Could the B-36 been ready by 1945?

[drgondog]

I have sources that said the XP-72 flew with the 4360 on 2 Feb, 44.

Also, concrete can be laid quite fast in wartime.

You are right Dave. I found several sources pointing to 4360 in Productio from 1944-1955 and bench test occurred in late 1942.

 

[JoeB]

The B36 was operational before the Korean War, I think, and yet the B29s and B50s were used in that war. Were we saving the B36 for the SU?

The B-36 became really operational only during the Korean War. In March 1951 the Far East Air Force actually proposed to SAC to run some B-36bombing missions from CONUS to NK, adding to their effort and providing training. SAC (LeMay) declined citing only 36 operational B-36's in SAC as of then, and they suffered from limited availability of spares for their R-4360's, so much that even main nuclear mission training was being limited to keep enough of a spares reserve for emergency (all out nuclear) war plans. The letter is reproduced in "The George E. Stratemeyer Korean War Diary" (Stratemeyer was CO of FEAF).

The issue did not come up again AFAIK, but by fall 1951 all B-29 bombing missions in MiG Alley had been shifted to night, because of losses to MiG's. B-36's wouldn't have been even as capable in that mission profile, unless fitted with SHORAN radio nav/bombing systems, which FEAF did in a crash program for all the B-29's in Korea; previously only a few per group were so fitted.

As mentioned, the 91st Strategic Recon Sdn got a detachment of (at first) 3 RB-50G's (alongside its main equipment of RB-29's plus RB-45's, etc) from 1952 and used them over Korea (at night). I've seen reference to specific missions of theirs over NK in declassed 'secret' docs. That was alongside general recon missions in Far East by the same unit: one of them, 47-145, was shot down along the Soviet far east coast July 29, 1953, two days after the Korean armistice.

The 91st also got a detachment of RB-36D's in 1952, but I've never seen any reference to flights by them over NK in declassified sources. They were probably only used around/over other Communist countries, though missions over NK during the war can't be ruled out.

But no B-50 bombers served in Korea. SAC lent 5 B-29 groups to the Far East Air Force for Korean ops at the beginning of the war, 19th, 98th, 307st, 22nd and 92nd. After they ran out of industrial targets in NK in October 1950 (and there were quite a few, industry built by the Japanese safe from US bombing in WWII) the 22nd and 92nd went home, and the other 3 remained the B-29 force even after Chinese entry into the war, the rest of the way.

Joe

 

[FLYBOYJ]

As mentioned, the 91st Strategic Recon Sdn got a detachment of (at first) 3 RB-50G's (alongside its main equipment of RB-29's plus RB-45's, etc) from 1952 and used them over Korea (at night). I've seen reference to specific missions of theirs over NK in declassed 'secret' docs. That was alongside general recon missions in Far East by the same unit: one of them, 47-145, was shot down along the Soviet far east coast July 29, 1953, two days after the Korean armistice.

My uncle might of been flying one of them.

I posted this previously, but prior to his death he spoke about B-50 ferret operations duraing and after the Korean War. Here's something else interesting.

"I would like to get in touch with John Foy above. I have been trying to prove B-50A combat in the Korean War for years. My father sitting in the engineer seat was wounded (no purple heart of course) and the weaponeer was killed in a fighter engagement in Dec. 51 over N.E. Korea (Think it must have been PLAAF-- I don't think I'd be here if it was an MiG 15.) I had spent some time at the archive at Maxwell AFB and found in 64th BS of the 43rd BW history that the unit was on rotation to ADVON (Yokota and Tachikawa)from Andersen During Dec 1951. One crew used 2500 rounds on the night of Dec 18th..The planes were rigged with racks for 500 pound bombs but were dropping only one or two bombs (or canisters?) at a time????? Curiously Col. Catton, commander of SAC X-ray was visiting that day. When I asked for the Special Weapons records that would explain what was going on, some poker faced gentlemen came downstairs and informed me that those records were still classified and "would not be declassified."

My dad's plane was engaged at 26,000 feet and he says the target was "Yang Dam Po" or something that sounds like that.

I realize the B-29s started having problems with fighters in early Dec. '51 and had to change tactics, but WHY would we risk our only secret "silverplate" to go out over Korea( Manchuria or Soviet airspace for that matter) to drop one or two bombs???

My theories:

1.Biological warfare tests (a war plan for Soviet penetration for atomic attack and bio warfare attack on the way out was approved in October 1951.) While the 2nd bomb bay of the B-50 usually contained a fuel bladder, it was still a functional bay that could be used for some lightweight load.

2. Release of the classified files would reveal US had atomic weapons based in Japan prior to our admission of 1954 deployment. ( Initiators and pits were kept at Yokota during these deployments from Andersen.)

3. These missions may have been CIA missions to drop parcels to partisans in support of sabotage and commando efforts.

Any other theories?
[email protected]
Mike Randall
P.O. 31143
Honolulu, HI 96820
USA"

Boeing B-50 - bomber

My uncle had similar stories and eluded that the B-50 he was flying in actually dropped bombs. He also told me about a "shoot out" coming out of Vladivostok where F-86s came in and took on pursuing MiGs.

Joe, comments?

 

[renrich]

Thanks for the good info. During the summer of 1952, I was hanging sheetrock in a housing project along side of Kelly Field in San Antonio. They were bringing burn casualties from Korea in the XC99 to Kelly Field and then on to BAMC. Quite a sight watching that sucker land and take off.

 

[JoeB]

1. My father sitting in the engineer seat was wounded (no purple heart of course) and the weaponeer was killed in a fighter engagement in Dec. 51 over N.E. Korea (Think it must have been PLAAF-- I don't think I'd be here if it was an MiG 15.) I had spent some time at the archive at Maxwell AFB and found in 64th BS of the 43rd BW history that the unit was on rotation to ADVON (Yokota and Tachikawa)from Andersen During Dec 1951. One crew used 2500 rounds on the night of Dec 18th..The planes were rigged with racks for 500 pound bombs but were dropping only one or two bombs (or canisters?) at a time?????

2. My uncle had similar stories and eluded that the B-50 he was flying in actually dropped bombs.

1. Interesting but a little vague as to what he looked up that might fit things his dad said v details of what his dad definitely said (for example 64th BS just fits his dad's account, or he knew for sure that was his dad's unit?, same with the date).

December 1951 was shortly after B-29's began night-only operations over NK. The Soviet 351st Fighter Regiment was attempting to intercept with their La-11's. As we discussed a previous time the La-11's success v B-29's was limited to damaging a pair Dec 23/24 1951, they found the going easier against B-26's of which they downed a few during 1951-52. There were no PLAAF night units over NK at that time according to the Chinese. There were many US reports throughout the war of night encounters that don't match Soviet accounts, presumably North Korean a/c, but those tended to be encountered in the southern half of NK, and never hit anything as far as US accounts (it's possible they explain some disappearances of US a/c, but the NK's have never claimed it, whereas they do give juiced up propaganda versions of all their real day victories early in the war). Enemy a/c were seldom encountered either day or night in NE NK, unless a US a/c had actually strayed across the border into the USSR, or very close.

I don't know of any incidents December 18, though that doesn't mean it didn't happen, of course. But even if a/c, like 91st SRS's, were on missions of higher classification than 'secret' they are often referred to in 'secret' level summaries, wrt to stuff like MiG or AA encounters, so basic threat knowledge could be spread around for everyone's benefit, and the mission just described as 'classified mission'.

2. That was true of some 91st SRS RB-50 missions I know of, they are listed with the particular a/c in the FEAF Consolidated Mission Summaries, just given as 'classified mission'. But sometimes RB missions are described in more detail. For example when RB-29 44-62217 was shot down on the NK/China border Jan 13 1953 (came down in China, surviving crew not released until 1955) it was described at 'secret' level as leaflet drop mission, so might explain 'few bombs' in case of RB type a/c of 91st SRS. The more classified missions probably included attempted support of anti-Communist partisans or inserted spies. The RB-50G lost July 29 1953 near the USSR was carrying an 'unamed Russian' who was lost along with all but one of the USAF crew.

Joe

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Thanks for the info Joe - I wish my uncle was still alive. His accounts became known to me (and the rest of my family) when I told him about magazine articles about Soviet Korean War pilots and encounters with "ferrets." We always had a suspicion he was doing something like this but was tight lipped until Soviet accounts became public.

I hope to see my cousin soon and he might have some more details about my uncle's activities.

 

[syscom3]

I just looked over the design and production results for the B29 and extrapolated them for the B36.

The B29 contract was signed in Sept 1940. But it wasn't until the end of Dec 1943 for a whopping total of 92 B29's to have been accepted by the AAF. That's 39 months of time.

Now the B-36 contract was signed in November 1941. Add 39 months to that and you get a similar production figure of 92 aircraft built by the end of Feb 1945.

But then that figure has to be de-rated considerably due to it being such a massive aircraft and complex bomber for its time (The B29 was a generational leap, the B-36 was a magnitude leap forward).

Any way you try to spin it, the B-36 was so big that the production rates of the aircraft were going to be low. The four B29 plants did not reach sustained individual double digit production monthly production rates until August 1944 (and it wasn't until Dec 1944 for three of them to have a production rate of one per day). And this was historically the single most important aviation project the AAF had in WW2. There's no use in saying "throw more resources at it", because there were no more resources to use!

How can anyone argue that here was an airplane that was nearly twice as big as the B29, and these hypothetical B36 plants were going to be completely ramped up for production by 1945?

Not only that, the historical experience with the production of the B29's shows that there were so many modifications being ordered, many B29's that were built and accepted, were simply flown to modification centers for several weeks to bring it up to "current" spec.

Whats makes anyone think otherwise this would not happen to the B36? In fact it probably be even worse due to its immense weight and extremely complex systems.

If you look at these issues, there's no other conclusion that can be reached that although the B36 could have easily flown by 1945, there would only be a few of them
available for actual missions. And it wouldn't have been till well into 1946 that enough of them could be used in a "bomb wing" mission.

 

[davparlr]

If you look at these issues, there's no other conclusion that can be reached that although the B36 could have easily flown by 1945, there would only be a few of them
available for actual missions. And it wouldn't have been till well into 1946 that enough of them could be used in a "bomb wing" mission.

The magnitude leap forward was only in size, which was not high risk. The high technology risk for the B-36 was the same for the B-29, pressurization, engine development, and remote controlled defensive weapons system. Consolidated did have more difficulties in solving these problems on the B-32 than Boeing had on the B-29. However, lessons learned and technology transfer would have helped the B-36 development. Size alone was not a major risk. Large aircraft with more than four engines were built before and during the war. The Germans flew the Blohm Voss BV 238V1, which was a six engine aircraft, 75% the size of the B-36, in August 1943. Logistics and production quantity would certainly be impacted.

I think that, had Britain succumbed to German demands early in the war, the emphasis would have changed dramatically and the B-36 would have become priority one in aircraft design. With the change in priority from B-32 to B-36, I think it is quite reasonable to assume the B-36 would have been flying operational missions in 1945 in rapidly increasing quantity.