Comparison of the Gloster F.5/34 and the Mitsubishi A6M2.

Steve Hnz said:

If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore.

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It was around 2-3 months sailing time to get anything from Britain to Singapore. Crating, uncrating, loading/unloading not included.
With the Soviets collapsing like a punctured balloon in the summer of 1941 the likelihood of German-British invasion was rather real for the spring of 1942.

The British were stretched too thin in 1941 and the political decision to aid Greece squandered whatever extra margin of resources existed in the "Mid-East"
Mid-East covering Egypt-Greece-Cypress-Iraq-Palestine-East Africa.
Over 1200 miles east to west and over 2200 miles North to South.

Unloading troops/material in Oct/Nov of 1941 just adds to Japanese booty.

He who defends everything defends nothing.

Steve Hnz said:

Kind of what I meant by

Not sure where but I have definitely read that L-M refused to release fighters for overseas deployment but it could have been referring more to Spitfires than fighters in general. If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore. History shows us that there was a significant lack of agility in the way this was handled, as was much of the conduct of the war in the early years. Plus, they did not have any suitable aircraft to use in an effective attack role, though maybe even Hurribombers would have been better than the poor old Blenheim.

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You might find the following thesis on Fighter Comand strength in terms of the numbers of squadrons and trained pilots in 1940/41 interesting. Note how FC never reached the 80 squadrons of single engined day fighters seen as necessary in Dec 1940. That was at least in part due to units being siphoned off for the ME.

Steve Hnz said:

Kind of what I meant by

Not sure where but I have definitely read that L-M refused to release fighters for overseas deployment but it could have been referring more to Spitfires than fighters in general. If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore. History shows us that there was a significant lack of agility in the way this was handled, as was much of the conduct of the war in the early years. Plus, they did not have any suitable aircraft to use in an effective attack role, though maybe even Hurribombers would have been better than the poor old Blenheim.

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Assuming that the decision were made the RAF has six months from the launch of Barbarossa to choose what to send, with all the maintenance support etc. Assemble the staff, find shipping and escorts which has to be drawn from existing purposes for an extended period, for a trip around the world and then send them by sea around Cape Horn, deliver them, assemble them and set up the bases and be ready in position. Can it be done? Yes but it would be close, very close. The only source would be from UK squadrons as the Middle East is actively using all it has. Hence the OTL dribble of old or unfit for UK service types that actually happened and we note that offers of Middle East cast offs were turned down. A comparison might be Operation Torch where an army was created and transported from scratch and launched across the Atlantic but that was with resources not being used in battle otherwise and itself took 11 months to arrive not 6 months and across one ocean not three. The US contribution to Torch was impressive under the circumstances but not a real model I feel.

It all comes back to scarce resources and necessary gross over commitment which led to the necessity to gamble on where could be neglected. In terms of industry etc. the Commonwealth was fighting in 1941 with 1/3 of what the Wallies had in 1944. Even allowing for the Pacific war draw upon those 1944 resources there was simply not enough to go around at the point when the decisions on the air defence of Malaya and Burma were made which is realistically March 1941 when the UK was considered under threat and the Middle East barely able to defend itself and one only has to look at the Commonwealth list of ancient and weird types used in battle in clearing Italy from East Africa and North Africa. To to mention preparing to invade Syria and Lebanon, put down revolt in Iraq and will have to invade Iran with the Soviets shortly.

However, we stray away from the OP into how to make a better Malayan and Burmese air defence.

Steve Hnz said:

If the A-M had been watching events in SEA with a critical eye, from the time Germany launched Unternehmen Barbarossa, & effectively quashed the likelihood of an invasion of the UK, it may not have been too late to reinforce Singapore.

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I like the idea, but I wonder at the time from July to Jan 1942 if it looked like the USSR might be quickly defeated, with the now entirely-UK focused Wehrmacht coming back to finish Sealion. By the time (Jan 1942) the Red Army had demonstrably stomped the Germans at the Battle of Moscow, Singapore was about to fall. We can't blame Churchill for thinking he'd better keep his best forces at home. I wonder if this thinking also led to the failures in the MTO. Now, if we want forces for Malaya it is through earlier success in North Africa that we will get them - so defeat the Italians and prevent the Afrika Corp from crossing the Med. That will give us the forces for Malaya (including my Canadian-made Gloster F5s) - and if large enough we might just force Japan to revise its southern strategy.

Now, if we can improve the aircraft sufficiently to enter service; the Gloster F5 needs a name. Were there any proposed names? Previous Glosters include the Gamecock, Gambet, Gannet, Gauntlet, Gladiator, Goldfinch, Goral, Goring, Grebe, Gorcock, Gnatsnapper, Grouse, Guan, Javelin, Meteor, Nighthawk, Nightjar, and Sparrowhawk. I assume, much to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring's disappointment that the Goring is out contention. With exceptions, traditionally Glosters are named after birds starting with G: Bird Gallery - Bird Gallery - Entries with Name starting with 'G'

I rather like the Gloster Gadwall
Anything with 2-3 words in the name is not snappy enough once you hang Gloster in front of it. I mean who is going to write out Gloster Great Crested Flycatcher in a report?
Or even be able to say it after a few pints in the Squadron bar?

Admiral Beez said:

Now, if we want forces for Malaya it is through earlier success in North Africa that we will get them - so defeat the Italians and prevent the Afrika Corp from crossing the Med.

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The Best opportunity for that, militarily speaking, was to send a lot less "stuff" (men) to Greece. Politically speaking is more questionable.

The British don't need to stop Rommel from landing in NA, they have to stop him from landing in time to do much of anything. This gives a little more breathing room.
By the time Rommel gets most of the 2nd German division into NA the British Commonwealth has got 62,000 troops in Greece (24th of April). But this was way to late to save Greece.
Another division to the East African campaign and other division in Egypt/Libya and the 1st Armored Brigade added to whichever division was in Egypt/Libya would certainly have made Rommel's job a lot harder.

Admiral Beez said:

Göring's disappointment that the Goring is out contention.

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They could have kept the same Gloster naming convention, and called it the GoringCock.
Then deliberately make it undersized, and a poor performer at max altitude

Shortround6 said:

...British Commonwealth has got 62,000 troops in Greece (24th of April). But this was way to late to save Greece.

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The British Army was the seaborne escape artist of 1940-41. 330k British (and allied) troops evacuated from Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo), 25k from Norway (Op. Alphabet), and 50k from Greece (Op. Demon). The following year, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival must have wondered why after so many successful evacuations, Churchill was now demanding that he and his 85,000 Allied troops at Singapore fight to the last man instead of trying to prepare an evacuation.

Shortround6 said:

Anything with 2-3 words in the name is not snappy enough once you hang Gloster in front of it. I mean who is going to write out Gloster Great Crested Flycatcher in a report?

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True. One bird of prey not used by Gloster is the Goshawk. It's two syllables. There is the failed Rolls-Royce Goshawk evaporative engine and the Curtiss BF2C Goshawk. Otherwise the name is free to use until the postwar T-45. And just look at this beautiful bird of prey - Folland had better clean up his design before it's thus worthy.

Shortround6 said:

The Best opportunity for that, militarily speaking, was to send a lot less "stuff" (men) to Greece. Politically speaking is more questionable.

The British don't need to stop Rommel from landing in NA, they have to stop him from landing in time to do much of anything. This gives a little more breathing room.
By the time Rommel gets most of the 2nd German division into NA the British Commonwealth has got 62,000 troops in Greece (24th of April). But this was way to late to save Greece.
Another division to the East African campaign and other division in Egypt/Libya and the 1st Armored Brigade added to whichever division was in Egypt/Libya would certainly have made Rommel's job a lot harder.

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However they had already got the troops into Greece well before Barbarossa occurred so, at the time the decision (whether wise or no) was made, it was either to keep them in North Africa or send them to Greece. In no way were they going to be sent to the Far East with all their equipment. By the autumn of 1941 efforts were being made to scrape together some sort of force to defend Syria and Iraq against any German incursion from the Caucasus. It included some of the last British operational cavalry. Nothing significant was going to be sent from the Middle East to the Far East. The Indian army had committed its regular forces to the war in the Middle East. There were no reserves uncommitted to be sent. The RAF and RIAF had negligible units and squadrons in India itself and those obsolete policing types and impressed civilian aeroplanes. I really cannot emphasise that the only place with a reserve of operational types was the UK itself.

Minor point. The Indian Air Force was established in Oct 1932 and the first aircraft flights on 1 April 1933. It didn't become the Royal Indian Air Force until 12 March 1945.

Background article on Britain's decision to assist Greece and the politics involved.

yulzari said:

However they had already got the troops into Greece well before Barbarossa occurred so, at the time the decision (whether wise or no) was made, it was either to keep them in North Africa or send them to Greece. In no way were they going to be sent to the Far East with all their equipment. By the autumn of 1941 efforts were being made to scrape together some sort of force to defend Syria and Iraq against any German incursion from the Caucasus. It included some of the last British operational cavalry. Nothing significant was going to be sent from the Middle East to the Far East. The Indian army had committed its regular forces to the war in the Middle East. There were no reserves uncommitted to be sent. The RAF and RIAF had negligible units and squadrons in India itself and those obsolete policing types and impressed civilian aeroplanes. I really cannot emphasise that the only place with a reserve of operational types was the UK itself.

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You are quite correct.
The window of opportunity was small, very small, and it entailed pretty much letting Greece fend for itself and using the forces that were sent to Greece help clean up East Africa and push the Italians further into Libya before Rommel even gets there. With an earlier end to the fighting in East Africa it at least frees up troops, they never had much for equipment and what they had was pretty much worn out and not worth shipping anywhere else. It does give you at least some trained combat veterans instead of the poorly trained (due to time in service) troops in the Far East.
Perhaps if the "reinforced" British (and commonwealth) had been able to hold the Italians and Germans inside of Libya there would not have been the wasteful hundreds of miles back and forth in the spring/summer of 1941. That may (or may not) have freed up some more things that could have been sent east.

Or perhaps any 'surplus' is just to Russia as more lend lease and nothing goes to the Far East anyway.

Admiral Beez said:

My What'if, as described below requires that the F5/34 is developed and produced in Canada, outside of the British Air Ministry but as a pre-war private venture, akin to the later Gregor FDB-1. Presumably we're substituting all (most?) of CC&F's Hawker Hurricane production with the Gloster, so Stalin is not getting his Canadian Hurricanes.

In 1940 when Britain is looking for non-essential aircraft to send to Malaya, the AM team sent to look at the Brewster Buffalo and others also heads to Fort William, ON has a look at the first dozen or so thin-wing, R-1830 powered F5s. Sufficiently impressed the Air Ministry orders the aircraft to be produced for the RAF for shipment by rail to Vancouver and by sea to Malaya. Given the timing, I am likely being too ambitious on the two dozen squadrons (300 aircraft) by autumn 1941 (how many Hawker Hurricanes did CC&F produce by mid 1941?) but I expect at least a couple of squadrons of F5s to arrive in time to serve alongside the Brewster Buffalos.

And that's how we get to compare a thin-wings, streamlined and Twin Wasp powered F5 to the Ki-43 and A6M.

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Hi
Page 379 of 'Canadian Aircraft since 1909' by Molson & Taylor has 76 Hurricanes produced during 1940, for 1941 up to June, 336 had been produced. What would you get rid of in aircraft production in Canada during 1940-41 to make skilled/semi-skilled work forces and production capability available to work on the Gloster and sort out the problems that may arise in your modifications? I can't see it appearing until 1942 at the earliest, which would mean it is a dated design by the time it reaches service.

Mike

MikeMeech said:

What would you get rid of in aircraft production in Canada during 1940-41

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All the Hurricanes, but starting earlier upon Hawker-Siddeley's 1934 acquisition of Gloster. We'll still not get them into service until late 1940 at best.