Yes the Pacific was the main area but I wouldn't call over a million Japanese soldiers in theatre a meaningless theatre of operations but each to his own...
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Gnomey said:Yes the Pacific was the main area but I wouldn't call over a million Japanese soldiers in theatre a meaningless theatre of operations but each to his own...
Agreed but they still where there and the still hand to be defeated, they weren't go to surrender on orders from Tokyo necessarily. Still it tied down men that the Japanese (although the couldn't move them) needed elsewhere. What the could move was sunk en-route. Later on to replace/reinforce the Pacific Islands they replaced them with troops from Japan who were without (not all) battle experience. Had they been able to send the divisions in China who were battle hardened, I doubt the ending would of been different but the cost may of been higher.syscom3 said:The Japanese didnt have the transport to move them around, little alone supply them.
The IJA in the CBI were essentially useless in the strategic way of things.
Gnomey said:Agreed but they still where there and the still hand to be defeated, they weren't go to surrender on orders from Tokyo necessarily. Still it tied down men that the Japanese (although the couldn't move them) needed elsewhere. What the could move was sunk en-route. Later on to replace/reinforce the Pacific Islands they replaced them with troops from Japan who were without (not all) battle experience. Had they been able to send the divisions in China who were battle hardened, I doubt the ending would of been different but the cost may of been higher.
daishi12 said:Syscom, where does the statement about the Pacific come into the argument about whether the RN won the BoB?
Surely the original argument was did the RAF steal all the glory from the RN?
Yep - those Russkies were totally thrashed, Stalin finally had to surrender in the ruins of their last remaining city, Vladivostok. That's why we've had a Nazi Europe these last 60 years!!
Soren said:Without an invasion of the USSR in 41 Stalin would've just kept up his trend eliminating his army's ability to fight, and by 1943-44 the Soviet army would've been in disarray. It was War which lighted the spark in Soviet industry, not Stalin.
Jabberwocky said:The Red Army and Stalin were doing exactly the opposite.
Under new leadership the Red Army was in the middle if a reform and repair porgramme in 1940-1941, undergoing a serious and comprehensive revision of its structure and doctrine. The purges of the mid 1930s were a thing of the past, particularly give the harsh lessons learnt in the Winter War.
Armour and aircraft (the modern and dynamic arms of the Red Army at the time) were being improved with an eye on the latest developments elsewhere, although infantry tactics and equipment, as well as artillery production and design were quite laggard, mostly due to intransigence from several older generation generals who delayed new programs and carved out their own little kingdoms. Training was also on the rise, according to John Erickson's 'The Road to Stalingrad' the infantry training budget in 1941 was double that of 1939.
The goal was to have a thoroughly reformed Red Army by 1943, possibly with an eye to expanding south into the Balkans.
When Germany hit Russia in 1941 they hit them at the beginning of a modernisation cycle, where equipment and doctrine were changing. If Germany had delayed another 12 months, I believe that they would of had a much harder time of things, being presented with a better organised and slightly better trained Red Army that was slowly divesting itself of some of its weaknesses.
Even as it was, Churchill was extremely nervous about D-day and put it off for as long as he could, by trying to emphasise operations in the Med. The reason is not hard to see. Opposed amphibious landings are always a terrible risk, with overwhelming superiority being required (Gallipoli was burned into the memory of the BCE). And the number of troops available for the assault is not the critical factor (the German Army was vastly stronger than the British in 1940) - it's the means of getting them across and supplied when there. Despite the huge resources put into D-day, IIRC there were still only 5 Divisions in the first wave. There would have been little scope for the Allies to increase that, they would still have been tied up in the Pacific as well. It would have taken, at the very least, an extra year or two before an invasion would have been contemplated as they would probably have waited for the end of the war with Japan so they could shift the amphibious resources over.davparlr said:Time was not on Germany's side. With limited men under arms (non-German forces were either mostly not reliable or not as well committed) and not as efficient arms manufacturing or logistic capablity, Germany would soon be significantly out manned (the US had vast amounts of manpower to tap) and out armed. Unlike Germany for operation Sea Lion, the allies would have total control of sea power and probably local control of the airspace due to total quantity of allied airpower available. Every day the Allies would get stronger at a faster rate than the Axis. In a matter of time, the allies could have generated three or four D-Day level invasions with supporting aircraft carriers and warships (Okinawa had 548k troops available, more than D-Day). They would have to defend Italy, Southern France, Calais, Normandy and other places, all silmultaneously against greater number of aircraft, tanks, ships, men, etc. Eventually, the Allies could overwhelm Germany with shear mass. The math is inescapable. Determination, however is something else.
I think you meant to type 21 miles (not 12) as that's the minimum distance across the Channel.daishi12 said:It is probably worth noting that during the majority of Allied landings the landing craft went in from no more than 5 miles offshore, and the troops usually where seasick. I'd like to see a flat-bottomed, low freeboard river vessel trying to go between 12 and 35 miles in even moderate seas without the troops being incapacitated, bombed, shelled, mined or swamped.
Soren said:Tony Hunter,
The way the USSR contributed to the final victory over Germany was not by outfighting the Germans, cause it couldn't, it just simply bled the German army white while Britain and the USA took the fight to Germany itself. .
Did the USSR conduct a bombing campaign against German industry ? No. Could they have done it ? No. Did the USSR conduct any major seaborne campaign against the Germans ? No. Could they have done it ? No. Without either of these there would be no way of winning against the Germans, pure and simple. With no bombing of German industry Russia was going to fall guaranteed !
Without Britain and the USA there is simply no way Stalin could've won over the Germans. I mean come on, even while simultanously fighting the western Allies Germany came damn close to putting an end to the Soviet army ! Stalin himself even considered surrendering at one point !
The German army, despite fighting on many fronts and being on the defensive, in terms of losses dealt to each other kept on beating the crap out of the Soviets until the end of the war.
Oh and about the "partially successfull" invasion, well, what I meant was establishing a foothold on British soil, cause had that been done the Germans would've achieved Objective #1 in a victory over Britain.
Only because Germany did not have a navy capable of disrupting the operation - which brings us back to where we started!pbfoot said:Well Churchill must have gun shy about landings after his attempt at it at Gallipoli which was a fiasco but as to whether shallow draft boats could move troops across the channel the only reason the Brits had a army left is because of small ships at Dunkirk if the stories are to be believed .
davparlr said:I disagree with this. Stalin was hyper paranoid. He placed lackies in positions of command and anyone who showed initative was eliminated. Great aircraft designers were thrown in jail, tank designers the same. I believe Tupelov (?) was one, the creater of the T-34 was another. More time without a threat would have made Russia even weaker. In fact, I think that, with better, meaning sane, planning and preparation, and launching the invasion earlier in the year (maybe early 42), Germany may have succeeded in putting Russia out of the war like in WWI.
Jabberwocky said:The Red Army and Stalin were doing exactly the opposite.
Under new leadership the Red Army was in the middle if a reform and repair porgramme in 1940-1941, undergoing a serious and comprehensive revision of its structure and doctrine. The purges of the mid 1930s were a thing of the past, particularly give the harsh lessons learnt in the Winter War.
Armour and aircraft (the modern and dynamic arms of the Red Army at the time) were being improved with an eye on the latest developments elsewhere, although infantry tactics and equipment, as well as artillery production and design were quite laggard, mostly due to intransigence from several older generation generals who delayed new programs and carved out their own little kingdoms. Training was also on the rise, according to John Erickson's 'The Road to Stalingrad' the infantry training budget in 1941 was double that of 1939.
The goal was to have a thoroughly reformed Red Army by 1943, possibly with an eye to expanding south into the Balkans.
When Germany hit Russia in 1941 they hit them at the beginning of a modernisation cycle, where equipment and doctrine were changing. If Germany had delayed another 12 months, I believe that they would of had a much harder time of things, being presented with a better organised and slightly better trained Red Army that was slowly divesting itself of some of its weaknesses.
Jabberwocky said:Erickson tends to disagree with you, as did the German Army in December 1940. At the start his history of the Great Patriotic War he goes into a 40+ page examination of the reforms that the Red Army was going through. Incompetence, particularly from the old guard, was being fairly ruthlessly weeded out. There was a powerful group of reformers in the Red Army: Zukhov, Pavlov and Yermenenko (amour, although Pavlov was a bit up and down), Karavchenko (aircraft), Smirnov and Meretskov (infantry). Erickson's general conclusion is that although there were definate steps in the right direction, it was too little, too late.
Similarly, German intelligence for 'Otto' (the pre-Barbarossa code name) conducted in Dec-1940 noted that the reorientation of the Red Army would not bring any substantial improvements before Spring 1941 i.e. that in the German view it was reforming and improving.
Tony Williams said:I emphatically disagree with you.
When Germany came closest to defeating Russia (but not very close) in 1941/2 they had no UK/US land forces facing them, except for the sideshow in the Med., so they were focusing the vast majority of their forces on beating the USSR. They failed. Allied bombing at that time was totally ineffective, but Germany still failed. There was no way that Germany was going to beat the USSR, they did their best and simply couldn't do it.
The US/UK bombing campaign was built up to such a pitch simply because they had no other way of attacking Germany until after D-day. It was partly a political move to buy off Stalin's pressure for a second front. Stalin was well aware that the war would be decided on the ground, by armies - the bombing campaign was helpful but was never going to win the war. In fact, the Allied bombing only started to become effective in 1943, by which time the Soviets had finally stopped the Germans (Stalingrad, Kursk) and moved onto the start of the offensive which swept all the way into Berlin. The bombing campaign certainly speeded up the German collapse, but after 1943 it was going to happen anyway.
Exactly in what way was the lack of Soviet experience in amphibious landings a disadvantage? There are no seas between Russia and Germany.
The losses suffered by the USSR relative to Germany are completely irrelevant - because they could afford them. The Germany/USSR fight was rather like a middleweight boxer fighting a heavyweight. The middleweight is faster, lands far more punches and does some damage but in the end it is all for naught - he gets battered into the canvas. If he then protested that he ""beat the crap" out of the heavyweight he would just be laughed at.
Putting troops ashore in an invasion is not "partially successful" if it leads to their subsequent surrender - it's a disaster.
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