tail end charlie
Senior Airman
- 615
- Aug 24, 2010
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The entire UK would be protected. However areas outside of Me-109 range need only be protected by second rate fighter aircraft like the Gloster Gladiator and Bristol Beaufighter.
The entire UK would be protected. However areas outside of Me-109 range need only be protected by second rate fighter aircraft like the Gloster Gladiator and Bristol Beaufighter.
The Gladiator would get minced by an Me110 and as far as I remember we only had two squadrons the beaufighter wasnt available until 1941. The North sea is a large area the fighters protecting it must be faster than the bombers by a substantial margin even with radar.
. It was the calm before the storm. August 15th saw the heaviest fighting of the whole battle...
For some time now the Germans had been waiting for this moment—the moment when the weather would be right for a concerted onslaught by all three Luftflotten. This, it will be remembered, was how they had planned to open the intensive phase of their campaign. While Luftflotte 2 attacked the south-east, and Luftflotte 3 the south, Luftflotte 5, in Norway and Denmark, would operate against the north-east. The British fighters would thus be engaged
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all along the line, If Dowding had stripped the north to thicken up his defences in the south, Tyneside and the bomber airfields of Yorkshire would suffer in full measure.
The first blow was struck at the south-east. At 1129, two German formations, amounting to about sixty Ju.87's escorted by fifty Me.109's, crossed the coast between Dover and Dungeness; a third formation, of fighters only, was driven back before it reached out shores. Two of the four British squadrons ordered up—Nos. 54 and 501—made skilful interceptions; and of the several airfields that were attack, only the little-used Lympne suffered much damage.
Then, while the Channel remained the scene of repeated alarums and excursions, so that No. 11 Group was continually forced to put up patrols, the attacks began against the north-east. At 1208, nearly an hour before the enemy eventually crossed the coast between Blyth and Acklington, the Operations Room table at No. 13 Group showed its first plot of German aircraft. They were opposite the Firth of Forth, nearly a hundred miles out to sea; and they were heading south-west. With such good warning five British squadrons were soon on patrol. No .72 Squadron intercepted thirty miles out beyond the Farne Islands; it reported that the enemy, so far from number some thirty, as indicated by our radar, consisted of about a hundred He.111's and seventy Me.110's. This sort of mistake was not infrequent in 1940, for though our radar stations at this time gave very accurate information about the enemy's bearing, they were much less reliable in their estimates of height and number. Nothing daunted, the squadron sailed in, caught the Germans by surprise, inflicted heavy losses, and split the broad mass of the raiders in twain. One of the resulting formations was savagely mauled by No 79 Squadron before it reached the coast; and as soon as our shores were gained the Me.110's, short of petrol and very unhappy in the presence of Hurricanes and Spitfires, turned and fled. Despite our attacks most of the He.111's managed to cross the coast, but they were then so harassed by Nos. 41, 605 and 607 Squadrons, with the Tees and Tyneside guns joining in, that their bombing went entirely astray. Not a single factory or airfield was hit. All that the enemy pilots could show for their efforts was the destruction of twenty-four houses at Sunderland.
Meanwhile another German formation from the Scandinavian bases was heading for Scarborough, a hundred miles to the south. Against this threat, four British squadrons were already on guard. No 616 Squadron was the first to engage, ten miles out beyond Flamborough Head. No 73 Squadron followed. Together their attacks resulted in the destruction of several of the enemy; but the
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bulk of the formation, consisting of fifty Ju.88's, pressed on and crossed the coast. Some then turned north to join in the attacks on Tees and Tyneside, while others turned south. They were pursued, completely in vain, by the makeshift Blenheim fighters of No. 219 Squadron, one of which chased a Ju.88 for 160 miles over land and sea without getting close than 600 yards. Nevertheless, the enemy bombers managed to hit only two military objectives. one of these, presumably struck by accident, was an ammunition dump near Bridlington. The other was the aerodrome at Driffield, where ten aircraft were destroyed and much damage was done to buildings and hangars.
The bombing of Driffield was the one item on the credit sited that the Germans could display for their operations from Norway and Denmark. Indeed, their losses were so severe that throughout the remaining weeks of the Battle of Britain they never again attempted a daylight raid against the north-east. Yet on the British side not a single fighter had been lost. The whole episode was a remarkable demonstration of the German bombers' complete impotence in the face of our defences when forced to operate by day without the company of Me.109's.
HyperWar: Royal Air Force 1939–1945: Volume I: The Fight at Odds [Chapter VI]
I suspect that the Gladiator would do OK as the Fulmar did against the Me110, but an effective defence against even unescorted bombers was needed, and only the Hurricane and Spitfire could provide it. The Luftwaffe did launch a raid from Norway and Denmark against the supposedly defenceless Northern UK and it got shredded so bad, despite the presence of the vaunted Me-110, that they never tried it again:
RCAF son I have read that report before but as it said the attack was decimated (in the main) by Spitfires/Hurricanes they had to call other squadrons from scotland to help though. Where blenheims were used (as it states) they were less effective. Once the LW cross the coast Radar doesnt work so it is a question of eyesight, the gladiator and blenheim were slow they just couldnt catch an attacker. Doing OK against the Bf110 is one thing it has to evade the Bf110 and get the bombers which is a different thing altogether.
I live in Teesside (mentioned in your quote) and there were much more sophisticated defences than used in many other areas because the petrochemical and steel industry was vital, it was also involved in the early days of the Nuclear programme. The whole area had smoke generators by day and false targets (fires in the country) by night + the usual air balloon and flak.
From other accounts it seems that the Northern German force consisted of:
"... 72 He IIIs, 21 Me 110s and a decoy of Heinkel 115C Floatplanes coming in from the north) and a formation of 50 Ju 88s from KG 30 based in Denmark. "
and losses were:
"23 German aircraft were shot down which included 8 He111s, 8 Bf110s and 7 Ju88s."
August 14th - August 15th 1940
AFAIK, no RAF fighters were lost. Doesn't really support the claim that the Me-110 was some kind of wunder flugzeugen, does it?
Well no, but to be fair I dont know what quality the pilots were. Also everyone on the German side were told that they would be unopposed. The Bf110s were initially identified as bombers because they had long range tanks, I think the escorts got "windy"
It seems as though the Me-110 got badly hurt whenever it met Hurricanes or Spitfires on anything like equal terms. The idea that the Me-110 was a match even for the Hurricane is a bit ridiculous.
I'd be curious to know exactly what weapons are included in that 9,200 guns. 8.8cm heavy flak didn't even hit mass production until 1940. 2cm and 3.7cm weapons are useless against high flying level bombers.
Historical German Flak Production.
Production Stats on German Tube-fired Weapons 1939-1945
Dave
in your opinion, why LW stopped the massive daytime air raids against London after 15 Sept, if it wasn't because of losses inflicted by FC?
From other accounts it seems that the Northern German force consisted of:
"... 72 He IIIs, 21 Me 110s and a decoy of Heinkel 115C Floatplanes coming in from the north) and a formation of 50 Ju 88s from KG 30 based in Denmark. "
and losses were:
"23 German aircraft were shot down which included 8 He111s, 8 Bf110s and 7 Ju88s."
August 14th - August 15th 1940
AFAIK, no RAF fighters were lost. Doesn't really support the claim that the Me-110 was some kind of wunder flugzeugen, does it?
Dave
At the time in 1940 the LW daytime losses in aircraft were exceeding their production.
13 Aug 40
Kampfgruppen - 1482 / 1008 (on hand / serviceable)
Stukagruppen - 365 / 286
Schlachtgruppe - 39 / 31
Jagdgruppen - 976 / 853
Zerstrergruppen - 244 /189
Nachtjagdgruppen - 91 / 59
Seefliegerstaffeln - 240 / 125
7 Sept 1940
Kampfgruppen - 1291 / 798
Stukagruppen - 174 /133
Schlachtgruppe - 59 / 44
Jagdgruppen - 831 / 658
Zerstörergruppen - 206 / 112
Fernaufklärungsstaffeln - 191 / 123
Seefliegerstaffeln - 52 / 33
There certainly is no rock steady strength or even an increase in numbers with front line units.
Kampfgruppen went from 1482 / 1008 on Aug 13 to 1291 / 798 on Sept 7. A decrease of 191 / 210.
Jagdgruppen went from 976 / 853 on Aug 13 to 831 / 658 on Sept 7. A decrease of 145 / 195
If production was exceeding the losses, then why did the strength of bombers and fighters decrease? Not even enough spare parts could be supplied to keep a/c flying.
German a/c production numbers can be found here, Aircraft Industry Report Exhibits