Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released.

Shortround6 said:

This is not the first time that this has come up nor the idea that somehow the US (and Britain) were remiss in not designing and building escort fighters sooner. This seems to be a rather consistent complainant. I am not single out Planesandships here.

Problem is that complainers never tell where the planes for realistic peace time training were to come from, for the US especially.
As of Dec 7th 1941 the US had about 130-140 B-17s total, of all kinds, and they were scattered from Newfoundland (anti-sub patrol) to the Philippines so getting even two dozen together at one base might have been a real trick.
The US had about 20 or so B-24s and around 1/2 had turbos and 1/2 didn't so we can rule out formation flying with those. Things got better in a hurry but it was no longer peace time.

I would be very interested to see how the US would build escort fighters to escort even those early B-17s with the engines of the time (1938-39-40-41).
Not a casual wave of the hand and statement of "if they wanted to they could have done it."

P&W canceled the 14 cylinder R-2180 after about 30 engines. Probably would not have done the job anyway, also used the same cylinders/piston assemblies as the R-2800.
P&W was working on a 24 cylinder sleeve valve pre war but canceled it in Oct 1940 leaving the XP-49, XP-54 and XP-55 without their first engine.
Wright was working on the 42 cylinder R-2160 Tornado and after about 6.5 million dollars they gave up.
The USAAC fair-haired child, the 0-IV-V-1430 Continental was supposed to take up the slack but it was running several years late and making a lot less the promised power.
Meanwhile, Allison goes from making 40 engines in 1939 to making just under 15,000 engines in 1942. Goes a long way to saving the Allies bacon. But the 1942 production also needed a lot help from at least one Automobile plant (Cadillac) for internal parts. Nowadays gets blamed for not being quicker with a two stage supercharger , 5000 fewer Allison in North Africa, Soviet union and the Pacific in 1942/early 43???
Other companies and countries did a fantastic job but before 1939 Allison had not built more than 13/14 engines in a single year. Blaming them for not coming close to RR superchargers in 1942/43 is more than a little harsh.

So the challenge how does the US come up with an "escort" fighter in 1939 or 1940 or 1941 to accompany even the early B-17s in training. Part of the challenge is that unlike British bombers, the B-17Bs of 1939 had turbos and were going to cruise higher than any non turbo or non two stage engine of the time.
Now just for fun, figure out far a P-36 could return from, after dropping hypothetical drop tanks, with totally full internal fuel (CG adjusted to solve that problem, special fuel pump to allow for full fuel after the tanks are dropped.)
allow for 15 minutes of combat, not 20, and plan on 15 gallons reserve(30 min) to find and land on a friendly field at the end of the mission.
how far will that P-36 fly at what speeds and how many hundreds of miles less is that than the radius of a B-17?
Use the 10,000 ft altitudes of the P-36 and forget flying at high altitudes for the B-17s.
I don't care how much fuel you hang under the P-36, 150-200 gallons? the problem is how do you get back.

Click to expand...

WRT "casual wave and it would have been done" being unrealistic, and it is unrealistic, but IMHO that's the point of focusing on the memo. Imagine if a different memo had been written on 5-16-39 requiring the use of drop tanks instead of prohibiting them. That gives another two years for engineering/design, testing, development, training, tactics, etc. Imagine if a forward thinking USAAF required Republic to design drop tank capability from the beginning. Wasn't the whole air corps propaganda going back to Billy Mitchell all about the future, of being forward thinking, that aviation would have a huge role in the future? How many lives might have been saved if the sentence read: "The Chief of the Air Corps directs that all tactical airplanes will be capable of carrying drop tanks." I'm anticipating that some will say, "Ok, how much fuel?" That is TBD, but requiring their use would have been a good step in the right direction.

WRT the P-36 not getting back, and CG problems.....other airplanes had that problem also, as noted here and elsewhere (for example in Greg's hated video) the P-51 had the same problem. The "get back" is dictated by the FOB after the tanks are dropped minus any fuel used for CG, minus any fuel used for fighting. The drop tank isn't a panacea, but it can be used, and was used later, to great effect. Its interesting to me that 20 years and 1,200 mph faster with very different technology, the Phantom had the same limitation. I know of at least 2 F4's that crashed due to fuel exhaustion: C.E. Southwick and Randy Cunningham were the pilots (I forget the RIO's/WSO's.) I wonder if any P-47s actually ran out of fuel over France or the Channel returning after combat, and if so, how many? Also, I mentioned McNamara and Vietnam earlier, and that was poo-pooed, which seems ironic given McNamara's involvement in strategic bombing in WW2. One might argue that the arrogant man was 0 for 2 in directing large conflicts on a world wide basis from the comfy confines of an office in DC.

WRT taking off downwind, I heard that if you deploy the spoilers it helps catch some of that wind and pushes you forward like a sailboat. Same thing happens in cruise with a big tailwind, deploy the flight spoilers and catch even more of that wind.......

PlanesandShips said:

WRT taking off downwind, I heard that if you deploy the spoilers it helps catch some of that wind and pushes you forward like a sailboat. Same thing happens in cruise with a big tailwind, deploy the flight spoilers and catch even more of that wind.......

Click to expand...

According to some internet info which must be right of course, a good tailwind did the obvious and lifted the tail
while the plane going faster on the runway automatically created a headwind which lifted the front.
Once slightly airborne, the two winds would hit each other under the fuselage and go up, thus lifting rest of the plane.
See, now you know.

These informative places also tell me that the Maybach HL230 was quickly converted for the Panther and Tiger to a diesel engine
(amazing engineering), so all Panthers and Tigers ran on diesel.

33k in the air said:

We can do basic calculations of the P-47's combat radius right here, right now, by using document AN 01-65BC-1A entitled, Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions for Army Models P-47D -25, -26, -27, -28, -30, and -35 Airplanes dated 25 Jan. 1945, and using its climb and cruise charts. Unfortunately, the cruise charts are only filled out to a limited degree, but there's enough data to make a rudimentary attempt.

91 gallons = amount of fuel consumed climbing to 20,000 feet at a 14,200 lbs gross weight
91 gallons = amount of fuel consumed by fifteen minutes of full MIL and fives minutes WEP
48 gallons = amount of fuel reserve (30 minutes' cruising at maximum range settings at 20,000 feet)

The above adds up to 230 gallons, leaving 140 gallons of the 370 gallon internal capacity for cruising. Column V (Maximum Air Range) shows that the aircraft gets 3.03 air miles per gallon at 20,000 feet (288 mph TAS / 95 gph).

Click to expand...

Fuel consumption agrees with the table provided in America's Hundred Thousand, interesting P-47 economic cruise speed. Assuming that is an acceptable speed over Germany then to turn it around a bit deducting the 91 gallons for combat and the 48 gallons for reserve leaves 166 gallons for return, or about 500 miles for the early P-47. To get there requires 91 gallons for take off and climb plus 166 gallons using the wonder no weight or drag external tank, add say 10% for tank drag and you are about 280 gallons of external fuel. Have 110 gallons of external fuel which can be pumped into the main tanks during the climb and jettisoned just about as soon as the climb has finished and your radius is around 280 miles.

Roger Freeman thinks for P-47, external fuel radius, 84 gallons 280 miles, 108 gallons 325 miles, 165 gallons 375 miles, 215 gallons 480 miles, 300 gallons 550 miles, the final combination a pair of tanks. Going from 84 to 180 gallons gets you 3.75 mpg from the extra fuel, from 108 to 165 gallons 1.75 mpg, 165 to 215 gallons 4.2 mpg, 215 to 300 gallons 1.65 mpg. Fascinating if true about the drag different tanks had but more likely to reflect some are using the early 305 gallon internal fuel and others the later 370 gallons, the extra fuel adding around 215 miles to economic cruise range. The many times used range graphic has Spitfire 175 miles in May 1943, P-47 230 miles in June, 375 miles in August (Frankfurt, Kassel, Hannover just in range, Hamburg just out), P-38 520 miles in August and P-51 600 miles in early 1944. It would be very useful to find the 8th Air Force documents specifying how combat radius was calculated. Do not forget the extra pilot training and navigation aids required to enable an isolated fighter or small formation to find their way back from hundreds of miles out in less than perfect weather.

To June 1940 any bombing campaign assumed the enemy was across the border, fighting at long range costs, assuming the French airfields became instantly available to the 8th Air Force on 1 September then in the period to 31 August 1944 some 2.7% of 8th Air Force B-17s listed as lost to fighters made it back to allied territory, versus 6.4% of those listed as lost to flak. For the period 1 September 1944 to the end of the war the figures become 5.8% and 16.6%.

Sending the P-38 units to the Mediterranean in late 1942 was the correct decision, apart from their contribution to the fighting they enabled what ultimately became the European Theatre Commander Team to work out longer ranged escorted heavy bomber raids. Heavy bomber missions in Europe in 1942/43 would likely be longer ranged on average and against stronger opposition than in the Mediterranean, given the losses the P-38 took in the Mediterranean and the difficulties later P-38 had as 8th Air Force escorts in 1943/44 any P-38 units in Britain would most likely take heavier losses, remembering in early 1943 the Luftwaffe was much more ready to engage allied fighters than at the end of 1943.

In September 1944 Germany's oil product production was down from a peak of just over 700,000 tons a month to around 260,000 tons a month. The bombers mostly hit the synthetic plants in the first phase, it was known Germany had more crude oil refining capacity than crude oil supply. The Hydrogenation plants from 340,000 tons at peak to 25,000 tons in September, Fischer-Tropsch from 43,000 to 6,000 tons, Benzol from 57,000 to 44,000 tons.

The USSBS notes occupied Europe contributed another 12% to German steel production in the 1941-44 time period, then there is the estimated loss of production due to air raid damage and alarms. The USSBS German total 1941-44 is 113.4 million tons (about 2.4 million tons a month on average), add another 13.7 million tons from occupied Europe, with around 6.5 million tons of production estimated lost due to allied air activity in Germany alone in 1943 and 1944. Christine Goulter in A Forgotten Offensive has Ruhr Steel production at 1.1 to 1.2 million tons a month January to August 1944, down to 300,000 tons in December. A significant part of the drop caused by reductions in iron ore imports starting earlier in 1944 due to a combination of Sweden reducing exports and the Coastal Command anti shipping operations.

John Ellis puts US steel production 1942-44 as 247.9 million tons.

Despite the return to full employment in the 1930's the availability of consumer goods declined as did the standard of living for the average German. The Rolf Wagenfuehr/Speer index numbers are now known to underestimate German economic mobilisation early in the war, things like the Hydrogenation plants being built, reducing the Speer "miracle", in any case like the allies there was the mass production efficiency curve. Speer definitely made the German war economy more efficient and effective, though not as much as he claimed. He was able to provide lots of accurate information to his captors, preferring to omit his involvement in slave supply, his book tends to be a real time account, meaning most advocates of various air and economic war causes can find support at some point.

In 1936 the USAAF used the technology and ideas of the time and ordered the XFM-1 long range fighter prototype, in 1938 came an order for test examples a month ahead of the XP-38 order, like the P-38 it had twin turbo charged Allison engines and 400 gallons of unprotected internal fuel, there were 7 FM-1, 3 FM-1A and 2 FM-1B in 1940 and 1941, ranges depending on model, best seems to be around 1,000 miles on internal and around 2,000 miles maximum.

PlanesandShips said:

Imagine if a different memo had been written on 5-16-39 requiring the use of drop tanks instead of prohibiting them. That gives another two years for engineering/design, testing, development, training, tactics, etc. Imagine if a forward thinking USAAF required Republic to design drop tank capability from the beginning.

Click to expand...

Imagine one or more significant accidents where the external fuel was a major cause. Meantime all combat worthy P-47 came with ferry tank or drop tank fittings. Since the USAAF did not specify internal fuel tank protection until 1940 the same would apply to external tanks to that date. At best the USAAF could have had 9 groups of longer ranged higher altitude fighters available to the 8th Air Force mid 1943, 3 P-38, 3 P-47 and 3 Spitfire VIII, at a cost to the fighting in the Mediterranean at least. The Germans could easily over match that force numbers wise as required. Imagine them doing a fighting withdrawal in North Africa, as the air cover was not available, saving most of the troops and taking way fewer aircraft losses, cancelling the air effort to defend Sicily as well.

PlanesandShips said:

Wasn't the whole air corps propaganda

Click to expand...

Interesting term, not publicity? Propaganda is a conclusion, yet we have someone claiming to be looking for evidence to support a conclusion.

PlanesandShips said:

How many lives might have been saved

Click to expand...

The numbers possible have been given for the 8th Air Force, now being ignored, time to wind things back to imagine another figure, the real one must be unacceptable.

PlanesandShips said:

(for example in Greg's hated video)

Click to expand...

Remember folks, Greg is dealing with haters, not rational people, hence why he must be more right than those here. People who ban others can be called haters. I have not seen the video, or those by others, as that medium is simply not information dense enough to justify use of my research time budget, the current failing attempt to defend the video confirms my decision as correct.

PlanesandShips said:

I mentioned McNamara and Vietnam earlier, and that was poo-pooed,

Click to expand...

Actually McNamara was mentioned as part of a sad guilt by association attempt, but watch someone get upset way beyond poo-poohed if they decide it is aimed at them. Thanks for such an easy to check example of your methods. One might argue that the arrogant man was 0 for many, heading for triple figures as the adjectives thicken while the facts stay unanswered and yet more look over there attempts are made. Adjectives can be a lot of fun.

So far you started with 10 times over inflated losses. Still believe Mosquitoes and B-26 could substitute for B-17 and B-24 for example? Flak suppression sorties? How ineffective the bomber gunners were? Still believe it was under 5% of bombs within 1 mile of target? Nothing you introduced was new, nil, zero. Including guilt by association. So who are the USAAF bomber mafia generals? How did they stop the 8th Air Force having a numerically viable escort force in 1943?

To complete the 8th Air Force Raid days on Germany to end 1944, Richard Davis figures, which includes non bombing sorties like night leaflet etc. Again the USAAF counted percentages from the number of aircraft that entered hostile airspace, which is more than the number credited with attacking, using attacking ups the figures . The jump in the average raid sizes from November 1943 helps reduce percentage losses. The last time the defences caused more than 5% of the number of bombers credited with attacking to be classified as missing was on 24 May 1944. The 4 raid days 8 to 14 October 1943 saw 142 bombers missing, the 4 raid days 3 to 8 March 1944 saw 131 bombers missing, the 4 raid days 1 to 11 April 1944 saw 129 bombers missing.

03-Nov-43 attacking: 539, missing: 7
05-Nov-43 attacking: 436, missing: 11
07-Nov-43 attacking: 112, missing: 0
11-Nov-43 attacking: 60, missing: 4
12-Nov-43 attacking: 1, missing: 0
13-Nov-43 attacking: 143, missing: 16
19-Nov-43 attacking: 113, missing: 0
26-Nov-43 attacking: 440, missing: 25
29-Nov-43 attacking: 155, missing: 14
30-Nov-43 attacking: 80, missing: 3
01-Dec-43 attacking: 281, missing: 24
02-Dec-43 attacking: 5, missing: 0
11-Dec-43 attacking: 523, missing: 17
13-Dec-43 attacking: 650, missing: 5
16-Dec-43 attacking: 539, missing: 10
20-Dec-43 attacking: 472, missing: 27
22-Dec-43 attacking: 440, missing: 22
27-Dec-43 attacking: 1, missing: 0
29-Dec-43 attacking: 7, missing: 0
30-Dec-43 attacking: 658, missing: 23
04-Jan-44 attacking: 551, missing: 19
05-Jan-44 attacking: 297, missing: 12
07-Jan-44 attacking: 421, missing: 12
11-Jan-44 attacking: 557, missing: 60
14-Jan-44 attacking: 1, missing: 0
23-Jan-44 attacking: 1, missing: 0
24-Jan-44 attacking: 58, missing: 2
25-Jan-44 attacking: 1, missing: 0
28-Jan-44 attacking: 1, missing: 0
29-Jan-44 attacking: 809, missing: 34
30-Jan-44 attacking: 754, missing: 20
03-Feb-44 attacking: 615, missing: 5
04-Feb-44 attacking: 655, missing: 20
08-Feb-44 attacking: 201, missing: 13
10-Feb-44 attacking: 138, missing: 29
11-Feb-44 attacking: 218, missing: 3
20-Feb-44 attacking: 889, missing: 21
21-Feb-44 attacking: 760, missing: 16
22-Feb-44 attacking: 183, missing: 35
24-Feb-44 attacking: 754, missing: 51
25-Feb-44 attacking: 694, missing: 31
29-Feb-44 attacking: 218, missing: 1
02-Mar-44 attacking: 373, missing: 9
03-Mar-44 attacking: 154, missing: 11
04-Mar-44 attacking: 214, missing: 15
06-Mar-44 attacking: 658, missing: 69
08-Mar-44 attacking: 543, missing: 36
09-Mar-44 attacking: 490, missing: 8
11-Mar-44 attacking: 124, missing: 1
15-Mar-44 attacking: 335, missing: 3
16-Mar-44 attacking: 711, missing: 23
18-Mar-44 attacking: 679, missing: 43
20-Mar-44 attacking: 149, missing: 7
22-Mar-44 attacking: 698, missing: 12
23-Mar-44 attacking: 705, missing: 28
24-Mar-44 attacking: 224, missing: 3
29-Mar-44 attacking: 228, missing: 9
01-Apr-44 attacking: 110, missing: 12
08-Apr-44 attacking: 630, missing: 34
09-Apr-44 attacking: 326, missing: 19
11-Apr-44 attacking: 826, missing: 64
12-Apr-44 attacking: 0, missing: 6 (Mission abandoned)
13-Apr-44 attacking: 576, missing: 38
18-Apr-44 attacking: 727, missing: 19
19-Apr-44 attacking: 749, missing: 5
22-Apr-44 attacking: 801, missing: 19
24-Apr-44 attacking: 714, missing: 39
25-Apr-44 attacking: 29, missing: 5
26-Apr-44 attacking: 342, missing: 0
29-Apr-44 attacking: 617, missing: 64
07-May-44 attacking: 886, missing: 9
08-May-44 attacking: 742, missing: 36
11-May-44 attacking: 229, missing: 6
12-May-44 attacking: 659, missing: 37
13-May-44 attacking: 688, missing: 12
19-May-44 attacking: 823, missing: 28
22-May-44 attacking: 292, missing: 5
23-May-44 attacking: 176, missing: 0
24-May-44 attacking: 519, missing: 33
27-May-44 attacking: 697, missing: 21
28-May-44 attacking: 875, missing: 32
29-May-44 attacking: 732, missing: 32
30-May-44 attacking: 672, missing: 12
31-May-44 attacking: 244, missing: 1
14-Jun-44 attacking: 60, missing: 0
15-Jun-44 attacking: 204, missing: 0
18-Jun-44 attacking: 1163, missing: 11
20-Jun-44 attacking: 1266, missing: 45
21-Jun-44 attacking: 1137, missing: 47
24-Jun-44 attacking: 317, missing: 1
28-Jun-44 attacking: 331, missing: 1
29-Jun-44 attacking: 706, missing: 15
06-Jul-44 attacking: 232, missing: 3
07-Jul-44 attacking: 1001, missing: 37
11-Jul-44 attacking: 1048, missing: 21
12-Jul-44 attacking: 1149, missing: 24
13-Jul-44 attacking: 901, missing: 10
16-Jul-44 attacking: 986, missing: 11
18-Jul-44 attacking: 652, missing: 3
19-Jul-44 attacking: 1031, missing: 17
20-Jul-44 attacking: 1166, missing: 19
21-Jul-44 attacking: 961, missing: 31
22-Jul-44 attacking: 7, missing: 0
28-Jul-44 attacking: 710, missing: 7
29-Jul-44 attacking: 1045, missing: 17
31-Jul-44 attacking: 1098, missing: 16
03-Aug-44 attacking: 71, missing: 1
04-Aug-44 attacking: 1169, missing: 17
05-Aug-44 attacking: 1070, missing: 13
06-Aug-44 attacking: 927, missing: 25
09-Aug-44 attacking: 420, missing: 15
11-Aug-44 attacking: 60, missing: 2
14-Aug-44 attacking: 483, missing: 2
15-Aug-44 attacking: 637, missing: 13
16-Aug-44 attacking: 992, missing: 23
24-Aug-44 attacking: 1072, missing: 24
25-Aug-44 attacking: 1117, missing: 18
26-Aug-44 attacking: 459, missing: 9
27-Aug-44 attacking: 162, missing: 2
30-Aug-44 attacking: 616, missing: 0
01-Sep-44 attacking: 13, missing: 0
03-Sep-44 attacking: 326, missing: 2
05-Sep-44 attacking: 667, missing: 8
08-Sep-44 attacking: 940, missing: 11
09-Sep-44 attacking: 920, missing: 16
10-Sep-44 attacking: 1091, missing: 8
11-Sep-44 attacking: 973, missing: 40
12-Sep-44 attacking: 735, missing: 31
13-Sep-44 attacking: 800, missing: 16
14-Sep-44 attacking: 2, missing:
19-Sep-44 attacking: 715, missing: 4
21-Sep-44 attacking: 441, missing: 4
22-Sep-44 attacking: 621, missing: 4
25-Sep-44 attacking: 924, missing: 3
26-Sep-44 attacking: 1068, missing: 9
27-Sep-44 attacking: 1092, missing: 28
28-Sep-44 attacking: 981, missing: 36
30-Sep-44 attacking: 765, missing: 9
02-Oct-44 attacking: 1107, missing: 4
03-Oct-44 attacking: 999, missing: 4
05-Oct-44 attacking: 944, missing: 8
06-Oct-44 attacking: 1196, missing: 3
07-Oct-44 attacking: 1301, missing: 41
09-Oct-44 attacking: 1051, missing: 2
10-Oct-44 attacking: 0, missing: 0 (Leaflet)
11-Oct-44 attacking: 130, missing: 4
12-Oct-44 attacking: 511, missing: 3
14-Oct-44 attacking: 1107, missing: 5
15-Oct-44 attacking: 1124, missing: 6
17-Oct-44 attacking: 1248, missing: 4
18-Oct-44 attacking: 479, missing: 5
19-Oct-44 attacking: 946, missing: 6
22-Oct-44 attacking: 1074, missing: 4
25-Oct-44 attacking: 1196, missing: 2
26-Oct-44 attacking: 1161, missing: 0
28-Oct-44 attacking: 363, missing: 3
30-Oct-44 attacking: 670, missing: 3
01-Nov-44 attacking: 366, missing: 0
02-Nov-44 attacking: 1102, missing: 38
04-Nov-44 attacking: 1109, missing: 5
05-Nov-44 attacking: 1211, missing: 12
06-Nov-44 attacking: 1107, missing: 5
08-Nov-44 attacking: 289, missing: 3
09-Nov-44 attacking: 363, missing: 4
10-Nov-44 attacking: 677, missing: 4
11-Nov-44 attacking: 440, missing: 1
15-Nov-44 attacking: 12, missing: 0
16-Nov-44 attacking: 1191, missing: 0
20-Nov-44 attacking: 152, missing: 0
21-Nov-44 attacking: 1136, missing: 25
23-Nov-44 attacking: 159, missing: 0
25-Nov-44 attacking: 947, missing: 8
26-Nov-44 attacking: 1068, missing: 34
27-Nov-44 attacking: 484, missing: 0
29-Nov-44 attacking: 1033, missing: 1
30-Nov-44 attacking: 1225, missing: 33
01-Dec-44 attacking: 15, missing: 0
02-Dec-44 attacking: 276, missing: 11
04-Dec-44 attacking: 1150, missing: 3
05-Dec-44 attacking: 549, missing: 12
06-Dec-44 attacking: 774, missing: 4
09-Dec-44 attacking: 394, missing: 1
10-Dec-44 attacking: 451, missing: 0
11-Dec-44 attacking: 1489, missing: 6
12-Dec-44 attacking: 1214, missing: 5
15-Dec-44 attacking: 654, missing: 1
16-Dec-44 attacking: 116, missing: 1
18-Dec-44 attacking: 402, missing: 0
19-Dec-44 attacking: 299, missing: 0
23-Dec-44 attacking: 409, missing: 0
24-Dec-44 attacking: 1879, missing: 11
25-Dec-44 attacking: 393, missing: 5
26-Dec-44 attacking: 126, missing: 0
27-Dec-44 attacking: 570, missing: 2
28-Dec-44 attacking: 1170, missing: 2
29-Dec-44 attacking: 760, missing: 3
30-Dec-44 attacking: 1276, missing: 4
31-Dec-44 attacking: 1250, missing: 27

PlanesandShips said:

WRT "casual wave and it would have been done" being unrealistic, and it is unrealistic, but IMHO that's the point of focusing on the memo. Imagine if a different memo had been written on 5-16-39 requiring the use of drop tanks instead of prohibiting them. That gives another two years for engineering/design, testing, development, training, tactics, etc. Imagine if a forward thinking USAAF required Republic to design drop tank capability from the beginning. Wasn't the whole air corps propaganda going back to Billy Mitchell all about the future, of being forward thinking, that aviation would have a huge role in the future? How many lives might have been saved if the sentence read: "The Chief of the Air Corps directs that all tactical airplanes will be capable of carrying drop tanks." I'm anticipating that some will say, "Ok, how much fuel?" That is TBD, but requiring their use would have been a good step in the right direction.

Click to expand...

In 1939 with Europe obviously marching to war, anyone in May 1939 making detailed plans for the USA to get involved in it may well have been told to clear their desk. For a start which side would they take? Most planners use the last war as a guide when planning for the next, to foresee a need for strategic bombers flying from UK only to Germany, you have to foresee the fall of France in a matter of weeks, did anyone do that? A P-51D with all internal and external tanks full is dangerously overloaded and it was only approved for the "duration" as a necessary risk, with limits on what could be done until fuel was burned off and tanks dropped. The Pointblank Directive which undertook to conduct day and night bombing of German industry was signed on 14 June 1943. From that you get a plan to win the war with a single raid on ball bearing production. We now know almost everything was over optimistic but that isnt a criminal offence. Training and practice improves things but is not risk free, around 15,000 aviators were lost by the USA in training accidents in USA, more than 5,000 in 1944.. In training for D-Day the disaster of "Operation Tiger" resulted in the deaths of 749 men with 200 more injured. You cannot selectively use and ignore statistics and events or twist historiacal events to reinforce your view of todays world with a "post hoc ergo propter hoc" philosophy.

PlanesandShips said:

WRT to "casual wave and it would have been done" being unrealistic, and it is unrealistic, but IMHO that's the point of focusing on the memo. Imagine if a different memo had been written on 5-16-39 requiring the use of drop tanks instead of prohibiting them. That gives another two years for engineering/design, testing, development, training, tactics, etc. Imagine if a forward thinking USAAF required Republic to design drop tank capability from the beginning. Wasn't the whole air corps propaganda going back to Billy Mitchell all about the future, of being forward thinking, that aviation would have a huge role in the future? How many lives might have been saved if the sentence read: "The Chief of the Air Corps directs that all tactical airplanes will be capable of carrying drop tanks." I'm anticipating that some will say, "Ok, how much fuel?" That is TBD, but requiring their use would have been a good step in the right direction.

WRT the P-36 not getting back, and CG problems.....other airplanes had that problem also, as noted here and elsewhere (for example in Greg's hated video) the P-51 had the same problem. The "get back" is dictated by the FOB after the tanks are dropped minus any fuel used for CG, minus any fuel used for fighting.

Click to expand...

When was the memo trashed? The P-40Cs were coming off the line in early April 1941, not quite 2 years but the planning for the new fuel system and manufacture of parts had to start a few weeks/months earlier?
The P-47C was supposed to fly 860miles using 265 gal at the same speed altitude that P-36 did 800 miles using 160 gallon. Using the full 305 gallons the P-47 had a rating of 990 miles.

Now neither of those theoretical ranges were any where near enough to escort a B-17 and here lies part of the problem.

Neither plane (or any fighter plane) could escort a B-17 over the range a B-17 could fly. The Army was buying planes that could carry 4000lbs of bombs 2400 miles. Even if we shorten that to 2000 miles to take into account taking off, high speed over target and a little reserve to get home, we are expecting a magical 1939-40 fighter to fly the same 2000 miles or the fighters have to abandon the bombers in the last few hundred miles. Who was going to by such an escort fighter in peace time?
The US did not know who the enemy was going to be (OK some good guesses, with Japan a strong contender) but they didn't KNOW. And later in 1940, the US was not sure Britain was going to hold out. within a couple of weeks of a P-40 rolling out to the Curtiss flight line with single 52 gallon drop tank the USAAC opened up a design competition that lead to the B-36 Peacemaker bomber. After a few months the initial specifications were scaled back to maximum range requirement was reduced to 10,000 miles and the effective combat radius requirement was cut to 4000 miles with a 10,000 pound bombload. The cruising speed should be somewhere between 240 and 300 mph, and the service ceiling should be 40,000 feet.
Obviously no single engine or twin engine plane could escort such a bomber. So the USAAC was heading for very large, very long range, unescorted bombers in the summer of 1941.
Another thing was that the USAAC was not as dumb as some people think. The B-17s of 1938-40 had 5-6 .30 cal machine guns in single manually aimed mounts, Not any better than an He 111 in the BoB. This was obviously not going to work and the USAAC worked on and ordered the B-17E in the fall of 1940 (B-17Ds were built in the mean time) for delivery in Sept 1941 with the now famous large number (not as large as later) of .50 cal guns and using, at first, two powered twin mounts.
The USAAC gave up 400 miles of range with 4000lbs of bombs while increasing the fuel load in order to accommodate that defensive armament. Turns out they were wrong but they were not flying their desks along in their offices fat dumb and happy.
And to put later raids in perspective, the US was asking the B-17Es for the ability carry 4000lbs from England to Vilnius Lithuania in small numbers in a straight line.
It is going to need a lot more than drop tanks on fighters to do that.

Shortround6 said:

When was the memo trashed? The P-40Cs were coming off the line in early April 1941, not quite 2 years but the planning for the new fuel system and manufacture of parts had to start a few weeks/months earlier?
The P-47C was supposed to fly 860miles using 265 gal at the same speed altitude that P-36 did 800 miles using 160 gallon. Using the full 305 gallons the P-47 had a rating of 990 miles.

Now neither of those theoretical ranges were any where near enough to escort a B-17 and here lies part of the problem.

Neither plane (or any fighter plane) could escort a B-17 over the range a B-17 could fly. The Army was buying planes that could carry 4000lbs of bombs 2400 miles. Even if we shorten that to 2000 miles to take into account taking off, high speed over target and a little reserve to get home, we are expecting a magical 1939-40 fighter to fly the same 2000 miles or the fighters have to abandon the bombers in the last few hundred miles. Who was going to by such an escort fighter in peace time?
The US did not know who the enemy was going to be (OK some good guesses, with Japan a strong contender) but they didn't KNOW. And later in 1940, the US was not sure Britain was going to hold out. within a couple of weeks of a P-40 rolling out to the Curtiss flight line with single 52 gallon drop tank the USAAC opened up a design competition that lead to the B-36 Peacemaker bomber. After a few months the initial specifications were scaled back to maximum range requirement was reduced to 10,000 miles and the effective combat radius requirement was cut to 4000 miles with a 10,000 pound bombload. The cruising speed should be somewhere between 240 and 300 mph, and the service ceiling should be 40,000 feet.
Obviously no single engine or twin engine plane could escort such a bomber. So the USAAC was heading for very large, very long range, unescorted bombers in the summer of 1941.
Another thing was that the USAAC was not as dumb as some people think. The B-17s of 1938-40 had 5-6 .30 cal machine guns in single manually aimed mounts, Not any better than an He 111 in the BoB. This was obviously not going to work and the USAAC worked on and ordered the B-17E in the fall of 1940 (B-17Ds were built in the mean time) for delivery in Sept 1941 with the now famous large number (not as large as later) of .50 cal guns and using, at first, two powered twin mounts.
The USAAC gave up 400 miles of range with 4000lbs of bombs while increasing the fuel load in order to accommodate that defensive armament. Turns out they were wrong but they were not flying their desks along in their offices fat dumb and happy.
And to put later raids in perspective, the US was asking the B-17Es for the ability carry 4000lbs from England to Vilnius Lithuania in small numbers in a straight line.
It is going to need a lot more than drop tanks on fighters to do that.

Click to expand...

Great post S/R. In addition it is often forgotten that until 1941 Germany had a non aggression pact with Russia, the invasion of Russia gave Germany what most planning tried to avoid, a war on two fronts. Berlin is often used as a yardstick for range when discussing missions, there is a huge amount of territory east and south of Berlin that Germany could have used to re locate industry, but didnt until too late.

What made the P-51 work was a combination of things.

Very good aerodynamics for low drag so the plane could fly further on one gallon of fuel.
It was large enough to hold a useful armament and a large amount of internal fuel.
It wound up with an engine that would give the needed power at the altitude it needed to fly that was compact/streamlined.
There maybe others?

Note the last.
The two stage Merlin didn't exist when the Mustang was being designed. Any escort fighters the US would have designed in 1939-40-41 would have used a different engine. As noted in an earlier post the US had three engines in the works that offered high power and low frontal area (streamline). ALL three failed leaving the R-2800 as the defacto high powered fighter engine. To escort B-17/B-24s using turbos you need (in 1941) a turbo in your fighter. So you need a large fighter, a very large fighter. The P-47 was actually darn good for it's size. It's low speed profile drag was actually about the same as the F4F and about 75% that of an F4U. Unfortunately that did mean it was about 50% greater than P-51D.
Again this is low speed profile drag, High speed drag changes but at least we have some form of comparison.

It does point out the problem of simply adding drop tanks to an existing fighter. A P-40 (no letter) has about 40% more drag than the P-51D. So you are going to use up about 40% more fuel per mile than a P-51D.

I may very well be guilty of over simplifying things here. At speed there can be some significant changes due to turbulence and local airflows.

A P-40 has a lot less drag than P-36 due to the engine installation but it is still way off the P-51. P-40 also was not in production until mid 1940 so it's ability to practice with B-17s until mid 1940 was non-existent. And the engine on the P-40_-C was crapping out where the B-17s were just starting to work good.
British found that an early B-17 running light (no bombs or bombs gone and some fuel gone) at over 25,000ft or so, could out climb a Bf 109E. Good thing as the windows were probably frozen over and the guns were frozen and wouldn't fire
The more heavily loaded, higher drag B-17Es and later couldn't do that trick anywhere near as well.
It is true that few, if any, of the US fighters were designed to be escort fighters during 1939-41/42. Most or all of the ones that were repurposed to escort fighters pretty much sucked.

While the original requirement did call for a 2500 mile range, it also wanted 5600ft per minute climb. The US was guilty of asking for too much at one time rather than trying to sort out what they really wanted from the stew that resulted. It took over a year from initial request to change to emphasizing the escort role and about 8 months from the contract for the first two prototypes. Of course July of 1943 for the order for the "escort" prototypes was more than a little late to affect much of anything in Europe.

As far as the P-51B with Merlin goes, trying to short circuit that development process by using some sort of lower tech Allison or Merlin (XX ?) to get some sort of escort fighter sooner runs into a weight problem. The engine and propeller are going to be several hundreds of pounds lighter which means you cannot use the rear fuselage tank. And the engine doesn't make the same power so performance takes a real hit if you try to load it up with fuel.

I might also point out that American long range bombing philosophy was a product of the 1930's, where a bomber could fly far enough and high enough to avoid enemy interceptors.

In 1933, the USAAC issued "Project A" with requirements for a bomber to have a range of 5,000 miles, a speed of 200mph and a bombload of 2,000 pounds.
Keep in mind that when the Air Corps requested Boeing and Martin to develop a proof-of-concept bomber (XB-15 and XB-16 respectively), the latest fighter in the AAC's inventory was the P-26A.

The XB-15 (also designated XBLR-1 for the Project-A/Project-D merger) was extensively tested with planned upgrades in 1938 as the XB-20.

Meanwhile, the afore-mentioned Project-D of 1935, resulted in the XB-19 (XBLR-2), which exceeded the earlier Project-A's requirements.

At this point in time (1935), the USAAC's latest fighter entering service, was the Consolidated P-30 (the P-36 was still under development and three years away from entering service).

These are just a few examples highlighting the mindset of the Army's desire to be able to deliver a substantial bombload over long distances and at no point during these trials, did they realize that within a few year's time, that there would be a need for fighter escort.

pbehn said:

Great post S/R. In addition it is often forgotten that until 1941 Germany had a non aggression pact with Russia, the invasion of Russia gave Germany what most planning tried to avoid, a war on two fronts. Berlin is often used as a yardstick for range when discussing missions, there is a huge amount of territory east and south of Berlin that Germany could have used to re locate industry, but didnt until too late.

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This brings up another point. The Criticisms of US bomber and fighter policies are rather European centric. Since the 8th air force seldom flew more than 600 miles (in a straight line although the actual routes flown were longer) and it is only 510 miles from Norwich to Berlin, it seems easier to demand that the US come up with escort fighters to suit that theater.
On Dec 7th 1941 there were 19 B-17s in the Philippines. B-17Es were on the way, some were stopping over in Hawaii on Dec 7th.
Remember that 2400 mile range for the early B-17s? From the north coast of Luzon 1200 mile radius covers most of the south island of Japan, Kyushu. Granted operational radius will be shorter than simple 50% of range but then, trade bombs for fuel. Or build longer runway and take-off over loaded.
It was 700 miles from Clark field to the northern most point of Taiwan and there is 200 miles of Luzon north of Clark Field. Most of the Chinese coast is within 900-1100 miles of Clark Field. While Rabaul is well out of range Palau is under 700 miles from Del Monte Air Field.

If the USAAC restricted their bombers to the range of possible fighter escorts, even with drop tanks, they would be loosing considerable areas of possible influence.

And, where is the money for these new long range fighters, drop tanks and such come from. The US was still in the depression. A good, really good, job paid $22 per week. A good lunch cost .65 cents, if one could afford to eat out. Money was raised only by bond sales after attack by Japan, when jobs began to increase.
As a measure, my parents first apartment after marriage rented for $20 per month in 1939. My first supervisor at Kodak told of risking a job change during the depression, when he went from $18 per week to $22 per week at a Hudson dealer as a mechanic because Hudson was a big company. Most of the employees in 1962, in their 50s-60s, came to Kodak from the US Navy where they learned photoprocessing and photography. I heard many stories about low pay during the depression. Where will the government get the tax money for these new "escort fighters" and the voters will ask, "Why would we need escort fighters? Why does the Army have to waste all that gas with formation training?"

I'm surprised that in 14 pages of posts, and since the central point of the thread seems to be G's criticism of the USAAF leadership in his video, no one has mentioned: The British told them it wouldn't work. "It" being precision daylight bombing (PDB) by lumbering bombers. Perhaps because G never mentioned that in his controversial video?

Our allies, in theatre, with extensive experience, apparently told the USAAF leadership PDB wouldn't work. But, since I've been proven "wrong" on numerous other points, I'm sure that someone will chime in who knows the exact sequence of events WRT the British telling the American's that PDB would not work, ie., who told who, and when. Or if it is another myth that never happened. If it is true that they were told, then it would appear that the USAAF leadership was rather arrogant in assuming that they knew better. And that would constitute another black mark against them. Or perhaps they just wanted to follow Admiral King's lead in disagreeing with the British.....

GrauGeist said:

These are just a few examples highlighting the mindset of the Army's desire to be able to deliver a substantial bombload over long distances and at no point during these trials, did they realize that within a few year's time, that there would be a need for fighter escort.

Click to expand...

B-15 which used R-1830 engines. There upgrade referred to earlier included using R-2180 engines of 1400hp but that was nowhere near enough for plane of this size.
It could carry a lot and it could fly very, very far. It was also significantly slower than the A-S Whitley.
The Douglas B-19 took about 4 years to build, Douglas was not very energetic about building it as they realized that is was out of date both in regards to aerodynamics and in structural design before it was close to being done and they begged to be let out of the contract (they lost over a million dollars) but the Army insisted on completion for engineering data, they also knew they would never build another.
There was a lot of "stuff" going on behind the scenes or under the skins of aircraft. What looked good one year was obsolete 2-3 years later. Some planes aged better than others.
Solving complex problems was usually a lot more complicated than a simple solution, like throw a drop tank on it, was going to solve.

And sometimes the solution took another form. Maybe the drop tanks would work, you just needed bulldozers to make the runways long enough

PlanesandShips said:

I'm surprised that in 14 pages of posts, and since the central point of the thread seems to be G's criticism of the USAAF leadership in his video, no one has mentioned: The British told them it wouldn't work. "It" being precision daylight bombing (PDB) by lumbering bombers. Perhaps because G never mentioned that in his controversial video?

Our allies, in theatre, with extensive experience, apparently told the USAAF leadership PDB wouldn't work. But, since I've been proven "wrong" on numerous other points, I'm sure that someone will chime in who knows the exact sequence of events WRT the British telling the American's that PDB would not work, ie., who told who, and when. Or if it is another myth that never happened. If it is true that they were told, then it would appear that the USAAF leadership was rather arrogant in assuming that they knew better. And that would constitute another black mark against them. Or perhaps they just wanted to follow Admiral King's lead in disagreeing with the British.....

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It's no secret that both American and British aerial leadership were in large part under the sway of Douhet's theories. Gen Wever in the Luftwaffe was also leading them in that direction before his death in an air crash in 1935.


The British tried to save the Americans lives and trouble by sharing their early-war experiences and advising night ops. That we didn't listen is not only due to arrogance but limitations of both equipment and training. A Norden bombsight is not terribly effective at night, and American aircrew would have had to spend months retraining for night ops,. Our generals wanted to start dropping ordnance mos' rickey tick.

PlanesandShips said:

I'm surprised that in 14 pages of posts, and since the central point of the thread seems to be G's criticism of the USAAF leadership in his video, no one has mentioned: The British told them it wouldn't work. "It" being precision daylight bombing (PDB) by lumbering bombers. Perhaps because G never mentioned that in his controversial video?

Our allies, in theatre, with extensive experience, apparently told the USAAF leadership PDB wouldn't work. But, since I've been proven "wrong" on numerous other points, I'm sure that someone will chime in who knows the exact sequence of events WRT the British telling the American's that PDB would not work, ie., who told who, and when. Or if it is another myth that never happened. If it is true that they were told, then it would appear that the USAAF leadership was rather arrogant in assuming that they knew better. And that would constitute another black mark against them. Or perhaps they just wanted to follow Admiral King's lead in disagreeing with the British.....

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I would be surprised if the British told the Americans daylight precision bombing wouldnt work because they were putting massive efforts into day and night time precision bombing and they got it to work. As far as I remember most discussions were about missions without escorts, and losses involved, Harris invited the USAAF to "join them in the night" but this was rejected because night time flying would require more training and cause more losses and also because a primary objective was to destroy the daytime Luftwaffe forces. Precision needs definition, there are levels of precision. Hitting a battleship with a tallboy bomb is definitely precision bombing, but you dont need that precision to hit a steelworks, marshalling yard or refinery which were and still are bigger than many towns.

PlanesandShips said:

I'm surprised that in 14 pages of posts, and since the central point of the thread seems to be G's criticism of the USAAF leadership in his video, no one has mentioned: The British told them it wouldn't work. "It" being precision daylight bombing (PDB) by lumbering bombers. Perhaps because G never mentioned that in his controversial video?

Our allies, in theatre, with extensive experience, apparently told the USAAF leadership PDB wouldn't work. But, since I've been proven "wrong" on numerous other points, I'm sure that someone will chime in who knows the exact sequence of events WRT the British telling the American's that PDB would not work, ie., who told who, and when. Or if it is another myth that never happened. If it is true that they were told, then it would appear that the USAAF leadership was rather arrogant in assuming that they knew better. And that would constitute another black mark against them. Or perhaps they just wanted to follow Admiral King's lead in disagreeing with the British.....

Click to expand...

The British told them it wouldn't work but then the specifics were not quite the same. Wither that is enough to let the USAAC leadership off the hook or not ???????
British big wake up call came in 1939 trying to bomb the German fleet with Wellingtons, and not just any Wellingtons, but early Wellingtons.

Note the absence of a bow "turret". The mount was power operated but the firing arc was restricted. the gunner did not turn with the gun/s. The tail mount was much the same. Nowhere near 180 degree traverse, two .303 guns, guns were powered in movement but the gunner did not move except by his own muscles.
There was a 3rd mount

At least this Wellington has actual turrets bow and stern. But lowering that air brake out the bottom when under attack by enemy fighters?
Top speed of these Wellingtons was 235mph at 15,500ft. At low altitude after a shipping strike and with that airbrake hanging out the bottom?
The Dec 1939 attacks, losses had the better turrets with 2 guns each (4 gun turrets were still a ways out) and at some point they got rid of the dustbin and stuck a single machine gun in each side window.
Daylight bombing with Hampdens ?

Note sophisticated device to keep gunner from shooting his own tail off. They got the twin mount after they lost more a few planes trying to use one gun in each rear mount (one mount on the bottom.)

The Americans were using a lot more guns per plane, they were using bigger guns. They were trying to use larger formations.
The first bad Wellington raid (there were several inconclusive early ones) was by 12 planes, 6 were lost, 2 of which crashed into each other. Avoiding flak or fighters? the 2nd raid used 24 planes and lost 21(9 shot down, 3 ditched and 3 force landed on British soil away from base). and that was pretty much the deciding British experience. German had also learned from earlier experiences that the Wellington could not defend against high beam attacks due to no dorsal guns and the bow and stern turrets not turning 180 degrees.

The Americans were also trying to fly at high altitude where the German fighter performance would be less.

Now the Germans were no longer using Bf 109Es or 110Cs so thinking they had solved the problem is taking a rather bright view of the things, but the Americans had addressed a number of the early British issues. Addressed does not mean solved until tested.

I will note that the Americans used unescorted B-17s and B-24s in the Pacific and China/Asia areas and while there were losses, it seems that they were not prohibitive?
Several differences is that the Japanese had less firepower per fighter, on average and that most damaged aircraft, once they were clear of the initial combat area were seldom re-attacked. Damaged aircraft that had to drop out of formation over Europe did not have good chances of making it back.
Escort fighters don't do anything to protect against flak and in the Pacific the Japanese had crap for Flak, comparatively speaking.
For some planes/crews all it took was one but the Japanese, especially away from the home Islands, did not have a lot of flak.

Something that just crossed by my mind was changes in conditions. If may be important or a total red herring.
The Americans did not leap into battle with long distance raids. They hit France and the low countries for quite a while.
The 303rd bomb group may not be representative but they have a good web site.
1st mission was 17th of Nov 1942 to St. Nazaire
it wasn't until the 12 mission that they hit Germany, Jan 27, 1943, Wilhelmshaven over 2 month later.
Their 50th mission July 14th 1943 to Paris.
Of the first 50 Missions only 17 had been in Germany.

While this did give the Americans a lot time to get use to combat conditions and experience, It also gave the Germans a lot of time to gain experience with the American aircraft.
It was one thing for German pilots in Germany/France to read an intelligence briefing from North Africa on B-17s. It is another to actually fight them over France and western Germany for a number of months before the Americans make very many long penetrations into Germany.
Again, this may be nothing and it is also with 20/20 hindsight, we KNOW how the Germans changed their fighter allocations/locations over time. There was a lot more guess work at the time.

Shortround6 said:

This brings up another point. The Criticisms of US bomber and fighter policies are rather European centric. Since the 8th air force seldom flew more than 600 miles (in a straight line although the actual routes flown were longer) and it is only 510 miles from Norwich to Berlin, it seems easier to demand that the US come up with escort fighters to suit that theater.
On Dec 7th 1941 there were 19 B-17s in the Philippines. B-17Es were on the way, some were stopping over in Hawaii on Dec 7th.
Remember that 2400 mile range for the early B-17s? From the north coast of Luzon 1200 mile radius covers most of the south island of Japan, Kyushu. Granted operational radius will be shorter than simple 50% of range but then, trade bombs for fuel. Or build longer runway and take-off over loaded.
It was 700 miles from Clark field to the northern most point of Taiwan and there is 200 miles of Luzon north of Clark Field. Most of the Chinese coast is within 900-1100 miles of Clark Field. While Rabaul is well out of range Palau is under 700 miles from Del Monte Air Field.

If the USAAC restricted their bombers to the range of possible fighter escorts, even with drop tanks, they would be loosing considerable areas of possible influence.

Click to expand...

I wasnt thinking in terms of absolute range, from UK but time over enemy airspace. Berlin is around 150 miles from Hamburg, Warsaw is over 300 miles further east.

PlanesandShips said:

WRT "casual wave and it would have been done" being unrealistic, and it is unrealistic, but IMHO that's the point of focusing on the memo. Imagine if a different memo had been written on 5-16-39 requiring the use of drop tanks instead of prohibiting them. That gives another two years for engineering/design, testing, development, training, tactics, etc. Imagine if a forward thinking USAAF required Republic to design drop tank capability from the beginning. Wasn't the whole air corps propaganda going back to Billy Mitchell all about the future, of being forward thinking, that aviation would have a huge role in the future? How many lives might have been saved if the sentence read: "The Chief of the Air Corps directs that all tactical airplanes will be capable of carrying drop tanks." I'm anticipating that some will say, "Ok, how much fuel?" That is TBD, but requiring their use would have been a good step in the right direction.

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You may have missed a critcal fact. What AAC Mat.Div. said was 'you can do what you want, but at your expnse - we're just not interested in your proposal. Curtiss, and NAA (NA-44, NA-50 Export fighter/fighter bomber) DID do just that because they perceived either an immediate or future need. Ditto Lockheed.

AAF did not force Republic to 'do anything' save install this here R-2800 and supercharger in a design of your choice. It was Republic's 'choice' to propose and build any airframe and equipment that he chose to design but the design primary objective were 40,000 foot ceiling and 400mph and heavy firepower. Karveli had major carte Blanche.

As to " How many lives might have been saved if the sentence read: "The Chief of the Air Corps directs that all tactical airplanes will be capable of carrying drop tanks." - That is EXACTLY what the Chief said in Feb/March 1942. He issued the Tech Order to Mat.Cmd. Tech.Div - but why do you think that the airframe manufacturers didn't hear the message?

You may recall that December 7, 1941 truly brought home the reality of AWPD-1 in all it's glory, instead of hypothetical coastal defense and or modelling 'how we might do it' after observing Blitzkrieg, BoB and Spanish and Sino-Japanese unpleasantness?


Your constant harping on 'bad judgment and criminal lack of vision' brings to mind what might have been, had Hitler decided to skip the Jun 22nd, 1941 Soiree to Russia, or Hitler prioritize Me 262 in 1941, or 'lets put a Merlin in the Mustang in 1941', or have a real Testing/Operational Suitabilty program in place for USN and AAC in 1939?

You evidence a marvelous flair for peeking at flawed decisions by significant and good leadership as acts of criminal negligence when events over ran visions and ideas with a smack in the face.

PlanesandShips said:

WRT the P-36 not getting back, and CG problems.....other airplanes had that problem also, as noted here and elsewhere (for example in Greg's hated video) the P-51 had the same problem. The "get back" is dictated by the FOB after the tanks are dropped minus any fuel used for CG, minus any fuel used for fighting. The drop tank isn't a panacea, but it can be used, and was used later, to great effect. Its interesting to me that 20 years and 1,200 mph faster with very different technology, the Phantom had the same limitation. I know of at least 2 F4's that crashed due to fuel exhaustion: C.E. Southwick and Randy Cunningham were the pilots (I forget the RIO's/WSO's.) I wonder if any P-47s actually ran out of fuel over France or the Channel returning after combat, and if so, how many? Also, I mentioned McNamara and Vietnam earlier, and that was poo-pooed, which seems ironic given McNamara's involvement in strategic bombing in WW2. One might argue that the arrogant man was 0 for 2 in directing large conflicts on a world wide basis from the comfy confines of an office in DC.

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Was there a real question there? The VIII FC had many fighters run out of fuel in N.Sea, Channel, Netherlands, Belgium & France. That was the hazard of long range escort, bad weather, poor visibility/poor navigation, extended combat. Nobody argues the value of combat tanks, only the exaggerated claims for increasing combat radius in context of internal fuel capacity.

One of the more notable examples that come to mind is the 355th FG P-47s captured by the Germns near Caen on November 7, 1943. It was a penetration escort with 110gal C/L combat tanks - the target was Gelsingkirchen but the escort was from Mons to Marche making R/V at 1040 15mi SE Mons until 1115. Landfall over Dunkirque and landing at 1235. Take off was 0927 so the duration of the mission excluding arm up and taxi time was 3hr8min - and the 358FS lost two to running out of gas and landing inact near Caen, three more in the Channel, many landed at Manston and other coastal airfields. One of the P-47s, YF-U Beetle, flown by Roach remained with Rozarius Zirkus as test P-47 for the Luftwaffe. Headwinds from NE were the primary cause.

That said, look at a map and compare Marche BL radius to Schweinfurt GY. Not to be cynical about Greg's P-47 range claims - please note that it is about halfway to Schweinfurt. Combat fuel usage not a factor,

for those not familiar with AWPD-1 ( I was not)
here is the Wiki version.