Zyzygie’s Mumbles and Rambles (1 Viewer)

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yak17-2.jpg

Yak-17 First flight June 1947, developed from the Yak-15 and developed into
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Yak-23 First flight July 1947 over 700 built between the two.

Not sure where this falls in cockpit location.
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View over the nose is dismal no matter if cockpit is judged midship or forward.

Ilyushin-IL-40-3.jpg

less said the better.
 
The 262 had C/G problems. If the cockpit had been moved forward then the fuel tank in front of the cockpit would have had to be moved to behind the cockpit further messing up the C/G.
I would have thought that having the fixed mass (i.e. the cockpit) forward and the variable mass ( i.e. the fuel) over the centre of lift would have been hugely preferable. Also from an ongoing development perspective, you can be fairly sure that the cockpit mass won't greatly change over the lifetime of the design, whereas the fuel requirements probably will.
 
There was 2 fuel tanks in the 262, one in front of the cockpit and one behind the cockpit.
 
The 262 had C/G problems.

It certainly did when used as a fighter bomber. There was never an option for it to be anything else. Generally people, including Galland and his clique, bang on about how it was forced into a fighter bomber role rather than being developed as an out and out fighter, completely ignoring that long before it entered production there was a requirement (actually a Fuhrer Befehl) that ALL future fighters should be capable of operation as fighter bombers.

Protokoll Nr.9 4th March 1943.

"... as per the Fuhrer Befehl, every fighter must henceforth be capable of performing in the fighter bomber role. An installation capable of carrying 500 Kg of bombs is foreseen for the Me 262, according to drawing Nr.II/141."

On 17th April 1943 Wolfgang Spate flew the V2 and made a report to Galland. he was obviously aware of this protocol, as he included the following in his report.

"As a fighter bomber, and carrying bombs, the aircraft would still be faster than any enemy aircraft."


But why let historical facts get in the way of a good aviation myth?

Cheers

Steve
 
And the only reason why the Me 262 had a swept wing was to address the C/G issue.

From Wiki - They reference Christopher, John. The Race for Hitler's X-Planes (The Mill, Gloucestershire: History Press, 2013)

"Plans were first drawn up in April 1939, and the original design was very different from the aircraft that eventually entered service, with wing root-mounted engines,[12] rather than podded ones, when submitted in June 1939.[12] The progression of the original design was delayed greatly by technical issues involving the new jet engine. Because the engines were slow to arrive, Messerschmitt moved the engines from the wing roots to underwing pods, allowing them to be changed more readily if needed; this would turn out to be important, both for availability and maintenance.[13] Since the BMW 003 jets proved heavier than anticipated, the wing was swept slightly, by 18.5°, to accommodate a change in the center of gravity."
 
I would hate to eject from that thing.

Or THIS:
320px-Heinkel_He_162_CASM_2012_5.jpg

But this was arguably one reason why the Germans were the first to develop ejection seats, no?

Heinkel 162 Ejection Seat

he162.gif
Thanks to Ludo Kloek, a reader from Belgium who sent me these photos of the He-162 Salamander (or Volksjager) ejection seat displayed in the Deutches Museum. This is one of the earliest seats in service in the world. The seat had the parachute stored in the seat pan, and was cartridge fired hence the name 'Schleudersitz Heinkel-Kartusche'. The Kartusche refers to cartridge. Other early German seats were powered by compressed air.

The Germans were the first nationality to use ejection seats in aircraft. They were used first in developmental aircraft, then in certain operational aircraft. By the end of World War II, over 60 aircrew had used ejection seats in combat.
 
Meteor vs. Tempest

For information -



…During comparative trials with a Tempest V, the Meteor III demonstrated a clear superiority in terms of top speed.

This varied slightly with height as follows:

Height ft------Meteor------ Tempest------ Difference

1,000---------- 465---------- 381--------- 84 mph

15,000--------- 471 ---------- 416---------- 55

30,000 -------- 465 ---------- 390 ---------- 75


Although the Tempest possessed an initial advantage in accelerations from 190 mph IAS due to the slow pick-up of
the Meteor's Derwent engines, after approximately thirty seconds, and with the speed approaching 300 mph IAS,
the Meteor was beginning to draw away quite rapidly, and it was out of range (600 yards) after ninety seconds. The
Meteor was also superior at decelerating if its airbrakes were deployed; indeed, these were so effective that they
had to be retracted once again after moving behind the Tempest to avoid dropping out of range. Zoom climbs were
attempted with a pull-out from a dive at 500 mph IAS into a forty-degree climb. Initially there was little difference
between the two aircraft until the nose of the Meteor came up to the horizon, when it started to pull away rapidly.

By the time it had reached its best climbing speed (225 mph) the Meteor was approximately 750 ft above and 600
yards ahead of the Tempest. It was also found that by increasing the angle of zoom, the Meteor could gain even
more of a height advantage. These tests were carried out at various heights with the same results. During dives with
the throttles closed there was nothing to choose between the Meteor and the Tempest. With throttles open,
however, the Meteor was 500 yards ahead by the time that its limiting speed of 500 mph IAS was reached in a dive
from 12,000 ft. Due to its lower wing loading, the Meteor was also superior at turning circles and could turn inside
the Tempest under all conditions and get on its tail in four turns. However, this was offset as the Meteor was at a
disadvantage in initiating manoeuvres, since the Tempest could out-roll it easily at all speeds. A well-flown Tempest
could thus be an extremely difficult target for a Meteor if its pilot used frequent turn reversals.

Despite the fact that the Meteor was superior in nearly all respects, the outcome of any dogfight was far from
certain. Although the Tempest had no performance advantage, its crisp handling characteristics, especially in the
rolling plane, were in marked contrast to the Meteor's heavy ailerons and gave it plenty of opportunity to keep the
jet-powered machine at bay…

Peter Caygill, Meteor from the Cockpit: Britain's First Jet Fighter . Casemate Publishers.
…When powered by the W. 2B/ 37 units rated at 2,000 lb Static Thrust the performance of the Meteor III increased markedly, with a sea level speed of 465 mph, rising to 476 mph at 10,000 ft, 483 mph at 20,000 ft, 484 mph at 30,000 ft, then dropping to 466 mph at 40,000 ft. Rate of climb was also largely increased over that of the Meteor I and W. 2B/ 23 powered Meteor III's, with a sea level climb rate of 3,975 ft per minute, dropping to 3,250 ft per minute at 10,000 ft, 2,500 ft per minute at 20,000 ft, 1,700 ft per minute at 30,000 ft and 750 ft per minute at 40,000 ft. However, the early Derwent I engines were rated at considerably less than the 2,000 lb static thrust. Development of the early Derwent I's was pushed to give 1,800 lbs static thrust, corresponding to a sea level sped of 435 mph, rising to 465 mph at 30,000 ft. As can be seen from these various engine and performance figures, the first of the Derwent I powered Meteor III's were not capable of producing the 2,000 lb thrust that is often quoted.
Correspondingly they were capable of 435 mph at sea level and 465 mph at 30,000 ft, significantly lower than the speeds of 450 + mph at sea level and 493 mph at 30,000 ft often quoted. In the weeks following the end of the war in Europe, the performance of the Meteor was significantly increased as more powerful Derwent engines became available. The increased thrust of the Derwent I was pushed to 2,200 lb allowing a sea level speed of 485 mph, increasing to 503 mph at 30,000 ft. This was increased again to 2,400 lb giving a sea level speed of 505 mph, rising to
520 mph at 30,000 ft. However, the original short engine nacelles of the Meteor I/ III, subjected these aircraft to a speed limitation of 500 mph (indicated up to a height of 6,500 ft), reducing proportionately to 300 mph (indicated) at 30,000 ft…
…Although they never met in combat, it is inevitable that the Meteor III is compared to its wartime rival, the Me. 262. The Meteor III had a higher profile drag compared with that of the Me. 262. This was principally caused by the Meteors higher wing drag, in turn caused by the Meteors lower wing loading, which corresponded to lower maximum speeds compared to the Me. 262. After a series of trials with the Me. 262 at RAE Farnborough in 1945, it was determined that with engines of equal thrust the Meteor III would be 20 mph slower than the Me. 262. On the plus side for the Meteor III, the lower wing loading gave it better take off performance, including a shorter take off run, and better manoeuvrability compared with the Me. 262.

Harkins, Hugh (2013-12-11). RAF Meteor Jet Fighters in World War II, An Operational Log. Centurion. Kindle Edition.
 
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Or THIS:
320px-Heinkel_He_162_CASM_2012_5.jpg

But this was arguably one reason why the Germans were the first to develop ejection seats, no?

Heinkel 162 Ejection Seat

he162.gif
Thanks to Ludo Kloek, a reader from Belgium who sent me these photos of the He-162 Salamander (or Volksjager) ejection seat displayed in the Deutches Museum. This is one of the earliest seats in service in the world. The seat had the parachute stored in the seat pan, and was cartridge fired hence the name 'Schleudersitz Heinkel-Kartusche'. The Kartusche refers to cartridge. Other early German seats were powered by compressed air.

The Germans were the first nationality to use ejection seats in aircraft. They were used first in developmental aircraft, then in certain operational aircraft. By the end of World War II, over 60 aircrew had used ejection seats in combat.


German ejection seats came out of the desire to allow Stuka crews to emergency bailout during an attack dive. They became standard on test aircraft. The early ejection seats used compressed air. Heinkel retained overall responsibility for all ejection seats. That rocket sled you see archival footage of in US tests is war booty taken from Heinkes facility and moved to the USA.

The ejection seats used in the Heinkel He 219, Dornier Do 335 used compressed air. This required periodic maintenance in the form of a pressure check. They were also a little heavy. The seat used in the Heinkel He 162 jet used pyrotechnical charges. It was much lighter and essentially maintenance free.

The crew of the tricycle undercarriage He 219 sat ahead of the propellers, like the bombardier of the B-26, and a crew bailing out could get mangled in windmilling propellers that hadn't been feathered. Hence the ejection seat greatly helped. The Do 335 rear propellers presented a similar problem. In that case explosive bolts could detach the upper and lower tail fin as well as the propellor at the roots. Prior to use of the Ejection seat, detachable fins system Dornier had tested a Drogue Paraschute that would slow the aircraft to a point that slipstream was not a problem. Such a system was in fact used in the Me 163 rocket fighter.

For a folk that is presented as suicidal in propaganda and Hollywood and supposed to be suicidal robotic maniacs the Germans put more effort into ingenious escape systems than any other nations air force. Ju 88 could jettison its whole canopy as well as lower gondala, Fw 190 had explosive bolts to blow of the canopy, the Me 109 canopy might have hinged for normal ingress/egress but was jettisoned in emergencies. The Ju 288 was being developed with a jetisonable crew cabin, F-111 style, with a parachute for the whole cabin.
 
The Fw190 had the a 20mm round that severed the rod because the canopy could not be jettisoned otherwise due to air pressure.

Where was this drogue parachute stored in the Me163?
 
Oh here comes a total can of worms.. there has never been total agreement on the total losses suffered by the german armed forces, and the records of the time do their darndest to hide such statistics.

Here is a starting table on total manpower used in the military and in essential war industries:

Manpower in Germany in World War II (Thousands)
manpower 1.jpg



Total population of "Greater Germany" at the time was about 80 million (some sources place the total German population at around 85 million). The Non-Combatants include Operation Todt workers. The above chart is from German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II, page 18. (HERO).

Now, to the prickly question of casualties and the related issue of replacement rates.

Losses and Replacements, German Field Army
manpower 2.jpg



The above chart is from German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II, page 52. (HERO) (If you are interested in this subject, I would highly recommend purchasing the report from the DuPuy Institute, http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/)


The first thing that should be quite obvious from looking at the above chart is that the Germans always had enough manpower to cover their losses. According to the research done by the DuPuy Institute, it looks like the only times the Germans came up short on manpower was during the fall of 1943 and 1944. Otherwise, over the course of the entire 12 months for 1943, and 1944 their replacments were technically enough to cover their losses. But, Hitler had other ideas. He took many of the replacements/convelescents and sent them to form new divisions instead (Stalin was guilty of this as well). The result of this policy left many of the infantry divisions of the Germans (and the Soviets) understrength. Was it the correct policy to build new units instead of focusing on keeping your existing units at full strength? I tend to think it was a bad policy. But there are exceptions of course. I think it was prudent to form new motorized and panzer units, but it was highly unadvisable to keep forming new infantry formations-- especially the Luftwaffe infantry divisions. That manpower was sorely needed within the Heer at the time.

manpower 3.jpg



Source: Organizational Brance, General Staff, #1/17867/44, 2 July 1944; T-78, Roll 411

The above chart is from German and Soviet Replacement Systems in World War II, page 54. (HERO)

I would add to that analysis that until 1942, the general draft that the germans applied had very few exceptions, with the result that many skilled workers were drafted in as grunts for the heer. However from 1943 there were exceptions applied such that specialist workers were often exempted from the general draft.

The main reason for lower serviceability rates in the LW stem from two basic reasons. Firstly, the rate of spare parts to whole airframe manufacture was deliberately kept low, because of Hitlers obsession with numbers. He was not interested in how many spare engines were being carried, but he was interested in the total numbers of aircraft available on a given front. Similarly he had only the most basic interest in serviceability rates. Less spares equates to lower serviceability rates.

Despite the above, manpower rates were stretched in the LW and the time spent in the repair workshops tended to be longer as a result. Additionally, the Germans pressed their formations more mercilessly than the allies, with the result that formations that really should be resting and recuperating often were not.
 

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