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The Merlins were being manufactured in England and at the time, there was a real concern wether England might be next to fall under Germany's onslaught.
Well, we knew for sure where England stood, but you had to keep an eye on those Irish (my Scottish ancestry *may or may not* have influenced my observation)Nice to know that you consider the rest of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was safe from Hitler's predations!
The first German air raid on Britain on 16 Oct 1939 targeted RN ships in the Firth of Forth. Spitfires from 602 (City of Glasgow) and 603 (City of Edinburgh squadrons, based at Drem & Turnhouse respectively, were scrambled and succeeded in bringing down 2 German aircraft.
Rolls Royce had a shadow factory at Hillington, on the outskirts of Glasgow (in Scotland) from 1937, it completed its first Merlin engine about two weeks before the outbreak of WW2. It went on to produce about 14% of all Merlins produced worldwide as well as Griffons.
Lets be honest, without the Merlin the Mustang would just be another fighter but with it it became a legend. The Allison engined models were great aircraft but so were all the other low altitude planes, it's above 20,000ft were the men were seperated from the boys and where the air war ultimately progressed.When the BPC approached North American about manufacturing P-40's under license, it was a whole different world in Europe.
The Merlins were being manufactured in England and at the time, there was a real concern wether England might be next to fall under Germany's onslaught.
North American drew up a design using what was available, tried and proven. The V-1710 was a solid performing engine and was, in my opinion, the right choice.
We can look back and ponder what-ifs, but at the time, no one knew that there would be a need for long-range escorts battling at 35,000 feet and the early Allison powered Mustangs were also excellent performers at lower altitudes (including the A-36).
Did they know that in 1940?Lets be honest, without the Merlin the Mustang would just be another fighter but with it it became a legend. The Allison engined models were great aircraft but so were all the other low altitude planes, it's above 20,000ft were the men were seperated from the boys and where the air war ultimately progressed.
The problem with your view is that no magic wand existed to make your vision work. Neither re-design or priority access for Sabre or Griffon had the change been feasible. Further, neither were in position to produce for NAA. In other words, reognize that some really smart people - particularly NAA that designed the Mustang WITHOUT the constraints of Materiel Command burocracy dictat Specification, continued to improve on the performance .The way i would have done it there would be NO aillson or merlin versions just sabres .
Well during the BoB Spit's and 109's were fighting all the way up too 30,000ft and over so I'd say yes. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/74-morrison-2nov40.jpg http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/74-stephen-30nov40.jpgDid they know that in 1940?
Well during the BoB Spit's and 109's were fighting all the way up too 30,000ft and over so I'd say yes. http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/74-morrison-2nov40.jpg http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/74-stephen-30nov40.jpg
In fairness, in 1939 Arnold was aware that unescorted bomber concept was trashed in Spanish Civil War and personally changed the ranked priorities of the Emmons Board. The "4. Long Range Fighter with 1500 mi Range" was moved by him to 1. While Arnold took personal responsibility for AAF not buying the Mustang sooner, in fairness the critical path to P-51B combat ops was Packard's gestation issues with 1650-3. That said, Col, then MG Oliver Echols was singularly responsible for rejecting the NA-73 when it was abundantly clear that XP-46 was a total failure - and NA-73 was superior AND in production at same time XP-46 first flew. Echols was forced by Gen Fairchild and HQ-Planning and Requirements to buy the A-36, then run over again when he tried to stop NA-99 (P-51A) and NA-102 (P-51B) from being let, favoring shutting down Mustang and diverting production capacity to B-25s. I haven't found documents to support Arnold's command infuence - but certain that it existed, and equally certain that he was impressed by the work efforts at R-R in June 1942 to instqll the Merlin.You're right to an extent...however, from the US perspective there wasn't an identified need at that time for a fighter that could operate at those altitudes and at long range, at least not in 1940. Even in 1942, the USAAF was hoping daylight precision bombing with unescorted B-17s and B-24s would do the trick.
Trouble is you need a Tardis (time machine).The way i would have done it there would be NO aillson or merlin versions just sabres .
Yes, no, maybe.You're right to an extent...however, from the US perspective there wasn't an identified need at that time for a fighter that could operate at those altitudes and at long range, at least not in 1940. Even in 1942, the USAAF was hoping daylight precision bombing with unescorted B-17s and B-24s would do the trick.
You are going to wind up with a lot more dihedral on wings after you land than when you took off
In fairness, in 1939 Arnold was aware that unescorted bomber concept was trashed in Spanish Civil War and personally changed the ranked priorities of the Emmons Board. The "4. Long Range Fighter with 1500 mi Range" was moved by him to 1. While Arnold took personal responsibility for AAF not buying the Mustang sooner, in fairness the critical path to P-51B combat ops was Packard's gestation issues with 1650-3. That said, Col, then MG Oliver Echols was singularly responsible for rejecting the NA-73 when it was abundantly clear that XP-46 was a total failure - and NA-73 was superior AND in production at same time XP-46 first flew. Echols was forced by Gen Fairchild and HQ-Planning and Requirements to buy the A-36, then run over again when he tried to stop NA-99 (P-51A) and NA-102 (P-51B) from being let, favoring shutting down Mustang and diverting production capacity to B-25s. I haven't found documents to support Arnold's command infuence - but certain that it existed, and equally certain that he was impressed by the work efforts at R-R in June 1942 to instqll the Merlin.
"Hoping" that long range escort would do the trick in 1942 was a good way to sum it up. That said, the 8th AF TO&E called for lng range escort (P-38F) FGs in original plan. From that point, when the P-38s were removed to Africa and Spitfire/P-47 replaced them, the "hope' quotient went up.It became abundently clear even to Eaker and Spaatz that daylight stategic bombing entered the Crisis Zone from BLitz Week in July 1943 through Tidal Wave August 1.
Eaker's plea in June 1943 for long range escort was heard and jolted several actions. First Arnold diverted deployment of 55th and 20th FG (P-38) to ETO immediately, arriving in August. Second, the pressure on increasing intenal fuel for P-51B, P-47D and P-38J ratched up (MG Giles), and finally Col Bradley finally unbloked Echols resistance to P-51B at Materiel Command.
And still, R-R and Packard strke a deal because Allison still doesn't have capacity in R&D to accelerate implementyation of the improved Allison V-1650-1& -3 as the bull headed Echols is still pushing the Allison V-1710 with single stage to supply Army needs.What you really want requires "alternative history" levels of change.
1) RR invite Allison engineers to England to help fix the useless Merlin Mk1 engine ramp head
2) Allison give them the pent-roof chamber and roller-rockers they`ve designed
3) RR pass on test data on high pressure cooling to Allison
4) A collaborative partnership emerges
5) RR, grateful, and Allison receptive - RR call Allison in 1940 to ask if they want "in" on the new 2 stage project
I think you can imagine the rest, this is totally fanciful and utterly against the corporate attitudes of the time
and would never ever have happened. But....
In fairness, in 1939 Arnold was aware that unescorted bomber concept was trashed in Spanish Civil War and personally changed the ranked priorities of the Emmons Board. The "4. Long Range Fighter with 1500 mi Range" was moved by him to 1. While Arnold took personal responsibility for AAF not buying the Mustang sooner, in fairness the critical path to P-51B combat ops was Packard's gestation issues with 1650-3. That said, Col, then MG Oliver Echols was singularly responsible for rejecting the NA-73 when it was abundantly clear that XP-46 was a total failure - and NA-73 was superior AND in production at same time XP-46 first flew. Echols was forced by Gen Fairchild and HQ-Planning and Requirements to buy the A-36, then run over again when he tried to stop NA-99 (P-51A) and NA-102 (P-51B) from being let, favoring shutting down Mustang and diverting production capacity to B-25s. I haven't found documents to support Arnold's command infuence - but certain that it existed, and equally certain that he was impressed by the work efforts at R-R in June 1942 to instqll the Merlin.
"Hoping" that long range escort would do the trick in 1942 was a good way to sum it up. That said, the 8th AF TO&E called for lng range escort (P-38F) FGs in original plan. From that point, when the P-38s were removed to Africa and Spitfire/P-47 replaced them, the "hope' quotient went up.It became abundently clear even to Eaker and Spaatz that daylight stategic bombing entered the Crisis Zone from BLitz Week in July 1943 through Tidal Wave August 1.
Eaker's plea in June 1943 for long range escort was heard and jolted several actions. First Arnold diverted deployment of 55th and 20th FG (P-38) to ETO immediately, arriving in August. Second, the pressure on increasing intenal fuel for P-51B, P-47D and P-38J ratched up (MG Giles), and finally Col Bradley finally unbloked Echols resistance to P-51B at Materiel Command.
In reality, the P-38 arrived on the scene barely in time to support US entry into combat theatres. Obviously, USAAF planners made use of the platform...but I sense this wasn't the most thought-through of procurements, and that a lot of luck was involved with the P-38 being ready in time.
Fair - but the Emmons Board set the R&D priorities and the desired fighter was to be Single engine with 1500 mi range. The P-38 was established via RFP as a 'T/E Interceptor', ditto the P-39, arising from CP38-608 and 609 respectively, The Emmons Board was fully aware that the envisioned P-39 with Turbosupercharging would have inadequate range. Lt. Ben Kelsey project managed both Circular Proposal RFPs and always considered the XP-39 to be the 'smaller solution' then became MC Project Manager for P-38, (Price for P-39), the Kelsey took over Fighter Projects in 1940-1941.As always, things were more complicated than my rather glib comment. The first flight of the XP-38 on 27 Jan 1939 preceded Arnold's decision, so clearly there were moves afoot. The XP-38 was followed by production of 15 YP-38s but progress was incredibly slow despite Arnold's prioritization. The first YP-38 only flew in Sep 1940 and last was delivered in Jun 1941, with the first operationally viable production airframe (a P-38E) rolling off the production line in October 1941, with several months to follow before a viable force was in existence.
In reality, the P-38 arrived on the scene barely in time to support US entry into combat theatres. Obviously, USAAF planners made use of the platform...but I sense this wasn't the most thought-through of procurements, and that a lot of luck was involved with the P-38 being ready in time.