Erich Hartmann - how did his comrades regard him?
- Thread starter paradoxguy
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I do not think there was special about British Civillian Repair Units. What was different from German - damaged planes were collected, sent to private owned factories, repaired, sent back to front. German system was the same. I think there is much hype about BBritish Civillian repair, probably due author of Battle of Britain emphasize it always how important it was for English survival. It was, but it does not make it special.
German after all never seem to lack planes, or tank. By 1945, they had more plane than ever. Ironic, is not it?
parsifal
Colonel
One of the issues being examined is exactly whether the "rate" of overclaiming was the same for all nationalities. With awards and benefits associated with German claims, and no real action taken even if caught, and at times no real adherence to the confirmation system, (indeed some individuals like Marseilles encouraged and allowed to overclaim on an institutional basis), some here are arguing that the germans had greater motive and opportunity to cheat than anybody.
Mind you, Russians too received rewards for claims that they logged. However, there were greater rewards for group claims....claims not attached to any individual bu to the unit. The most common reward was to be designated a guards unit, which carried with it better pay, better equipment and a lot of prestige. There were rewards for individual achievement as well, though not as marked as was the case for the german flyers. A man that received a decoration, could also expect some financial reward, though usualy the amount was pretty modest, even by Russian standards
parsifal
Colonel
i dont know if the British salvage system was especially efficient, or the german especially innefficient, but there is strong evidence to suggest a much higher write off rate in the luftwaffe than in Allied air forces. As an example, JG11 in 1943 suffered a 250% loss rate from all causes, and about 150% due to post action scrappings and non-combat losses. At the same time Allied units were suffering about a 100% loss rate from all causes per annum. That means the overall loss rate for the LW unit was about 2.5 times greater than a typical allied unit, and most of these units were dropping out of commission as scrapped units rather than wrecked units.
I suspect the high loss rate has something to do with the heavy demands placed on LW units, but even so, a hell of a lot of crippled birds were not returning to service, and the ULTRA intercept posted by Stona gives some indication of this.
Germany was never really short of planes, is true to a degree. They were unable to greatly expand on their frontline forces, because to maintain an adequate reserve, and keep existing units up to strength meant there were not enough resources to put into other arms, like bombers and trainers. there were never enough trainers, and because of this (along with other reasons) the germans were always short of pilots as well.
So it is only partially true what you are saying. They could keep the numbers of fighters up to strength, but they had to virtually abandon production of all other types to do that. In the end, that shortcut caught up with the LW in a very nasty way
The Luftwaffe did lack aircraft towards the end. In the simplest terms the allies were destroying more than they could produce. They never really had enough aircraft. They embarked on "Barbarossa" with 4,882 aircraft which is very similar to the amount,4,782, that they had about a year earlier in May 1940 when they were about to start and subsequently lose the Battle of Britain. This despite much heavier commitments in several theatres.
The Luftwaffe repair system was very inefficient and unwieldy,here is a schematic. Too many arrows.
The British system was more streamlined and major repairs could be carried out on bases by civilians. It was also much easier to get a badly damaged airframe from a base in the South of England to say Cowley (Oxford) than from Abbeville to Munich.
As of 24/6/40 de Havilland started converting all Spitfires,Hurricanes and Defiants in service to accept a constant speed unit.
De Havilland manufactured the relevant parts,including those to adapt the Merlin engine to drive the hydraulic pump. It was deemed more important that Rolls Royce themselves concentrated on building Merlins. They did not need to change the propeller blades but did have to increase their pitch range. The time allowed to convert a squadron was ten days and in less than a month,by 20/7/40,all Spitfire squadrons had been converted.
On 16/8/40 every Spitfire and Hurricane in service,over 1000 aircraft,had been converted. Much of this work was carried out by civilians trained by de Havilland. I don't believe that the Luftwaffe would have been capable of such a project in 1940 or any other time during the war.
Late in the war the massive production of aircraft by the allies,something planned for years in advance,which Germany never did,meant that a Spitfire or Mustang badly damaged during Bodenplatte could be bull dozed off the runway and replaced with a brand new one in days. There was no need to repair it and in some cases salvageable parts were not retrieved. The Luftwaffe could not do this.
Simplistically it's why they lost the war and we won.
Cheers
Steve
The Luftwaffe repair system was very inefficient and unwieldy,here is a schematic. Too many arrows.
The British system was more streamlined and major repairs could be carried out on bases by civilians. It was also much easier to get a badly damaged airframe from a base in the South of England to say Cowley (Oxford) than from Abbeville to Munich.
As of 24/6/40 de Havilland started converting all Spitfires,Hurricanes and Defiants in service to accept a constant speed unit.
De Havilland manufactured the relevant parts,including those to adapt the Merlin engine to drive the hydraulic pump. It was deemed more important that Rolls Royce themselves concentrated on building Merlins. They did not need to change the propeller blades but did have to increase their pitch range. The time allowed to convert a squadron was ten days and in less than a month,by 20/7/40,all Spitfire squadrons had been converted.
On 16/8/40 every Spitfire and Hurricane in service,over 1000 aircraft,had been converted. Much of this work was carried out by civilians trained by de Havilland. I don't believe that the Luftwaffe would have been capable of such a project in 1940 or any other time during the war.
Late in the war the massive production of aircraft by the allies,something planned for years in advance,which Germany never did,meant that a Spitfire or Mustang badly damaged during Bodenplatte could be bull dozed off the runway and replaced with a brand new one in days. There was no need to repair it and in some cases salvageable parts were not retrieved. The Luftwaffe could not do this.
Simplistically it's why they lost the war and we won.
Cheers
Steve
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I've never seen any evidence that Bartels made a fraudulent claim. I don't know what his actual tally was,I've not compared or seen it compared, to losses and I think I've already made it clear what a fruitless excercise I find that to be. There are just too many holes in the available evidence.
He ended up with an official tally of 99 IIRC,which makes him a fine combat pilot.
Cheers
Steve
times/dates/location/aircraft shotdown here: Aces of the Luftwaffe - Heinrich Bartels I think you'll find everything crosschecks.
as far as 'holes' in the evidence, maybe after Nov./44 when RLM stopped confirming claims.
Yammas
Yes, we seem to disagree. IMHO claiming is not 1 to 1 with shoot downs, there are many well known cases from several AFs when one shot down an enemy plane but didn't bother to make a claim because he knew that the claim wouldn't be accepted because of lack of withnesses. And there are many more cases when claims were made and accepted as confirmed even if there were no corresponding losses. And I know the LW system of making claims and their confirmation system, thank you.
On LW claims, they tended to be fairly accurate, in early war years more accurate than those of RAF but RAF, which were well aware on its pilots overclaiming by ULTRA, became stricker with confirmations later on and during later part of the war RAF system seems to have been fairly good. On the other hand later in the war there seems to be lapses in the LW system, claims which by little work on ground would have found to be clearly inflated were anyway accepted. But generally IMHO LW confirmation system remained fairly accurate until it was run down. And IMHO LW claim accuracy in the East was better than that of VVS but there seems to have been fairly bad problems with at least JG 5 after mid 42 or sometimes after that, in L41 LW claim accuracy in the North was at more or less normal LW level.
Juha
Hi Ratsel I meant cross referenced with allied losses,so not just "Spitfire" but its unit,pilot serial number etc.
It may have been done but I've not seen it. I'm not that interested in the numbers for individual pilots,exceptional airmen though they were. I'm more interested in the big picture from which we have more to learn.
Cheers
Steve
In fact one sees in the table that nothing is crosschecked on Bartels case, see for ex Wutz Galland Aces of the Luftwaffe - Wilhelm-Ferdinand Galland as an example when there are some crosschecking made.
Juha
drgondog
Major
Steve - true but you have to reflect that so much of LuftFlotte Reich was deployed to eastern France/Belgium and Holland during the Normandy Campaign - and weren't pulled back until August/September 1944.
Great example.
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Maximowitz
Tech Sergeant
Somebody has done some investigation already. Some interesting thoughts in that thread - I remain however open minded.
Severe Overclaimers Vs. Reliable Claimers List - Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum
Yes,and it took a battering. In August 1944 Luftflotte Reich lost 375 Bf109s and Fw190s nearly 20% of its establishment in one month.
We need to put this "the luftwaffe was never short of fighters" thing to bed.
Increases in German aircraft production,no matter how impressive on a graph or bar chart were ineffective since,in relation to allied industrial efforts,they were falling further and further behind. The impact of the air war on the German force structure was such that rising attrition cancelled out increased production. In May 1940 the Luftwaffe had 1,369 fighters and 1,758 bombers. Three and a half years later,in January 1944,it had 1,561 fighters and 1,604 bombers.
The loss rate was such that increased German production was NEVER able to maintain frontline squadrons at their full authorised strength. The trend from 1942 onwards,with fluctuations in the percentage,was always downwards.
Add to this the attrition of aircrew and eventually the collapse of fuel supplies and it is evident why the luftwaffe was effectively defeated by September/October 1944. Frankly it's amazing that they carried on for as long as they did.
Cheers
Steve
ahhh yes, Mr. Rob Romero, basing some (or all) of his research on the finding of Dimitri Khazanov. That should tell you something right there.
drgondog
Major
4-24-44 is probably one specific example of overclaiming by Bartels , et al. In addition to these victory credits there are two more in Tony Woods list for the Munich area on 24 April 1944. The USAAF in fact lost two Mustangs (357FG) to mid-air collisions with their Me 110 victims, two Mustangs east of Munich (NE Erding/SW Landshut plus NeuMarkdt-Sangt Viet near Muhldorf/Simbach) 1 near Taufkirchen (S Munich) and and 1 at Lake Wessling west Munich. Net four of 11 Mustang credits plus a bogus (or mis identified P-47 in exactly the same area two hours later
Neumarkdt-Sangt Viet might match up w/ Zeller 9./JG26 (W Simbach) or Bartels (10km w Muhldorf but 10km west Muhldorf is 20 km sw of Neumarkdt-Sangt Viet and more closely matches "W. Simbach"for Zeller award than Bartels). NE Erding/sw Landshut might match up w/Ayerle (12./JG26), Taukirchen might match up with Rabenstein 10./JG27 (1Km SE Munich) or Mueller 2./JG301, and Lake Wessling - no idea unless it is close to Steiner Zee (which I couldn't fight on the map.
Point - Bartels claimed three P-51s withing a 20 mile radius where only one went down. The LW claimed 11 P-51s when only four were shot down by Me 109s and two were downed in mid air collisions for which Me 109s were nowhere close or in escort - both SE of Landhut.
Ergo - Dahl, Bartels and Steigler were awarded four additional P-51s in locations and times that do not match any crash site in the KJ reports. The first Mustang down were the 357FG pair that hit Me 110s ne Erding at ~ 1340. The next one was a Mustang about 10 minutes later as the bombers turned south of Erding for lower corner of se Munich... that almost certainly was Ayerle. Then one went down in Muhldorf/Simbach/Waldkraiburg triangle (Neumarkdt-Sangt Viet) ~1400, then one between Munich and Holzerkirchen at 1405 (s or se of Munich) the last one at 1415 between Landsberg and Munich (Lake Wessling). Most specifically two of Bartels awards could not reasonably be valid based on time and location, ditto Dahl and likely not Stigler.
Make your own judgment - and BTW one P-47 was claimed by Barr of 2./JG106 near Landshut at 1535, two hours after the battle, and 200 miles east of any P-47 range possible - all of which turned back near Mannhein/Stuttgart at 1215.
According to Woods these are the "official P-51 Credits" awarded in Munich area Me 109 pilots between 1315 and 1430 on April 24. Additionally there are 3 more P-51 credits per Prien's history of the JG27 unit.
4/24/1944 Uffz. Joachim Zeller 9 JG 26 P-51 CF-89: 500-7000m [W. Simbach]
4/24/1944 Uffz. Hermann Ayerle 12 JG 26 P-51 CD: NNE München
4/24/1944 Ltn. Otto Engel 11 JG 27 P-51 -
4/24/1944 Fw. Heinrich Bartels 11 JG 27 P-51 10km W. Mühldorf: 4500m
4/24/1944 Fw. Heinrich Bartels 11 JG 27 P-51 10km W. Mühldorf: 5000m
4/24/1944 Fw. Walter Rabenstein 10 JG 27 P-51 DD-25: 100m [1km SE München]
4/24/1944 Fw. Heinrich Bartels 11 JG 27 P-51 N. Waldkraiburg
4/24/1944 Ltn. Franz Stigler 11 JG 27 P-51 -
4/24/1944 Ofhr. Michael Frasch 1 JG 3 P-51 bei Augsburg: 6000m
4/24/1944 Major Walter Dahl Stab III. JG 3 P-51 Raum München: 6500m
4/24/1944 Ofw. Hans Müller 2 JG 301 P-51 Ebersberg
Neumarkdt-Sangt Viet might match up w/ Zeller 9./JG26 (W Simbach) or Bartels (10km w Muhldorf but 10km west Muhldorf is 20 km sw of Neumarkdt-Sangt Viet and more closely matches "W. Simbach"for Zeller award than Bartels). NE Erding/sw Landshut might match up w/Ayerle (12./JG26), Taukirchen might match up with Rabenstein 10./JG27 (1Km SE Munich) or Mueller 2./JG301, and Lake Wessling - no idea unless it is close to Steiner Zee (which I couldn't fight on the map.
Point - Bartels claimed three P-51s withing a 20 mile radius where only one went down. The LW claimed 11 P-51s when only four were shot down by Me 109s and two were downed in mid air collisions for which Me 109s were nowhere close or in escort - both SE of Landhut.
Ergo - Dahl, Bartels and Steigler were awarded four additional P-51s in locations and times that do not match any crash site in the KJ reports. The first Mustang down were the 357FG pair that hit Me 110s ne Erding at ~ 1340. The next one was a Mustang about 10 minutes later as the bombers turned south of Erding for lower corner of se Munich... that almost certainly was Ayerle. Then one went down in Muhldorf/Simbach/Waldkraiburg triangle (Neumarkdt-Sangt Viet) ~1400, then one between Munich and Holzerkirchen at 1405 (s or se of Munich) the last one at 1415 between Landsberg and Munich (Lake Wessling). Most specifically two of Bartels awards could not reasonably be valid based on time and location, ditto Dahl and likely not Stigler.
Make your own judgment - and BTW one P-47 was claimed by Barr of 2./JG106 near Landshut at 1535, two hours after the battle, and 200 miles east of any P-47 range possible - all of which turned back near Mannhein/Stuttgart at 1215.
According to Woods these are the "official P-51 Credits" awarded in Munich area Me 109 pilots between 1315 and 1430 on April 24. Additionally there are 3 more P-51 credits per Prien's history of the JG27 unit.
4/24/1944 Uffz. Joachim Zeller 9 JG 26 P-51 CF-89: 500-7000m [W. Simbach]
4/24/1944 Uffz. Hermann Ayerle 12 JG 26 P-51 CD: NNE München
4/24/1944 Ltn. Otto Engel 11 JG 27 P-51 -
4/24/1944 Fw. Heinrich Bartels 11 JG 27 P-51 10km W. Mühldorf: 4500m
4/24/1944 Fw. Heinrich Bartels 11 JG 27 P-51 10km W. Mühldorf: 5000m
4/24/1944 Fw. Walter Rabenstein 10 JG 27 P-51 DD-25: 100m [1km SE München]
4/24/1944 Fw. Heinrich Bartels 11 JG 27 P-51 N. Waldkraiburg
4/24/1944 Ltn. Franz Stigler 11 JG 27 P-51 -
4/24/1944 Ofhr. Michael Frasch 1 JG 3 P-51 bei Augsburg: 6000m
4/24/1944 Major Walter Dahl Stab III. JG 3 P-51 Raum München: 6500m
4/24/1944 Ofw. Hans Müller 2 JG 301 P-51 Ebersberg
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point - perhaps Mr.Bartels hit those other two Mustangs, seen them smoking, and made a call that he got them. Just a guess. What happened to those two suposed P-51 claims? They returned to base I assume.. did they ever fly again? How many P-51's were damaged that day? Just curious.
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drgondog
Major
They were eithernot hit, or hit and escaped to be shot down by one of the other awardees, or he downed them in a location that was in gross error to his reporting. What is baffling is that with only four wreck sites - what judgment was used for 7 (8 including a P-47 which could never be found because it could never fly that far) credits more than wreck sites and KJ Reports?
There are no Battle Damage reports for April 24 for the 355th and 357th FG - which were the two escort groups taking the 1st BD from Augsburg past Munich and around to Oberphaffenhofen/Landsberg and up to Hildesheim. According to Caldwell and Prien there were ~ 250 s/e fighters deployed to attack around Munich.
Ergo, none were hit and returned as 'limp off's'.. either no damage or shot down. Additionally the 355th and 357th lost one Mustang each between Stittgart and Bingen to flak while strafing on the way home.
There are no Battle Damage reports for April 24 for the 355th and 357th FG - which were the two escort groups taking the 1st BD from Augsburg past Munich and around to Oberphaffenhofen/Landsberg and up to Hildesheim. According to Caldwell and Prien there were ~ 250 s/e fighters deployed to attack around Munich.
Ergo, none were hit and returned as 'limp off's'.. either no damage or shot down. Additionally the 355th and 357th lost one Mustang each between Stittgart and Bingen to flak while strafing on the way home.
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