WWII air war myths

RAF Fighter Command was outnumbered during the BoB.
In fact the reverse was true.

Britain was worried about invasion during 1940.
So worried they shipped an armored brigade from England to Egypt during August 1940.

stona said:

The quote from an American officer I posted above was from one of the four man team that delivered "Purple" to Bletchley Park. He doesn't sound that unhappy.

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Other elements in US intel were not happy, drawing and notes about Enigma machines v actual Purple machine(s and Red machines and various code books produced for various other Japanese codes) given to the British. But it was all worked out eventually. This is discussed in Blair's "Silent Victory" among other sources.

But, let's just be sure we're all on the right page about one thing: Enigma had nothing, zero, to do with reading Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese didn't use any Enigma method at the time. The Purple machine was a device to decode a different type of code. Later, from ca. 1943 the Japanese and Germans began using the Enigma T machine to communicate with each other, and it was eventually used on a limited basis late in the war for intra-Japanese diplomatic and other traffic. But it was also different from the German service Enigma machine and code, and wasn't intercepted enough for the Allies to have enough material to work with to keep up with the machine settings and procedures and actually read it, even though actual German Enigma T machines were captured in France in 1944.

Joe

RAF Fighter Command was outnumbered during the BoB.
In fact the reverse was true.

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Do you have a source for this? Are you talking fighter vs fighter or fighter vs the LW?

WWII Data Book by John Ellis pg 232

(Luftflotte 2 and 3 only for LW. Numbers for LW are actual strength - only about 50% were servicable)

6 July 1940
RAF S/E fighters...................................... 644
RAF S/E in storage- immediately available.....373
RAF S/E in storage - delayed available.........181
LW S/E fighters.......................................760
LW T/E fighters.......................................220
LW Dive bombers.....................................280
LW bombers...........................................1200
RAF = 1198 LW = 1230

10 August 1940
RAF S/E fighters...................................... 708
RAF S/E in storage- immediately available.....336
RAF S/E in storage - delayed available.........267
LW S/E fighters.......................................805
LW T/E fighters.......................................224
LW Dive bombers.....................................261
LW bombers...........................................998
RAF = 1311 LW = 1143

7 September 1940
RAF S/E fighters...................................... 746
RAF S/E in storage- immediately available.....194
RAF S/E in storage - delayed available.........196
LW S/E fighters.......................................623
LW T/E fighters.......................................129
LW Dive bombers.....................................180
LW bombers...........................................772
RAF = 1136 LW = 853

I split the LW totals by half for serviceability as stated in the book but other charts within the book show closer to 75% serviceability. But are we adding the a/c in storage not immediately available? Lots of variables but I would say that at least for the first 2 months the LW did have an advantage in machines over the RAF.

I've never read "Doornob 5-2" but I've heard there were some doozies in there. Maybe someone knows.

Early on, somebody asked me about the P-38 incident at Iceland. I have mentioned this in a couple of other threads, including one exclusively dealing with it. The myth aspect is the timing-- the often repeated myth is that it occurred 12-8-1941, when in fact it was in August of 1942. A vast and significant difference when you consider the timing of the U.S. entry into war. Several books claim the Fw 200 was shot down within hours or minutes of the declaration of war. Simply isn't so.

Edgar: I read books, you read books. Who's are right?

Can tell you the first time I read of 'The bomb' - as I recall it being written Steve - was in 'Bodyguard of Lies' by Anthony Cave Brown. If any misquotes on my part, it's due to remembering back 18 years to the last time I saw most of my books. Pardon, such is the travelling life.

Evan

The raw numbers are pretty irrelevant during the BoB.
The Luftwaffe committed three "airfleets",a significant proportion of its total strength to the attack on Britain. This was opposed,with a few noteable exceptions,almost exclusively by one of Fighter Commands Groups,11 Group. This,combined with the British tactics of meeting raids with limited resources,keeping a reserve(again with at least one famous exception) meant that over Southern England and the Channel the RAF fighters were almost invariably out numbered.

Njaco's 50% serviceability for all Luftwaffe aircraft is a little pessimistic for the BoB period,the average was a little higher.
It is also worth remembering that whilst single engined fighter pilots remained at an operational ready rate above 80% from July to August 1940 until plummeting to a mere 60% in September the operational ready rate for bomber crews was down to 75% by July and had fallen to 59% by September.

These dramatic falls followed "Adlertag",13 August 1940. In the week following Adlertag the Luftwaffe wrote off 284 aircraft. That is 7% of its total force structure or 10% of aircraft deployed against Britain.
In the whole month of August it wrote off 774 aircraft or 18.5% of all aircraft available at the beginning of the month. Losses of aircrew this month were disproportianately high as most combat was over enemy territory.
216 killed
13 captured
80 injured
264 missing
It doesn't matter how many aircraft you have if there is noone to fly them. The RAF had the same problem.

Whoever had the most aircraft in a particular place at a particular time this,August 1940,was when the Luftwaffe was comprehensively defeated for the first time.

Cheers

Steve

13 Aug 40

Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
42 1/3 Kampfgruppen 1482 1008 > 68%
9 Stukagruppen 365 286 > 78%
1 Schlachtgruppe 39 31 > 79%
26 Jagdgruppen 976 853 > 87%
9 Zerstrergruppen 244 189 > 77%
3 Nachtjagdgruppen 91 59 > 65%
14 Seefliegerstaffeln 240 125 > 52%

Overall > 72%

7 Sept 1940

Strength Summary
Number Type Strength Svcble
43 Kampfgruppen 1291 798 > 62%
4 Stukagruppen 174 133 > 76%
2 Schlachtgruppe 59 44 > 75%
27 Jagdgruppen 831 658 > 79%
8 Zerstörergruppen 206 112 > 54%
18 Fernaufklärungsstaffeln 191 123 > 64%
6 Seefliegerstaffeln 52 33 > 63%

Overall > 68%

Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

RAF 10 Group - 5 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 squadrons of Spitfires
RAF 11 Group - 14 squadrons of Hurricanes, 7 squadrons of Spitfires
RAF 12 Group - 7 squadrons of Hurricanes, 6 squadrons of Spitfires
RAF 13 Group - 7 squadrons of Hurricanes, 2 squadrons of Spitfires

So basically there was 21 squadrons of fighters (11 Group) opposing the Lw with some additional squadrons from 10 and 12 groups helping out.

oldcrowcv63 said:

Ahhhh! glad you asked!
2. the very legitimate sacrifice, for which the TBDs rarely receive credit, was keeping the IJN carriers manuevering to avoid them. Without being able to consistently point into the wind, the carriers launch and recovery ops were limited.

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This is very true but I do think it should be expanded on to show the importance of the events that led up to the final destruction of the Japanese carriers. I think a time line, from "Shattered Sword" is revealing. Time line is a bit approximate.

0710 - 0725 Attack from Midway. Six Navy/Marine TBF Avengers and four Army B-26s attack the Akagi and Hiryu. Five TBFs and two B-26s were shot down but several torpedoes were dropped. One B-26 flew over the Akagi straffing and one B-26 apparently tried to ram the Akagi before it crashed, missing Nagumo by an estimated 10 ft. One Avenger and one B-26 shot down a Zero each. The Japanese were impressed by the attackers courage but not their expertise, dropping their torpedoes too far out. No damage was done.

0753-0835 Midway SBD and B-17s attack the Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu. Poor training of Marines prevent any damage being done by the SBDs and again B-17 were not effective, this time bombing from an even higher altitude. Losses to the SBDs was high.

0918 VT-8 commences attack and the rest is history.

It is important to note that, while the earlier attacks were pretty well shot up and not physically damaging, their effects on the Japanese operational timeline was critical. When the carriers were twisting and turning to avoid torpedoes, dive bombers and B-17s, they could not refuel aircraft, rearm aircraft, move aircraft from the hanger deck to the flight deck and vice versa, nor launch and retrieve aircraft. From 0710 to 0918, and taking into account delays in coming back up to speed after an attack, the Japanese had perhaps 50-55 minutes of unmolested operational time. In addition, the Japanese practice of rearming and refueling aircraft on the hanger deck instead of the flight deck as the Americans did meant time preparing aircraft and positioning them for launch was excessive. For two hours before VT-8 attacked, a large amount of Japanese flight operations was paralized. Throw into that the almost three hours of constant combat by the Japanese fighters and you have a pretty good picture of the situation before the SBDs began their bomb runs.

While these early attacks are often overlooked and dismissed, and certainly overshadowed by the historic attack by the SBDs, these incredibly brave and sacrificing airmen deserve more than just a footnote to one of the most important naval battles in history.

Milosh said:

So basically there was 21 squadrons of fighters (11 Group) opposing the Lw with some additional squadrons from 10 and 12 groups helping out.

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Exactly so. Rarely were they all committed at any one time.
10 Group covered the South West and both squadrons and personell were rotated to 11 Group. 12 Group was more directly involved most famously on the rare occassions that Mallory/Bader's "Big Wing" actually managed to assemble and get in position to do something useful.
Cheers
Steve

Myth: The Sherman tank caught fire easily because it used gasoline rather than diesel.

Most of the fires in Sherman tanks were caused by hits that ignited shell propellant. The practice was to store ammunition in the turrets and that is what caused most fires. When they kept shells out of the turret and used storage that had armour protection with water / glycol surrounding it,the fires went down something like 85%. The fact that the German practice was to keep hitting the Sherman with shells until it caught fire so the Allies couldn't repair the vehicle didn't help. Most German tanks used gasoline and the T-34 used diesel and they would also catch fire. I haven't read any accounts of the diesel powered Shermans that the US marines used in the Pacific faring any better than the gasoline counterparts...

I'm sorry. My reply had nothing that related to AIR myths. My apologies.

stona said:

Exactly so. Rarely were they all committed at any one time.
Steve

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The same is true for the LW unit.
So or we measured strenght in each air battle and after this we can tell what air force was outnumbered. or we take all the unit involved in the Campaign (BoB) and tell what air force was outnumbered in the deployemet strenght.

If RAF squadrons rotate and gruppen not maybe this came from different air force structure, the LW gruppen are a larger unit of RAF squadron so maybe that the rotation was within the gruppen and not between the gruppen.

Dav, Great summary and a very good point. The USMC SBDs apparently came very close to scoring a Glide-bombing hit on one of the IJN CVs, a matter of a few meters as I recall. How different might the outcome have been if the F2As were sent as escorts as originally planned. Might the reputation of the F2A-3's been somewhat redeemed by THEIR worthy sacrifice? They surely would have had their hands full with the strong defending IJN CAP, but perhaps might have provided that often narrow difference between a hit and a miss.

Vincenzo said:

The same is true for the LW unit.

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The Luftwaffe committed three "Luftflotten" to the campaign against Britain,though Luftflotte 2 was tasked with London and the South East. All the aircraft of all three fleets were certainly not committed at the same time. Luftflotte 5 made its one major attack on August 15th and got its arse kicked. Dowding had not transferred his fighters South and 13 Group was ready for them. Generaloberst Stumpff,in command of Luftflotte 5,would soon have to transfer his fighters to Luftflotte 2.
Nonetheless there were occassions when more than 1,000 German aircraft crossed the Channel,hugely out numbering the RAF's defenders,principally from 11 Group.
Cheers
Steve

stona said:

Nonetheless there were occassions when more than 1,000 German aircraft crossed the Channel,hugely out numbering the RAF's defenders,principally from 11 Group.

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This gets back to what was asked previously in response to somebody saying the *LW* was outnumbered. Just a matter of counting things, it's factually true to say, for if example 1300 bombers escorted by 800 fighters and intercepted by 800 opposing fighters, that the interceptors are outnumbered 2100/800. But that's certainly not equivalent to a fighter sweep by 210 fighters intercepted by 80 fighters.

As a general rule the force on offense *has* to have superior numbers of fighters *plus* bombers to the opposing interceptor force or its operations will be put to an end very quickly, save tremendous qualitative superiority of its fighters.

In very rough terms, per numbers in posts above from standard sources, the Germans committed comparable to inferior numbers of single engine fighters in the BoB, depending on the vagaries of stored reserve v. unsericeable a/c, plus a number of other a/c that doubled or more the total. Of course interceptors must worry always about shooting down bombers not just fighter combat. OTOH in this particular situation the escorts had poor fuel persistance over the targets, a very key factor. That seems clear from the lower kill ratio 109's scored against RAF fighters in BOB than in fighter sweeps back over France later on, or for that matter in most other other campaign of the first 3 years or so of the war. Even in the supposedly 'advantageous' position as escorts in BoB 109's had perhaps less than 2:1 kill ratio v RAF fighters, but equal or greater to 2 in most other campaigns through 1942, often substantially more than 2.

As you allude to, another factor is how the two forces are deployed, but it's not really 'numerical inferiority' in any kind of warfare, land sea or air, if one side the other or both doesn't optimally deploy their forces. That's part of leadership quality.

In summary I don't see a simple 'myth' either way about RAF v LW numbers in BoB. To make real sense of numbers you have take into account a lot of other factors, and there legitimate differences of opinion emerge.

Joe

I am referring to fighter aircraft sorties over England during the summer and fall of 1940.

Not sure how bomber sorties match up. However if we include all of 1940 then RAF Bomber Command almost certainly put more bomber sorties over Europe then the Luftwaffe put over England.

I believe you were talking about the BoB which wasn't a strictly fighter vs fighter campaign. You must include bombers and T/E fighters (that is what they were used for at that point in the war). That being said, JoeB's point about numbers and variables is so true. There are far too many factors involved to just say "Air Force A was outnumbered by Air Force B".

My personal opinion is that the RAF was outnumbered at least through the early months and then a possible parity or even superiority occurred for the RAF towards the later months.

davebender said:

Not sure how bomber sorties match up. However if we include all of 1940 then RAF Bomber Command almost certainly put more bomber sorties over Europe then the Luftwaffe put over England.

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Possibly, but that is not apples to apples, since Germany's forces were focused against France and other countries during the first half of 1940. You would have to compile all of the Allied powers vs. all of the Axis powers on the western and north-western fronts for the year, and even then its hard to draw a comparison because it is just not apples to apples. However, a more telling statistic would be bomber sorties for Germany and England during the BoB months.

I was under the impression, from various sources, that Bomber Command sorties were far fewer than the KG sorties for all of 1940, however.

The BoB is generally understood as an offensive campaign fought by the Luftwaffe using bombers and escorting fighters and a defensive battle fought by the RAF's Fighter Command. What Bomber Command was up to in 1940 is not really relevant to the battle.

I would dispute the contention that the total numbers of aircraft available is relevant to the battle either. The battle was principally fought over the Channel and South Eastern England. On the rare occassions when the Luftwaffe attacked the Midlands and the North Dowdings decision to retain his other Groups,at something approaching full strength,to cover those regions (the industrial heartlands of Britain) was fully justified.

I'm sure that the Allies had more infantry and artillery available to them at the time of Waterloo,but if they weren't there they count for nothing.

There are many accounts from the RAF pilots who actually fought the battle containing the "six of us against all that lot" type of comments and few when they thought that they had a numerical advantage,or even something approaching parity.

I have read dozens of combat reports in which RAF pilots comment that they feel they would have been more effective had there been more of them. Men at the front are rarely able to see the bigger picture.

Their experience was clearly that they were almost invariably out numbered. If you want to argue with that there are still a few of the "few" around who might be happy to dispute your conclusions!

Cheers
Steve

davparlr said:

0753-0835 Midway SBD and B-17s attack the Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu. Poor training of Marines prevent any damage being done by the SBDs and again B-17 were not effective, this time bombing from an even higher altitude. Losses to the SBDs was high.

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Totally agree, except that, as far as I know, most of USMC dive-bombers were not SBD but SB2U.

Best regards,

Francis Marliere