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And just how well were the Allies equipped to handle the strength of Japanese forces in 1944 compared to 1945?
The war of attrition on the Japanese was showing definite results on both the IJA and IJN by spring of 1945...so an assault on Okinawa and/or Iwo Jima in 1944, when the Japanese had greater material strength seems to me like it may have turned into a disaster for the Allies.
As for the "political assault" on the Philippines...at what point should they have been taken?
The Philippines provided a wealth of military resources for the Japanese in airfields, naval bases and staging areas that was a "jumping off" point to held areas to the south, east and the Asian mainland - taking that away from the Japanese drove a huge wedge into their ability to move, resupply and hold areas in the region.
Yes, General MacArthur was respected by Japanese because he tried to understand them as he testified later in the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the United States Senate – 82nd Congress, Thursday May 3, 1951. His mistake, however, was to have disbanded IJA and IJN perfectly. He would have missed them when he encountered communists in Korea.
An intercepted Japanese report of early 1944 summarising combat lessons after the first clashes between the Ki-43 and RAF Spitfires in Burma mentions that its pilots were pleased with the armour and fuel tank protection in the Type 1 Hayabusa and that one aircraft had returned safely after receiving 39 hits.