I'm hoping that's the case myself. Just how rational/informed/committed to the Czar are the theater commanders?
I can't remember the name of the Soviet naval officer who didn't go along with launching a nuke from a sub during the Cuban Missile crisis. The world's survival might hang on such an officer now.
I'm not sure, but Captain Arkhipov didn't launch the torpedo out of a moral reservation against using nuclear weapons: He realized we weren't trying to sink the submarine flotilla he commanded. He realized they were using fairly low power charges and trying to scare them to the surface.
Likewise Lt. Col. Petrov didn't confirm the launch order as authentic because he figured it was unlikely to be real: Only one launch was registered at first, followed by another four over a window of a few minutes. Since the USSR & USA would have both launched massive numbers of missiles (for a variety of reasons, some of the launches would have probably been in a staggered fashion, but the numbers would be unmistakeable).
In November, 1979: NORAD had a false alarm which indicated 300 ballistic missile launches followed by another 1900 as a chaser. The data flowing in, as a I remember reading, listed all data as being authentic. Because it was a fairly low ebb during the Cold War (Afghanistan didn't occur until around Christmas of 1979), there was a decision made to actually call each of the sites and determine if the data flowing in was correct (fortunately, they reported nothing).
Ultimately, the cause was a simulator tape that had been put in, which ended up on the main-display. Since it didn't have "simulation" on it, it looked like the real thing. While the actual cause was never fully duplicated, the decision to ensure that there weren't any connections from where the simulator tape was inserted to the main-display appeared to have been made: Interestingly, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was a case where somebody put in a simulator tape which displayed a single incoming launch. Because most missiles in those days didn't have storable propellant (most used RP-1 and LOx), it would take around 10-15 minutes to ready the missile upon receiving orders to launch (that said, there was a Minuteman squadron/wing being brought online during this period).
I'm honestly amazed we survived the Cold War: The biggest possibilities of triggering a nuclear exchange included political miscalculation and failures of the early warning systems that could have triggered a nuclear release.
Political Miscalculation
1. Cuban Missile Crisis: The USSR was abjectly terrified of the fact that we put Jupiter missiles in Turkey (their distance made reaction time short, something which was already poor in those days owing to ballistic missile design), so they decided to do the same to us (We had also adopted a strategy of containing the USSR through encirclement, which they apparently wanted to subject us to as well). It went over a lot worse than they expected, though it didn't fully seem to register how close things were getting until Maj. Anderson was shot down over Cuba on October 27. An agreement was hashed out to agree to two terms, of which one was to remove the Jupiter missiles: We only addressed one part of the issue (remove the Jupiters, which we were planning to do so anyway), ignoring the other. It would appear the other side either didn't notice, or didn't feel like making anything worse.
2. Able Archer '83: The USSR had become extremely paranoid, which combined with: President Reagan's fiery rhetoric, the Strategic Defense Initiative (i.e. Project Star Wars), the presence of the Pershing II MRBM's and BGM-109 Gryphon's (a Tomahawk with a nuke) in Europe, and a NATO exercise planned for November (ironically within two weeks of my birth) had them convinced we were going to use the exercise as cover for a nuclear first-strike.
Since the USSR had considered similar ruses to justify invading Europe: It seemed plausible as, it was in alignment with their mentality. Since the low-flying capabilities of the BGM-109 made them difficult to shoot down, combined with the short flight time of the Pershing II's made reaction-time virtually nonexistent (something that made it impossible for them to order a retaliatory strike), and the misguided belief that the Pershing II had an earth-penetrating warhead designed to take out hardened command bunkers (it was originally conceived to carry such a warhead, but it was cancelled for one reason or another), as well as difficulty understanding what we meant when we used the term 'First Strike' (i.e. Does it mean: "We nuke them because we realize they're an imminent threat, and we shoot first to limit our losses"? Or does it mean: "We nuke them the instant we can catch them with their pants down to get them out of our hair for good"?), resulted in the belief that we not only were planning to execute a nuclear first-strike, but would be able to pull it off without any retaliation.
When the exercise occurred, there were some communications errors that further heightened their paranoia and, it was stated that, if the exercise had continued for another day: They would have launched a nuclear strike against us believing we were inches away from doing the same.
Errors/Failures of Early Warning Systems
These are just the one's I know about. None are classified, and there's probably other non-classified cases I don't readily recall right now.
1. October 5, 1960: Thule's BMEWS had just been brought online less than two weeks earlier, and one of the search sectors indicated radar-echoes that were consistent with dozens of ICBM launches. Fortunately, somebody remembered their political briefing and realized that Soviet Premier Kruschev was at the United Nations. Seems odd that they'd nuke us when their head of state is effectively in New York. Since they were unable to ascertain the impact point (something they had trouble doing reliably for a few years), and none of the other radars indicated anything, which led the belief it was erroneous.
It turned out that the false alarm was caused by radar echoes bouncing off the moon as it came over the horizon. I'm amazed the radar didn't read some seriously bizarre ranges as the moon ranges from 225000-253000 miles from earth, but ultimately they had improved the range-gating system to take care of that, and as the years went by, the full system would be brought online by 1964.
2. 11/24/1961: Communications failed between SAC, Thule, and NORAD. Since that looked to be a plausible set of places to get taken out should the USSR attack first. Fortunately, a B-52 performing the Thule Monitor mission was able to communicate with SAC, pointing out there appeared to be no damage (the fact that there wasn't a brilliant flash that burned out anybody's retinas, or a mushroom cloud extending dozens of thousands of feet into the air might have also been a good indication whatever happened, it wasn't nuclear).
The culprit was basically a supposedly redundant communication system that wasn't all that redundant. I don't remember what caused the failure, but the fact that the lines all flowed through one location, producing a single-point of failure basically did it.
3. Cuban Missile Crisis: There were at least two, and I'm not sure in what order they occurred, but here you go...
a. Simulator Tape
Already covered
b. Faulty Radar Message
Apparently there were two radar sites, one of which was new, but not as reliable as the older one (probably a mere function of it being brand new). A message indicates a missile inbound, but it's stated to be from the reliable site. Fortunately, the time to impact is a few minutes and when that expires and no earth-shattering kaboom results, the alarm goes away.
4. Non Specific False-Alarms, Late 1970's: We started putting up shitloads of satellites with a variety of scanners, of which infrared were among one of them. Since the USSR has loads of forests, much like parts of the United States, with some areas fairly dry, you get the occasional forest fire. The forest fire on an IR system looks like a massive thermal source that could set off the alarm for indicating an ICBM launch.
Fortunately, they were able to conclude these alarms were false for one reason or another. While I don't know the exact way they did, I would guess that it might include some of the following: The location of the thermal emission wasn't where a known ballistic missile site was; the plume wasn't rising and moving around, but remaining in place; optical systems indicated a massive forest fire and nothing else.
5. 11/9/1979 (NORAD False Alarm): Already covered.
6. June, 1980: NORAD would apparently send this test-message to SAC which would read something like "There are currently 000 missiles airborne" or something like that. All fine and dandy when the number only reads zeroes. Unfortunately a computer chip a few cents cheaper than a 2 liter bottle of pepsi caused some zeroes to read as 2's (i.e. "222 missiles airborne"), it produces a serious scare. The fact that the USSR had already invaded Afghanistan meant that the geopolitical situation was far more tense.
I'm not sure how that one was sussed out, but I'm relieved it was.
7. 9/26/1983: This one was Petrov's event, already covered.
8. 1/25/1995: That was not a typographical error, that was 19
95, not 1985 (I was 11), the Cold War was over, and a Canadian Black Brant XII rocket sounding rocket was being readied for launch from Norway through the Aurora Borealis as part of a research project: As was the norm when launching spacecraft, the Russian Federation (probably all nuclear powers) was told specifically that this was being done to avoid fatal misunderstandings: Unfortunately, the message wasn't relayed to the top Generals, to President Yeltsin, and the Early Warning guys (guys who basically had the same job Lt. Col. Petrov had in 1983): All the people that should have been briefed on this.
So, they launch the rocket: As it starts heading on up, it was detected by Russian radar systems. The trajectory looks like it could be consistent with something coming out of the Barents Sea, where we had SSBN's at least during the Cold War. Because of the fact that one SLBM can carry multiple re-entry vehicles, and reaction time is shorter for a launch of this nature, as well as the fact that it's possible to have several warheads detonate as part of an "X-Ray Pin-Down" which would produced persistent energy that would destroy missiles attempting to be launched: They really start to panic, and it only gets worse when the rocket starts shedding stages. It looked very similar to an SLBM shot-gunning off it's RV's.
Predictably, Yeltsin is urged by his generals to launch a retaliatory strike, and given the Cheget (i.e. the Russian version of the Nuclear Football). Fortunately, he was pretty cool under pressure and, receiving no anomalous responses from satellites monitoring the missile-fields in the United States, a stand-down was ordered.
Tactical nukes are off the table IMO. Any strike against Kyiv or Mariupol will see the prevailing winds send nuclear fallout straight into Moscow and Volgrad. Much could also be said for any large use of chemical weapons.
It hasn't stopped them from attacking Chernobyl, right?
And this is the REALLY dangerous part of all this...Putin clearly sees himself as the embodiment of Russia. We've already heard from one of his cronies that "there's no world if there's no Russia" (or words to that effect). Thus if Putin IS Russia, then no Putin means there's no Russia...and if there's no Russia, then what's the point of the world?
And there you have it: You've just illustrated the danger of the Malignant Narcissist. An amoral, paranoid, and utterly self-absorbed person who literally sees himself as mattering more than any other entity on earth. A guy like that could be inclined to order missile launches in order to ensure that "if I go down, you go with me".
I'm not sure if I posted this earlier, but if I could draw people well, I probably would have made political cartoons like this. I would have probably not made it to 38!