TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.
MOST SECRET W.
M-(S9) 47th CONCLUSIONS. MINUTE 4.
Confidential Annex.
AIR POLICY, THE MINISTER FOR CO-DRDTNA^ION OP DEFENCE said that the Conference arranged in accordance with the (Previous Reference: War Cabinet Conclusion referred to in the margin.
W.M.(39) 46th
Conclusions, had arrived at the following, conclusions in connec Minute 2,) tion with the policy which should govern the employment of the Royal Air Force in the immediate future.
The governing fa.ctors might be summarised as follows
a) The Allies were in a position of inferiority vis-a-vis Germany inexisting air strengths. From this it follows that for the present the initiative was with Germany: our action must be conditioned by her action. It also followed that, so far as enemy action permitted, we should conserve and develop our resources
until the gap in numerical strength was narrowed. In particular, we should not fritter away our striking force on unprofitable objectives in deference to public clamour for retaliation or public criticism at inaction.
(b) On the other hand,
we must not shrink from using the whole of our air strength if enemy action against either France or ourselves looked like being decisive; for example, an attack on our Mercantile Marine, on the scale of 1917: in that event, our striking force must, at all costs, be employed in the manner that held out the best hope of obtaining decisive results against Germany,
c) Germany's weakest spot was the Ruhr, the heart of which was about the size of Greater London, anr1 in which was concentrated approximately 60 per cent, of Germany's vital industry.
It contained moreover, a population which might be expected to crack under extensive air attack. Such attacks would involve a heavy casualty roll among civilians, including women and children.
(d) We should not be the first to "take the gloves off". Prom this it followed that until and unless Germany, either by killing large numbers of civilians
or by a violation of Belgium, gave the necessary justification,there could be no question of attacking the Ruhr, or anything other than strictly military objectives If the War Cabinet approved these conclusions, the Committee proposed that the governing principles should be applied to the situation with which we were now confronted, in the following way:
i) If the enemy confined his attack either on the French or ouselves to strictly military objectives, we should reply by strictly limited attacks on corresponding German objectives, i.e., we should continue our present bombardment policy.
(ii) If the enemy attacked convoys or even our Fast (joast ports
indecisively, i,e,,if they were not doing vital damage — we should, still not do anything to invite retaliation which might do us vital damage.
It would, however', probably be necessary, both on military and political grounds, to take some "token" action in reply. For example, an attack on Hamburg Oil Storage and. Refinery would, be a useful, spectacular and appropriate reply to a German attack on "East Coast ports or London Docks.
(iii) If the Germans should deliver an attack on either France or ourselves which looked like being decisive and had involved either appreciable casualties to civilians outside the battle zone (i.e., anywhere in England or in the back areas in France) or a violation of Belgian neutrality, we should attack the Ruhr as our first and chief objective. In the event of an attack on France through Belgium, our air forces, in addition to attacking the Ruhr, should operate against any favourable military targets presented by the German advance.
Action under (i) was within the existing policy approved by the War Cabinet. Action under (ii).and particularly (iii), would not have to be taken at a moment's notice, and, in the view of the Committee, should not be undertaken without the approval of the War Cabinet.
THE PRIME MINISTER observed that an attack on the Ruhr, in consequence of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, would be a departure from our previous ideas.
THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OP DEFENCE said that the Committee had taken the view that an attack on Belgium would be an act which would involve tremendous suffering in Belgium amongst the civil population, and we should be amply justified in hitting Germany as hard, as we could.
THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether
the same argument did not apply to Luxembourg and Holland.
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR ATR said, that
Belgium had been considered a special case. An advance through Luxembourg would meet with no opposition, as there were no defences. An advance into Holland would no doubt be rapidly succeeded by an attack on Belgium.
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS while not pre-judging the issue, asked whether
there was not a wide distinction between a violation of Belgian neutrality and an attack on the Ruhr, which would result in heavy civilian casualties. In the latter case would, there not be a grave danger of an accusation that we were the first to "take the gloves off"?
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY said that he thought the violation of Belgium would afford
a moral justification for our bombing the Ruhr, even if this involved civilian casualties. The idea of causing civilian casualties among the German population of the Ruhr was to him less shocking than the civilian casualties which the Belgians would incur if we bombed, the German Army while it was moving through Belgium.
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR ATR pointed out that, in order to invade Belgium, the German Army would have to pass through the Ruhr,
which would therefore become a military concentration area. (yeah, right)
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL felt that a decision on the matter should not be taken until the time came.
An indiscriminate attack on the Ruhr, in reply to a violation of Belgian neutrality, would be a departure from the policy (which we were at present pursuing) of meeting like with like.
THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR ATR pointed out that an attack by our Air Force on the Ruhr would be by no means indiscriminate, Attacks would be carried out in daylight against military objectives.
It was inevitable, however, that, heavy civilian casualties would be caused. A point which the War Cabinet would have to bear in mind, was the probable loss sustained by our attacking formations, which might conceivably be as heavy as 50 per cent.
THE MINISTER WPTTOPT PORTFOLIO said that
the Committee had felt that attack on the Ruhr was the only operation of a decisive character to relieve the pressure on Belgium. There was general agreement, that an attack on
the Ruhr would, have a very big moral, as well as military, effect. In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Belgian Ambassador had been confident that the Belgian defences would, hold up a German advance
at least for a time.
THE CHIEF OF mHE AIR STAFF said that, in the view of the Chiefs of Sta.ff, Belgium could, only impose a certain delay on the German advance.
Tt was agreed that, while it was desirable to have preliminary discussion on this matter, there wa.s no need for the War Cabinet to reach a final decision that day as to the use of our Bomber Force in the circumstances envisaged.
The War Cabinet —
(i) Approved the conclusions summarised in (a), (b), ( c) and (d) above:
(ii) Took note of the proposed courses
of action set out in ( i) , (ii) and
( iii) above.
Richmond Terrace, S.W.1,
14th October, 1939.