Carriers!! (5 Viewers)

[syscom3]

The IJN submarine doctrine was to use the submarine fleets to support the main fleet. It never occured to them to attack allied cargo, transports and oilers.

The IJN HQ was also a dismal failure in the operations and control of the sub fleet. Micro managing them and sending them on predictable courses and having them waste time hauling supplies. After the sinking of the USS Wasp in 1942, there was hardly one victory worth mentioning. A whole fleet of submarines with nothing to show for it.

The whole IJN submarine history can be summed up in one word..."failure".

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Wasn't the Indianapolis sunk by a IJN Sub?

 

[syscom3]

Yes. Unfortunatly for the IJN, it was the only notable success in two years of sub warfare

 

[MP-Willow]

But what it could have been. Think the IJN subs could have stayed around Pearl found the Carriers and just maybe sunk one, or hassle the fleet and repairs might have been longer

I know that is all I strech but I agree that when compaired to the other major Sea powers the IJN's use of subs was poorly exicuted.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

They did send subs around Pearl. The small midget subs, but that was just dumb anyhow and did not accomplish anything.

 

[syscom3]

If they had sent a wolf pack to operate off of Panama and the US west coast, they might have really accomplished something.

Even operating off of southern part of Baja California, they could have cut the sea lanes between the US and Panama for several months.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I wonder why they did not think of the same tactics like the Germans did with there U-Boots.

 

[plan_D]

No one really did, the idea of a 'Wolfpack' was revolutionary and excellent. I believe the Germans told the IJN to use their submarines in the same way, but they would not listen.

I think the British and Americans did use submarines effectively in the PTO and MTO. I don't know how they were used though, except that they were against cargo vessels.

 

[Glider]

I understand that it was down to the culture. The Japenese didn't consider fighting against merchant shipping was for want of a better word, worthy of a fighting soldier.
The Japenese were aware of the tactics as the Germans were pushing them to attack supply vessels but the Japenese didn't want to know.

 

[evangilder]

They also used them against warships. One of the more famous usages by the US was the very beginning of the battle of the Leyte Gulf, in the Palawan Passage, by the subs the Darter and the Dace. Here is an excerpt from one of my articles:

The Center Force, Led by Admiral Kurita left Brunei on October 22, 1944, heading towards the Philippines. To conserve fuel he traveled through the Palawan Passage, a narrow, shallow body of water Northeast of Palawan Island. From there, his path was through the Sibuyan Sea and San Bernardino Strait into the Leyte Gulf.

The American submarines, Darter and Dace had taken up position near the Palawan Passage on October 20, to guard against any Japanese ships that may come from that direction. At 12:23 AM on October 23, while traveling southwest towards the Balabac Strait, the radar in the Darter made initial contact with Kurita's Group. The Darter's commander, David McClintock was a bit surprised as they showed up on the bridge repeater screen. The size of the force was an even bigger surprise. The Americans confirmed the presence of 5 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, and 2 light cruisers. 12 to 14 destroyers screened the convoy's flanks and center, all moving at 16 knots. What did not make sense to McClintock is why the convoy was not zig-zagging, not knowing that the Japanese were trying to conserve precious fuel.

McClintock contacted the commander of the Dace, Bladen Claggett. They increased their speed to 19 knots to get closer. Around 5:30 AM, the 2 subs moved about 10 miles ahead of the Japanese fleet on the fleet's left. Their speed was reduced to match the speed of the Japanese and the decision was made to attack at dawn.

The Darter rose to periscope depth and fired six torpedoes at the Cruiser Atago, Kurita's flagship. McClintock was firing on the second target, the Cruiser Takao, when the Atago erupted in explosions and flames. The Atago sank in a matter of minutes, but Kurita survived the attack. After attacking the Takao, McClintock dove the Darter to avoid the depth charges that were sure to follow from the destroyers. Meanwhile, Claggett attacked the Cruiser Maya. He fired six torpedoes and then dove deep. Four of the six torpedoes found their mark and the Maya sank in several pieces. The subs escaped the searches by the Japanese, but the Darter ran aground on a shoal. After unsuccessful attempts to free her, they tried to sink her with torpedoes from the Dace. Finally, they stripped the sub of anything useful to the Japanese and abandoned her. Both crews returned to Brisbane on a very crowded return trip.

 

[syscom3]

The US submarine force was used with little imagination in the first 2 years of the war.

Some junior officers readily saw the choke points existing between the PI and Formosa and wanted to spend their patrols concentrated there instead of wasting time patrolling ports that may or may not have shipping, and were covered by land based patrol planes.

Untill 1944, the whole story of the US submaine force is one of bravery, but of little to show for it. Most of this was due to the faulty torpedo's, but a good measure of blame can also be thrown at the admirals who deployed them with little imagination, and were prone to blame them (the skippers) for the high commands failures.

 

[delcyros]

Undoubtly. But they also had some brilliant tactician minds in their submarine fleet. I thought the one who invented the B-25 raids was one of them. So they had a decent horizon, not ignoring the other arms, this speaks for themselves.

 

[syscom3]

Once the "peacetime thinking" skippers were purged from the ranks, the performance of the sub fleet began to improve.

Too often though, when their patrols were critiqued by the admirals, the skippers were faulted for anything. If they followed the "fleet doctrine", they were criticised for not being aggressive or showing intiative. If they used their initiative, they were criticised for putting their boat and crew at risk. If they fired three torpedo's at a traget, they were condemned for wasting torpedo's. If they fired two torpedo's, they were condemned for not shooting enough to ensure a kill.

It wasnt untill 1943 that some of the finer skippers were promoted to the admirals staffs and realistically critiqed the patrols. Morale began to improve when this occured.

Its also amazing that Admirals King and Nimitz tolerated this crap for as long as they did.

 

[delcyros]

This sounds like a very uncomfortable situation. I wasn´t aware of such unsimilarities in tactical thinking, compared to Dönitz and his skippers...

 

[MP-Willow]

I liked the artical evenglider. dance and Dart nice name for a sub. A subs life is so much of a dance. Two crews on one boat, that I hope was a short trip.

The US should have been more like the Wolfpacks, as they were in the europe first mode, the subs could do a good job holding the japs off or confuse them a lot.

 

[syscom3]

Heres a colorfull poem written by the torpedo officer of the USS Sargo, Doug Rhymes.

This was written about April 1942, when the sub fleet was awash with cautious "peacetime" skippers.

The captain is a rugged guy
with hair upon his chest.
O'er a glass of beer in peacetime
He's at his fighting best

He scorns far distant danger
With a scornful, scornful leer.
And never runs for cover
When everything is clear

He swings around the periscope
With firm and steady hands;
When the ship is unescorted
He has no fear of cans.

In eyes so gray and piercing
There shines a reckless gleam.
As he takes a sip of coffee
And adds a little cream.

With conversational courage
He talks a fearless fight.
He's a rough tough hombre,
When nothing is in sight.

All hazards of navigation
Cause him no loss of sleep.
He cruises along most calmly
In water one mile deep.

Hi snerves are surely made of steel,
Hi voice has a confident sound,
And he never gets excited
When danger's not around.

 

[syscom3]

Heres another great poem written by Art Taylor, a fine and agressive skipper of the USS Haddock. He had something to saya bout the morons on staff who commanded and critiqued the subs force in the Pacific.

This was written about Aug or Sept 1942.

"Squat Div 1"

Theyre on their duff from morn till nite;
Theyre never wrong, theyre always right;
To hear them talk theyre in the fight -
Oh, yeah?

A boat comes in off a patrol,
The skipper tallies up the toll
And writes it up for all concerned.
He feels right proud of the job hes done,
But the staffies say he shoulda used his gun!
Three fish for a ship of two score ton?
Outrageous! He should have used but one!
A tanker sunk in smoke and flame -
But hes still wide open for blame.
His fish were set for twenty right -
That proves he didnt want to fight!
Oh, yeah?

The freighter he sunk settled by the stern -
With depth set right she'd split in two!
So tell me, what is the skipper to do?
He's on the spot and doing his best,
But thats not enough by the acid test.
The staff must analyze his case
And pick it apart to save their face.
Just because you sink some ships
Doesnt mean you win the chips -
You've got to do it according to plan;
Otherwise youre on the frying pan!

So heres to the staff with work so tough
In writing their endorsement gruff -
Whether the war is lost or won
Depends entirely on "Squat Div One"
Oh, Yeah?

 

[Glider]

I wonder if Art ever put these into a book, I would be the first in the queue to place an order

 

[syscom3]

The poems were put into the excellent 2 volume series about the US sub war in WW2

"Undersea Victory" by Clay Blair Jr.

 

[Glider]

Thanks, That I will ahve to try to find