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Intelligence is nice to have, but with it or without it Samurai spirit will prevail! Tennoheika banzai!I ain't no expert but if my target is American carriers it helps if I know where they are.
Shokaku survived because she had launched most or all of her planes, her flight deck was wrecked but no major fires. Hiryu, Soryu, Kaga and Akagi had the hangers full of fueled and armed or partially fueled and partially armed aircraft. Even a single bomb in the hanger area was enough to start fires that couldn't be put out.The Zeroes did a good job against most of the attacking aircraft sent against it at Midway. Not all but most air defences are not foolproof.
At Coral Sea again not foolproof but American carriers also got hit so not exactly one way traffic.
At Ceylon did shoot down the Blenheims so end of day better than a Fulmar.
Would be interesting to know Japanese tactics in relationship to CAP over the carrier.
Oddly Shokaku was badly damaged at Coral but survived and was able to get home. Why Shokaku survived and the 4 carriers at Midway didn't are interesting.
The Royal Navy did tests in the 1930s with their carriers where the carrier was in bad shape if it came under air attack because there was no early warning and so no time to launch interception and if the interceptors had no radios then no fighter control either. Pure eyeball stuff and if you can see the bomber then it's probably too late. This was before radar which the Americans had but still lost carriers.
The concept was very simple. First strike first kill. Attack the carrier first.
So the real failure was Japanese reconnaissance and intelligence which doomed the fleet. The moment the Japanese realised the game was up it was too late.
The Zeroes are good but they not supernatural. If you swapped Zeroes for 109s or Spitfires, I doubt the outcome would have changed.
Their entire military was run on a shoestring. The only way they got a half dozen good carriers into service for end 1941 was to allocate a massive portion of peacetime GDP to military spending. They probably just didn't have the dosh for radar, sufficiently powerful aero engines to allow for robust aircraft, an effective pilot training scheme and replenishment pipeline, nor funds for having effective damage control designed into their ships.I ain't no expert but if my target is American carriers it helps if I know where they are.
Maybe someone was out taking a whizz when that was taught at IJN strategy school.
In addition to a "dosh" deficit it seems they had a lack of appreciation for the importance of these things in the rapidly accelerating pace of war making technology. A Samurai-like cultural affinity for the devastating decisive strike, combined with the heady string of victories leading to delusions of invincibility tended to downplay the importance of defensive measures at all levels from radar to damage control. Their entire philosophy was built on a "blitzkrieg" model rather than a "seige" model.They probably just didn't have the dosh for radar, sufficiently powerful aero engines to allow for robust aircraft, an effective pilot training scheme and replenishment pipeline, nor funds for having effective damage control designed into their ships.
A fair assessment. The Brits became experts at damage control, but that didn't stop them after three years of combat experience from losing Ark Royal to a single torpedo hit, with the captain ordering the damage control teams to abandon ship.Prior to Coral Sea, their carriers had never encountered any creditable opposition, so the whole damage control scene was a new thing for them. What limited damage control they had was geared more towards flying accidents than battle damage. Read "Shattered Sword".
Damage control, like Air Combat Maneuvering or carrier landing, is a perishable skill which must be practiced constantly and kept abreast of the latest changes in weaponry, technology, and configuration.A fair assessment. The Brits became experts at damage control, but that didn't stop them after three years of combat experience from losing Ark Royal to a single torpedo hit, with the captain ordering the damage control teams to abandon ship.
What the Japanese saw through that loonngg telescope stretched across the big pond was a nation beaten down by the depression, full of "America Firsters", isolationists, and pseudo fascist sympathizers, as well as a significant Japanese population. A little optimistic thinking on their part could easily lead to the conclusion the US had very little stomach for war. Heck, they'd sat quietly on their hands while Hitler rolled through Europe, hadn't they? The images projected by newspapers, radio, and newsreels can easily give foreigners a distorted view of any country.Throughout its history the US has demonstrated an audacity and willingness to fight, taking huge losses and fighting almost always to victory. Where in this history did Japan not pay attention? I
the dosh for radar, sufficiently powerful aero engines to allow for robust aircraft, an effective pilot training scheme and replenishment pipeline, nor funds for having effective damage control designed into their ships.
The US did paint Japan into a corner for certain. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN 1938-1940Hey Admiral Beez,
re your post#224 (the second paragraph)
I refer you to my post#63, in particular:
"Contrary to popular myth (at least in the US) the Japanese government had no interest in going to war with the US, and their war planners never thought it likely (possible? yes, but not likely) that they would win a short war with the US. The Japanese war planners considered it a certainty that they would not win a sustained war with the US (barring devine intervention, pure luck, extreme US incompetence, etc.). The reason for Japan's willingness to start a war with the US, UK, and Dutch (at least at that point in time) rested solely on the fact that these countries had all ceased to supply oil to Japan. Even if the US alone had continued to supply oil to Japan, the Japanese high command would not have started a war at that point in time. The Japanese government knew that without oil the Japanese nation would have returned to its late-1800s to early-1900s status. They would most likely have lost Manchukuo, Korea, and have had to stop their invasion of China. This would have destroyed their economy and their ability to defend themselves, putting them at the mercy (once again) of the European nations and the US, and possibly the Soviet Union."
I feel I should add that this is not simply my opinion. The above Japanese view was substantiated by post-war intelligence gathered from the debriefing of various Japanese civil and military higher-ups, and is generally accepted as accurate by serious historians, including those in the US military services. Why it is not emphasized in US history classes/books more is open to debate and speculation, the Japanese assessment of their situation (right or wrong) is not. They were quite aware of the US military/industrial capabilities and did not think it likely that the US would not fight. They simply felt that there was no other acceptable choice.
Japan was, quite literally, rampaging through China for at least a decade by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked.
This is a rather simplistic analysis of how Japan got involved in China. Ever since Will Adams (the character John Blackthorne in "Shogun") had landed in 1599 around the start of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Japanese intelligentsia had been aware of the existance of Great Britain and the fact that a small resource limited island nation could rise to become a world power through prowess in trade and force of arms.Japan did not need to invade China; they chose to do so.
In addition to a "dosh" deficit it seems they had a lack of appreciation for the importance of these things in the rapidly accelerating pace of war making technology. A Samurai-like cultural affinity for the devastating decisive strike, combined with the heady string of victories leading to delusions of invincibility tended to downplay the importance of defensive measures at all levels from radar to damage control. Their entire philosophy was built on a "blitzkrieg" model rather than a "seige" model.
Prior to Coral Sea, their carriers had never encountered any creditable opposition, so the whole damage control scene was a new thing for them. What limited damage control they had was geared more towards flying accidents than battle damage. Read "Shattered Sword".
The Lex and the Yorktown taught USN a lot about damage control; lessons which were quickly learned and incorporated into doctrine and hardware. (Lessons which were unfortunately forgotten by the time Vietnam rolled around, and had to be learned again the hard way.)
Cheers,
Wes
This is a rather simplistic analysis of how Japan got involved in China. Ever since Will Adams (the character John Blackthorne in "Shogun") had landed in 1599 around the start of the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Japanese intelligentsia had been aware of the existance of Great Britain and the fact that a small resource limited island nation could rise to become a world power through prowess in trade and force of arms.
When they finally emerged from their bubble to engage with the world, they set out to emulate Britain's success. Unfortunately, the rules were changing and the methods that worked for Britain in the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries were becoming less acceptable on the world stage in the late19th and 20th centuries. Additionally, a much greater portion of the world's natural resources were already claimed by others, most of whom were more advanced technologically and industrially.
Japan's prowess in the Sino- and Russo-Japanese wars, along with her long held Samurai warrior tradition combined to give the armed forces a high level of social respect and political clout. Alongside this (and within the services) there developed cults of ultranationalism and a sense of "competitive extremism" not unlike what we see in the US today: "I can be more (conservative, liberal, racist, sexist, [insert explitive of choice],) than you can!" This led to junior and mid level officers who were well respected nationalists sometimes taking matters into their own hands when government policies were not deemed forceful enough. Any senior officer or government official rebuking or countermanding such actions risked being labeled a traitor to "the National Destiny" and possibly subject to assassination or public disgrace. The invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was just such an event. Officers in the Kwantung Army (ostensibly there to protect Japanese industrial assets from "bandit warlords") assassinated one of the warlords and proceeded to occupy his and adjoining territories, all without orders from Tokyo. When this resulted in international protests, the government could only take an internationally defiant stance, as the alternative of admitting their chain of command was breached was unpalatable. Having discovered that this ploy would work, the Kwantung Army repeated it on the border of China proper in 1937, leading to the infamous China quagmire that soaked up so much of Japan's resources and manpower.
Thus Japan's 1930s policy of aggression was to a large extent a non-policy of fait accompli that they were too proud to back down from. As an example of a society rife with extremism run amok, this is a lesson to be heeded by our current world.
Cheers,
Wes
We were all rampaging through China. Japan just did it later than everyone else, and with a yellow, not white face.Japan was, quite literally, rampaging through China for at least a decade by the time Pearl Harbor was attacked.
Not just the late 30s. My mother's parents (Universalist missionaries) were forced to leave Japan with their three daughters in 1933 due to death threats from ultranationalists due to their gaijin "infidel" faith polluting the Shinto purity of the Japanese national essence. Local law enforcement advised that no protection could be provided and suggested they leave the country, as they wanted no "tragedies" on their doorstep.Dan Carlin in his 'Supernova in the East' mentioned some historians who described the Japanese system in the late 30s as "government by assassination".