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Worst Allied loss of the war is probably Fall Gelb, or Barbarossa on the Eastern front. Dieppe, in terms of casualties, and strategic impact, is really a very minor setback in the wider picture. A tragedy for sure, but not a point where the outcome of the war hung in the balance.
Also bear in mind the vast majority of the BEF were PBI (poor bloody infantry) which didn't have much heavy equipment. Most of the Dunkirk evacuees literally could have been handed a new .303 rifle as they disembarked in the UK.
We have a good idea what the Allies learned from Dieppe:
- can't attack an urban port
- beware of rocky beaches
- tanks can be problematic
- don't let officers go ashore with "plans"
- don't handcuff enemy prisoners
- surprise is hard to achieve
- etc. etc
My question is: what did the Germans learn from Dieppe?
My guess is: not much. They had to feel pretty smug about their defense. And THAT in itself may have spelled problems later on - in June '44.
Thoughts on this ....?
MM
Dunkirk gets my vote. British propaganda says the BEF was saved at Dunkirk. In actuality the 3 BEF army corps were destroyed as combat units.
2,472 out of 2,794 total artillery pieces lost. (I assume this number includes AT and AA guns)
63.879 out of 66,618 total motor vehicles lost.
I've been thinking about this and would like to present some more candidates for the worst Allied defeats of WW2;
Pearl Harbor - the carriers survived, but US losses in other surface units, personnel, and aircraft were heavy and required significant investment to repair. Obviously, these lost assets could not be deployed to assist the fight against the Japanese advance in early 1942.
PQ-17 - a needless waste of lives and resources, IMHO, in a convoy that could (and should) have been saved.
The Channel Dash - The British missed a brilliant chance to knock the two most powerful survivor of the Kriegsmarine out of the war, and avert the danger of another PQ-17 type disaster. Inexcusable given the level of British control over the Channel.
Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.
Force Z - a needless squandering of two very powerful fleet units due to an institutional inability to grasp the significance of air power in naval warfare. Again, inexcusable given the lessons of Taranto, Bismarck and Pearl Harbor that should have already been learned.
The tactical loss of Force Z came at the end of a long stream of more strategic failures, key of which was the fallacy of being able to reinforce Singapore if Britain was engaged in a European conflict. To be fair, Force Z was supposed to include the carrier HMS Hermes but she was damaged leaving the already unbalanced Force Z without organic airpower and highly vulnerable. Then there was the shocking miscommunication between Phillips and AHQFE regarding the provision of air power. It was a confluence of events but had massive strategic impact. I still wonder whether Japan would have pursued its invasion plans had a portion of the US Pacific Fleet sortied to Singapore and hooked up with Force Z in late Nov 41.