in the closing weeks of the war.
Can you give me more detail?
The SBD was designed and built at a time when Scouting aircraft were the "eyes" of the fleet - it was a multi-purpose aircraft and was certainly more capable of defending itself from enemy fighters than most dedicated Divebombers.
So it was supposed to be carrier recon?
 
I'm confused, I didn't know there was anywhere near as much restraint in Korea as Vietnam.

As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things): Sure we could have bombed every city into fiery ruin without even dropping a nuke with our B-52's and probably a great number of fighter bombers.
I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure. It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.

Enter French Indo-China (aka Vietnam). It was Ho Chi-Minh, who was trained as a guerilla fighter against the Japanese, that turned on the French as they tried to recover control over their former Colony, that ignited the Vietnam War.

In both cases, the U.S. was drug into the conflicts because of ties to Allies and the U.N. but because of politics (and perpetual U.N. passive mediations), was limited in the amount of force needed to suppress the enemy.
Case in Point: the USS New Jersey was recalled after hammering the eff out of North Korean positions, because the North Koreans complained to the U.N. and it was determined that the Jersey was "unfair & unconventional" and demanded that she had to be withdrawn.

In both cases, the U.S. should NOT have been there, it wasn't our problem and it wasn't our fight, but obligations to Allies and the U.N. was the black hole that sucked us in.

I'll leave it at that, and Joe can expand on it if he likes, but you get the picture.

What altitudes could the AAA go up to?
While Japanese AA was not as concerted as German AA, it was still very capable.
They had several layout patterns for their installations and these would include a blend of types: 75mm, 105mm, 120mm and 155mm.

That were able to easily reach altitudes of 26 to 30,000 feet and there were many reports from B-17 and B-29 crews that verified that Japanese AA was reaching their altitudes of 32,000 feet and even witnessed bursts as high as 36,000 feet.
I should add that the AA batteries were also protected by a perimeter of 7mm and 13mm MGs as well as 20mm and 25mm pom-pom to protect the batteries from low altitude attack.

Can you give me more detail?
Shinpachi gave the account and it's been a long time since the discussion, but in summary, there was a lone patrol on the morning of the Nagasaki mission. The pilot (Shinpachi has his name and Sentai info) spotted the B-29 and thought it to be an American recon mission (there was actually several B-29s per Atomic mission) and disregarded it. However, he was at altitude and in a position where he could have intercepted the unescorted B-29s as they turned towards Nagasaki.

But as luck would have it...

So it was supposed to be carrier recon?
Any USN aircraft that had the prefix "S" was intended for Scouting duties as one of their primary missions.

Curtiss SOC-3 for example, shows it's primary mission is Scouting.

The Douglas SBD was a Scouting Bomber and while it was designed as a Dive-Bomber, it's designed purpose was an armed Scout.

In those, the scouts were the eyes of the fleet, no matter who had radar and who did not.
 
I'll comment on this, even thought it was in response to FlyBoyJ...
The U.S. was involved in Korea because of the French and British failure to re-establish authority over former colonies at the conclusion of WWII. It was such a bad situation, that they actually remobilized the Japanese in several precincts, as the Japanese already had established infrastructure. It was actually Japanese troops that saw the first part of armed conflict as the situation in Korea deteriorated and then the situation escalated into the Korean war.
...

Dave - French and British can be accused of this or that, but Korea was not within either countrie's sphere of influence, let alone a former colony of those countries. Korea was a place where Russian/Soviet, Chinese and Japanese influences over-lapped, many times the Koreans drawing a short straw in the process.
 
I'm confused, I didn't know there was anywhere near as much restraint in Korea as Vietnam.

As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things): Sure we could have bombed every city into fiery ruin without even dropping a nuke with our B-52's and probably a great number of fighter bombers.
Can you give me more detail?
So it was supposed to be carrier recon?
The big worry in Korea, especially after the Chinese jumped in, was that the Soviet Union would get directly involved and escalate a regional conflict into World War lll. We had abruptly demobilized after War ll, and had neither the preparation nor the stomach for another big one.
In Vietnam, Kennedy, Johnson, and especially McNamara started out helping a (not very worthy) ally stem what they thought was a minor insurgency, and just couldn't comprehend the facts on the ground and the level of commitment of the Vietnamese people to unification. They clung to the illusion that by manipulating military actions and diplomatic initiatives they could discourage the North from their unification campaign.
The Dauntless was spec-ed and designed at a time when there weren't a lot of long range patrol options available to the fleet. PBY-class aircraft were just coming into being, and battleships and cruisers each had a couple of seaplanes, but a carrier's flock of scout bombers were the backbone of the fleet's search capabilities.
Cheers
Wes
 
I think the USN had always thought of its aircraft as multi-mission platforms, possibly more so than the USAAC, as carriers were more limited in what they could carry than land bases. The USN did have a shot at scout-fighters, in the Grumman SF, and one wonders how that would have played out had the navy continued that into the monoplane world. Reportedly, the SF gave very little performance away compared to the F2F, and a two-seat, high performance aircraft would have been an interesting basis for a night fighter
 
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Grumman-FF-2-Goblin.jpg

Given the amount of drag this thing had, the 2nd cockpit wasn't that big a deal. Difference between the FF-1 and the SF-1 was pretty much equipment in the cockpit/s.
It did evolve to a scout bomber version
Scan01-19-080026.jpg

but Curtiss got the contract.
 
As for Vietnam, it's my opinion that we should have never been there as the British told us it'd fail (and they had experience with such things)

The advice, allegedly, was more along the lines of 'first change the government of South Vietnam into something that the people might support'. Regime change was a traditional British strategy as a cheaper way to achieve goals and with less casualties. Then harry and isolate the Vietcong on the ground so that they have to concentrate upon survival not attack. Fire power is not a substitute for an infantry/intelligence/police war.
 
The advice, allegedly, was more along the lines of 'first change the government of South Vietnam into something that the people might support'. Ngo Dinh Diem, Nguyen Cao Ki, "Big Minh": we just never could get that regime change thing right.


Fire power is not a substitute for an infantry/intelligence/police war.

The day we acknowledged the failure of the special forces war and started sending in poorly trained, scared shitless draftees, our goose was cooked.
Cheers,
Wes
 

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