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I've always heard and read about the German U-Boats
but i've only read few refferences to the allies submarines
i believe that they had them, right?
could anyone provide any information, please?
I would like to know more about them
PS: sorry if this theme was already been discussed
I've always heard and read about the German U-Boats
but i've only read few refferences to the allies submarines
i believe that they had them, right?
could anyone provide any information, please?
I would like to know more about them
PS: sorry if this theme was already been discussed
There is a new book out on the Japanese Submarines jointly written by a Japanese and American Naval Historians "The Japanese Submarine Force and WWII" Carl Boyd Akihiko Yoshida, Bluejacket Books, 1995 -2002 (reprint)
It dispels nearly all the myths and legends around the submarine force.
The Japanese sub force was wedded very closely to the fact that the Japanese wanted the decisive naval battle fought in the central pacific, and were keenly aware of two things in their prewar planning. Firstly, the naval treaties condemned them to an immediate numerical inferiority in Battleship numbers, which they needed to redress by the use of their light forces, aircraft and submarines to attrition away, as the US forces advanced across the pacific for the decisive Jutland style battle in the Marshalls or the Marianas (the Japanese were right to assume this in their planning, because this was precisely what the Americans intended to do before PH came along). The second was that Japan in a prolonged war against the Americans could not hope to win. The war had to be short, and the naval victory sudden, to shock the Americans to negotiate peace.
Against this background, the Japanese submarine was perfectly designed. The US battleship force had a fleet speed of under 20 knots. So the Japanese designed their big subs to cruise at 24 knots on the surface, and to have very long legs. They also provided aircraft to many of their designs. These features would have allowed the Japanese subs to track the progress of the battle fleet, move ahead of the fleet, and then set elaborate and deadly ambushes for it, as often as torpedoes remained in the magazines.
That was the theory, but two things upset the plan,and the Japanese were very slow to realize it. The first, was Pearl Harbour, which effectively removed the slow moving battle force from the equation. Henceforward, the US was forced to rely on its fast carriers, and its light forces for the prosecution of its war. The carriers possessed two things that made them hard targets, speed (a fleet speed of 30 knots), and aircraft, which allowed the positions of the Japan subs to be often spotted in advance, and avoided.
Later, as the Americans brought into commission new battleships, these were also able to operate at speeds that the Japanese subs were unable to counter. One other factor began to be apparent from the middle of 1943 on wards, was the increasing allied proficiency in ASW warfare. At the beginning of the war, US ASW effectiveness was terrible, but later, as they learned new techniques (taught to them by the British), the weaknesses if the Japanese sub force really started to come to the fore. The weaknesses were both technological and doctrinal. The technological weaknesses were basically the large size (easy to spot on the surface), and slow diving times (longer to seek safety by diving). The doctrinal problems were the forced usage of the subs as transports for the army (a staggeringly large number of subs were lost on these missions, in which ULTRA allowed the allies frequent opportunities to set ambushes), as well as the continued use of the subs to support fleet operations despite its proven failure (this meant the Japanese were often attacking heavily guarded military TFs).
On those occasions where Japanese subs were used on merchant shipping duties, they were effective. They managed to sink, or capture (the ship would be damaged, return to port, and then be captured by the advancing Japanese....this happened very frequently in the Far East, where an estimated 300000 tons affected by sub damage was captured, and re-used by the Japanese). A very large percentage of merchantmen listed as damaged by allied sources, were actually never returned to service after hits by Japanese subs. IN the NEI, off the coast of Australia, and in the Indian Ocean, the Japanese subs proved to be very effective at mercantile warfare. But the commitment to total employment to attacking merchantmen was never there, there was no Donitz in the Japanese submarine arm to force the correct use of the force in its entirety.