Zyzygie’s Mumbles and Rambles (1 Viewer)

[Zyzygie]

The V2 was meant to counter the Allied bombing offensive. With roughly 6000 built, and each with a one tonne high explosive warhead, that equates to 6000 tonnes.. Say double that to allow for the kinetic energy of the rocket as it hits, that's 12,000 tonnes round figures. Compare that with RAF bomber command:

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In total 364,514 operational sorties were flown, 1,030,500 tons of bombs were dropped and 8,325 aircraft lost in action.

That's a ratio of 85 to 1. And then there was the USAAF figures to factor in as well.

For an expenditure 50% greater than the Manhattan project, I'm sure a lot of folk (including Werner von Braun), in the German war machine realised that they were wasting their money.

On the other hand it was no doubt fun to design the rockets...

 

[Zyzygie]

The German engineers were trying to come out with weapons and weapon systems that German military wanted. Under the term 'German military' we can toss in Hitler, Goering, Doenitz etc. So when RLM orders a big bomber that can dive bomb, and there is a ~3000 HP engine in pipeline, what you do? come out with a bomber that can do what is wanted, on 2 such engines, hence the He 177. RLM/Goering/Hitler wants a jet propelled bomber? Produce it.

"...For the He 177, Günter decided to employ two of the complex Daimler-Benz DB 606 "power system" setups for propulsion. He had already employed these engines on the record breaking Heinkel He 119 reconnaissance aircraft prototypes. They consisted of a pair of DB 601 liquid-cooled 12-cylinder inverted-vee inline engines mounted side by side in a nacelle – for the He 119, centrally within the fuselage, just behind its heavily glazed cockpit enclosure – driving one propeller. The two engines were inclined inwards by 30°, so that the inner cylinder banks were disposed almost vertically. A common gear-housing connected the front ends of the two crankcases, with the two crankshaft pinions driving a single airscrew shaft gear.[6] The starboard DB 601 had to be fitted with a mirror-image version of its mechanically driven centrifugal supercharger, drawing air from the starboard side of the engine. Two of the DB 606s, each of which initially developed 2,600 PS (2,564 hp, 1,912 kW) for take-off and weighing some 1,515 kg (3,340 lb) apiece, were to power the He 177. The DB 606 — and its eventual replacement, the Daimler-Benz DB 605-based "DB 610" — were to be the only two production German aviation powerplants designed to surpass 1,500 kW of power, something that the Germans had considerable challenges in developing during the war into production-ready, combat-reliable aviation engines..."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177

Trying to couple two engines together through a common gear is very ambitious. The vibration problems are horrendous.

The British had problems with the Napier Sabre, although they arguably approached the problem more intelligently:
"....Napier followed the Lion with two new H-block designs: the H-16 (Rapier) and the H-24 (Dagger). The H-block has a compact layout, consisting of two horizontally opposed engines lying one atop or beside another. Since the cylinders are opposed, the motion in one is balanced by the motion on the opposing side, leading to no first or second order vibration whatsoever..."
Napier Sabre Explained

 

[Zyzygie]

"...Just how big the need for nickel is on the U-boot or on a tank?? If one does not have ample amounts of rare metals, why we should start accusing them for sabotage? As for the 'failure to develop' - let's accuse the Napier's engineers for Sabre's early troubles, Wright for R-3350 problems, BMW for BMW 801 problems, Klimov for VK-106/107/108 problems.

... Such a jet could be built with the Jumo 004A engine utilizing the 9-10,000 tons of Krupp cemented armor used by the KM on massive artillery emplacements of the Atlantic Wall which were of little real value anyway. Instead this combination could be used to produce thousands of Jumo-004A with the high nickel chrome alloys needed for turbine blades.

Just to be clear each ton of Krupp cemented armor used 3.4% Nickel and 2.4% Chrome, so each ton of installed KC steel amounted to 34kg of nickel and 24kg of Chrome. Failing that each ton of Krupp Non Cemented armor had 2.3% Chrome and ~ 1% Nickel. So if each Jumo OO4A engine does in fact need 88kg of Nickel - then each Engine would need these alloying agents from 3 tons of KC armor or 10 tons of NC. General Warship construction is done with STS 52 steel which needs no Chrome or Nickel alloy agents. So each ton of armored steel lost can still be used as 1 ton of general warship construction. STS is the main steel used in U boat construction.

Heavy KC installed for coastal artillery.
1941 1,800 tons
1942 2,300tons
1943 2,800tons
1944 3,100 tons

Regular NC installed Naval use.
1941 2,100 tons
1942 12,000tons
1943 11,700tons
1944 9,800 tons..."
See How many jets to have a decisive impact on the war? - Page 5 - Axis History Forum

There were about 2000 Tiger tanks produced averaging around 50 tonnes each.
Around 6500 Panthers of 45 tonne each.
Assuming 40% is armour plate, that is 157,000 tonnes. At 3.4% nickel, that's 540 tonne. If the JUMO 004 requires 88 kg of nickel, that amounts to 6000. Then add the armour on the Atlantic wall above.

That should be plenty.

By the way, the Russians only used 1% nickel content on their tank armour, but they cleverly sloped it to increase its effectiveness against kinetic energy rounds.

 

[GregP]

This, although interesting, is running quite far afield of the Meteor versus Me 262 in one-on-one combat, don't you think?

 

[stona]

Not a single word posted above by Zyzygie himself supports his original contention that :

"I believe that German engineers and scientists probably worked willingly for Hitler initially, but later deliberately sabotaged the Nazi war effort."

Many German programmes sabotaged themselves by over ambition and incompetent management, despite the best efforts of the scientists and engineers to make them work.

There was certainly sabotage in the German war effort, but it wasn't carried out by German engineers and scientists. The sabotage was generally fairly simple material sabotage carried out (at great risk) on the production lines by workers and forced labour, usually not German.

Cheers

Steve

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Zyzygie, tell us your point...

Look, the early Meteor was no match for the Me 262.

Later versions of the Meteor were good aircraft - they weren't a match for the MiG-15 or F-86.

So please, spare us with all this cut and paste information

 

[Zyzygie]

Later versions of the Meteor were good aircraft - they weren't a match for the MiG-15 or F-86.

OK, we have some agreement...

 

[Magnon]

See Why the Germans Failed to Accomplish a Nuclear Bomb

...There are many arguments as to why Nazi Germany was unable to develop an atomic bomb during World War II.Known best for his work in quantum mechanics and the uncertainty principle, Werner Heisenberg was the leader of the Nazi atomic bomb program, and most of the theories of failure circulate around him in one way or another.

Did Heisenberg sabotage the program from within? Or, did he try his best to construct a nuclear bomb and simply failed?...

 

[GrauGeist]

Did Heisenberg sabotage the program from within? Or, did he try his best to construct a nuclear bomb and simply failed?...

Evidence indicates that Heisenberg did intentionally "drag his feet" with the program's development.

There were certain expectations regarding an eventual weapon, but in the end, the program was never given a high priority.

 

[fastmongrel]

Evidence indicates that Heisenberg did intentionally "drag his feet" with the program's development.

There were certain expectations regarding an eventual weapon, but in the end, the program was never given a high priority.

There is no evidence Heisenberg dragged his feet, unless you consider his daughters hagiography as evidence. There were German physcists capable of building a working bomb but Heisenberg wasnt one of them. His theoretical knowledge was flawed and his practical knowledge was lacking. He knew that which is why he wanted to recruit Nils Bohr to help him.

 

[parsifal]

I think it is possible at least that Hausenberg dragged his feet, but the failure of the Nazi nuclear program has far more to do with mismanagement at levels above him. it is significant I think that direct funding was withdrawn from November 1941, following his meeting in Copenhagen with Bohr, thereafter placed under the direction of Goring no less.

mismanagement and a lack of resources was the reason for the german failure more than anything else

 

[GrauGeist]

There is no evidence Heisenberg dragged his feet, unless you consider his daughters hagiography as evidence. There were German physcists capable of building a working bomb but Heisenberg wasnt one of them. His theoretical knowledge was flawed and his practical knowledge was lacking. He knew that which is why he wanted to recruit Nils Bohr to help him.

This has been an ongoing debate since the end of the war, and I suppose it depends on which account a person listens to in forming an opinion.

However, the meeting between Heisenberg and Bohr was to obtain information of extracting Protactinium 233 from Thorium since Bohr was an expert in that field and had published papers on his work before the war, for the transmutation process.

One of the reasons people say he was incompetent, was because he preferred the Heavy Water process. However, a Heavy Water reactor is much less complex in it's design/construction than a Graphite dampened reactor and it does not need enriched Uranium to function. So the process to create Heavy Water is far less involved than the creation of enriched Uranium.

Additionally, he pursued Plutonium as a fissile material over Uranium because he didn't feel that Uranium would produce the best chain reaction.

So here in lies the puzzle...his choices were obviously well thought out, not the ramblings of an idiot. This program could have produced results if it were a priority, but it inched along, bit by bit.

And for the record, Heisenberg wasn't the key figure in the German Atomic Weapon development program, it was Professor Kurt Deibner, who worked for the Heerwaffenamt and their secret program.

I could go into more specifics overall, but I don't want to derail the thread too much!

 

[stona]

And for the record, Heisenberg wasn't the key figure in the German Atomic Weapon development program, it was Professor Kurt Deibner, who worked for the Heerwaffenamt and their secret program.

Diebner ran the programmes but he was no Oppenheimer. Like any major scientific undertaking there was a team of scientists and technicians involved, minute in Germany compared to the USA.
The failure of the German project, specifically the design of a bomb, was to a very large extent a result of a fundamental mistake made by Heisenberg.
If he had made that mistake, working in the Manhattan project, it would certainly have been discovered by his peers. In the limited German project peer review, a fundamental principle of any scientific endeavour, wasn't exactly a strong point. Heisenberg and the others didn't drag their feet, they just didn't get it right.
Cheers
Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

This has been an ongoing debate since the end of the war, and I suppose it depends on which account a person listens to in forming an opinion.

This debate hasnt been going on since the war Heisenberg was totally shocked when told of the 2 A bombs dropped in Japan as he didnt think it was possible to make a fission device capable of being lifted by a plane. He was under discreet interrogation by British Intelligence at the time at Farm Hall MI6s main interrogation house Operation Epsilon - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia and everything he said was recorded. It took Heisenberg, Otto Hahn and Kurt Diebner two weeks to work out how the Manhattan project had done it. Impressive but then they were all brilliant physicists.

The first time anyone came up with the Good NotNazi Heisenberg was iirc in 1966 when his daughter wrote a biography. Heisenberg himself never claimed he dragged his feet probably because he knew peers would have called him out for it. Another source for the Good NotNazi Heisenberg theory is David Irving a man whos published work I wouldnt spit on if it was on fire.


Heisenberg never got over the embarresment of getting things so badly wrong, in physics circles it was like claiming a belief in Phlogiston Theory the day after Rutherford split the Atom. Heisenberg was a brilliant physicist but he was no Oppenheimer.

 

[Zyzygie]

It seems that even in the US, there was some degree of sabotage of the atomic bomb program. Lyman Briggs had hidden the British MAUD committee findings in his safe! :
"…Mark Oliphant helped goad the American program over the top. "If Congress knew the true history of the atomic energy project," Leo Szilard said modestly after the war, "I have no doubt but that it would create a special medal to be given to meddling foreigners for distinguished services, and Dr. Oliphant would be the first to receive one." "
"Conant in his 1943 secret history thought the "most important" reason the program changed direction in the autumn of 1941 was that "the all-out advocates of a head-on attack on the uranium problem had become more vocal and determined" and mentioned Oliphant's influence first of all. Oliphant flew to the United States in late August— he considered the Pan-American Clipper through Lisbon too slow and usually travelled by unheated bomber— to work with his NDRC counterparts on radar. But he was also charged with inquiring why the United States was ignoring the MAUD Committee's findings. "The minutes and reports . . . had been sent to Lyman Briggs . . . and we were puzzled to receive virtually no comment. . . . I called on Briggs in Washington, only to find that this inarticulate and unimpressive man had put the reports in his safe and had not shown them to members of his Committee." Oliphant was "amazed and distressed." He met then with the Uranium Committee. Samuel K. Allison was a new committee member, a talented experimentalist, a protégé of Arthur Compton at the University of Chicago. Oliphant "came to a meeting," Allison recalls, " . . . and said 'bomb' in no uncertain terms. He told us we must concentrate every effort on the bomb and said we had no right to work on power plants or anything but the bomb. The bomb would cost twenty-five million dollars, he said, and Britain didn't have the money or the manpower, so it was up to us." Allison was surprised. Briggs had kept the committee in the dark. "I thought we were making a power source for submarines." In desperation Oliphant reached out to the most effective champion he knew in the United States. He wired Ernest Lawrence: "I'll even fly from Washington to meet at a convenient time in Berkeley." At the beginning of September he did. Lawrence drove Oliphant up the hill behind the Berkeley campus to the site of the 184-inch cyclotron where they could talk without being overheard. Oliphant rehearsed the MAUD Report, which Lawrence had not yet seen. Lawrence in turn proclaimed the possibility of electromagnetic separation of U235 in converted cyclotrons and the virtues of plutonium. "How much I still admire the way in which things are done in your laboratory," Oliphant would write him after their meeting. "I feel quite sure that in your hands the uranium question will receive proper and complete consideration." Back in his office Lawrence called Bush and Conant and arranged for Oliphant to see them. From Oliphant he collected a written summary of the secret British report. In Washington Conant took Oliphant to dinner and listened with interest. Bush met him in New York and gave him a barely courteous twenty minutes. Neither administrator admitted to knowledge of the MAUD Report. "Gossip among nuclear physicists on forbidden subjects," Conant characterizes Oliphant's
peregrinations in his secret history.

Oliphant also stopped by to talk to Fermi. He found the Italian laureate more cautious than ever, "non-committal about the fast-neutron bomb and not altogether happy about the Bohr-Wheeler theory of fission…"

See more at Rhodes, Richard (2012-09-18). Making of the Atomic Bomb. Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition.

 

[stona]

How does this amount to sabotage?

You should at least have put these events into some kind of context to support an explanation of the contention that the programme 'changed direction' in the autumn of 1941. It's far too vague though it certainly did change later in 1941 and the reason is far less conspiratorial and rather obvious.
The British urgency and American lack of it might both be more rationally explained by the facts that Britain was already at war and had been for two years when Oliphant flew to the States in August 1941. The Americans were not at war yet, but they soon would be.

Briggs had graduated in the 19th century, was old and incompetent, maybe a decent administrator but not at or near the cutting edge of nuclear physics. He was a Presidential appointment and a man whose previous work in other government departments was known to the administration. Incompetence and lack of understanding do not equate to sabotage.

Conant was an organic chemist (as was I once upon a time) and his understanding of the new science surrounding nuclear processes and the separation of isotopes would have been limited at best. That puts his comment in some context.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Zyzygie]

How does this amount to sabotage?

You should at least have put these events into some kind of context to support an explanation of the contention that the programme 'changed direction' in the autumn of 1941. It's far too vague though it certainly did change later in 1941 and the reason is far less conspiratorial and rather obvious.
The British urgency and American lack of it might both be more rationally explained by the facts that Britain was already at war and had been for two years when Oliphant flew to the States in August 1941. The Americans were not at war yet, but they soon would be.

Briggs had graduated in the 19th century, was old and incompetent, maybe a decent administrator but not at or near the cutting edge of nuclear physics. He was a Presidential appointment and a man whose previous work in other government departments was known to the administration. Incompetence and lack of understanding do not equate to sabotage.

Conant was an organic chemist (as was I once upon a time) and his understanding of the new science surrounding nuclear processes and the separation of isotopes would have been limited at best. That puts his comment in some context.

Cheers

Steve

Well OK.

But if it was incompetence, I'd characterize it as incredible incompetence.

The MAUD report is available at The MAUD Report, 1941 | Historical Documents | atomicarchive.com

Cheers

 

[stona]

Incompetence, a lack of understanding and a lack of urgency (the US was not at war, why should it embark on military rather than civil atomic projects?).
To be fair there were many physicists who were not entirely convinced that a bomb would work in the way the British believed, and many more who were concerned at the difficulty of producing enough of the required nuclear materials. Then there were the administrators who balked at the proposed costs, which in the end would be far exceeded in any case.
The idea that producing an atomic bomb in 1940/41 amounted to an open goal for the European/American scientific community is, I'm afraid, the result of hindsight. We know that it worked.
Cheers
Steve

 

[fastmongrel]

I prefer the cock up rather than conspiracy theory. Briggs might simply have forgotten about the file or just not understood it's importance

 

[stona]

I prefer the cock up rather than conspiracy theory. Briggs might simply have forgotten about the file or just not understood it's importance

Almost certainly the latter. He was not a young man and no longer exactly at the cutting edge of his own discipline, never mind the relatively new science of nuclear physics. There were plenty better qualified than him who might have made the same mistake.

Cheers

Steve