Erich Hartmann - how did his comrades regard him?

[Ratsel]

actually it says ' He flew 825 missions in recording 352 victories ' exclude the victories with no time, location, and its 323 victories.

 

[Juha]

Hello Milosh
read again, it says "He flew 825 missions in recording 352 victories"

Barkhorn was pre-war trained pilot he had some 100 combat sorties at the beginning of the Oper Barbarossa on 22 Jun 41, one year four months before Hartmann arrived to front.

Juha

 

[jim]

Oh gosh ratsel, I see another difference of opinion raising its head. My view is that from 41-44 the LW was generally never at a numerical disadvantage. Thats because it chose its attacks, and only chose to fight where it held a local advantage. Over france in 41, they nearly always would decline engagement, unless they could see a local advantage. Over Germany in '44, DG has conclusively shown time and again that despite a numerical advantage for the allies frontwise, in terms of total aircraft, in terms of fighters protecting bombers over the target, the LW nearly always massively outnumbered the allied escort forces.

In the east, as a generalization, and excepting the first summer campaign of 1941, VVS was nearly always outnumbered in a local sense. Germany was on the offensive, and was adept at concentrating its forces over the Schwerpunkt. VVS were pretty much incapable of doing this in a cordinated way until Kuban. Even after Kuban, VVS strategic concepts always emphasised broad front strategy in the air, so that even after mid '43 LW would hold the advantage locally in the battles it chose to fight (in terms of fighters), but overall, suffered an increasing numbers imbalance on a frontwise basis.

North Africa, which I assume you would include Malta, the LW rarely fought at any local disadvantage. They would choose their fights, and in those fights would achieve significant local superiorities. This continued right up until Alamein. Its about the strategic priorities of the opponents. allies and Soviets knew they were at a disadvantage individually against a technically superior foe, so they "decentralised", to maximise their numeric advantages. They would be fighting and inflicting losses on the Germans on a wide scale, whereas the germans took a much more restricted approach to the usage of their airpower. Both allies were fighting for a long term strategic vioctory....german theory was about quick and opportunistic uses of air power. one gave short term, battle specific advantages, the other was a long term invesment in winning an overwhelming strategic advatage....the longer this battle went on, the more pronounced the victory became.

German approach and application of air assets worked well until they lost the initiative in that theatre. once on the defensive, they would lose the initiative, and be forced to disperse their effort. once that that happened, the numerical imbalances at a theatre level rapidly showed the weakness of the german strategy....qulaity without numbers in an unconcentrated environment, is going to lead to an inneffective force, unable to hit targets with sufficient weight to make a difference.

Excellent post.

 

[Ratsel]

yes, except for ' the LW nearly always massively outnumbered the allied escort forces. ' thats not entirely true. combine allied escorts in 44' with the bomber streams and the LW is now at a disadvantage. what continueally amazes me is that nobody takes into the consideration about the LW pilots who were there, and knew day after day they were outnumbered. seems like to me that if its not on a USAAF document, its ( the luftwaffe being outnumbered) not true.

 

[kettbo]

Let's just do some math....short duration, OstFront sorties.
Even flying 200 days per year (weather, leave, down time) at 3 sorties per day is 600 sorties in a year x even only 2 years in combat is 1200 sorties.
Throw in 4,5, or 6 sorties for "crunch time" and I can easily see 1400, 1500 sorties if one is lucky enough to survive accidents, mechanical fialure, enemy fighters, defensive fire, AAA, scads of Soviet soldiers pointing their weapons skyward hoping for that Golden BB, accidental "friendly fire"
Being on the defense allows most of your flying on you side of the line of contact greatly reducing some of the risks mentioned.

 

[Juha]

Hello George
why theorize, look at Luftwaffe Aces of the Eastern Front
of those who got more than 130 kills in the East and whose biographies there are only 4 flew 1000 or more combat sorties (Barkhorn, Krupinsky Rudorffer and Hackl) but several flew under 500. And that is not surprising if you have read several biographies on, memories of those high ranking aces.

Juha

 

[Tante Ju]

Oh gosh ratsel, I see another difference of opinion raising its head. My view is that from 41-44 the LW was generally never at a numerical disadvantage.

This is interesting view, because German memoire all say disadvantage in numbers was very important in Africa, Eastern Front, Western Front. Perhaps they all know wrong. Also we know from strenght numbers this to be true.

Can you show some "general" example when LW actually outnumbered foe in these ttheatres you mention, oppose to common perception?

 

[kettbo]

Juha,

I've seen the site. Thought that number was low compared to what my memory was telling me.
Was thinking in the neighborhood of 1100 combat sorties.
Perhaps I was thinking for H U Rudel and 1400 or 1500 sorties
Based upon your research, do you consider these numbers ironclad?

 

[parsifal]

This is interesting view, because German memoire all say disadvantage in numbers was very important in Africa, Eastern Front, Western Front. Perhaps they all know wrong. Also we know from strenght numbers this to be true.

Can you show some "general" example when LW actually outnumbered foe in these ttheatres you mention, oppose to common perception?

Yes I can, but then we both know where you are wanting to take this. Best not to go there in the first place dont you think

 

[Tante Ju]

We can agree to disagree

 

[Ratsel]

We can agree to disagree

then whats the point? but I think I see what your saying. one can ask 1000 luftwaffe pilots what the situation was.. but 1, 2, 10 USAAF docs say about the 365th reporting they engaged 287 Me 109's with there 10 P-51's automatically means the entire ETO/MTO was like that. most likely they were counting the same plane 3 times. the number of COMBAT ready luftwaffe a/c just wasn't there.

but yes... agree to disagree.

 

[parsifal]

This definately goes against my instinct not to engage, however I am hoping against logic and experience that things might be different this time around....

I cannot understand how it can be seriously argued that the Germans were not masters of warfare in their own right, and that all they had was guts , glory and the individual skills of their aircrew to rely on. These were factors to consider, but in reality the strength of the germans was in their use of their forces, and this meant achieving local superiorities where it mattered. This applied equally to ground forces and their air forces.

The theories behind the application of german military strength, whether that be land forces or airpower, are closely linked to the idea of the decisive battle, specifically kesselshlacht and blitzkrieg concepts relating to encirclement and isolation (and dislocation) of enemy forces. These theories revolved around a maximum concentration of effort at decisive point(s) of the enemy lineto achieve decisive breakthroughs, and from there create a war of rapid movement and encirclement. The application of airpower was a critical element of that theory, and aimed to achieve local superiority rather than front wide superiority. Consequently German air operations were invariably in support of ground operations, and invariably because the germans concentrated their MLA at a narrow point , those air operations were also concentrated. Thus, for example, during operation Typhoon the German 2pz army delivered its main blow from about the 15 November 1941, was supported by 579 LW serviceable aircraft (give or take). in that general TO, they were opposed by more than 1300 VVS aircraft, however, whereas the LW concentrated all its strength at one point (specifically, supporting 2pz Army in its attacks on 49A and 50A, the Soviet aircraft were spread out over a much wider section of the front....supporting in fact two complete Fronts, such that when the German hit on the 15th, they outnumbered the VVS locally by more than 5:1 (according to Nagorski). Moreover, even though this offensive eventually was defeated, for a while it rolled along, and whilst the germans could maintain momentum, they were able to keep both the red army and the supporting VVS off balance and unable to concentrate for an effective counterstroke. Only after the Germans ground to a halt and the flanking attacks by the 43A and 51A (???) started to take effect, was the VVS able to register effective counterattacks.

Forces on the strategic defence found it difficult to react to German breakthrough battles. a defender did not usually have good information on the dispositions and intentions, in a tactical sense, of the attacking germans. inevitably this meant they were reduced to decentralised deployments, and this meant that in most battles the LW enjoyed marked superiorities of numbers. The more fluid, the better, since the germans were adept at relocating their forces to follow the offensive, and their opponents were not so good at that. Thus, for most german offensives 1939-42, of which their air forces played a central and key rolethe germans were able to achieve marked and sustained superiority of numbers over the actual battlegrounds that they committed their forces.

 

[Ratsel]

nobody's arguing that the Germans were not masters of warfare. but to counter your points, the LW launched 986 a/c on 1.1.45 to attack allied airfields. does that mean they had superior #'s in 1945? I don't think so. what about local superiority? well almost 1/2 of the aircraft shot down were hit by flak/AAA on 1.1.45. still think they had local superiority? you seem to underestimate the allied strengths my friend. I'll say again, Rall expressed time and time again, along with may other LW pilots, along with unit diaries that they were outnumbered.

the LW were locally superior on the Ost front becouse of superior #'s? again, I don't think so.. russians kept sending waves after waves of a/c. and the same LW pilots were shooting them down wave after wave. JG 52 for example.

don't get me wrong, I understand what your saying. some local areas were very well covered by the LW. but as a whole, not by a long shot.

 

[parsifal]

nobody's arguing that the Germans were not masters of warfare. but to counter your points, the LW launched 986 a/c on 1.1.45 to attack allied airfields. does that mean they had superior #'s in 1945? I don't think so. what about local superiority? well almost 1/2 of the aircraft shot down were hit by flak/AAA on 1.1.45. still think they had local superiority? you seem to underestimate the allied strengths my friend. I'll say again, Rall expressed time and time again, along with may other LW pilots, along with unit diaries that they were outnumbered.

the LW were locally superior on the Ost front becouse of superior #'s? again, I don't think so.. russians kept sending waves after waves of a/c. and the same LW pilots were shooting them down wave after wave. JG 52 for example.

don't get me wrong, I understand what your saying. some local areas were very well covered by the LW. but as a whole, not by a long shot.

This is mixing strategic superiority with local superiority. The Germans on the eastern front were technically outnumbered, and therefore should have lost air superiority from the first day of the war. There were far more Russian aircraft in the VVS inventory than there were Axis aircraft. yet no-one can seriously argue that on the 22 June 1941, the Russians held air superiority.

So if the germans didnt have the numbers, how is it that in every offensive engagement up to and including Kursk they managed to dominate the airspaces over their battlefields (in the east, but we will examine allied situations a bit later I expect). The answer is by being able concentrate their forces at the critical point, whereas their opponents frequently could not. This does not make Rall or any of the other sources wrong (necessarily) it just acknowledges that the germans achieved their victories by more than just good luck, or good equipment, or well trained personnel. The majority of their success was due to the leadership and technique that they brought to the battle. The Germans understood very well the concept of concentration of effort, which is particulalry true in air operations for the purpose of supporting ground offensives. The problem with it is that it can never be independantly decisive....only a portion of the defenders will ever be destroyed, and unless the land campaign to which the air op is being flown is 100% successful and forces the surrender of the opposing force, the friendly efforts are bound to fail. This is precisely what happened to the bodenplatte operation. At the moment and the point that the remaining German airpower was released, it possessed air supeiority, but it was bound to fail, because the land operations that the force was designed to support had long since been decimated. It was only a matter of time before the front wide allied forces, so obviously superior would grind such a pathetic effort paste....

 

[Tante Ju]

There was no big concentration on Eastern Front - typical was many smaller flights because of vast airspace. Both VVS and Luftwaffe, many times these flights did their job, did not meet even, operate independent of other.. Think of Kursk "battle" - area equal of Western Europe.. how its possible to "concentrate"? And, in the smaller size engagements, German could often dominate because of their tecnical and tactical superiority. VVS had generally more fighters, so they could, in general, send up more fighter and other plane in each flight.. German reaction was as in Western desert, look for opportunities in bounce, they did not stay to fight, but used existing performance superiority to inflict sensitive losses. But many times flights went not harassed, Stukas, Fokkers did their job, Shturmoviks did their job, and did not meet any opposition in air... Russia is just too vast. No side could muster enough plane to reach even near concentration of warplane in area as in narrow North Africa seastrip or in West..

 

[drgondog]

There were very few 8th AF aces that started Ops after August 1944. Having said that the big battles in November/December 1944 killed a lot of inexperienced German pilots in the west- This buildup during October brought in a lot of low time new fighter pilots as well as a lot of transport and bomber pilots into LuftReich Flotte.

 

[razor1uk]

mmm I see another thread duel brewiing/fermenting .. both Parsifal Ratsel are thrusting and parrying with near identical logics, true enough points, and minor heartfelt differences of opinion.

 

[Readie]

mmm I see another thread duel brewiing/fermenting .. both Parsifal Ratsel are thrusting and parrying with near identical logics, true enough points, and minor heartfelt differences of opinion.

I'll get my banjo out then...

 

[Ratsel]

This is mixing strategic superiority with local superiority. The Germans on the eastern front were technically outnumbered, and therefore should have lost air superiority from the first day of the war. There were far more Russian aircraft in the VVS inventory than there were Axis aircraft. yet no-one can seriously argue that on the 22 June 1941, the Russians held air superiority.

So if the germans didnt have the numbers, how is it that in every offensive engagement up to and including Kursk they managed to dominate the airspaces over their battlefields (in the east, but we will examine allied situations a bit later I expect).

The same way Leonidas defended the pass against numerically superior Persians. The VVS flew predicatably, always to the same locations, with a single mindset. The German were in a perfect position to take advantage of that tactic.

The problem with it is that it can never be independantly decisive....only a portion of the defenders will ever be destroyed, and unless the land campaign to which the air op is being flown is 100% successful and forces the surrender of the opposing force, the friendly efforts are bound to fail. This is precisely what happened to the bodenplatte operation. At the moment and the point that the remaining German airpower was released, it possessed air supeiority, but it was bound to fail, because the land operations that the force was designed to support had long since been decimated. It was only a matter of time before the front wide allied forces, so obviously superior would grind such a pathetic effort paste....

clearly the Allied AAA had been the real menace for the German attack force. Almost half of the total losses can be directly attributed to Allied AAA. The other major factor was Allied fighter aircraft, which in several cases were already in the air or in the process of taking off.Fixing the time of attack at 09.20 hrs. for all units simultaneously resulted in the fact that several Allied fighter units were already airborne. Furthermore, when these Allied units were able to engage the attackers, they were in better position than the German attackers flying low on the deck. Added to this should be the general poor training standard of the young inexperienced German fighter pilots, which gave them literally no chance. This resulted in particularly heavy losses among JG 1,JG 3,JG 6,JG 11 andJG 53. In some cases Allied units had taken off at 08.00 hrs. This was approximately 20 minutes earlier than their German attackers, although their airfields were further east so daybreak would have been earlier. It is believed that several Jagdgeschwader were in position to take off 45 to 60 minutes earlier than they actually did.

The tactical value of the mission on 1.1.45 should be seen in a broader picture.The attack was planned to coincide with the offensive in the Ardennes. On January 1st 1945 this offensive had clearly come to a halt and, within the commands of Heeresgruppe Band OberfehlshaberWest a more defensive roll in the Ardennes was already foreseen. An attack on the enemy tactical air forces with the objective of supporting the ground offensive came too late and should have been cancelled.

 

[pbfoot]

How come no one takes the condition of Allied aircrew into consideration on Bodenplatte , from what I know about aircrew I'll wager that more then a few were under the weather following a night of new years revellry